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Summary 
 
University of Sussex 
 
Franz F. Wong 
DPhil in Development Studies 
 
Following the Commitment: Development NGOs and Gender Mainstreaming – 
the case of Oxfam GB 
 
 
The thesis is concerned with relationships between different conceptualizations and 
understandings of gender mainstreaming in Oxfam GB during 2001-2006 and focuses on two 
sites of policy and practice: Oxfam House and an Oxfam project in Cambodia. Drawing on 
anthropology of development literature, I observe that while the mainstreaming strategy was 
becoming further embedded in the organisation, it also evolved differently in each research 
site. Gender policy and practice were not necessarily linked, and policy did not drive practice; 
different drivers were at play.  
 
In Oxfam House, understandings of gender mainstreaming among senior managers were 
informed by perennial feedback that the organisation’s gender work was wanting and 
perceptions that previous gender efforts were overly critical and uninspiring. These 
understandings influenced inter-related imperatives, pursued by senior managers, of assuming 
organisational leadership for gender and making “gender accessible”.  Both of these 
contributed to rendering the promotion of gender equality a contested process. In contrast, the 
project case study in Cambodia, which Oxfam viewed as a “successful” gender mainstreamed 
model of community-based disaster management, demonstrates a process of taking on gender 
issues characterised by mutual benefit and reciprocity. Regional gender advisors and project 
staff needed to work together to secure their places in Aidland. Unlike the drivers of policy in 
Oxfam House, the drivers of gender mainstreaming practice were the demands and 
uncertainties of Aidland and, in the light of these, the maintenance of project relations and 
reproduction of “success”. They also concerned localised contingencies of social relations of 
gender and relations of aid. 
 
I conclude that while gender mainstreaming policy and practice are connected by formal 
organisational structures, they can also be unrelated due to different micro politics within 
these respective sites and, relatedly, from the varying degrees of autonomous decision making 
exercised by Oxfam staff and their understandings of gender and their particular interests.  
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Chapter 1Introduction 1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The focus of this thesis is on gender mainstreaming within a large international 
development NGO, Oxfam Great Britain (OGB), and its different sites of policy and 
practice.  I worked for the organisation as a Regional Gender Advisor for East Asia for 
three years, initially from September 2002 to August 2004 then again from November 
2007 to October 2008. During this first period, I had come across a number of situations 
about the policy and practice of gender mainstreaming that were initially frustrating, 
then later a source of interest that I wanted to explore as part of my PhD studies. I had 
arrived with great respect for the organisation, but after some time the patina of its 
reputation for being a leader on gender and development wore off. I had come to realise 
there were different, sometimes contentious, understandings about gender, development 
and how gender issues needed to be promoted in the organisation and its programmes. It 
was this contradiction – the reputation on the one hand and the realities of 
organisational politics on the other – that became the impetus for this research which 
spans the period of 2001 to 2006. 
 
Established in 1943, OGB
1
 aims “to work with others to alleviate poverty and suffering” 
and its values are empowerment, inclusiveness and accountability (Internal document. 
Oxfam GB, 2006). Working in over 70 countries with some 3,000 local groups, the 
organisation works in five areas, known as Aims, that are formulated as the rights of 
individuals to be secure, skilled, healthy, safe, heard and equal (Internal document. 
Oxfam GB, n.d.). Among these is a specific objective to promote gender equality. As 
the largest charity in Great Britain, Oxfam had about 5,000 staff and 22,000 volunteers 
in 2005. The organisation, based in Oxford, raised about 60% of its annual budget, 
about GBP130M in 2004, from unrestricted sources including from over 550,000 
regular private donors. 
 
                                                 
1
 While Oxfam was known as Oxfam UK and Ireland, this was changed to Oxfam Great Britain in the late 
1990s with the establishment of Oxfam Ireland. For the purpose of this thesis, I refer to Oxfam Great 
Britain as OGB. 
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OGB’s experience with gender and development is a long, contested and remarkable 
history of over 25 years
2
. From the mid-1980s, it became known as a pioneer among 
development NGOs with the establishment of a stand-alone internal gender unit, 
accumulated experience with gender training and as a major publisher of gender and 
development literature.  Still, review after review found the organisation’s gender work 
wanting and it was facing perennial challenges. Despite a strong gender policy 
framework and the increasing adoption of gender mainstreaming since the mid-1990s, 
leadership, commitment and staffing were continuous concerns throughout the 
organisation, although these manifested themselves differently within the organisation’s 
headquarters and in its projects. 
 
As a multi-sited ethnography, this research includes OGB headquarters and the 
Cambodian country programme – using the case of a single project – as well as the 
intermediary site of the regional office for East Asia. It explores the links between the 
policy and practice of gender mainstreaming by focusing on different understandings 
and its promotion between and within these sites in the period 2001-2006. This follows 
a major organisational strategic review in 1998, which had far reaching direct and 
indirect implications for the organisation and gender mainstreaming. 
 
This chapter introduces my research by explaining the significance of its main subject, 
gender mainstreaming, with particular reference to development NGOs. I then describe 
the how a focus on OGB offers a unique research opportunity given its long-standing 
experience with addressing gender issues in the organisation and its programmes, its 
reflective publishing and the access offered due to my previous experience with the 
organisation. Still, as I discuss in this chapter, my history vis-à-vis OGB also 
complicated my role as a researcher. This chapter also outlines the main research 
questions and the remaining chapters of this thesis.      
 
GENDER MAINSTREAMING, DEVELOPMENT NGOS AND OXFAM GB: AN EXPLANATION 
OF THE RESEARCH FOCUS  
 This section provides an explanation for the research focus by way of an overview of 
the approach as adopted by development organisations with a particular attention on 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that OGB’s efforts to institutionalize gender concerns within the organisation and its 
programmes represent early initiatives among NGOs in Britain if not elsewhere.   
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development NGOs in general and OGB in particular. “Gender mainstreaming” has 
become part of mainstream development discourse (Prugl and Lustgarten, 2006) since 
the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which marked the wide 
endorsement of the term by governments and the UN. This can and should been seen as 
welcome attention to the engendering of development assistance and development 
organisations with gender mainstreaming as the main strategy for addressing gender 
issues through development. Gender policies and strategies as well as the establishment 
of gender infrastructure – such as gender advisory posts, focal point and networks – are 
now de rigueur practices of gender mainstreaming. Gender training, almost a rite of 
passage, has become the ubiquitous response to address of gender awareness, 
knowledge and skills.  
 
Overall, however, the period following the achievements of the Beijing conference did 
not yield improvements in women’s condition and position as was hoped. “Progress” 
for women has been uncertain (Molyneux and Razavi, 2005: 25). In some cases, gender 
inequality had taken on different forms, resistance to women’s public participation had 
increased and previous gains had been reversed. A number of analyses that emerged 
around the 10
th
 anniversary focused on gender mainstreaming highlighting a paradox: 
the ways in which it was taken on in different settings was different yet, at the same 
time, also similar. 
 
That gender mainstreaming has become entrenched with greater institutionalisation has 
also meant bureaucratisation and, as a result, the undermining of those elements that 
originally constituted it as a change strategy. Lost from the initial conceptualisations 
have been complementary strategies such as women’s empowerment, which has also 
been coopted as the approach has become “mainstreamed”. As gender mainstreaming 
and associated ideas have been taken on by development and government institutions, 
they have become interpreted though their particular paradigms. This has led to 
observations that gender mainstreaming has led to a cooptation of the feminist 
foundations that lie at both the impetus for gender mainstreaming as well as its 
antecedent, gender and development (Cornwall et al., 2007a). Generally, there was a 
sense that the strategy has been coopted, instrumentalised and rendered a technical 
exercise (for example, see Mukhopadhyay, 2007b) 
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How should one understand the contradiction of the promise of gender mainstreaming, 
on the one hand, and its poor performance as change strategy on the other? One is to 
acknowledge that the popularization of gender mainstreaming is not indicative of a 
common understanding of the term.  March et al. (1999: 10) describe the meaning of 
“mainstreaming” and its aim as “contested” terrains due to different understandings. 
These need to be understood against shifting meanings over time and across different 
contexts.  For example, the term first emerged from and in reaction to efforts to address 
the exclusion of women from development, first highlighted in the early 1970s, 
popularly known as Women in Development (WID). During the period leading up to the 
Beijing conference and immediately following it, the popularization and adoption of the 
term marked a growing consensus within and influence, at the time, of global women’s 
movements
3
, their bringing a gender and rights agenda to international fora  (Jaquette 
and Summerfield, 2006) and an overall increase in acceptance of gender and rights by 
states. The Beijing conference and its immediate aftermath are significant for gender 
mainstreaming because it signalled a major shift from the focus and separatism of WID 
to a systematic effort to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in all of 
an “organisation’s pursuits” (Goetz, 1997b: 5). The Beijing period was also an occasion 
for critical analysis and reflection of experiences to date as well as airing of concerns 
that served to foreshadow the general consensus that emerged during the tenth 
anniversary of Beijing in 2005, discussed above. Writings surrounding Beijing Plus 10 
generally address the legacies resulting from, in some cases, 10 years or more of efforts 
to routinely institutionalise gender concerns in policy, organisational and programming 
processes that, as many reviews attest, failed to produce desired outcomes. Analysis of a 
decade of experience with gender mainstreaming also revealed a certain “ennui” 
(Molyneux, 2007) due, in part, to the limits of organisations to change and take on 
radical agendas, which became more apparent during this period. Some of these 
challenges were already experienced prior to the adoption of gender mainstreaming; 
others concerns were raised around Beijing, such as feminist agendas and women 
concerns being co-opted, as well as after, as illustrated by Batliwala and Dhanraj 
(2007).  
 
                                                 
3
 In the use of this term, I do not imply that there was one global women’s movement or a harmonious 
and undifferentiated collective of women’s organisations at the global level.  
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A second line to understanding the experience of gender mainstreaming is to focus on 
how the analysis of experiences with gender mainstreaming has been approached. To 
date, research of gender mainstreaming and WID/gender units, whether in state 
bureaucracies or development agencies, has primarily used standard organizational 
study approaches that see organizations as “machines” (Wright, 1994: 18, Shore and 
Wright, 1997) that can be disaggregated with each constituent part respectively 
analyzed (see for example Jahan, 1995).  This assumption seems to ignore other forms 
of organizations, such as “organization as culture” (Wright, 1994: 19), which is a 
critical distinction when we consider organizations as being gendered (Goetz, 1997b) 
and constituted by power relations (Goetz, 1994).   
 
Relatedly, the relationship of gender policy and practice is often assumed to be linear 
and positivist that leads to a deficit perspective and an analysis based on identifying a 
lack of “inputs” that are said to be critical to mainstreaming gender such as leadership, 
commitment, resources, training, policies etc. The emphasis of such work is on the 
failure of policy to be implemented and a disjuncture between institutional policies and 
practice (Prugl and Lustgarten, 2006: 54).  
 
While gender mainstreaming has, in many ways, been studied, there are opportunities to 
take a different approach. What have not been fully explored are alternative 
methodologies to understanding organisations and the relationships between policy and 
practice. Also, previous research of gender mainstreaming and WID/gender units are 
limited to desk reviews, interviews and short-term field visits where breadth seems 
privileged over depth as most studies include multiple organizations. This is particularly 
the case with development NGOs (see for example, Tiessen, 2007 and Wallace, 1998). 
   
What have been the experiences of development NGOs (DNGOs)?  How do they 
compare with other development agencies, whether multi-lateral or bi-lateral? Much of 
the literature on organizational experience with institutionalizing gender equality is 
either on state bureaucracies or multi- and bi-lateral agencies.  Relatively speaking, 
there are fewer systematic studies on DNGOs
4
, and what does exist are individual 
anecdotal accounts.  
                                                 
4
 Much is also focused on northern European DNGOs as opposed to North American, Southern or Eastern 
organizations.  Where literature is available on the latter two, (“available” at least in the sense of 
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Given the commonly associated characteristics with DNGOs, one would expect their 
experiences to not only be different to other types of development organisations, but 
also more positive (others have also echoed this sentiment. See Goetz, 1997: 9, Porter et 
al., 1999, Wallace et al., 1997).  DNGOs are considered more innovative, flexible and 
driven by values - such as equality, democracy, participation - that are conducive to 
promoting gender equality in development work and also within organizations.  
Additionally, for NGOs that raise their own funds from the public, they face relatively 
fewer restrictions on how they use their resources.   
 
Still, DNGOs gender mainstreaming performance and achievements are strikingly 
similar compared to government bureaucracies and other development agencies.  For 
example, European DNGOs are characterized as past the “gender is a good idea, 
accepted in theory” stage but rarely go further (Macdonald et al., 1997: 30).  
Leadership, management and commitment are said to be needed to move beyond this.  
One review found that documentation from UK-based NGOs was mostly gender 
unaware and that few NGOs had addressed gender issues in policies and procedures 
(Wallace et al., 1997) while at the same time gender equality initiatives faced lip-
service, marginalization and resistance.  Those responsible for promoting gender 
equality within organizations found themselves marginalized and over worked. 
Obstacles included ignorance or misunderstanding about gender, cultural resistance by 
partners and NGOs’ reluctance to question it (Macdonald et al., 1997: 38-40).   
 
Studies  reveal that DNGOs are no less “gendered”, both in terms of their organizational 
structures, practices and beliefs as well as their programmes (Rao and Kelleher, 1997, 
Yasmin, 1997).  Goetz (1997a) concludes that the structural differences between 
governmental and non-governmental organizations and their respective receptivity to 
needs and interests of poor women are not as great as would be expected; class and 
gendered hierarchies are more significant particularly at the grassroots level.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
accessible from the UK), it is either literature written from a Western paradigm (and usually edited and 
published by Westerners) or a non-Western paradigm that is sometimes conceptually inaccessible (cf. 
Sharma, 2004). 
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Tiessen’s (2007) study of gender mainstreaming of some 35 national and international 
NGOs in Malawi echoes studies of multi and bi-lateral development organisations. She 
contends that gender mainstreaming was understood as needing to happen elsewhere, in 
projects not in organisations, but happened nowhere, despite the discourse of gender 
mainstreaming being everywhere. In other words, gender mainstreaming was pursued as 
a technical, apolitical and unfocused process. 
 
Given DNGOs’ social development mandates and supposed commitment to people-
centred, participatory and empowering approaches, listening and incorporating the 
voices of those normally marginalized, at the least, would be de rigueur.  Again, the 
gendered nature of DNGOs not only belies this apparent comparative advantage but also 
sets up a certain hypocrisy.  For example, women’s participation in decision-making at 
the grass-roots level is not matched their participation in organization management 
(Yasmin, 1997).  “Male priorities (still prevail) through a process of cooptation” (Miller 
and Razavi, 1998b: 16). 
 
DNGOs do not appear immune to the pressures of organizational survival despite their 
relative financial independence described above.  Competing demands and pressures to 
increase participation, impact and efficiency and to scale up operations compromise 
their “comparative advantages” which may, in the end, be inimical to the empowerment 
of women and to the NGOs’ advocacy roles.  This is exacerbated as NGOs become 
more involved as service delivery agencies (Mayoux, 1998, Miller and Razavi, 1998b, 
Wallace et al., 1997). 
 
As a case study, however, OGB offers a number of advantages compared to other 
DNGOs. Firstly, it offers an opportunity to better understand gender mainstreaming 
without the usual constraints of previous studies.  These include the lack of an explicit 
commitment to gender equality, the absence of a mandate conducive to the promotion of 
gender equality, financial and programming constraints due to numerous and diverse 
stakeholders and limited and undocumented experience with promoting gender equality 
(Goetz, 1997, Miller and Razavi, 1998a, Razavi and Miller, 1995).  OGB has had a 
gender policy since 1993, it explicitly links the promotion of gender equality to its aim 
to relieve poverty and suffering and it raised more than 60% of its funds from the 
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British public in 2004, an indication of an endorsement of its work, allowing it more 
financial autonomy than if its funding base was more restricted. 
 
Moreover, OGB’s long history with gender and development and efforts to promote 
gender equality (see Chapter 4) distinguishes it from other DNGOs which have been 
pursuing gender mainstreaming for a shorter period. For these latter organisations, their 
challenges concern getting gender on the agenda (see for example Tiessen, 2005 and 
Wallace, 1998). For OGB, its challenges are both recurring whilst others have emanated 
from the organisation’s long history with gender that have contributed to a complex 
organisational context informed in part by previous efforts.  
 
For example, gender works (Porter et al., 1999a), a publication by OGB on OGB gender 
and development efforts, captures perennial challenges in Oxfam’s history – such as 
insufficient management commitment and leadership. Published six years after the 
establishment of Oxfam’s gender policy, its contributors found its implementation 
“patchy” (Melrose, 1999: 109), “mixed” (Iddi, 1999: 77) and “difficult and challenging 
to implement. Success and failures, and innovative work and resistance, co-exist” 
(Porter, 1999: 9).  Iddi (1999) writes that while the organization has shifted from WID 
to GAD, programmes, at least in Burkina Faso, remain women-focused where they are 
“add-ons” to projects.  Eade (1999: 289) describes her challenges in fulfilling her 
mandate to “genderise” Oxfam’s well-known Field Director’s Handbook where her 
charge was simply interpreted by the organization as “tinkering in the margins of the 
text.”  
 
gender works also raises new challenges, such as balancing the personal and 
professional and women facing a glass ceiling (Melrose,1999) as well as a lack of 
understanding, coupled with  diverse understandings, of “gender” and the implications 
of moving from a WID to a GAD approach.  While WID was fairly straight forward - 
staff needed to include women - a gender approach remained misunderstood and 
theoretical causing confusion for staff and partners.  Such misunderstanding seemed to 
have pervaded all levels of the organization.  Melrose (1999), then the Policy Director, 
states that “[d]espite the extensive discussion that took place…it is clear…that part of 
the problem lies in the very different understanding of what the policy means.” (108)   
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Lastly, OGB is a major source of knowledge and literature on gender and development 
issues in general and institutionalizing gender more specifically.  Much of this body of 
work is based in the organisation’s own experiences and is substantial both in depth, 
with material dating back to the 1980s, and in breadth, with Oxfam being a major 
publisher on gender and development since the early 1990s. These in addition to 
archival information allow for considerable secondary information sources unavailable 
for other DNGOs.   
 
Together these offer OGB as an ideal research site for greater insight into DNGOs and 
their efforts to promote gender equality. Focusing on understanding the challenges of 
“mature” gender mainstreaming may provide insight for those organisations that have 
relatively less experience.  In particular, research on OGB provides an opportunity to 
explore two inter-related themes. One concerns disparate understandings, appreciation 
and conceptualizations of the promotion of gender equality. March et al. (1999) 
emphasize that for organizations to promote gender equality both in their organizations 
and therefore in their programmes, there needs to be an understanding of the goal and 
how it will be achieved.  OGB’s gender equality policies, strategies and plans suggest 
such an understanding; its practice indicates otherwise, gender equality and how it is  be 
achieved have different meanings within the organization. Moreover, such disparate 
understandings are not just indicative of different levels of awareness; they are also 
reflective of differences in appreciation and conceptualization of the nature of gender 
inequity, the relationships between development and gender equality and how 
development organizations promote the latter.   
 
A second related theme concerns the paradoxical existence of coherence and 
incoherence in and between policy and practice. OGB’s gender equality policies, 
strategies, plans and initiatives not only suggest an informed understanding of the goal 
and means to achieving gender equality, but there appears a certain consistency and 
coherence to this understanding, again as evidenced in its gender equality policies, 
strategies, organizational procedures and plans.  At the same time, OGB’s gender work 
has often been described as “patchy” at different occasions since 1993.  The patina of 
coherence is deceptive as it is also characterized by incoherence, contradictions and 
conflict. In particular, the focus on OGB’s Community-based Disaster Management 
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project in Cambodia provided an opportunity to explore this contradiction given its 
status in OGB as a gender mainstreamed model project.    
 
OGB as a case study is also conducive for research due to my position and history with 
the organization, as described above, which offered both access and insight that would 
otherwise not be easily obtained with an organization with which I was less familiar and 
known.  OGB had approved my researching it as part of my DPhil studies and the 
Cambodia country programme invited me to participate in a gender impact assessment 
of its projects as part of my research. These provided an opportunity to be actively 
engaged and make a “practical contribution” (Mosse, 2005: 12) thereby facilitating 
longer-term participant observation. Extant knowledge of the case studies that feature in 
my research allowed for more in-depth and contextualised understanding than if I had 
not previously been exposed to them.      
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OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My impetus for this research is to explore different understandings of gender 
mainstreaming and the “disjunctures” between policy and practice. I suggest that a 
linear understanding of the relationship between these, while common to the analysis of 
gender mainstreaming, do not reveal the “social worlds” of policy. Development 
organisations as well are not comprised of unrelated atoms, free of value as Weberian 
understandings suggest. They are not homogeneous entities but are comprised of 
individuals and relations that are diverse, complex, multi-faceted and political. Gender 
mainstreaming as well is a political process. What these understandings of 
institutionalizing gender, policy and organisations suggest is a focus on the micro 
politics. They beg for different approaches to policy and practice and an appreciation of 
individuals as agents who are part of and constitute organisational structures but are not 
necessarily completely dominated by them. Instead of focusing on a policy-practice 
continuum, I assume a relational perspective of understandings in different policy 
spaces characterised by critical interfaces where different understandings merge, collide 
and are created through the making of meaning and bringing to bear extant 
understandings of gender, organisations and change. 
 
My main research question is “What are the relationships between different 
conceptualisations and representations of the policy and practice of gender 
mainstreaming, in the case of Oxfam GB?”   
 
In addressing this question, I focus on a number of related research questions 
concerning different understanding of gender mainstreaming and the roles of individuals 
and their relationships in furthering gender mainstreaming.  
 
- What are different understandings of gender mainstreaming in OGB?  How have 
they evolved? How are they practiced? How are they related to different formal, 
informal and hidden roles and structures within the organisation?  
- How are policies and practices of gender mainstreaming related to each other? What 
evidence exists to demonstrate a link between policy and practice? What are these 
links? How are these related to different understandings of gender mainstreaming? 
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- What roles do individuals play in the policy and practice of gender mainstreaming? 
How are they competing? How are they complementary? What informs their 
practice?  
 
MY HISTORY WITH OXFAM GB AS AN ADVISOR AND RESEARCHER 
As mentioned previously, I have a history with OGB, having worked for the 
organisation for 3 years as a gender advisor, which complicates my position as a 
researcher of gender mainstreaming in Oxfam. For this reason, I explain in detail how I 
came to focus on the organisation for my PhD research and summarise some of my 
challenges. I was first accepted to undertake a PhD in 2002 at the University of Sussex
5
, 
but I deferred for two years, as I had accepted the position of OGB Regional Gender 
Advisor for East Asia, a role I held from September 2002 to August 2004 (in Hanoi) 
and then from November 2007 to October 2008 (in Phnom Penh)
6
. 
 
My experience of working for OGB between 2002-04 led me to focus my research on 
gender mainstreaming within OGB.  Several institutional innovations had left me with 
unanswered questions
7
 , and I found I wanted more generally to understand what was 
happening to ideas about gender equality that I was promoting and which I had assumed 
were shared within the organisation. As mentioned previously, I started my work with 
OGB with great respect for the organisation as a leader on gender and development, but 
working on the inside, wore off. This was not a case of misrepresentation: I think my 
expectations had been informed by what I wanted to see. But it was this contradiction – 
the global reputation on the one hand and the realities of organisational politics in its 
gender work on the other – that I wanted to understand. In October 2003 I approached 
the regional office for East Asia to conduct my PhD research on Oxfam which was 
approved in March 2004. 
 
It would be misleading to suggest I wore the hat of a researcher during my first stint 
with OGB from 2002-2004. I enjoyed the job and working with the organisation 
                                                 
5
 My research proposal, entitled “Operationalising Donor Gender Policies through a System of 
Stakeholders – Working through a Broken Telephone?”, was a multi-agency study to analyse the 
implementation process and critically identify and analyse facilitating and hindering factors. 
6
 During the intervening period, I was on sabbatical from Oxfam to undertake my PhD studies. I resigned 
from my post in order to be able to spend more time on my thesis. 
7
 Two of these, relating to the 2003 updating of Oxfam’s Gender Policy and the CBDM project in 
Cambodia, are featured in this research. 
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tremendously, and the work was mostly exciting and professionally satisfying. Unlike 
many gender advisors (Smyth, 1999), I faced relatively little resistance and had good 
relations with most staff in the region. The position was not without its challenges, but I 
had great support from my managers, who provided me with a fair amount of autonomy, 
and colleagues, some of whom I still consider friends. Still, with my research interests 
piqued from my professional experiences, as explained above, I made a point of saving 
documentation after Oxfam approved my research in 2004 that allowed me full access 
to OGB staff and documentation. 
 
My identity and position as a former Oxfam staff member both facilitated and 
complicated the research. I had previous knowledge of the organisation, contacts and 
access. This is not to say, however, that my knowledge and familiarity of OGB was 
complete but it was sufficient to allow me an entry-point. Still, as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3, my identity raised a number of challenges concerning potential 
conflict of interests, issues of trust and my own bias. Most critically, however, I was 
challenged by evolving and gaining an etic perspective while maintaining my partial 
emic perspective and understanding the difference between the two. This was a concern 
while in the “field” (van Maanen, 1979) as well analysing and writing up data 
interpretively (Marcus, 1995). It was also a matter of understanding that data collection 
and interpretation are inter-twinned and mutually informing processes belying the often 
dichotomous distinction made between these “phases” of research. I have attempted to 
address these concerns through transparency and reflexivity about my positionality and 
own subjectivity to attain “strong objectivity” (Harding’s, 1993: 72). In this thesis I 
endeavor to be cognizant of my assumptions and transparent of what actually happened 
during the research. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In addition to this introduction, this thesis is comprised of 9 other chapters.  
 
In Chapter 2, I explore the theory and practice of gender mainstreaming by way of a 
critical historical review where I identify gaps in understandings of gender 
mainstreaming which provides a justification for a focus on the micro-politics of 
organisations. I then suggest a different way of thinking of gender mainstreaming 
drawing on organisational ethnography, as a counterpoint to organisational development 
which has informed much of the thinking on gender mainstreaming, as well as 
anthropology of development with a focus on policy-practice, multi-sited ethnography 
and critical interfaces. 
 
Chapter 3 is where I describe how the research was conducted and outline its design and 
data collection, particularly in terms of methods, sources of information and timelines. 
Critical to this discussion is a reflection of my position as researcher as well as a former 
OGB gender advisor. While offering access, this also posed challenges such as attaining 
an etic perspective, briefly mentioned previously. 
 
Chapter 4 explains the organisational context for my multi-sited organisational 
ethnography and provides a mapping of OGB for readers to understand the different 
research sites and related organisational structures that I refer to in the thesis. I provide 
an overview of OGB and its global, regional and country structures more generally but 
also in terms of the promotion of gender equality, which is prefaced by a historical 
tracing of contestations about its gender work with a particular focus on the increasing 
adoption of gender mainstreaming. 
 
Chapter 5 explores how gender policy emerged and analyses moments that served to 
further the organisation’s adoption of gender mainstreaming. In particular, I focus on 
key assessments of OGB’s gender work and consider not only the influence they had on 
the organisation, but also how they were addressed by senior managers. I suggest that 
these responses signaled a shift in direction in how gender mainstreaming was 
understood and structured. This is illustrated by the updating of the original 1993 
Gender Policy in 2003.  
 
  
Chapter 1Introduction 15 
Chapter 6 extends the analysis of gender policy and its drivers and considers how policy 
is shaped by the balance between institutional and individual imperatives and 
ideologies. In particular, I explore two gender mainstreaming policy imperatives: One 
concerned the mainstreaming of gender leadership and predominance of senior 
managers along with a shifting in how gender advisory services were provided. Another 
related imperative was “making gender accessible” in order that staff would know what 
to do.  I explain and analyse senior managers’ rationales and understanding of gender 
from the perspective of making it accessible and how the agenda was in part informed 
by perceptions of why OGB’s past gender efforts had failed. 
 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 explore how these changes played out at the level of 
implementation. They focus on OGB’s Community-based Disaster Management 
(CBDM) project in Cambodia, which the organisation considered as a “model” of 
disaster management and an example of a gender mainstreamed project. As a case 
study, it stands in contrast to gender assessments of OGB, described in Chapter 5, that 
reiterated that its gender work was wanting. I suggest that while the adoption of gender 
mainstreaming was furthered by post strategic review structural changes, the practice of 
gender mainstreaming was informed by different contingencies. I explore how the local 
site of implementation plays a more critical role in the practice of promoting of gender 
equality than does organisational policy, both of which, however, were informed by 
organisational changes. I also look at what differences OGB makes to women’s lives 
and their integration into the organisation’s work. 
 
Chapter 7 sets the stage for the case study and outlines the project as well as OGB in 
Cambodia’s claims of having established a model that has mainstreamed gender. 
Despite this, the project was controversial and its claims as a model were contested.  
 
Chapter 8 investigates the development of project proposals in more detail. While 
influenced by regional policy imperatives, the insertion of gender awareness into project 
design was also concerned with the maintenance of the interests of strategic groups, in 
ways that contrasted with the policy making situation in Oxfam House. In the case of 
the CBDM project, the notion of women as particularly vulnerable to floods was central 
to the discourse of project success. I explore the origins of this notion and how the 
discourse integrated it and was reproduced. 
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Chapter 9 explores the role of women in the apparent success of the project. I suggest 
that the project’s “success” was partly due to the co-optation of women under the 
auspices of promoting gender equality.  Under the guise of promoting women’s 
participation and leadership, women members of village committees provided their 
labour, acquiesced to imposed gender roles and experienced increased dependency on 
men in service of the project. I then explore these observations within the context of 
project brokerage and translation. 
 
The final chapter returns to the main research question of the relationships between 
different conceptualisations and representations of the policy and practice of gender 
mainstreaming, and draws together the main findings from each of the main sites. I 
demonstrate that policy does not inform practice. Rather the overriding drivers of the 
policy and practice of gender mainstreaming are those to be found respectively in sites 
of policy definition and practice. I go onto explore why these drivers are different in 
these sites and end with reflections about gender mainstreaming.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Theory and Practice of Gender Mainstreaming 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Previously I have described the contradiction of gender mainstreaming between the 
promise it once held and its disappointment as change strategy despite its widespread 
popularisation. To understand this paradox, one needs to appreciate that there are 
different, often contested, understandings of the term, which itself has changed over 
time.  Still, the way gender mainstreaming has been pursued has been remarkably 
similar with its practice also having become more entrenched. Also similar has been the 
way gender mainstreaming has been researched and analysed. In particular, gender 
policy, practice and outcomes are understood as linearly and unproblematically related. 
The failure to produce gender outcomes is understood as a lack of or poor 
implementation as well as missing commonly identified factors, such as leadership, 
commitment and staff skills and knowledge. Similarly, organizations are seen in 
Weberian terms as rational entities, based on idealised notions of bureaucracy, and 
efficient machines (Yanow et al., 2011, forthcoming) that implement policies 
unproblematic.   
 
This chapter provides the context of the emergence of gender mainstreaming, through a 
historical overview of the thinking behind the approach and a critical analysis of its 
practice, and identifies gaps in how it has been analysed. I highlight the relatively little 
attention paid to the role of micro-politics of organisations as well as the assumptions of 
linear relationships between policy and practice. I explain how previous efforts to 
understand gender and development organisations have predominantly relied on 
organisational development approaches that seem to be inappropriate for the study of 
DNGOs and fail to uncover the micro-politics of organisations.  From this analysis I 
explore two fields of literature – organisational ethnography and anthropology of 
development – that provide a theoretical framework for my research.  
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GENDER  MAINSTREAMING: A CRITICAL HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SHIFTING 
MEANINGS 
The wide popularisation of gender mainstreaming among governments and 
development agencies since the 1995 Beijing Conference is not indicative, however, of 
a common or constant understanding of the term. Moreover, there has been much 
confusion (Rathgeber, 2005) and contestation (March et al., 1999) about the approach, 
its aims and about the means to achieve them.This diversity of understandings concerns 
shifting meanings over time and  across different contexts, which is the focus of this 
section.  In particular, I examine how the term originally emerged from and in reaction 
to efforts to address the exclusion of women from development, first highlighted in the 
early 1970s
8
. I trace the trajectory of gender mainstreaming across three periods: its 
origins in the 1970s, the period leading up to the Beijing conference and immediately 
following it, and the period surrounding its tenth anniversary in 2005.  
 
While gender mainstreaming is often associated with the Beijing conference, its origins 
can be traced to the 1970s and the UN Decade of Women (1975 to 1985). It reflects two 
main areas of concern about Women in Development (WID) , popular at the time 
among development agencies and governments as a means to address the ‘exclusion’ of 
women from development. First, although WID initiatives resulted in some 
improvements in women’s material conditions, there was little improvement in 
women’s status; the inclusion of women in development was emphasised, but the nature 
of women’s relational and structural subordination was ignored (Razavi and Miller, 
1995b) and unequal gender power relations remained unaltered (Goetz, 1997b). 
Secondly, WID initiatives were predominantly characterised organisationally by 
separate WID units or, in the case of governments, National Machineries for Women 
(NMW). Programmatically, women’s concerns were addressed through specific 
women-focused projects that were undertaken separately from other initiatives. Despite 
WID Units and NMW, women remained marginalised from organisational decision 
making and resources, women’s issues continued at the periphery, and women-focused 
projects did little to improve their position relative to men. 
 
                                                 
8
 The emergence of Women in Development (WID), often associated with Boserup’s (1970) Women’s 
Role in Economic Development, has been documented elsewhere.  See for example, Moser (1993) and 
Rathgeber (1990). 
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Gender and development
9
 offered an alternative to WID with its focus on social 
relations of gender and critique of dominant development paradigms. Miller and Razavi 
(1998a) trace the conceptual roots of GAD to the work of the Subordination of Women 
Collective and a related workshop and conference. In a critique of WID, the Collective 
highlighted the inadequacy of studying women as a homogeneous category and in 
isolation of the relations between men and women; relations that are both “socially 
constituted” and “not necessarily, nor obviously, harmonious and non-conflicting” 
(Whitehead, 1979: 10). GAD advocates also attempted to “develop a theory of gender 
which was integrated into and informed by gender analysis of the world economy” 
(Pearson, 1981: x cited by Razavi and Miller, 1995a: 15). These two themes – social 
relations of gender and critique of “development” – are also to be found in the concerns 
of Southern feminists who raised them “consistently” since the beginning of the Decade 
of Women (Jahan, 1995: 8; for example, see Mohanty et al., 1991 and Sen and Grown, 
1985). 
 
Gender mainstreaming can be associated with GAD as an attempt to address the 
marginalisation of women resulting from WID (Jackson, 1997, Baden and Goetz, 1998), 
and its adoption by development organisations can be seen as parallel to the “shift” from 
WID to GAD (Staudt, 2003). By the time of the 1985 World Conference on Women in 
Nairobi, “gender mainstreaming was born” (ibid. 51) with calls for diffusing 
responsibility for addressing gender issues across the breadth and depth of 
organisations.  Women’s groups, particularly those from developing countries, raised 
concerns about the limits of an integrationist-separatist strategy. Calls for a more 
transformative approach were made, for example by UNIFEM, one of the first agencies 
to pursue a mainstreaming agenda, which advocated a change of the mainstream itself.  
 
Following the 1985 conference, other agencies had also adopted the approach. For 
example, Miller (1998), in writing about this period, remarks on two mainstreaming 
approaches taken on by UNDP, the World Bank and ILO. One was the establishment of 
gender units or the strengthening of previously established WID units, such as by 
                                                 
9
 Both WID and GAD broadly describe a number of approaches to addressing inequity between men and 
women (Levy, 1996 and Moser, 1993). Both, but GAD in particular, are difficult to define. CCIC (1992) 
provides a rare  comprehensive description of GAD: in this interpretation, GAD is being used to describe 
approaches that represent an alternative to WID, and where gender and social relations of gender are core 
considerations, and the goals are equal gender/social relations (CCIC, 1992). 
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setting up focal point systems. Second was the establishment of procedures for 
spreading “responsibility for WID/gender concerns across the organisational context” 
(ibid: 151). Such initiatives, however, faced constraints. Focal points had weak 
mandates and authority, were poorly resourced and lacked capacity. Gender-related 
questions in project approval forms were completed perfunctorily. What is interesting is 
that while efforts to diffuse responsibility for gender were attempted as alternatives to 
WID efforts, the approaches and subsequent challenges were not dissimilar. 
“Infrastructure” established to promote gender mainstreaming experienced similar 
constraints as did WID units. Little of the learning from the WID era seems to have 
been considered in the early, pre-Beijing era of gender mainstreaming. 
 
The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action (PfA) is a testament to the achievements efforts 
since Nairobi as well as other UN sponsored international conferences in the 1990s. The 
agreement of governments to its Strategic Objectives is significant in terms of the extent 
of the commitments to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, which 
were formulated on a structural analysis of women’s disadvantaged position. In terms of 
mainstreaming, governments committed themselves to promoting “an active and visible 
policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes, including, 
as appropriate, an analysis of the effects on women and men, respectively, before 
decisions are taken” (United Nations, 1995: various paragraphs), which was a clause 
repeated in a number of Strategic Objectives, including those related to the UN itself. 
What is particularly noteworthy about the understanding of mainstreaming in the PfA is 
that it was seen as a means to the ends of achieving the various Strategic Objectives, 
which concerned different areas of strategic interests of women. Gender mainstreaming 
in the context of Beijing represents one of the most systematic approaches to integrate 
gender concerns, link gender mainstreaming with gender equality, women’s 
empowerment and position women at the centre-stage of development (Jahan, 1995) 
and development organisations.  
 
The support by governments and coming together of women’s organisations does not, 
however, imply a harmonious process at Beijing. The preparatory conferences, 
involving women’s organisations from around the world, and the conference itself were 
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conflict ridden among governments
10
, between governments and civil society and 
among women’s organisations themselves. In particular, among the latter, there were 
already concerns for a cooptation of analytical concepts of gender with the 
popularisation of gender mainstreaming. These included fears that gender analysis was 
becoming a technocratic discourse due in part, as explained by one critic, to the 
“professionalisation and 'NGOisation' of the women's movement and the consequent 
lack of accountability of 'gender experts' to a grassroots constituency” (Baden and 
Goetz, 1998: 39).  Questions were raised as to whose interests and positions were being 
served by gender mainstreaming and the costs of deploying instrumentalist strategies in 
order to convince mainstream development organisations to adopt a gender agenda. 
There was also a concern about what was being mainstreamed and the limits of the 
mainstream, and as Miller (1998; 151. My emphasis) suggests, the “extent to which 
gender mainstreaming within development institutions can have a transformatory impact 
on the development process.”  
 
Still, gender mainstreaming became the main approach following from Beijing for state 
bureaucracies and development organisations such as OGB. The periods running up to 
and following the conference were characterised by a number of different analyses, 
diagnoses and efforts to develop systematic approaches.  A number of extensive reviews 
were conducted that provided accounts  of gender mainstreaming efforts, particularly of 
development agencies (Geisler et al., 1999, Jahan, 1995, Razavi and Miller, 1995c) and 
by NMW (Byrne et al., 1996, Goetz, 1995).    
 
Two publications especially stand out.  First is Goetz’s (1997a) edited collection, 
Getting Institutions Right for Women, which was influential in pointing out the 
gendered nature of organisations, which are governed by institutions or rather “rules”.  
Focussing on the “institutional politics of pursuing feminist policy ambitions” (ibid: 3), 
the authors build on experience with gender mainstreaming by that time and analyse 
organisational resistance to change, dilution of feminist aims and the compromises 
needed to forward a gender agenda organisationally. With its focus on the 
institutionalisation of gender concerns, the work of some of the contributors, such as 
                                                 
10
 Debates and controversies prior and during Beijing concerned a number of issues including the term 
“gender” itself.  Friedman (2003) claims the Beijing PfA was the most contested of all texts emerging 
from the various conferences. See Baden and Goetz (1997) and Friedman (2003) for descriptions and 
analysis of these.  
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Goetz (1997c, 1997b) and Harrison (1997), represents an extension of the intellectual 
thinking of the SOW collective to gender mainstreaming, which was not an original 
concern during the 1970s. In particular, the emphasis on individuals, which Goetz 
(1997b) and Jackson (1997) claim as being previously overlooked, is an important 
contribution to the gender mainstreaming literature. Individuals exercise agency, despite 
constraints posed by organisational and social structures, and in doing so, bring their 
own ideologies and interpretations, where career and job security are also 
considerations. Getting Institutions Right for Women is also significant for its 
consideration of NGOs, which previously had not been a focus
11
, and the finding, as 
described previously, that NGOs are no less gendered, hierarchical and dominated by 
male privilege, even with their presumed advantages.  
 
The second is Pearson’s and Jackson’s (1998) Feminist Visions of Development, which 
is another critical publication coming out of the immediate post-Beijing era. Inspired by 
the conference, the collection of essays find their roots in gender and development and 
reflect on contemporary debates, “paradoxes and uncertainties” (ibid: 5) in gender 
analysis of development. While 25 years had passed since the initial work of the SOW 
collective and a different global context meant different challenges, such as the 
structural adjustment polices and their impact on developing countries, the contributors 
find resonance with the previous work: “Issues of representation, of positionality and of 
practice transform old questions of integration, interests, struggles for resources and 
well-being, but do not replace them” (ibid). While not particularly concerned with 
gender mainstreaming, they recognise that the propagation of “gender” has also 
produced a diversity of meanings, such as from its conflation with poverty (Jackson, 
1997). 
 
The 10th anniversary of the Beijing conference also served as an opportunity for 
reflection on what had happened since the international endorsement of the PfA. For 
some, it was an occasion for renewal; for others, despondency. In Beijing Plus 10: An 
Ambivalent Record on Gender Justice, a summary of a series of papers commissioned 
for the occasion, Molyneux and Razavi (2005) reflect upon the previous 20 years and 
conclude “Gender inequalities have reduced over time but they have also proved to be 
                                                 
11
The other major study on NGO experience with gender mainstreaming during this period is Wallace et 
al. (1997). 
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remarkably resilient in the face of change” (ibid: 4). What is interesting about Molyneux 
and Razavi (2005) is how the research is positioned and referenced to the idea of 
“gender justice”. According to Mukhopadhyay (2007a: 2. My emphasis), this signals 
gender mainstreaming losing “its credibility as a change strategy [and] the language of 
justice, rights and citizenship […] being brought back”. 
 
Much of the analysis around the 10
th
 anniversary was on gender mainstreaming, and it 
too reflected different perspectives while also focusing on how wide spread the 
approach had become. For example, Rai (2003) edits a collection of articles that focus 
on NMW in the era of gender mainstreaming (as opposed to during the WID era). She 
comments that NMW have been critical in promoting gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming by making gender more visible despite them facing constraints such as a 
lack of financial and human resources and clear mandate. Her positioning of gender 
mainstreaming as being critical and core to wider processes contradicts Goetz (2003: 
89) who shows less confidence in her essay on NMW in the same collection. She cites 
inter-ministerial politics as exacerbating the “hierarchical and undemocratic nature of 
bureaucracies, and their hostility to agendas which challenge accustomed organisational 
patterns” while also preserving patronage relations. Goetz’s continued12 concern about 
the potential for bureaucracies to transform and undertake progressive change not only 
echoes those first raised around the Beijing conference – (and even prior, for example 
see Ferguson, 1984) – but was increasingly evident around the Beijing Plus 10 
reflections.     
 
In one of these, Prugl and Lustgarten (2006) focus their attention on UNDP, the World 
Bank and ILO. In contrast to most other studies from this period, they are not interested 
in the question of whether gender mainstreaming has “failed”, but as a “site around 
which global gender politics operate [where it] takes on meaning through 
organisational processes and politics” (ibid: 54. My emphasis). Overall, they found 
“cooptation of feminist agendas into broader organisational priorities” in the case of 
UNDP (ibid: 60) and an adjustment of “feminist arguments to the logics of liberal 
economics [and isolation of] gender analysis from finance and macroeconomic 
interventions” in the case of the World Bank (ibid: 64). Similarly, while the ILO has 
                                                 
12
 See also Goetz (1998) and Baden and Goetz (1998). 
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had a long historical concern for women workers,  Prugl and Lustgarten (2006) 
conclude that long standing core commitments, in this case to tripartite agreements 
between unions, employer organisations, and governments, “demand […] a co-optation 
of feminist purposes” (citing Lotherington and Flemmen 1991: 68). They warn that 
organisational strategies are not the same as movement strategies: both are needed and 
the latter, in particular, as a way to support the holding of development agencies 
accountable.  
 
What is interesting about Prugl and Lustgarten’s findings is that they contrast Razavi 
and Miller’s (1995c) study of the same organisations from ten years earlier when the 
issue seems to have been more about getting gender on the agenda. For Prugl and 
Lustgarten, the challenge is keeping it there while maintaining integrity of the process 
of institutionalising feminist concerns in the face of competing agendas and, more 
broadly, organisational mandates and remits. These may not always be so compatible 
with promoting women’s interests, even if they appear to be at first glance, such as 
UNDP’s commitment to participatory sustainable development. Prugl and Lustgarten’s 
study illustrates the complexity, difficulty and, relatedly, the slowness of 
transformational organisational change as well as the need to study gender 
mainstreaming historically.  
 
Prugl and Lustgarten’s study is also illustrative of the further entrenchment of gender 
mainstreaming, which should be seen as a success with stronger policy frameworks, 
increases in resources for mainstreaming, deeper and more extensive gender 
infrastructures, but also a weariness (Haddad, 2004). Challenges persist but are of a 
different nature. The generation of writings surrounding Beijing Plus10 concern the 
legacies resulting from, in some cases, 10 years or more of efforts that, as many attest, 
failed to deliver on the promise gender mainstreaming once had. Accordingly, some 
studies from this period took a much more longitudinal perspective, such as Pialek’s 
(2008) PhD research on OGB, which is also one of the few studies that concentrates on 
development NGOs. Pialek focuses on policy “impasse” to describe “an all-
encompassing and long term inability of a broad policy ambition to be transformed into 
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sustained and consistent practice” (ibid: 7. My emphasis)13. Still, many other studies 
lack such a historical perspective (see for example Moser and Moser, 2005) 
 
Pialek’s approach to analysing gender mainstreaming, a decade after Beijing, is 
representative of one line of investigation that characterises literature during this period 
that either explores it as a failed strategy (Sandler, 2005) or one that still had potency 
and should still be pursued, although with adaptations (Tiessen, 2005). Many of these 
studies tend to assume a deficit perspective and linear relationships between policy and 
practice (Mehra and Gupta, 2006, Moser and Moser, 2005). While such an analytical 
perspective is not necessarily unique to the Beijing Plus 10 period, it does contrast with 
others that took a different tack.  An example of this is a series of publications based on 
a collection of reflective writings that emerged from a 2003 workshop entitled Gender 
Myths and Feminist Fables: Repositioning of Gender in Development Policy and 
Practice (Cornwall et al., 2004). Focusing on the struggle for interpretive power and the 
undermining of feminist intent by development institutions and the way they function, 
contributors to these publications seek ways to repoliticise feminism in gender in 
development. This call comes from a number of contributors who observe how a 
“transformative agenda has been captured by power, coopted and instrumentalised, and 
its political vision has been neutralised, where not excised” (Molyneux, 2007: 234).  
Similar to concerns expressed during the Beijing era, responses to gender 
mainstreaming have been bureaucratic and technical where the “political project of 
equality [has been] normalised in the development business as ahistorical, apolitical, de-
contexualised and technical project (Mukhopadhyay, 2007b: 135-136). 
 
Almost 20 years after Beijing, gender mainstreaming has certainly become popularised 
as the main strategy for pursuing gender through development. With this process of 
propagation and greater acceptance, it has become further entrenched within the 
mainstream while, at the same time, increasingly undermined as a change strategy. Also 
coopted from the initial concept have been complementary strategies, such as women’s 
empowerment. As gender mainstreaming and associated ideas have been adopted by 
development and government institutions, they have been adapted to fit with particular 
organisational paradigms. Almost two decades after Beijing, gender mainstreaming has 
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 Such studies, however, are few in number. While others do take a long-term perspective, such as 
Tiessen (2007), they lack a historical analysis. 
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become concerned with not only getting gender on the agenda, but keeping it there – a 
situation which has been  accompanied by a weariness (Molyneux, 2007) from over 20 
years of struggle and resistance, due in part to intransigent, and now understood as 
gendered, organisations, which became more apparent during this period. While such 
challenges were already experienced prior to the adoption of gender mainstreaming with 
WID, other concerns were raised around Beijing, such as feminist agendas and women 
concerns being co-opted, as well as after where the focus was not so much on getting 
gender on the agenda, but what happened to the idea one it did become part of the 
mainstream.  
 
The Implementation of Gender Mainstreaming 
Despite shifting meanings and emphasis of gender mainstreaming, approaches have 
been remarkably similar (Subrahmanian, 2007). They commonly entailed establishing 
gender policies and strategies (Moser, 2005) that were meant to demonstrate and 
communicate organisational commitment to the promotion of gender equality as well as 
guide organisations on how they would “implement the policy”. Often, gender policy 
concerned an organisation’s programme activities as well as organisation itself in an 
acknowledgement that organisations themselves are gendered (Goetz, 1997a), and that 
this is related to their outcomes, which are also gendered, reflecting an inward-outward 
looking dynamic (Rao and Kelleher, 1997, Macdonald et al., 1997).  
 
That organisations have gender policies, even progressive ones (for example, see 
Geisler et al., 1999, in reference to UNDP) is obviously not a guarantee that they will be 
implemented or result in gender outcomes. Not surprisingly, what is most noted is not 
the absence of policy, but rather the nature of the policies adopted (Prugl and 
Lustgarten, 2006) and the quality or lack of implementation, both at headquarters and in 
the field. Failure in policy implementation is particularly linked to a lack of 
organisational leadership as well as commitment, not only among senior managers but 
staff more generally, to the agenda being promoted by the policy.   
 
To support the implementation of policy, many organisations established “gender 
infrastructure” that most commonly included staff with supposed “gender expertise”, 
often in the position of gender advisor and sometimes collectively organised as a 
“gender unit” or similar organisational structure dedicated to promoting gender equality 
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and gender mainstreaming (Tiessen, 2005). Such staff were assumed to have particular 
knowledge and skills that would help others to know what to do.   Often they worked 
with “gender focal points” who had the remit to be working on gender in addition to 
other formal organisational responsibilities. Collectively they were commonly organised 
as a gender working group that often was not part of the formal organisational structure 
but was seen as an informal committee with a specific, and often assumed, time-bound 
task of mainstreaming gender. 
 
The deployment of staff with particular knowledge about gender can be an 
acknowledgement that gender work is a specialist work (Beveridge et al., 2000: 395) 
requiring a range of skills (Byrne et al., 1996; Goetz, 1995) as well as attitudes and 
knowledge in order to undertake a variety of often conflicting roles. This 
acknowledgement is generally held by those working as gender specialists while others 
do not necessarily see gender expertise as the purview of gender specialists and question 
whether gender specialists are the only holders of this specialist knowledge
14
. Others 
make a distinction between specialist knowledge and “populist knowledge” (Beveridge 
et al., 2000: 390) with the former involving gender experts “with specialized training as 
well as a sophisticated understanding of gender relations” (ibid) and the latter “a range 
of individuals and organisations” (ibid) who participate and access policy-making and 
to whom experts and officials are supposed to be accountable.  
 
Beveridge et al.’s distinction is an illuminating one if only to reveal the assumptions 
behind “gender expertise”. It highlights the division between specialist knowledge as 
the exclusive domain of certain individuals, whether practitioners, development 
professionals or academics (Prugl and Lustgarten, 2006), and more populist notions of 
knowledge. Intertwined with this distinction is the assumption of a knowledge, one that 
privileges certain understandings of gender over others. For example, evidence from 
practice reveals often dogmatic, rigid, linear-binary interpretations and applications, or 
what Standing (2007: 103) calls a “gender and development hegemony” based on a 
“myth of a right and a wrong way to ‘do’ gender in policy contexts” applied through 
“policing or even shaming” (ibid, 106). Moreover, as Lazreg (2002: 133) suggests, 
“gender expertise is now part and parcel of an international order of things, the 
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 For example, Prugl and Lustgarten (2006: 61) note how in the World Bank, managers are assumed to 
have “a high level of gender expertise [despite] never work[ing] as gender specialists”. 
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arrangement of which it sustains rather than upsets”.  What these authors point to is the 
sometimes complicit role of those who impede change rather than supporting it. 
 
In addition to the deployment of gender advisors and establishment of gender focal 
points, gender mainstreaming often entailed engendering of organisational and 
programmatic processes such as the design and development of development projects. 
This often included the requirement of a gender analysis, often conditional upon project 
approval, as well as gender aware monitoring frameworks. Tools and guidelines were 
developed to instruct and support staff to mainstream gender in their organisations and 
programmes (Moser and Moser, 2005) and serve as mnemonics in the form of 
checklists. For many critics of gender mainstreaming, the popularisation and wide 
production and dissemination of such resources have contributed to the co-optation and 
de-politicisation of gender and development (Standing, 2007). Such “tools” encouraged 
“box ticking”, instead of critical engagement and analysis (Cornwall et al., 2007), and 
promoted simplistic application of gender analytical concepts.   
 
Similar criticisms have been leveled against another common approach to supporting 
staff to mainstream gender in their work: gender training, which represents a broad 
range of approaches and “sub texts” of development, change and their implications for 
women (Kabeer, 1994: 264)
15
. Gender training was provided to raise staff awareness of 
gender and related concepts, increase understanding of its relevance to development and 
develop skills in gender analysis and planning. In many cases, gender training was seen 
and used as a panacea (Ahikire, 2007) to the challenges of gender mainstreaming 
whether they concerned a lack of understanding, knowledge, skills, commitment or 
organisational support or outright resistance. Rather, the popularity of training seems to 
reflect a technical understanding of gender mainstreaming where the engendering of 
development is a matter of filling in knowledge and skills “gaps”.  
 
                                                 
15
 What and how particular understandings of GAD were propagated, as reflected by different training 
approaches that embodied different analytical frameworks, is significant, inasmuch as they represented 
different treatments of gender, gender relations and, in particular, the degree to which the latter is 
considered as a power relationship characterised by cooperation and conflict. They differed in their 
acceptance or rejection of dominant – namely economic, market-oriented – development paradigms, with 
some reproducing the notion of development planning as a linear process. Lastly the degree to which each 
were taken up in trainings and by development organisations differed, with the Department of Planning 
Unit Framework approach being the most widely popularised, particularly in its analysis of triple roles 
and gender needs. See Kabeer (1992) for more detailed analysis of the different training frameworks. 
  
Chapter 2 The Theory and Practice of Gender Mainstreaming 29 
The discussion above provides an overview of how gender mainstreaming has been 
approached. What is common to these processes is that they, to some degree, assume a 
positivist approach and focus largely on the mechanics of mainstreaming, where policy, 
practice and outcomes are assumed to be linearly related (c.f. Moser, 2005). At the basis 
of the assumed relationship between gender policy and practice is that the former is 
supposed to guide, or can even guide, the latter. For example, Jahan (1995: 11) takes a 
rational linear approach and looks at policy objectives, describes agencies’ approaches, 
assesses institutional and operational strategies (the practice), measures progress (the 
outcomes) and draws conclusions based on a comparison of all of these assuming a 
causal link between policy, practice and outcomes.  
 
The emphasis of such an approach is on the failure of policy to be implemented or, as 
often noted, to put policy into practice and a disjuncture between institutional policies 
and practice (Prugl and Lustgarten, 2006: 54). This view contributes to a deficit 
perspective and an analysis a lack of “inputs” that believed to be critical to 
mainstreaming gender such as policy, leadership, commitment, resources, capacity, etc. 
 
The problem with deficit perspectives is that they tell us little about what happens in the 
process of mainstreaming gender. Behind the façade of mainstreaming policy 
frameworks and infrastructure is the doing of mainstreaming, and this is the purview of 
social actors interacting through social relations. As a number of writers observe, gender 
policy implementation is a political process entailing “struggles over meanings and 
pragmatic measures […] in order to determine courses of action and pursue specific 
gains” (Woodford-Berger, 2007: 126). Such struggles occur at the micro level of 
interactions among social actors in the context of organisations and inherent politics that 
constitute them (Wright, 1994). What happens to and results from gender 
mainstreaming is contingent on the nature and outcomes of such contestations. For 
example, Eyben (2007) documents what at first glance appears as differences in content 
of information booklets published by Britain’s department for international 
development. What she reveals, however, are different power struggles subject to 
particular policy emphasis at the time. They also represent overall differences between 
managers, who were concerned with pleasing and maintaining the status quo, and 
advisors who wished to persuade to change policy. Similarly, Mukhopadhyay et al. 
(2005) describe the “gender routes” several southern based NGOs took in undertaking 
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gender and organisational change processes. These entailed continuous negotiations and 
persuasion which were realised, in some cases, when different spaces were opened up 
for gender advocates to voice their concerns and agendas which, in turn, fostered a 
sense of commitment and accountability. Each “gender route” was different and 
iterative but no less contested. As the authors write “In order to make gender equality 
come alive in their organisations and their work, [the NGOs] engaged in implicit power 
struggles that, during the course [of their route] became explicit” (ibid: 9). 
 
When individuals are considered, such as in the case of gender advisors, focus is on 
their agency but not the organisational structures, within which they operate, or their 
relationships with these. For example, what is interesting about Standing (2007)’s and 
Lazreg (2002)’s observations, previously cited, is that while others have also focused on 
the roles and experiences of gender advisors as part of mainstreaming infrastructure, 
they are two of the few who scrutinise their sometimes complicit role in the co-optation 
of a gender agenda based on their own positionality within mainstream development. In 
contrast, Goetz and Sandler (2007)’s observations about gender training exclude an 
analysis of the contexts in which trainees keep knowledge gained from training to 
themselves. 
 
Still, what these observations do point to is the micro-politics of organisations for 
processes, exchanges and decisions that lead to the particular outcomes of gender 
mainstreaming.  Part of the problem, however, is a lack of empirical studies on gender 
mainstreaming more generally (Mosesdottir and Erlingsdottir, 2005, cited by Pialek, 
2008) and at the micro-politics level of gender mainstreaming policy and practice in 
particular. Given the nature of such interactions, being contingent and often implicit, 
how does one go about studying micro politics of organisations and their efforts to 
institutionalize gender concerns? 
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APPROACHES TO RESEARCHING AND UNDERSTANDING GENDER MAINSTREAMING 
The nature of my research on gender mainstreaming and OGB presented a set of 
challenges related to the context of the research; namely, how do you study a large, 
well-established and complex organisation that works in over 70 countries
16
 but from 
the perspective of micro- politics? In this section I describe particular organisational 
ethnography and anthropology of development literature which offered ways of thinking 
about micro-politics of gender mainstreaming policy and practice. As a point of 
departure, I first critically review how DNGOs have attempted to understand gender in 
their organisations, which primarily has drawn on organisation development 
approaches. In a critique of these, I explore organisational ethnography as an alternative 
approach to understanding organisations. Relatedly, in contrast to how gender 
mainstreaming policy and practice is seen as linearly related, I describe different 
understandings of the relationship between policy and practice, particularly from an 
actor oriented perspective and from the vantage of strategic groups and their 
involvement in webs of relations with differing, sometimes contrasting and, at the same 
time, complementary motivations. This exploration of organisational ethnography and 
anthropology of development literature provides a theoretical framework for my 
research. 
 
Organisational development  
Previously I have argued that there has been relatively less research on gender 
mainstreaming in DNGOs and the organisational challenges such agencies have faced. 
This is not to say that in practice DNGOs have not paid attention to themselves as 
organisations. Compared to other development agencies, northern DNGOs, in 
particular, have acknowledged the need to address gender issues both internally in their 
organisations as well as externally in their programmes. For Plowman (2000), this 
seems to have come from three inter-related forces: a recognition of feminist analysis 
that organisations themselves are gendered and are therefore an object for change; 
pressure exerted by southern partners; and internal advocacy by gender activists. 
Demanding gender aware programming from southern partners, whilst not addressing 
gender inequity within their own organisations, created a certain hypocrisy that did not 
escape their partners from the south.  
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 See Hovland (2005), who faced similar questions with defining her “field”. 
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A number of NGOs, such as Oxfam Novib in the Netherlands, turned to organisation 
development (OD) to better understand their organisations and to affect gender aware 
change. Previously, they had already been exploring OD approaches since the early 
1990s (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2005) with an interest in organisation and human resource 
management after years of a focus on training that bore meager improvements in 
organisational effectiveness (Plowman 2000). The extension of OD to addressing 
gender and organisations, however, was not problematic, mainly due to the roots to OD 
and its initial conceptualization as a gender unaware process.  
 
OD
17
 has its roots in the private sector and earlier efforts to apply ‘scientiﬁc’ approaches 
(Wright, 1994) to better understand businesses and enhance their efficiency. While OD 
encompasses a broad range of methodologies for understanding and changing 
organisations, it has mostly remained silent on issues of social change more generally 
and gender issues in particular. As Kelleher (2002: 4) notes, organisational learning, an 
off-shoot of OD, “has never claimed to be about transforming power or gender relations 
[…] it leaves the authority structure intact”. To address the historical gender 
unawareness of OD, a number of academics and practitioners took a closer look at the 
nature of gender and organisational change. These efforts, however, address the issue 
from a variety of perspectives and rationales, which include differences in the aims of 
gender and OD initiatives. Some work emphasises increased organisational 
performance, while other work prioritises the promotion of gender equality – although, 
as we see later, these are not always distinct differences.  
 
Much of the thinking on gender and OD focuses on increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness and stresses a ‘business case’ as a way to both overcome the limits of 
traditional, gender unaware OD approaches as well as to persuade decision-makers 
who would not be convinced by equity arguments (Ely and Meyerson 2000b). Other 
approaches focus on gender equality as an organisational change aim though with 
different emphasis. Some stress gender equality in the organisation “to make the 
workplace a fairer and more hospitable place for women” (Ely and Meyerson 2000a: 
589). Efforts with this aim have a long history in the private and public sectors where 
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 I use the term organisational development to broadly describe approaches to studying and improving 
organisations described in this section.  These are sometimes referred to as organisational behaviour 
(Bates, 1997) or more generally organisational studies (Czarniawska-Jorges, 1992) 
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emphasis is placed on establishing more equitable workplace practices. For Kolb et al. 
(1998), this ultimately requires addressing the systemic causes of gender inequity in 
the organisation itself. Others emphasise organisational change as a way to produce 
gender equality outcomes such as gender aware development results (Macdonald et al. 
1997: 8) where the explicit assumption is that organisations need to be gender aware in 
order to do so.  
 
Others, however, set their sights higher for gender outcomes. For example, Goetz 
(1997: 2) notes that the aim is “to routinize gender equitable forms of social 
interaction and to challenge the legitimacy of forms of social organisation which 
discriminate against women.” Rao and Friedman (2000) link organisational change to 
organisational transformation with the wider goal of societal transformation. Other 
gender and organisational change proponents do not view goals of organisational 
change and gender equity as cause-and-effect processes but as mutually reinforcing. 
For Ely and Meyerson (2000a: 591), a ‘dual agenda’ is possible as “very often the 
same processes that create gender inequities also undermine an organisation’s 
instrumental objectives”.  
 
Empirical evidence, however, does not seem to support the realisation of such “dual” 
agendas: despite their apparent inter-relationship, gender equality goals must be 
privileged. Research by Bailyn et al. (1996) reveals that gender-related organisational 
changes resulted in addressing both work-family issues and furthering business goals. 
They also note, however, that such efforts did not address “true gender equity” (ibid: 8) 
as this required changes at the family level, which was beyond the scope of the research. 
For Ely and Meyerson (2000a), the gender agenda was “lost” in their action research 
project to promote gender equality and organisational change, even though it was part of 
the initial organisational change strategy and seemed to resonate with company staff. 
Keeping it on the agenda implied continuous effort. 
 
More critically, at the basis of OD approaches to gender and organisational change are 
assumptions about organisations, which has underscored the analysis of gender 
mainstreaming, as indicated previously. Much has taken positivist perspectives and have 
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focused on the mechanics of mainstreaming that understand organisations as 
“machines” (Wright, 1994: 18, Shore and Wright, 1997). With this approach, 
organisations are viewed in terms of their constituent parts – policies, staff, structure - 
and organisational development analytical categories are employed (Hinton and Groves, 
2004). Behind these are implicit assumptions about the nature of organisations, 
organisational culture and the purpose of organisations. Ideal organisations are seen as 
rational and efﬁcient entities devoid of values and inefﬁciencies. Organisational culture 
is understood, or is rather pursued, as something homogeneous and static to bring 
cohesion
 
(Hirsch and Gellner, 2001). Such views tend to ignore other perspectives that 
may be critical when we consider organisations as being imbued with different, often 
competing, ideologies and where individuals operate as agents but within wider 
organisational and social constructs. How does one avoid the pitfalls of standard OD 
approaches? 
 
Organisational ethnography 
Organisational ethnography
18
 offers a different way to approach an understanding of 
gender mainstreaming. While OD has its roots in anthropological approaches
19
, as 
evidenced in such seminal research as the Hawthorne experiments and Manchester 
studies, a number of ethnographers distinguish between OD and organisational 
ethnography drawing, understandably, on tenants of the traditional ethnography, as 
developed from a long tradition of cultural anthropology. What is organizational 
ethnography?  Why is it appropriate to the study of gender mainstreaming and gender 
and organizations?  The methodology will be described by a discussion of ethnography 
and a comparison with more commonly used OD approaches. 
 
In discussing organizational ethnography, Bate (1997) describes three conceptions of 
ethnography – as a method, as a paradigm and as a way of writing – which he contrasts 
to organizational behaviour.  As a method, ethnography is more of an “attitude” (Bate, 
1997: 1152) that is much less concerned with knowing, a priori, “how to” do the 
                                                 
18
 The terms ‘organisational ethnography’ and ‘anthropology of organisations’ (or ‘organisational 
anthropology’) are often used to describe similar approaches to studying and understanding organisations 
and sometime are used interchangeably.  I use the term organisational ethnography to emphasise the 
methodology as well as inter-related methods, the latter of which are not always made explicit in 
anthropological literature that I have used in my research. 
19
 This rich history of the influence of anthropology on OD has been well documented by others 
(Czarniawska-Jorges, 1992; Wright, 1994) as has their divergence and recent convergence (Yanow, et al., 
2011) and the potential from this (Vermeulen and van Strobbe, 2005). 
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research, the concern of organizational behaviour, than with just getting into the field 
and “doing it”.  It is only being in the field where the research can gain from 
serendipity, what Hendry (2003: 507) considers the “most valuable part” of 
anthropological work.  Fieldwork is seen as an iterative and learning process, an act that 
lends itself to “finding the right question” (ibid).  In this way, the approach seems 
appropriate for researching understandings of gender mainstreaming, given that it 
“cannot be defined a priori but takes on meaning through organisational processes and 
politics” (Prugl and Lustgarten, 2006: 54). Similarly, ethnography as paradigm entails a 
particular “frame of mind where learning to ‘think culturally’ about an organization” is 
critical (Bate, 1997: 1153).  As will be explained below, culture in this sense does not 
refer to a uniform, consensual “organizational culture” as stressed in OD.  Lastly, 
ethnography is a way of writing.  Representations of experiences and theory making are 
through text where “narrative or rhetorical style” are key (ibid: 1151).   
 
In particular, it is the different notions and treatments of “culture” in OD and 
organisational ethnography that seems most strongly distinguish them. The former sees 
culture as something to be simplified, created and shared in an attempt to create a 
uniform, unchanging “organisational culture” (Bate, 1997; Wright, 1994). For 
ethnographers, metaphors for organisations – machines, organisms, culture – are 
themselves cultural, and concern issues of power and contested meaning making 
(Wright, 1994). Organisations are multi-cultural milieu, through which anthropologists 
need to interpret “what is going on” (Wright, 1994: 23); despite the appearance of 
uniformity, conflict within organisations is alive and well (Hirsch and Gellner, 2001). In 
this sense, organisational ethnography adopts the notion of culture as a basis for 
explanation and methodology (Jiménez, 2007). 
 
Relatedly is the consideration of “conflict”. With its emphasis on fostering 
homogeneous organisational culture, OD approaches tend to want to smooth over 
conflict, particularly observable conflict (Lukes, 2005) in formal settings. 
Organisational ethnography attempts a cultural understanding from conflict between 
formal and informal dimensions of organisations with an emphasis on the latter (Bates, 
1997). It is in the often overlooked and everyday of organisational life where meaning is 
made (Yanow et al., 2011). Such an understanding is derived not only from seeing 
conflict as only oppositional, but also how “opponents” further their respective and 
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often diverse and contrasting agendas through the pursuit of a common culture and 
mutual accommodation as well as the “‘cross-cutting ties’, the paradoxes and 
unexpected alliances which maintain both the system and its inherent conflict” (Wright, 
1994: 12). It is these “subtle forms of collaboration, in which terms of inter dependence 
[are] agreed […based on…] informal rules” (Bates, 1997: 1159) that suggest a more 
dynamic and diverse organisational culture than that promoted by OD. These are 
political processes that the ethnographer attempts to “to track, describe, and explain” 
(ibid). 
 
Such a focus on conflict-consensus emphasizes the notion of power and, in particular, 
its relation to knowledge; a relation that Mosse (2001: 175 citing Gaboon 1996) states 
needs to be made “unusually clear” by ethnographic work in organizations. 
Furthermore, according to Jiménez (2007: xiii), the “institutionalisation of power has 
been the central focus concern of anthropology of organisations.” The focus again is on 
anthropological understandings of ‘culture’; the processes of “continuously organizing 
and negotiating order” (Wright, 1994: 20) where “certain ‘essential meanings’ become 
authoritative in specific historical perspectives” (ibid: 22). As Haugaard (2003: 93) 
states, such social order is derived from predictability “created through the reproduction 
of meaning” through structuration and confirming structuration. In the case of 
organisations, understanding and negotiating formal or, more commonly, informal 
“rules of the game” is how meaning is made and consensual social power is reproduced 
(Haugaard, 2002). Such an understanding of power deviates from an emphasis on 
conflict - whether overt, covert or latent (Lukes, 2005) - and requires understanding 
how consensual power is created through the collaborative pursuit of different interests, 
which is expanded on later. With organisational ethnography’s emphasis on conflict and 
this understanding of power, research into organisations and gender mainstreaming calls 
for a different focus than OD studies and one that emphasises both difference and 
consensus, not either-or as early human relations approaches stressed (Jiménez, 2007), 
and what lies behind these. 
 
Another distinguishing feature of ethnography is its “commitment to methodological 
holism” (Hirsch and Gellner, 2001: 7) where everything in the research context is grist-
for-the-mill. A main contribution of the Manchester studies was the focus on context 
that required seeing organisations not as closed systems but rather needing to 
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understand the influence of external factors and wider social structures (Wright, 1994). 
As Bate (1997: 1156) contends, “thought and behavior cannot be properly understood 
outside the context in which they are situated; it is knowledge of context that renders 
them intelligible.” Still, Hirsch and Gellner (2001) caution to not read too much into the 
notion of context.  This requires the ethnographer to “adopt a curious kind of cross-eyed 
vision, one eye roving ceaselessly around the general context, any part of which may 
suddenly reveal itself to be relevant, the other eye focusing tightly, even obsessively, on 
the research topic” (ibid: 7). It is through this ethnographic process that reveals 
“contrasts and shadows” providing “a comparative and critical edge”, particularly in the 
study of policy and practice (Jiménez, 2007: xxv and xxiii).    
 
Context refers to temporal, physical or institutional, but what seems particularly critical 
to the study of gender mainstreaming, as indicated previously, is the importance of 
understanding history. OD tends to be future-oriented with its emphasis on vision and 
mission and short- and long-term plans. Organisational ethnography embraces and 
attempts to understand the past as a way of understanding the present and future, for 
organisations are better understood as a continuing system across time (Pettigrew, 
1979). But, as Bate (1994: 1156) insists, “history should not actually be studied 
historically, however. It is in the everyday that the anthropologist searches for the past, 
in such things as rites and rituals, myths, stories and sagas, ballads, and anecdotes.” 
 
Still, despite the emphasis on context, organisational ethnography is also distinctly 
“actor-centred” (Schwatzman, 1993) where the aim is “representing the lives of others, 
and in particular conveying a ‘flavor’ of what it looks and feels like from the ‘native’s 
point of view’” (Malinowski, 1922 cited by Bate, 1997: 1160).  The appropriate focus 
of people’s lives comes not from the researcher, but from those being researched so that 
the patterns are found “both in the data/perceptions and by implication in how the 
people studied present order and systematize their lives” (Hirsch and Gellner, 2001: 8). 
For Yanow et al. (2011), organisational ethnography’s focus on the interplay between 
context and actors provides relief to the often binary treatment of structure and agency. 
In particular, it consists of “an orientation toward subjective experience and individual 
agency with sensitivity to the broader social settings and the historical and institutional 
dynamics in which these are embedded.” (ibid: 7). 
 
  
Chapter 2 The Theory and Practice of Gender Mainstreaming 38 
Organisational ethnography, while informed by cultural anthropology and classic tenets 
of ethnography described above, has also required a questioning of these, particularly in 
a “mobile, changing, globalizing world” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997: 3). Within such a 
world, the basis of anthropology, “field” and “fieldwork”, are the object of scrutiny and 
re-thinking. For example, rather than abandoning the notion of fieldwork, “the field” as 
a source of knowledge is de-privileged (ibid). For Marcus (1995), multi-sited 
ethnography is almost as inevitable as the need to change notions of the “field” and 
“field work”. It represents a move from a single site focus to an analysis of how 
“cultural meanings, objects, and identities (circulate) in diffuse time-space” (Marcus, 
1995: 96). It is not just a matter of being multi-local but trans-local (Hannerz, 2003) 
where the strategy is “following connections, associations, and putative relationships” 
(Marcus, 1995: 98). Such an approach seems appropriate to the study of OGB given the 
multi-local, global nature of the organisation.  
 
Anthropology of development: policy, practice and critical interfaces 
While organisational ethnography provides a methodological framework for studying 
gender mainstreaming and DNGOs, which stands in contrast to how these organisations 
have approached gender and organisations previously, it does not help to understand 
what happens in the practice of policy. For this I turn to a diverse and related body of 
anthropology of development literature.  
 
As described previously, most analysis of gender mainstreaming suggests a linear 
relationship between policy and practice where the role of the former is to guide the 
latter (Moser, 2005).  When policy-prescribed actions fail to happen or policy outcomes 
are not forthcoming, a common diagnosis is that policy has evaporated or there are gaps 
in implementation. Hobart (1993: 3) suggests such a view is misplaced, not because of a 
lack of theory or a good theory, but from “the limitations of a paradigm” and 
inappropriate application to processes that are in fact “non-natural and involve 
reflexivity”. Van Ufford (1993: 154) explains disjunctures between policy and practice 
by describing policy formulation, occurring at the centre, as mostly concerned with 
image projection, with political centres remaining “relatively ignorant of what is going 
on”. Relationships between policy, practice and outcomes are characterised by 
“contested political spaces or policy communities” that arise from a range of diverse 
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interests, agendas and needs (Shore and Wright, 1997: 15). Resistance, cooptation and 
lip service are manifestations of these struggles.  
 
Given the contested relationship between gender mainstreaming policy and practice, as 
the previous review describes, what is the purpose of gender policy? Might it serve 
other aims such as bringing coherence, as well as legitimacy and motivation, to an 
otherwise constant state of change and contestation? What makes for good policy – its 
ability to mobilise political and practical support among otherwise divergent interests – 
does not make for good practice; “good policy is unimplementable” (Mosse, 2005: 230). 
For Mosse (2005b), success is a matter of creating an illusion of coherence and stability 
by using mobilising metaphors that “conceal ideological differences so as to allow 
compromises and the enrolment of different interests [whereas] a significant part of 
development practice involves the reproduction and stabilization of policy models 
which both conceal and provide authoritative interpretations of practice” (230-231, My 
emphasis). 
 
Development projects are the practice of policy and “important instruments of aid” 
(Salkeld, 2008)
20
. They are arguably the main focus on which development agencies 
place, or more accurately “load”, their multiple aspirations. Still, just as policies are 
viewed as related rationally and linearly to practice, projects are presented as planned 
interventions designed to achieve predetermined outcomes as a result of the provision of 
inputs
21
. Underpinning the paradigm of development projects are assumptions of 
homogenous and harmonious intra-project relations. Given the uncertainty of 
development (Buvinic, 1986), though, and the fallacy of planned interventions, an 
alternative view is to see projects as contested spaces comprising different groups of 
people with divergent priorities (Arvidson, 2004b). Interactions are concerned with 
mutual enrolment whereby projects become means to accommodate diverse interests 
                                                 
20
 Gould (2004) suggests that, in the 21st century, development assistance is concerned less with projects 
and more with policy. While other forms of assistance are certainly now more common, particularly since 
the Paris Declaration of 2005, I argue that projects are still just as important to understanding 
development, given that governments still use them and they are still instances and manifestations of 
policy. Also, Crewe and Harrison’s (1998) observation that the development project is an “important way 
in which these ideas, and those that apparently challenge them, are negotiated between the various groups 
involved in development” is still valid. 
21
 See Wallace et al. (2006: 36) on why, despite concerns about the assumptions of planned interventions, 
the reduction of complex realities and ill-conceived causal relationships, the fallacy continues to 
dominate. 
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and produce “success”. Seeing policy and practice in this light, as well as their inter-
relationships, provides insight into the often noted observation of the “failure” of gender 
policy to be implemented. The nature of the question changes from a deficit perspective 
– what is missing that policy was not implemented? – to a more preliminary one of 
“How are policies and practices of gender mainstreaming related to each other?”. 
 
If policies and their practice in development, projects, are not necessarily “linked” but 
more concerned with creating consensus among divergent views, what does one 
research to understand what goes on? Bierschenk (1988: 146) suggests that the focus 
should be on the different groups of actors, or “strategic groups”, and their interactions 
at critical interfaces, which represent “an instance of policy delivery” (Lipsky, 1980: 3). 
Such groups engage in struggles of “perspective, interpretations and concepts, material 
resources and political power” (Bierschenk, 1988: 158-159). Such an approach 
recognises the agency of strategic groups and the power they possess, even if this is to 
refuse participation, such as noted by Goetz (1997c). For in the end, despite power 
differentials, strategic groups need each other, directly or indirectly, in order to pursue 
their own interests. 
 
Eyben (2006) and others focus on unequal power relations within and between 
development organisations. For Hinton and Groves (2004: 5), this requires an 
understanding of both the “choices being made by individual actors and their position 
and power within the system” and the relationships between actors “in the system as a 
whole – recognizing that the system has its own emergent dynamism and internal 
logic”22. As such, an understanding of the relations of aid requires an understanding of a 
web of relations
23
 where power is central, and where unequal power relationships, 
generating compliance and resistance, abound (2006). For Eyben (2006), power in aid 
                                                 
22
 Proponents of a relational perspective to development aid adopt complexity theory in understanding 
how change happens (Hinton and Groves, 2004). At the basis of complexity theory is an understanding 
that change is constant, beyond comprehension in its totality and unpredictability. As a result, a systems 
approach is necessary to understand the relationships among various actors, not just the actors 
themselves. This approach contrasts with mainstream development perspectives, which assume linear 
positivist notions of change and relations between policy, practice and outcomes. 
23Relations of aid are often described as an “aid chain” (e.g. Wallace et al.,2006). For Eyben (2006), this 
metaphor is limited in terms of understanding the actors and their relations, as most are both recipients 
and providers of development aid, belying the binary categories of “donor” and “recipient”. Eyben 
prefers the notion of a “web” to convey the “diversity and complexity of networks and connections of 
power between the plethora of organisations that constitute the international aid system” (2006: 2). I 
adopt Eyben’s term as it helps to reduce the use of binary terms, particularly “us” and “them” (Crewe and 
Harrison, 1998: 187). 
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relations can be seen as A getting B to do something, whereby power can be visible, 
hidden or invisible. It can produce an effect, such as resistance, also an expression of 
power. It can also be approached as relational, whereby aid agencies reproduce certain 
knowledge – particular ways of understanding and seeing the world – through the 
development and deployment of instruments and procedures. This has the effect of 
legitimising particular world views, or ideologies in the sociological use of the term 
(1993), while excluding others. For Shutt (2006b: 86), understanding the reproduction 
of “systems of thought [...] gives clues as to why some actors are conferred with more 
symbolic capital that functions as social relations of power than others”. She draws on 
Haugaard (2003) to show how more power or capacity are not always about control 
over funding, but also concern “knowing and communicating” (Shutt, 2006b: 80). She 
also alludes to “consensual power that is created through collaboration to achieve 
mutual goals” (ibid). Such an understanding of structure, as a web of relations of power, 
offers a counterpoint to how individuals are seen in literature on gender mainstreaming 
which, as noted above, tends to ignore the organisational context in which they operate. 
In particular, it is helpful to start to understand the sometimes complicit role of 
supposed gender advocates as noted by Standing (2007). Additionally, building upon 
the nature of power as understood in organisational ethnography, described above, and 
Shutt’s and Eyben’s ideas of power, it becomes possible to understand different and 
shifting understandings of gender mainstreaming and how some become dominant 
through everyday micro-politics of organisations. 
 
This stands in contrast with much of the literature on strategic groups and their relations 
which emphasises the context of development, namely, categories of groups involved in 
projects, such as donors, development NGOs (DNGOs), community groups and 
beneficiaries (Bierschenk, 1988). Also, when analysing the relations of aid in projects, 
relations as manifested in projects are privileged, despite being informed by dominant 
extant social relations, as highlighted by a number of observers (Shutt, 2008). For 
example, mainstream development perspectives treat organisational and project 
relations as value-free and neutral. Take for instance the organogram, which focuses on 
one dimension of relations among project actors – who reports to whom. Actors are 
treated as undifferentiated “atoms” linked by solid and dotted lines which describe how 
they are to act, akin to Weber’s notion of organisations as machines and that 
underscored by OD approaches. Absent is an understanding of project actors as social 
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beings, with particular characteristics, values and attitudes informed by their own 
individual backgrounds. Also absent is a way to understand these groups and, more 
critically, their motives and agency. 
 
For example, strategic groups – whether local DNGOs, government officials, village 
committee members or direct beneficiaries themselves – adapting their values, 
behaviours and attitudes in order to access project resources is a familiar narrative in the 
development literature to explain how projects “misbehave” (Buvinic, 1986)24. There 
are three explanations as to what is happening: adaptation, adoption and projection
25
. 
The motivations of these groups are, of course, multiple and shifting, but there is one 
clear dividing line in the literature on this. On the one side are those who view strategic 
groups as motivated primarily by self-interest to capture resources and benefits, whether 
monetary, physical or intangible, such as status, and “act according to their own 
interests” (Bierschenk, 1988: 146)26. Other observers of strategic groups and their 
motivations take a more nuanced approach and attempt to understand the particular 
social and historical contexts in which strategic groups work and relate. For example, 
Arvidson (2004a: 241) demonstrates how organisational staff start their careers with “an 
ideal image of the altruistic development worker” but contradictions and confusions 
inherent in development organisations, particularly local DNGOs that are vulnerable to 
the whims of the international aid system, result in ambivalent and contradictory 
motivations ranging between altruism and self-interest
27
.  
 
Seeing acts of adoption, adaptation and projection as “deceit” and motivated primarily 
by self-interest represents the perspective of those doing the intervening and their own 
interests, even if this is for wider altruistic aims
28
. The goals of planned interventions 
                                                 
24
 Buvinic (1986) uses this term to describe how economic development projects for women take on 
welfare orientations. While I use the term to describe generally how projects fail to achieve their stated 
goals, I also draw on Buvinic’s analysis of how perceptions of project staff contribute to “misbehaviour”.  
25
 For example, see Crewe and Harrison (1998: 157-158), Mosse (2005: 78) and Bierschenk (1988: 231) 
for respective examples. 
26
 For Olivier de Sardan (2005), project staff are motivated by gain and the intended “beneficiaries” are 
seeking safety and minimising risk; seeking aid; and monopolising aid opportunities to increase or obtain 
privilege. This analysis of motives is echoed by Mosse (2005: 78). 
27
 Similarly, Bierschenk et al. (2002, cited by Mosse and Lewis, 2006: 12)avoid “heavily normative 
representations” of renegade strategic groups as either “parasites” or emerging forms of civil society and 
locate their actions within “the fragmented politics of the postcolonial state”. 
28
Shutt (2006a) discusses how perceived acts of self-interest are seen as “subjective interpretations of 
those living in recipient countries” (Shutt, 2006a: 85-86). I would argue that systems of local meaning 
also influence all strategic groups implicated in relations for aid. Jackson (1997: 162) makes a similar 
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are seen as ultimately undermined, projects become side tracked and “unintended 
outcomes” result (Rees, 2005). As Harrison (1997: 73) suggests, “[i]t may be wrong to 
suggest a neat causal relationship”. In particular, such acts become distorted and 
misunderstood when seen from the paradigm of planned interventions and inherent 
“ideal-typical, time-space conceptions” (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989: 230). Even 
when acts of agency are considered, such as the case of women “subverting” project 
goals, these acts are viewed from a perception of “male bias, in accordance with a 
concept of power in which action equates with power and masculinity” (Jackson, 1997: 
161). 
 
What should we make of the motives of those who do not fall in line and openly subvert 
official plans? Adopting an “actor-oriented perspective” (Long, 1992), one view is to 
consider such acts as representations of agency, with personal gain but also 
opportunities and power at stake (de Sardan, 2005: 163). For example, projects may 
misbehave owing to subversive acts by women who do not follow the official script that 
project design imposes. These practices are “contingent and performative, reflecting 
choice and agency, to variable degrees, of all social beings, as well as constraint” 
(Jackson, 1997: 161)
29
.  
 
Goetz (1997c) and Jackson (1997) see “project failures” as acts of social change and 
note “the significance of cultural and political influences, and the potential of well-
placed individual agency and leadership to effect systemic change” (Hinton and Groves, 
2004: 5). This alternative view understands acts of subversion – whether through 
insincerity or agency and defiance – as representative of interpretation and 
transformation which occur when external interventions, and the ideas that they bring, 
interact with “contexts” other than those from which they originate (Crewe and 
Harrison, 1998). As Long (1992: 35) states, “external interventions enter the life-worlds 
of the individuals and groups affected and thus come to form part of the resources and 
constraints of the social strategies they develop”. With the multitude of knowledge 
                                                                                                                                               
point that both project staff and participants are “subjects constituted partly by the constellation of 
institutions within which they exist”. 
29
Still, seeing such acts as expressions of oppositional perspectives and acts of agency must be viewed 
within the context of wider power relations (Hinton and Groves, 2004). For example, according to Goetz 
(1997: 194)who found that women credit officers subverted microcredit projects through their use of 
personal discretion, viewing these as an expression of “some natural solidarity or sisterhood” between 
bureaucrats and their beneficiaries would misconstrue the dominant allegiance of project staff to their 
superiors and not their clients. 
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contexts from which strategic groups work, both across groups and within them as 
individuals (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989: 231), a wide range of diverse 
understandings are bound to emerge and “so-called external factors become 
'internalized'” (ibid, 229).  
 
While the process of internalisation helps to understand what happens to “external” 
ideas, Harrison’s (1997: 73) “hybridization of externally induced values” is more 
nuanced in explaining “partial internalisation” through a process of giving and making 
meaning. Rather than seeing project participants primarily motivated by personal and 
immediate gain, they internalise the external through their particular systems of 
“knowledge and meaning” (Mosse, 2005b: 170)30 drawing upon available discourses 
(Long, 1992: 25). Such a perspective requires viewing the actions of strategic groups 
from an understanding of the contexts – social, developmental or otherwise –  in which 
they are working. In particular, we need to understand the “the diversity of social codes 
and norms of behaviour which serve as references to these strategies” (Mosse, 2005b: 
187) of those doing the “developing” as well as those “being developed”. What emerges 
is that such actions are results of complex processes informed by different values, ideas 
and beliefs brought to bear by different members of strategic groups. As Shutt (2006b: 
86) from her research in Cambodia states, the translation of motivations into 
interactions within the context of development projects is an interpretive process 
shaped, “not only […] by the social relations of power in Aidland, but also by local 
systems of meaning”. 
 
A focus on strategic groups, on understanding their relations as a web and their 
intentions from an “actor-oriented perspective” offers insights to the study of the 
relationships between gender mainstreaming policy and practice and, in particular, the 
micro-politics of institutionalizing gender concerns. Such a focus recognizes both 
individual agency and competing as well as complementary interests compelled as well 
as mediated by organisational structures. In this manner, individuals and their inter-
relationships are interrogated for their roles in the policy and practice of gender 
mainstreaming?  
 
                                                 
30
 See also, Bierschenk (1988: 146) and Shutt (2006a) 
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Taking a much broader perspective, a multi-sited ethnographic approach releases the 
researcher from the confines imposed by more traditional understandings of the “field” 
and “field work” while organisation ethnography allows for a letting a focus to emerge. 
Still, where and what does one study to understand policy and practice given the multi-
sited nature of the research subject, Oxfam GB, as a global organization? Hirsch and 
Gellner (2001:4) note that “[r]ather than working inside an organization, the 
anthropologist sometimes researches at the 'interface' between organizations and 'the 
people', a situation for which anthropological skills and awareness can be argued to be 
particularly suited.”  Such interfaces of micro-politics are often sites of explicit and 
implicit conflict (Lukes, 2005) and, in the case of the research, of different 
understandings and practices of gender equality.   These conflicts can be seen within the 
formal system – “the map of the organizational structure, job descriptions, the hierarchy 
of decision-making, the goals, rules and policies” (Wright, 1994: 17) – and, perhaps 
more illustratively, in the informal system – “the way individuals and groups in the 
organization relate to each other” (ibid).  For Bate (1997: 1159) it is the interplay or 
process between the formal and informal, the struggle of meanings and making 
meaning, in other words the micro-politics, that the ethnographer needs to “track, 
describe and explain”.   
 
Focusing on “critical interfaces” is particularly key, given the broad and complex nature 
of OGB as a case study, as it is here that one can observe “struggles over meanings, 
representations and images [… that] are central to understanding development 
institutions, policies and outcomes” (Arce, 2000: 32). Long (Arce and Long, 1992b, 
Arce and Long, 2000, Long, 1989b, Long, 2000, Long, 1989a, Long and Long, 1992) is 
most widely associated with the notion of interfaces. He defines them as “the critical 
point(s) of intersection or linkage between different social systems, fields or levels of 
social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value 
and social interest, are most likely to be found” (Long, 1989a: 1-2).  They are where 
policy is applied and transformed by acquiring new meanings.  Being “social and 
epistemic”, they also are where “discontinuities are managed through such practices as 
deferral, accommodation, negotiation, selective appropriation, and distantiation or 
absenteeism” (Arce and Long, 2000: 3).  Such critical interfaces lie behind and 
comprise the appearance of coherent policy (Mosse, 2001). Within the context of multi-
sited ethnography, interface analysis is a way of examining “connections between levels 
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and forms of social process and action, and exploring how those processes work in 
different sites – local, national and global.  [It is] tracing ways in which power creates 
webs and relations between actors, institutions and discourses across time and space” 
(Shore and Wright, 1997: 14).  Moreover, these “are affected by, and in turn themselves 
influence, actors, institutions and resource-fields that lie beyond the interface situation 
itself.” (Long, 1989a: 2)   
 
Where then are such interfaces?  As meetings points of different stakeholders, their 
perspectives and their interests, they most obviously are physical, face-to-face 
encounters but also, especially in multi-sited ethnography and in the world of 
information technologies, they entail other “spaces” – cyber space, discontinuous space 
– where boundaries meet (Villarreal, 1992) and differences and negotiation of these 
differences are played out.  Long (1989a: 2) reminds us not to just focus on physical 
interfaces “as the analysis should situate these within broader institutional and power 
fields.” 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The concepts of organisational ethnography, multi-sited ethnography and critical 
interfaces were instrumental in designing the research with its focus on understandings 
of gender mainstreaming and the micro politics of policy and practice. In particular, 
organisational ethnography provided clues of a focus and what to scrutinise: areas of 
conflict and convergence, informal rules behind the practice of formal procedures, and 
contexts that lie beyond as well as submerged in the organisational structure.     
 
Anthropology of development literature on policy and practice helped me research and 
think in a more nuanced and critical manner and challenge my own assumptions about 
the organisation developed, in part, from working with it. Research on development 
policy (particularly Baviskar and Mosse), in particular, was instrumental to consider my 
data differently and ask rudimentary questions that challenged conventional 
development thinking. This was especially important to negotiating the tensions of my 
status as an Oxfam employee and researcher, described in Chapter 3.  
 
  
Chapter 2 The Theory and Practice of Gender Mainstreaming 47 
As stated previously, research on gender mainstreaming has primarily been on single 
sites; multi-sited ethnography provided suggested of the value (as well as challenges) of 
not only considering more than one site, but their inter-relationships and the circulation 
of meanings. Marcus (1995: 106-110) suggests that multi-sited ethnography entails 
following the people, the thing, the metaphor, the story, the life or the conflict. For this 
research on Oxfam, I follow the commitment to gender mainstreaming.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Approaches and Challenges to Researching Oxfam GB 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines how I approached the research. I first the data collection phase, 
focussing on the different sites of my research, the methods used and sources of 
information. The last section discusses the challenges and limits of the research both 
from the perspective of my identity as a former OGB gender advisor and my position 
via-à-vis the research, as well as from the perspective of the research design. While my 
identity offered access, my work at OGB also raised ethical concerns and posed 
particular challenges for the research. 
 
DATA COLLECTION: METHODS, SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND TIMELINES 
Data for this research were gathered during two periods. The first concerns data I 
collected when I was working with OGB between 2002 and 2004. From this time, I 
draw on documentation as well as email correspondence concerning two case studies 
featured in the research: the development of proposals for the CBDM project in 
Cambodia and the 2003 updating of OGB’s Gender Policy. Knowing that I was going to 
focus on OGB in my research, I retained what I thought would be important sources of 
information after I received permission from OGB to conduct my research on the 
organisation. These included my emails and other electronic files, including initiatives 
that I worked on, and copies of OGB’s intranet, as made available to staff and 
volunteers, on CD. The latter in particular proved invaluable as an institutional record of 
the organisation’s policies, communications, studies and reports. 
 
The second period includes data I collected as a PhD student and conducting fieldwork 
between September 2005 and August 2006. This period can be divided into three 
phases, described in further detail below:  
 
 October to December 2005 in Oxfam House 
 January to June 2006 in Cambodia, which included fieldwork in the RMC in 
Bangkok in three visits spread over a four-week period 
 June and August 2006 in Oxfam House.  
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Subsequent to this, I collected data sporadically up until 2011. This consisted of phone 
interviews as well as archival research for four days at OGB’s headquarters in March 
2009. 
 
I initially chose three of OGB’s different planning processes through which to track 
understandings of gender mainstreaming: country programme planning and review; 
programme and project design; and annual impact reporting. This approach quickly 
became unfeasible, for a number of reasons. First, these processes excluded a focus on 
the involvement of Oxfam House, except the latter, in which headquarters was involved 
only marginally. Second, my timing was off. During my fieldwork period, the 
Cambodian programme was not involved in country programme planning and review, 
and any project design would have extended beyond my timeframe, with the result that I 
would perhaps have missed key moments. 
 
What did emerge, as described below, were key events that I could observe, and these 
became my focus. Events that occurred during my time as Regional Gender Advisor 
from 2002 to 2004 also came up as relevant to my research, particularly as the 
timeframe for the research, 2001 to 2006, took shape. Soon into my research at Oxfam 
House, it became clear that the arrival of Barbara Stocking in 2001 was relevant to the 
pursuit of gender mainstreaming, which helped delimit the period of research. As a 
result, I augmented data collected during my time at OGB as a Regional Gender 
Advisor by conducting interviews and collecting additional organisational documents, 
particularly communications, which I previously did not have access to. 
 
As described below, I used a variety of data collection methods including 
 In-depth, semi structured interviews with key informants from three key sites of 
Oxfam House, the RMC and the Cambodia country programme with a focus on the 
CBDM project including current and previous staff, such as former GADU members 
 Focus group discussions with participants from the CBDM project 
 Participants observation in all three sites, as described below 
 Accumulation of organisational, archival and project documentation including 
policies, reports, proposals and organisational and personal communications in hard 
and electronic copy 
  
Chapter 3 Approaches and Challenges to Researching Oxfam GB 50 
 
In total 110 informants, 74 women and 36 men, were involved in my research, all of 
whom I interviewed, sometimes twice, except in the case of CBDM informants, some of 
whom participated only as focus group discussion participants (see Figure 1). In all 
cases, informed consent was sought from informants who were briefed of the purpose of 
the interview or discussion, were asked if the interview could be recorded (except in the 
case of CBDM research), were allowed to decline or stop the interview without 
prejudice and were ensured of their anonymity and confidentiality. Only once was my 
request for an interview declined, which was later agreed to after repeated requests. 
 
Figure 1 Research participants 
 
Research Site 
 
Female Informants 
 
Male Informants 
 
Total Informants 
Oxfam House 28 2 30 
RMC 8 8 16 
Cambodia Office 9 3 12 
CBDM project 
participants 
29 23 52 
Total 74 36 110 
 
Oxfam House 
During my time at Oxfam House, OGB was in the process of developing its Strategic 
Plan (2006-2010). This became a focus for my fieldwork at Oxfam House and allowed 
me to observe different but related processes, including the finalising of OGB’s Gender 
Equality Strategic Framework (2006-2010) and the development of other thematic plans 
that were to contribute to the wider organisational strategy as well as to supporting 
initiatives, such as an organisation-wide system for monitoring, evaluation and learning. 
While these processes are not included in my thesis, they provided opportunities to 
observe the links between activities concerning these processes in Oxfam House and 
other levels, such as regional discussions supposed to feed into the development of the 
Oxfam International Strategic Plan, which was to serve as a basis for OGB’s Strategic 
Plan.  
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During my research at Oxfam House (October to December, 2005; June to July, 2006), I 
conducted 14 formal interviews
31
 and participated in meetings of the Corporate 
Management Team, the International Directorate Senior Management Team, the most 
senior body concerning programming, and the Assembly – a biannual, three-day 
gathering of volunteers, staff and Council members. I attended staff meetings, briefings, 
consultations (for example “Have Your Say”) and trainings, such as in gender 
mainstreaming and health and safety. When not participating in meetings, I sat with the 
Programme Policy Team, with the gender and other advisors, reviewing files and other 
organisational documentation, conducting further interviews and observing goings-on
32
. 
When I had the chance, I would sit with people from other departments and visit the few 
staff I knew outside the Programme Policy Team in their work area. I wanted to create 
opportunities for casual encounters and informal discussions. 
 
During my period at Oxfam House, I spent a fair amount of time trying to figure out 
how the organisation went about developing and deciding on its strategic three-year and 
annual plans. Part of the challenge was that these processes were complicated and very 
few people had the whole picture (Hannerz, 2003). Even staff who had worked at OGB 
for more than 10 years said, “If you find out how decisions are made, let me know” 
(field notes). Planning also tended to change from cycle to cycle and was processual. A 
senior policy staff person regularly involved with OGB planning processes described 
them as “more of an art […] there are no clear guidelines […] They go back and forth 
and then they become policy” (Interview. Wright, 2008). 
 
When I was not interviewing or observing meetings, fieldwork at Oxfam House was 
mostly uneventful given the nature of work people do at headquarters, much of which is 
at individual desks and involved communicating through cyber-space. During these 
                                                 
31
 I conducted eight additional interviews between 2007 and 2011 of staff who were working or had 
worked at Oxfam House, for a total of 22 interviews. These latter interviews were held mainly with 
former members of GADU, when I needed to complete information garnered about the unit from 
publications and archival material. 
32
 I was fortunate to have been at Oxfam House just as it moved to its current location in Cowley. The 
new offices had limited space and staff were required to archive or dispose of any documentation they 
could not accommodate. I inherited documentation from gender advisors that would otherwise have been 
thrown away. 
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times, I would be doing other work
33
 besides my research, but would keep an ear open 
for conversations and observe staff interactions.  
RMC for East Asia 
The main reason for me spending time at the RMC was to attend meetings of regional 
and country-level staff, including those from Cambodia who feature in my case study, 
and to observe interactions among differently positioned staff. My second aim was to 
conduct interviews with regional staff: in total, I interviewed 12 staff. Lastly, I wanted 
to observe what the managers did. I was familiar with their role when I was working as 
a regional advisor but had spent very little time in the regional office, and my 
interactions had been concerned primarily with gender work. So when the Regional 
Programme Manager invited me to “shadow” him, I took him up on the opportunity. I 
sat in his office for two weeks, attending meetings with him as well as other activities, 
such as interviews. This was not a particularly high-value research activity, given its 
lack of focus, but it was helpful to get a sense of what the Regional Programme 
Manager did and allowed for numerous informal discussions.  
 
Cambodia country programme office 
My research in the Cambodia country office included participant observation, 
documentation review and interviews. I regularly attended Senior Management Team 
meetings as well as meetings of programme staff. I shadowed the National Gender 
Advisor in her work and observed staff inductions, meetings of the gender network and 
meetings with project partners. During this period, I held 10 formal interviews
34
, 
excluding those concerned with the Gender Impact Assessment (GIA), discussed below. 
When I was not in meetings or shadowing staff, I rotated desks so as to be able to sit 
with different teams. This afforded me opportunities to socialise and hold informal 
discussions with staff.  
 
Compared with my time at Oxfam House, the fieldwork in the Cambodia office was 
busy and engaged. This was primarily because of the GIA, but also because of other 
events that occurred at the time, concerning not only the Cambodia programme but also 
a number of regional OGB events taking place in Cambodia as well as regional Oxfam 
                                                 
33
 This included paid consultancies, such as editing a PhD student’s thesis. 
34
 All were with OGB staff; except one, which was with a former OGB Hong Kong staff and key 
informant on gender issues within OGB in Cambodia given her long history working in the country and 
with OGB in particular. 
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International events such as the consultation on the Strategic Plan, in which I 
participated. 
 
For the most part, the research was conducted in English. At times, however, translation 
was required, and this was provided by an OGB staff person with whom I had worked 
since 2002. This was the case in external meetings with organisations with which OGB 
worked and, as described below, during data collection for the GIA. 
 
Gender Impact Assessment 
The GIA was conducted between February and June 2006 and focused on three projects, 
one of which was the Community-based Disaster Management (CBDM) project in 
Takeo province, which became a focus for my research. In November 2005, an OGB 
programme coordinator with the Cambodian office, contacted me, knowing I was 
planning to be based in the country office. The idea was that, while Cambodian staff 
would conduct the GIA, it would also be a learning experience for them and one which I 
would support and facilitate. I worked with four Cambodian staff: three project officers, 
each responsible for one of the projects being investigated, and one gender officer.  
 
The aim of the GIA was to “assess the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming as a 
strategy and approach in our programme to achieve gender equity” (Internal document. 
Gender Working Group, 2006) and had three main questions: 
 What input has OGB provided to partners to help them to mainstream gender in 
their organisation and programme? 
 What changes have been made in the attitudes and actions of partners to address 
gender inequity? 
 What changes can be seen in men’s and women’s lives in terms of gender roles and 
relations? 
 
The rationale was to see what difference OGB had made with partners and in 
communities, in order to come up with “concrete examples that [staff] can get their 
heads around [… to provide examples of] the differences that we want to see” 
(Interview. Smith, 2006).  
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GIA of the CBDM project 
This section describes the part of the GIA that focused on the CBDM project. In total, 
three of 13 villages where the CBDM project was being implemented were included in 
the assessment. These were selected mainly based on the knowledge of the OGB staff 
member responsible for managing the project, using three variables: vulnerability to 
flood; remoteness from social services such as education and health; and participation of 
women in village committees for disaster management (VCDMs), as indicated below.  
 
Village Vulnerability to flood Remoteness Women’s participation 
Sang Ke Chaur More vulnerable More remote Less active 
Bantey Slek More vulnerable More remote More active 
Anchang Less vulnerable Less remote More active 
 
A total of 61 participants were interviewed, which included 11 (9 women) VCDM 
members of a total of 15, and 48 (28 women) beneficiaries out of approximately 300 in 
the entire project. 
 
We spent six weeks preparing, planning and practising for the assessment. None of the 
team members, except myself, had previously undertaken field assessments, and 
everything, from research questions to design, sampling, questionnaires and 
methodology, had to be developed. I led much of the preparation and planning, and we 
held regular team meetings, usually two or three times a week, to review our work and 
plan the next steps
35
. During this period, we 
 
 Reviewed project documentation to gather information and evidence from project 
files on the three main assessment questions;   
 Undertook a sampling exercise, which lasted two days per project, and included a 
brainstorming and prioritisation of possible sources of information for each 
assessment question; 
 Designed questionnaires and interview and focus group discussion guides, pilot-
tested them and revised them accordingly; 
 Developed coding systems for informants to ensure anonymity; 
 Practised using the tools as well as interviewing protocols and techniques. 
                                                 
35
 Logistics were undertaken by the staff member responsible for the project. 
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Data collection 
Data was collected using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions 
(FGDs). Generally, the former was reserved for TD staff, members of the project 
committees established for the project, commune councillors
36
 as well as village chiefs. 
They were held usually at the informant’s residence. Efforts were made to conduct 
interviews at their respective houses in private which was sometimes difficult to 
negotiate and not always possible. There was little private space to conduct interviews 
in this manner and other family members would be curious about the meeting. Project 
beneficiaries, as direct recipients, and project committee members took part in FGDs. 
FGDs with the former were conducted as single-sex, usually at the house of the chair of 
the project committee. FGDs of project committee members were mixed-sex and 
followed up with individual interviews with key project committee members such as the 
chair and vice-chair 
 
Sampling of committee members was relatively straightforward where FGDs included 
those members who were available with all key project committee members being 
interviewed. Selection of beneficiaries was somewhat less structured and depended on 
who was available to meet the team as well as a random sampling. Generally, GIA team 
members were free to randomly choose among those who were available with little 
interference from project committee members.  
 
Semi-structured interviews and FGDs were based on guides developed for the GIA (see 
below) and conducted by a team of three staff from the six-person GIA team37. 
Interviewees were informed that I was a PhD student and would use the interviews for 
my personal research which was separate to that of the GIA and that they would remain 
anonymous and their answers confidential, and that they were free not to participate or 
to stop the interview at any time. They were asked for their verbal consent to participate 
under these conditions.  
 
                                                 
36
 The Commune Council is the lowest tier of Cambodian government. 
37
 These were all OGB staff, and included the three Project Officers, the Gender Officer, a translator and 
myself. Interviews and FGDs were conducted by a team comprised of the Gender Officer and two Project 
Officers who were not involved in that particular project. The GIA Team decided during the planning that 
there would be a conflict of interest if Project Officers conducted field work in project areas for which 
they were working. 
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Of the 61participants interviewed, I attended interviews and FGDs for 40 informants 
participating through simultaneous translation. I was introduced as a team member as 
well as a student collecting data for my own research. On numerous occasions, although 
I was not leading interviews or discussions, I would ask questions through translation 
when responses required further clarification or points I was interested in were 
explored. This occurred during the discussions but also after the end of the interview as 
the GIA facilitator would ask if I had additional questions.  Often, this would result in 
an extended discussion that I would lead through translation.   
 
Data collection took about seven to eight days per project, which allowed for two to 
three days per village. Data collection for the CBDM project was conducted over a 7-
day period. FGDs lasted about three to four hours and interviews were usually one to 
one and a half hours, although they sometimes extended to two hours, particularly if the 
discussion was prolonged with my questions. Data collection proved more physically 
exhausting than was anticipated, particularly as a lot of daily travelling was required, 
sometimes under arduous conditions, by foot or by ox-cart38. Although shortening the 
time between field visits would have decreased the overall time needed for the 
assessment, this would have been physically difficult and would ultimately have 
affected the quality of the assessment. 
 
Two sets of written interview records were kept, one in Khmer, recorded by team 
members on an alternating basis, and one in English, by me.  
 
Data analysis and report writing 
Transcripts were coded and analysed through a two-stage process. First, questionnaires 
were reviewed and coded as a team. Second, relevant excerpts were translated into 
English which were then peer reviewed at least twice, with recoding carried out as 
required. This was augmented with coded data from interview notes in English, based 
on simultaneous translation, from myself who had attended about half the interviews 
overall. When discrepancies arose, two sets of notes were reviewed and reconciled by 
the team including myself to produce a version that was used for analysis. In these 
cases, the original Khmer version was used as a reference to verify and revise the 
                                                 
38
 This was the first time that some of the GIA team members, including myself, had been exposed to 
such difficult conditions working in remote, inaccessible areas. 
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English version and I amended my interview notes accordingly with the corrected 
Khmer-English translation. 
 
Writing of the report was based on the final revised English datasheets and was 
conducted by two members of the research team, with the final draft reviewed by all 
team members. I analysed and wrote the report for the CBDM project in English.  
 
The GIA and my field research 
The GIA was important to my research. First, it provided raw data from project 
participants of their experience with the CBDM project. I used only interview material 
collected when I had been present and the contents of which I had the chance to verify 
with respondents as well as with other GIA team members. This included data from 40 
informants: 23 men and 17 women. Transcripts from these interviews were re-analysed 
separately for the purposes of my PhD research. 
 
Second, the data offered me with a glimpse of another project reality, different from that 
projected by OGB in Cambodia and project documentation. This helped me to think 
beyond the assessment questions and those concerned with evaluation more generally, 
to ask, “Why are there differences between project rhetoric and what community 
members said? What do these differences mean in terms of understandings of gender 
equality and gender mainstreaming? How can I understand these differences and what 
went on in the project?” As explained previously, literature from the anthropology of 
development helped me to consider these and other questions. 
 
Third, the GIA provided me with an opportunity to engage intensively with OGB staff. 
While much of what I observed does not feature in my research, this helped me to 
understand the context in which programme staff worked and the contingencies they 
faced. In particular, the GIA became an interface for tensions between GIA members 
and their managers and a lightning rod for on-going issues. For example, one 
programme coordinator asked me to comment on a team member’s performance on the 
GIA as part of her annual performance review. I agreed on the condition that the team 
member agreed to my commenting and asked that her permission be sought beforehand. 
Despite this, the programme coordinator continuously asked for my input without 
asking for the staff person’s permission.  
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Moreover, from the beginning, although OGB managers and staff agreed to undertake 
the GIA as a staff-run exercise and acknowledged that considerable time would be 
needed, there was conflict between the Country Programme Manager and programme 
coordinators and between the latter and programme officers over the time staff were 
spending on it.  
 
Lastly, my interaction with the team helped to build rapport among us all but 
particularly between myself and the others. I knew most of the members from previous 
work with OGB as Regional Gender Advisor, but our interactions had been limited then 
to me providing training. Spending several days a week together on the GIA gradually 
helped to break down barriers. There were a number of times when team members 
confided in me about work as well as personal concerns. This is not to say that I became 
one of “them”: at the end of the day, I was a foreigner, a previous regional staff person 
and a researcher. Still, I believe there was a sense of mutual respect.  
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LIMITS AND CHALLENGES OF THE RESEARCH  
 
In this section, I consider the constraints I faced in undertaking the research as well as 
the challenges given my identity as a former OGB gender advisor. 
 
Constraints of the research design and data collection 
The research has a number of limitations, mainly from being a multi-sited 
organisational ethnography, from working in a non-English context and my lack of 
Khmer language skills and from a lack of comparative analysis.  
 
First, time spent in any one site was limited, and my exposure to different fields was 
uneven, in terms of both time and space. This is a key concern of a multi-sited 
approach: “dilution” from a lack of depth and, correspondingly, too much breadth 
(Falzon, 2009). This does not necessarily entail a “thin” ethnography, however. Thick 
description can result from attaining a “native’s” perspective by having established a 
rapport (Hovland, 2005). As Shutt (2008 citing others) argues, this relies on the 
relationships established with key informants for data collection (Aull Davies, 2008) 
and sense making (de Neve, 2006). Reflexivity, particularly of one’s positionality, vis-
à-vis the research and the informants, is critical. In this case, I have attempted to 
contextualise my “privileged”39 access to data with a constant awareness of my position 
as an insider-outsider, as discussed below. 
 
For instance, I have had to be aware of the level of robustness of my data and use it 
accordingly. An example is my research in Cambodian villages which was short and did 
not include ethnographic methods that might be expected, such as participant 
observation. In other cases, I understood that CBDM respondents had their own agendas 
and were sometimes coached by OGB project staff (see Chapter 9). Accordingly, this 
data is only used as interview material for ethnographic interpretation of what the data 
represents, as a contrast to OGB in Cambodia’s claims about the project. Understanding 
in advance that GIA data, whether interviews or reports, were presented for particular 
reasons (van Maanen, 1979) provided the basis to explore motivations of strategic 
groups (see Chapters 8 and 9).  
                                                 
39
 I use the word “privileged” in the sense that I was fortunate that informants were forthcoming with 
their views and records and that they trusted me.  
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A related constraint is a focus on individuals and a paradox set up by my research 
design. On the one hand I was interested in the micro-politics of gender mainstreaming 
policy and practice that required focusing on critical interfaces of interactions among 
individual agents. On the other, this meant that even though I conducted a number of 
interviews with a diversity of OGB staff, the research at times tends to focus on one or a 
few individuals who were key to a particular case study or field of inquiry. This narrow 
focus does not owe to a lack of sampling but rather is indicative of how authority was 
vested in a limited number of people, who were not only at the interface of policy and 
practice but were also making policy, as senior managers, but as “street level 
bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980). In these cases, the focus on individuals is not to emphasise 
that their “actions translate […] policy into practice” (O'Leary, 2006: 106)40, but rather 
that they “must interpret the policy” (ibid), and it is this act of interpretation that is 
relevant to understandings of the micro-politics of gender mainstreaming. Crewe and 
Harrison (1998: 192), however, caution against over-emphasis on the motivation of 
individuals “because it assumes that individuals are capable of making choices 
irrespective of their culture”. This is problematic given that the “relative consistency of 
behaviour within a particular culture remains unexplained, and there is confusion about 
how human behaviour works in relation to time” (ibid). Gould (2004b: 17) also cautions 
against ethnographies becoming “the hostage of ‘situated knowledge’ and of partial 
truths”. Still, a “micro level social actor approach” (Shutt, 2008: n.r.) is helpful as it can 
reveal the highly contingent nature of understandings of gender mainstreaming. 
 
The problem with a focus on individuals is that it makes ensuring anonymity and 
confidentiality more difficult, even with the use of pseudonyms as in this thesis. It 
requires removing any details that could be used to identify people. The disadvantage is 
that the use of general descriptors is tediousness for the reader and does not provide any 
distinction among informants. Still, I felt that on balance, these were acceptable 
compromises given the value of such information. Also, the alternatives, such as putting 
an embargo on the thesis or risking possible legal actions, were unsatisfactory. 
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 Hinton and Groves (2004) also ask that the agency of individuals or their capacity to enact change 
through small actions not be underestimated. 
  
Chapter 3 Approaches and Challenges to Researching Oxfam GB 61 
During data collection for the GIA as well as in a minority of meetings
41
 I observed 
during the research of OGB in Cambodia, people spoke Khmer and I was provided with 
translation by an OGB staff person. While not a professional, my translator was 
experienced, had a very good command of English and was someone with whom I had 
worked previously – I understood her strengths and limitations as a translator. Still, 
conducting research in a language that I do not understand presented possibilities for 
misunderstanding. I was aware of this and took a number of precautions. For example, 
if there were questions or parts I did not understand, I sought clarification during the 
translation if possible – or after the fact if not. As mentioned previously, I cross-
referenced the GIA interview material I had noted from translation with the Khmer 
transcripts translated for the purpose of the GIA. Lastly, I analysed translated data for 
what respondents actually said and did not attempt to carry out interpretation, such as 
through discourse analysis. 
 
Meanwhile, my research does not include a comparative analysis of another crosscutting 
theme. I could legitimately be asked whether my observations about understandings of 
gender mainstreaming are unique to gender or indicative of more general issues 
concerning policy and practice within development NGOs. In some sense, it is the 
unique history of the promotion of gender and development and, later, gender 
mainstreaming in OGB that makes it incomparable. However, I certainly explored the 
idea of comparability. For example, when informants spoke of gendered experiences, I 
more often than not asked them for comparable examples and if they thought their 
experiences were unique to gender. I took into account similarities and differences in 
perspectives on gender mainstreaming and other policy processes in my analysis and 
convey these in the text. For instance, I juxtapose different explanations for the moving 
of advisory roles from Oxfam House to the regions in early 2000 (Chapter 6), which 
range from a general concern with making advisory support more accessible to the 
country offices to ridding the organisation of particular gender advisors considered 
incompatible with the agenda of making gender accessible.  
 
                                                 
41
 All OGB staff meetings, meetings with the GIA team and interviews with OGB staff in Cambodia were 
conducted in English. All Cambodian OGB staff are fluent in English, which is a requirement to work for 
the organisation in all but a few support positions. 
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Positionality, reflexivity and writing from the inside or out 
One of the main challenges of the research concerned my identity and position as a 
former and continuing OGB staff member that both facilitated the research and 
complicated it by raising a number of issues related to access, trust and ethics
42
. On the 
one hand, I had in-depth knowledge of the organisation and its procedures, inner 
workings and dynamics, as well as access to the “field”, both formally and informally, 
given my various personal contacts. If ethnography is about gaining the perspectives of 
the “natives” (Bate, 1997, Hirsch and Gellner, 2001), both the empathy and access 
offered by my position and identity should have been a benefit to the research (Mosse, 
2001). Shutt (2008: n.r.) suggests that “what is discovered during research depends on 
the quality of relationships that exist between […] researchers and research 
informants/participants”. For the most part, my assumption that I would be privy to 
information that an outsider would not have access to was borne out. On the other hand, 
there were, of course, dilemmas and complications due to my identity and former 
position that affected both data collection and the processes of data interpretation and 
writing. In this next section, I discuss these particular issues as separate phases of my 
research and then provide an account of how these were addressed.  
 
During data collection, my former identity posed a number of ethical issues, particularly 
concerning access and trust. First, there was concern relating to conflicting and 
competing interests. At the time, I was on leave from OGB but planned to return to my 
previous position (and did so in 2007). What would I do if I uncovered information that 
compromised my job security, either because it “upset” the organisation or reflected 
badly on my performance as a gender advisor?
43 
How does one balance professional 
interests with academic ones when they come into conflict?
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Of course, I am not the only member of Aidland (Gould, 2004a) who has turned the focus of research 
onto both their field of work and the researcher as a participant in this. “Aidnography”, as a subset of the 
anthropology of development, has in recent years become more common (e.g. Eyben, 2005a; 2005b; 
Gould and Marcussen, 2004; Mosse, 2005b; 2011). Others have written about how being an “insider” and 
an “outsider” is problematic given the blurred distinction between these interrelated roles (Mosse, 2005b), 
although development anthropologists have long been keenly aware of their complicated position vis-à-
vis the “object” of their research (e.g. Arce and Long, 2000). Throughout this chapter, I particularly draw 
on the work of Eyben (2005a and 2005b) given her reflections of her role as a development 
anthropologist and long-time former staff of a large development agency.  
43
 Eyben (2005a) discusses a similar ethical issue. 
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Related to this was the issue of trust and relationships, which can lead to a “personal 
identity conflict and discomfort” (Eyben, 2005a: 3). A number of former colleagues, 
many of whom acted as key informants, have remained friends and acquaintances. How 
would our personal relationships affect my analysis, particularly if they were portrayed 
negatively or if I knew that they would have disagreed with what I was writing?
44
 Also, 
how could I use information provided to me in confidence without betraying their trust 
and compromising my promises of anonymity? Although I use pseudonyms, positively 
identifying the informant might not be so difficult with a little knowledge of OGB, 
particularly as I focus on a few individuals in key positions. Accordingly, I attempted to 
meticulously and sufficiently anonymise my sources, upon the strong advice of my 
supervisors
45
.  
 
In other cases I found myself in difficult positions because of an assumed identity by 
former colleagues with whom I had a former relationship. For example, as I mention 
previously, a programme coordinator asked for my informal comments on a GIA team 
member’s participation as part of her formal performance review. While I wanted to 
assist him and her, I also felt that the process should be transparent and asked that he 
seek her permission beforehand. When he did not, after repeated requests to me and my 
same response, I did not agree to provide feedback, which strained my relationship with 
the coordinator. In this and other cases, my identity as a former colleague and researcher 
was confusing for others, which was only exacerbated due to my status as an observing-
participant in the case of the GIA. Still, in such situations, I was clear that I could not 
compromise my ethical responsibility and principles of confidentiality, as a researcher 
but also as a former employee, not only with research “subjects” but also with research 
colleagues.  
 
For example, the GIA was conducted on behalf of OGB to assess its impact which, as I 
mentioned previously, was already assumed to be positive before the work was 
undertaken. For some GIA team members, they too were similarly predisposed and 
                                                 
44
 Gould (2004b: 10) also highlights “a tension between the basic requirements of mutual trust and 
accountability upon which ethnography is predicated, and the scepticism that drives the ethnographic 
inquiry”.  
45
 This was done for all interviews and internal communications. In the case of discussing formal 
positions, such as Oxfam’s Director, Barbara Stocking, and Human Resource Director, Jane Cotton, I use 
their real names and draw on secondary data available in the public domain. In addition, real names are 
used in the case of archival sources as these were attained in the public domain. 
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became defensive when critical observations arose. In such cases, my role as researcher 
overlapped but was also de-lineated. As I was invited to join the GIA in part to support 
the strengthening of staff capacities, I used my research experience to help team 
members develop rigorous approaches and, in this example, make evidence based 
observations. In my role as PhD researcher, I was clear about my interest in the data and 
need to be able to independently use it. In some cases my analysis used in this thesis and 
conclusions are not the same as those included in the final GIA report for OGB, which I 
did not author. This is due in part to the different questions being asked (the GIA 
focused on the impact of Oxfam’s efforts; I was interested in explaining why 
respondents answered the way they did) which meant a different focus. OGB was much 
more interested in evidence of impact while I was interested in anomalies (Hirsch and 
Gellner, 2001). Being clear of my different roles and my obligations as a researcher to 
OGB and myself provided a basis to keep them separate. 
 
Similarly, at times I felt confronted by sometimes conflicting expectations. For 
example, the key foci of the research are political and highly charged issues such as the 
engendering of organisations and the role of gender advisors. Some of my former 
gender colleagues had issues they wanted to surface and saw my research as a way to do 
this (see Eyben, 2005a for similar concern). Even if I agreed with them, what would I 
do if the evidence was not sufficiently robust to make the assertions they offered? This 
was complicated by my own experiences and biases. Sometimes, informants derided 
gender advisors more generally, and specific acquaintances in particular, and my first 
inclination was to come to their defence. Trying to retain distance was all the more 
difficult because I understood the struggles some of the gender advisors had faced (c.f. 
Broussine and Fox, 2003). Of course ethical issues are not confined to field work but 
are also acute in interpretation and writing, discussed next. 
 
Ethical concerns, such as those resulting from my identity and position as a former 
employee and a researcher of OGB, as described previously, featured in all aspects of 
my research. In particular, however, the process of “writing up” is critical, for that is 
when the “privilege and authority of the anthropologist [is] unambiguously reassumed” 
(Marcus, 1995: 112). Different imperatives and contingencies gain prominence than 
during data collection, which is primarily concerned with gaining trust and access. As 
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Long (1992: 270) suggests, the researcher “in the final analysis [is] responsible for the 
construction of the ethnographic text”46. 
 
The problem of maintaining sufficient distance, while retaining the authoritative 
knowledge I gained from my previous position, became most acute during this period, 
not least because the phase of data analysis, interpretation and writing was a protracted 
and discontinuous one that spanned a period of four years. My previous experience with 
OGB prevented me at times from gaining and maintaining an etic perspective (Wallace 
et al, 2006) and “learning to be surprised” (Eyben, 2005b: 1). When designing the 
research, I was concerned with maintaining the tension of participant observation, “so as 
to ensure that one is close enough to see what is going on, but not so close as to miss the 
wood for the trees” (Bate, 1997: 1151). My challenge during data analysis and 
interpretation turned out to be of a different sort: at times, I did not realise I was in the 
woods, what the woods were or how I related to them. It was not easy to detect the 
“minute inconsistencies and variations among actor renditions” (Gould, 2004b: 13) that 
ethnography requires. Often, I would not let my empirical data speak, either by missing 
such minutia or, more commonly, by overstating the case (Gould, 2004b). Getting the 
interpretation “right” entailed many rewrites and constant probing by my supervisors. 
 
My initial interpretations were infused with Oxfam jargon, which I initially adopted 
unquestioningly. This was made worse by my exiting and re-entering the world of OGB 
and not being conscious of particular perspectives I assumed when I was wearing my 
OGB hat
47
. As Eyben (2005a: 2) describes, there “were problems of exit”. At other 
times, my observations and analysis were punctuated with rhetorical flourishes and 
lacked nuance. I also struggled not to project my own experiences from OGB onto what 
the data were saying: as Eyben (ibid: 2) writes, “a former employee’s construct of the 
organisation might blind her from observing recent changes”. This challenge was 
exacerbated by my return to Oxfam in 2007, the only period when my roles as 
researcher and Oxfam staff overlapped. While I was analysing and writing, I was 
                                                 
46 Mosse (2005a: 937) writes that turning “relationships into data, and placing interpretations in public, 
can also disturb and break relationships of fieldwork” (Mosse, 2005a: 937). Eyben (2005a: 5) also refers 
to this period and identifies publishing as a key ethical moment that can be perceived as a “betrayal of 
friendships formed during the research process”, or even long before in my case. 
47
 After an initial year of data analysis during my sabbatical from OGB, I resumed my position as 
Regional Gender Advisor in 2007 and attempted to do both: work during the day and study during the 
evening. 
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juggling with different ways of thinking and writing required at work. With strong 
encouragement from my supervisors, I decided to dedicate myself to writing and left my 
position with OGB which both freed up time and allowed me to immerse myself in the 
data for longer periods. Still, the process of writing and being challenged by my 
supervisors were critical for me to sufficiently shift emphasis from emic to etic 
perspectives. Achieving this shift whilst retaining the insight gained from emic 
knowledge helped me gain perspective of the “field” data and a more nuanced 
perspective. While I was critical of Oxfam during data collection, despite efforts to 
resist initial judgements, this changed to critical analysis and interpretation during my 
writing. It was during this period that I could focus on asking less “what” and more 
“why” and “how” questions, which became the basis for drafting chapters with the 
engagement of secondary critical literature, much of which does not feature in the final 
text due to space limitations. 
 
Related to my ability to write ethnographically and convincingly is a concern for 
objectivity – not in the sense of being able to convey the “truth”, for such positivist 
notions have generally been discarded (Hendry, 2003), but in relation to being able to 
establish sufficient credibility for my perspective to be considered worthy alongside 
other perspectives. As a former OGB employee and later with a working role in one of 
the arenas of data collection, how do I analyse myself and events in such a way as to 
convey both an insightful emic understanding and a convincing etic perspective to 
ensure an overall credible account? How then do you do interpretation?  
 
I attempted to address these concerns through reflexivity about my positionality, 
described next. I pay attention to these issues so as to be transparent about my 
assumptions and what actually happened during the research, and also because I believe 
that part of reflexivity is being transparent about how I approached the research 
problem. 
 
Ethnography is about interpretation of different perspectives (Mosse, 2001) from the 
perspective of the ethnographer. As such, the ethnographer can get close but can never 
exactly mirror the perspectives of those being researched, and positivist ideals such as 
“objectivity” are abandoned (Harding, 1987) or rather, more accurately, enhanced. By 
introducing the “subjectivity of the researcher”, objectivity, or in Harding’s (1993: 72) 
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words, “strong objectivity” can be attained. This concerns “locating the researcher in the 
same critical plane as the overt subject matter” where the subject as well as the object of 
research are the objects of “critical, causal, scientific!-social explanations” (ibid: 71). 
For Arce and Long (2000:8), “good ethnography…must repudiate the idea of the 
detached and ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ observer”. 
 
“Reflexivity” is critical, particularly with multi-sited ethnographies (Marcus, 1995), that 
is, working with your own biases “to uncover what may be deep-seated but poorly 
recognized views on issues central to the research, and a full account of the researchers’ 
views, thinking, and conduct” (Broussine and Fox, 2003: 32 citing Olesen, 1998). In 
aidnography (Gould, 2004a), reflexivity must be extended to the interfaces between the 
researcher and the subjects of Aidland being researched and interwoven with fieldwork 
as well as data analysis (Long, 1992). All research projects must be seen as socially 
situated in an acknowledgement that all knowledges are socially situated (Harding, 
1991).  
 
Accordingly, awareness of my positionality was critical to my ability to attain “strong” 
reflexivity and “objectivity”. It entails more that an uncritical use of “buzzwords” and 
studying the meaning they acquire as suggested by Nuijen (2004). “Researchers are also 
differently positioned depending on why they want to know” (Eyben, 2005a). They 
have their own interests that must be surfaced “as part of the forces that sustain…and 
reproduce” their positionality and struggles over “relevance, legitimacy, and/or practical 
applications” (Lazreg, 2002: 123). For example, during analysis and writing of thesis, I 
had to remind myself to ask, “Why am I including this material?” “Is it just interesting 
for me, as a former employee, or is it offering something to the overall thesis?” Still, 
while asking these questions allows for some perspective, how do you know what you 
know?  
 
Gould (2004b: 15) suggests that the range of things we can know first-hand is extremely 
narrow and highlights “socio-spatial positionality [… as] a pivotal point of 
epistemological reflection for ethnography”. Three dimensions of this are particularly 
relevant to aidnography and its multi-sitedness: spatial, social and normative. Spatial 
positionality concerns the very real physical limitations of conducting research as an 
individual, or even a team. How much can you really know given the vastness of the 
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“field” and the practical challenges multi-sited ethnography throws up? As Hannerz 
(2003) suggests, this is a matter of knowing what you know and what you don’t and 
being clear about what part of the “site” your data represents. It’s not claiming to study 
the “entire cultural and social life” (ibid: 208) or every facet of people’s lives, but rather 
how they may be related to the focus of study. In my case, I have had to not only be 
careful of what my data and analysis represent but to also how far I could legitimately 
extend such representation and make possible links. For example, I previously discussed 
the research’s focus on individuals which often begged the question of whether my 
observations are individual or representative of something wider and, if the latter, 
representative of what?  
 
Social positionality is about how one is situated between the supposed extremes of 
being an “outsider” and an “insider”. As Gould (2004b) suggests, these identities are 
hypothetical; they often co-exist and overlap. It is more helpful to think of them as 
perspectives from different vantage points that limit what you know but in different 
ways. From an emic perspective, you don’t always see the woods from the trees; from 
an etic perspective, you don’t understand the localised meaning given to the trees. I had 
to learn that rather than acting as binary opposites, these perspectives are inter-related 
and mutually informing. For example, much of this research focuses on gender advisors 
and, at some points includes my own direct experiences working in this position for 
OGB (see Chapter 8 for example). While my past offers insight into the challenges 
about this role, it is obviously from this perspective that I am more strongly informed, 
and not, for example, from that of Oxfam staff with whom advisors engage, even when I 
had attempted to appreciate this. Not only was it necessary to be aware of the limits of 
my experience, but I also needed to attain an actor oriented perspective (Long, 1992) 
which included understanding the limits of my ability to do so. 
 
Normative positionality is similar to Harding’s concept of “strong objectivity” and 
concerns acknowledging that aidnography is not nor could ever be “value free” (Gould, 
2004b: 11); aidnographers are critical of development rhetoric but also “feel compelled 
to defend the very principles donors invoke” (ibid) to pursue normative agendas. This 
limits what you know by accepting “that’s how things are done around here” without 
acknowledging, or even entertaining, that there may be a political agenda. This is 
different from the blindness of a solely emic perspective, but is related: it is 
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understanding that the field and the perspective of the field on the part of the researcher 
and the researched are politicized. In my case, and based on my previous experience, 
the challenge was to get the “micro-politics” right to raise myself above the inter-
personal minutiae in which I was ensconced when I was working. For example, the case 
of the 2003 updating of OGB’s 1993 policy (featured in Chapter 5) is one which I was 
initially involved in. At the time, there was a lot of mistrust and positioning, of which I 
was part. In order to understand the wider politics the case represented, numerous re-
writes and re-analysis was required in order to become aware of my own biases and 
agenda that I developed while being involved in the case study, to be able to consider 
the interactions among staff as being more than inter-personal grievances and 
understand what they represented.  
 
Writing reflexively about these positionalities requires not only an acknowledgement 
and reflection of the authoritative position assumed by the ethnographer, but also the 
responsibility that comes with such a position. What are the ethical issues in taking 
people’s words and making an argument from them? One approach for providing 
credibility is to take text back to research subjects to, at the very least, validate 
information they provided. Mosse’s (2005a: 939 citing Latour, 2000) notion of 
“objectivity”, which echoes that of Harding, is not concerned with eliminating 
subjectivity, but of courting it by “maximizing the capacity of actors to object to what is 
said about them”. In his case, he shared his writing with research subjects and 
informants, who included his former colleagues and collaborators from the project, 
which is the focus of his research. 
 
In my case, I did not pursue this option, but have taken authorial responsibility in terms 
of how data was collected and in its interpretation. The option used by Mosse was not a 
viable one in my research given the deeply competing understandings of events and the 
highly political nature of the kinds of issues addressed in the research. Moreover, the 
point of such an exercise is not to validate the interpretation of the data, which I have 
assumed responsibility for, but to correct “factual” errors either in terms of what people 
said in interviews or what was written. It can also provide alternative points of view 
(Mosse, 2005a: 948). In terms of the former, I suggest that this has already been 
addressed in data collection, namely through attaining consent and tape recording 
interviews, and careful treatment of secondary sources of data. In terms of the later, I 
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offer my research as a “positioned interpretation” (ibid: 941. Original emphasis): this is 
one interpretation of gender mainstreaming in OGB from 2001 to 2006. There are 
others, which are a source of this research. I conducted interviews and collected 
documents and analysed them not for their “truth” but for what they represent according 
to my interpretation, for which I take responsibility. 
 
In sum, my challenge in conducting this research involved how to make the most of the 
opportunities provided in a transparent and, in the end, convincing manner. This has 
entailed constant attentiveness to my position as a researcher and member of Aidland 
and the sometimes contradictory perspectives and agendas these two identities entail. 
This in itself was a constant challenge in a number of respects. Attaining an etic 
perspective after and while being ensconced in the world of OGB was not an easy feat. 
Additionally, maintaining this while also maintaining an emic point of view that my 
identity as former staff and my experience working with OGB could offer also proved at 
times elusive. My initial binary use and understanding of these terms ignored their inter-
relationship and that they are on the same continuum of appreciating and interpreting 
“the point of view” of those whose worlds I was researching. The challenge was 
attaining different perspectives of others’ perspectives to inform my interpretation of the 
latter. This was complicated by traversing along this continuum to not only see things as 
an “outsider”, but appreciating insider’s perspectives with an outsider’s vantage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As a large development NGO, researching OGB was a daunting task.  In my case, my 
challenges were not necessarily because the organisation was not transparent (Wallace 
et al., 2006) or that I lacked access. I was fortunate to have “inside knowledge and 
connections [that allowed for] access to people and documents” (ibid: 9).  Maintaining 
reflexivity about my positionality, particularly in social and normative terms (Gould, 
2004b), helped in being aware of this continuum but did not help to resolve the tension 
that etic-emic perspectives throw up. In many ways, my positionality only complicated 
this further.  
 
Drawing on previous work and reflections of Aidnographers was helpful to negotiate 
my complicated status and resulting ethical issues. It provided a basis for which to make 
decisions and be clear of my role as a researcher. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Research Context of Oxfam GB: a remarkable and contested history with 
gender and development 
 
INTRODUCTION 
OGB is the UK’s largest overseas development charity and one of the oldest. In 2006, it 
worked in over 70 countries with some 3,000 local groups and employed about 5,000 
staff. In 2004, it raised about 60% of its annual budget, about £130 million, from the 
general public, including over 550,000 regular private donors. 
 
This chapter introduces the organisational context for my multi-sited ethnography. I 
briefly describe OGB’s aims, history and structure, with a focus on Oxfam House, the 
Regional Management Centre for East Asia and the Cambodia country office, all of 
which are research sites. I also introduce Oxfam’s promotion of gender equality by way 
of a historical overview of the organisation’s efforts and a review of its gender policies 
and gender mainstreaming infrastructure at different levels of the organisation. Finally, 
the chapter also includes a brief account of development practice in Cambodia as 
relevant to Oxfam’s history in the country and its efforts to promote gender equality. 
 
As a global organisation, Oxfam is complex, characterised by intricate sets of relations 
among different strategic groups working at different “levels”.  Its history is long, 
complicated and often one of contestation. The main purpose of this chapter is to enable 
readers to understand the different research sites and the related organisational 
structures I refer to, as well as to introduce the cast of actors (Mosse, 2005b) and some 
of the research themes. The complex formal relations within OGB seemingly represent 
a connected organisation, as in the organograms and lines of reporting and 
communication, but staff often exercise autonomous authority within their respective 
spheres. 
 
OVERVIEW OF OXFAM GB 
History of expansion and change: a brief summary 
The Oxford Committee for Famine and Relief was established in 1942 in response to 
famine and sickness in Europe, especially Greece and Belgium, during World War II. In 
1949, it expanded its activities to other parts of the world. By 1958, it had raised about 
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£0.5 million, in cash and in kind, and was providing grants to 27 countries; by 1960, 
this number had grown to 56. National staff from countries where Oxfam was working 
were employed for the first time in 1969. 
 
In the 1970s, OGB’s international profile was raised when it broke an international 
embargo by providing relief to Cambodia, which was emerging from four years of 
genocide. Income doubled that year to nearly £24 million, including some £12m for 
Cambodia. The Cambodian crisis and other emergencies – such as the Ethiopian famine 
in the 1980s, the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s and the Asian tsunami of 2004 – have 
been key to the organisation’s growth in terms of income, staffing and programming. 
Each episode of rapid growth for the organisation corresponds with an international 
emergency (field notes). 
  
As with any large organisation, OGB’s history is one of continuous institutional change. 
One major shift occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the organisation 
underwent a radical restructuring process in order to become more “professional”. 
Previously, the structure and working culture were informal and decentralised: Oxfam 
had 34 relatively autonomous field offices, with some 1,700 staff loosely organised in in 
relatively independently groups. The restructuring process introduced a “host of 
supporting policies, guidelines and procedures to assist line managers in performing to 
common standards across departments, specialisms and geographies” (Internal 
document. OGB, 1998: n.r.)
48
. Field offices and their staff were brought into main of the 
organisation by having to follow common administrative policies and procedures. Also, 
this period saw a shift to include more advocacy as part of Oxfam’s campaigning efforts 
(Black, 1992).  
 
Later, in 1997/98, OGB undertook a strategic planning process, the Fundamental 
Review of Oxfam’s Strategic Intent (FROSI). FROSI responded to a recognition that 
the “the organisation [was] on a course of ifs and buts” (OGB, 1998: n.r.) and that a 
clearer mission was required, particularly given the changed global context. The review 
sought to provide a new sense of purpose with a shift from relief and emergency 
                                                 
48
 GADU team members would dispute that they were not ‘professional’, preferring instead to distinguish 
between “professionalization” and “managerialism”, with the latter concerned more with “managers, 
targets, performance indicators, quantitative measurements, a plethora of frameworks and short term 
goals”.  (Personal communication from former GADU-member)  
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response to addressing “poverty and suffering”. With FROSI came a new mission 
statement for OGB, as described below. Also, “change objectives” or Aims (mentioned 
in Chapter 1 and described further below), formulated as rights, were introduced as a 
way of focusing the organisation and developing consistency and coherency.  
 
As with the earlier organisational shift, FROSI was concerned with “professionalising” 
staff. The organisation adopted language from the private sector that concerned 
performance, strategy and knowledge management. It also resulted in a smaller 
governance structure by decreasing the size of OGB’s board and initiated a process of 
establishing regional management centres (RMCs) that were meant to move the 
organisation away from “a traditional hierarchy to an international network” (OGB, 
1998: n.r.). Accordingly, financial and human resources were shifted from Oxford to the 
RMCs and the role of Oxfam House was re-defined. FROSI was a also catalyst for a 
number of other changes that are relevant to the promotion of gender equality at 
different levels of the organisation, as described below. 
 
FROSI was also significant for Oxfam International (OI), the roots of which date back 
to 1963, when Oxfam Canada was the first overseas committee to be established outside 
of the UK and Ireland. Other overseas committees were subsequently established, 
mainly in Europe and the United States, which over time became independent national 
Oxfam office in these countries. By 1995, Oxfam International was established as a 
confederation of 15 independent Oxfam organisations including OGB
49
. The 
international secretariat, based in Oxford, is intended to support collaboration among 
the affiliates to increase their overall impact on poverty and injustice. With FROSI, the 
establishment of Aims was the first of a number of initiatives to develop a common 
basis around which OI affiliates could harmonise their work, as part of an overall 
commitment to work as an international confederation. 
 
Oxfam’s mission, aims and structure 
Revised as part of FROSI, OGB’s mission, as stated in Chapter 1, is “to work with 
others to alleviate poverty and suffering” and its values are empowerment, inclusiveness 
and accountability (Internal document. OGB, 2006g). The organisation states that its 
                                                 
49
 Oxfam International national affiliates include Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Quebec, Spain and the US. 
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work is based on a belief of the rights of individuals to be secure, skilled, healthy, safe, 
heard and equal (Internal document. OGB, n.d.-a). These five Aims subsume nine 
Strategic Change Objectives (SCOs). The SCOs, or long-term objectives, are supposed 
to guide the whole of the organisation and to be used to judge its impact (Internal 
document. OGB, n.d.-a). 
 
In 2005/06, OGB had 5,026 full time staff, of whom 1,239 were based in the UK and 
3,787 in regional and country offices (Internal document. OGB, 2005). Almost all UK-
based staff were British nationals whereas regional and country-level staff were 
generally from the countries where the respective office was located. Women comprised 
66% of all staff in the UK, and 33% of all staff in the country and regional offices 
(ibid). 
 
Broadly, the overall structure of OGB can be thought of in terms of three levels of 
activities - global, regional and country – each of which has a corresponding centre and 
respective remit (see Figure 2). It is a hierarchical organisation where supervision and 
the provision of financial and advisory support generally occur “downward” and 
reporting on compliance generally goes “upward”. A staff member’s relative position 
within the three levels is indicated by their respective job grade
50
. This is not to say, of 
course, that staff with the highest grades are based in Oxfam House. Within each of the 
levels of activities, there is a combination of differently ranked staff. Still, they are 
ranked relative to each other, despite being the same positions. For example, a Country 
Director may be the most senior at country level but answers to the Regional Director 
who in turn is subordinate to the Executive Director. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, Oxfam staff can be thought of in four broad descriptive 
categories that can be found at all three levels, although each category is not 
homogeneous
51
. First are senior managers who are vested with authority to make 
decisions on policy and budgets. They usually directly supervise a number of staff and 
                                                 
50
 OGB has a six-point grading system for staff at headquarters and those serving overseas on 
international contracts. In 2002, 2.3% were senior managers (Grade A), 9.5% were Grade B, 22.5% 
Grade C, 40.4% Grade D, F.14.7% Grade E and 10.5% Grade F (intranet.  Oxfam grades. 2002).  
51
 My overview does not include administrative staff, who work on internal functions of finance, human 
resource management and information technology.  
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sometimes, indirectly through these, teams of staff. They include, for example, Oxfam’s 
directors in Oxfam House and at the regional and country levels.  
 
A second category of staff are programme managers. These too are decision-making 
staff with responsibility for budgets and other staff, but they take on this role to a lesser 
degree than senior managers and their authority is limited to their respective area, such 
as programme policy. Their role generally is to oversee programme areas such as 
programme policy, campaigns and advocacy. 
 
Third are advisors – staff who are supposed to possess expertise in a specific area and 
are expected to advise other staff, such as managers or programme staff.  They generally 
do not have any decision-making authority.  
 
Fourth are programme staff, who take up a wide range of positions and implement 
activities related to campaigns and programmes. This category includes, for example, 
project officers in Country Offices and programme resource persons in Oxfam House. 
They do not have formal decision making authority but, as described in this thesis, can 
exercise decision making concerned with implementation. 
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Figure 2 The global, regional and country structure of OGB 
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Source: Oxfam intranet. 
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Oxfam House in Oxford 
Oxfam House is the organisation’s headquarters and included about 700 staff. It 
provided oversight for activities, was a locus for the organisation’s management 
functions – such as communications, finance and personnel – and ran global activities, 
namely, humanitarian responses and international campaigns. It was also the centre of 
Oxfam’s UK-based activities, such as fundraising and public awareness raising 
implemented through Oxfam’s “charity” shops and campaign offices. 
 
Oxfam House included the main corporate Directorate as well as six divisions and their 
respective departments. The Director
52
 reported to the trustees (the main governing 
structure of OGB), seven division directors reported to the Director and various division 
heads reported to their respective directors (see Figure 3)
53
. 
 
Figure 3 Organogram of Oxfam House  
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The divisions involved with “programmes” are the most relevant to this thesis. The 
International Division had 160 staff in Oxford (25% of Oxford’s staff) and was 
responsible for implementing all of Oxfam’s humanitarian and development 
programmes. In terms of the organisation as a whole, it was the largest division, with 
3,800 staff worldwide (72% of all Oxfam staff) and spent most of Oxfam’s budget, 
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 In 2007, the title “Chief Executive” replaced “Director”. This research uses the title “Director”. 
53
 The remainder of the UK-based staff, about 500 people, were worked in Oxfam’s offices in Scotland 
and Wales, in offices of the UK Poverty Programme or in Oxfam shops. 
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about 85%. The International Division Directorate was, however, small, with six staff, 
but was the centre for all of Oxfam’s humanitarian and development programmes. It 
was headed by the International Director, who had responsibility for international 
programmes, to whom the RMCs reported. 
 
The Campaigns and Policy Division was critical because this was where the gender 
advisors were located. It had 135 staff (20% of all Oxford staff), mostly based in Oxfam 
House, and worked in four interrelated areas including programme policy led by the 
Programme Policy Team. This group developed programme policy and strategies, 
supported the design and implementation of programmes and undertook research and 
publishing. It also played a key role in developing, facilitating and monitoring Oxfam’s 
strategic plans and, in particular, strategies for four of Oxfam’s five Aims54.  
 
Within the Programme Policy Team, the Social Policy and Governance Group included 
a number of global advisors, working on gender equality, institutional accountability, 
health and education. During the research period, this group underwent a change: in 
2000, it included four gender advisors; in 2002, new staff were hired to expand the team 
based in Oxfam House; but this decision was reversed in 2003 with the aim “to get more 
gender advisors out there in the realities”, according to a senior manager (Interview. 
Blair, 2007)
55
. By the end of 2006, two gender advisors remained in the Programme 
Policy Team, one had moved to work from the RMC in South Asia and three new 
regional advisors were hired to be based from the regions. This decision followed the 
overall FROSI rationale to place advisors closer to programming (Interview. Wright, 
2008). Still, the cut in gender specialists based in Oxfam House also had a particular 
purpose. As a senior manager explains  
 
We had a gender unit at the time I arrived and that got pruned down quite 
significantly with the view that it’s a gender mainstreaming thing, if you like, it’s 
that we actually have to get (advisors) embedded in our programmes. And having 
a small gender group here wasn't going to deliver it. (Interview. Pilkington, 2009) 
 
                                                 
54
 The fifth area concerns Oxfam’s humanitarian work and is led by the Humanitarian Department. 
55
 As stated previously, I use pseudonym throughout this thesis, except when drawing on published 
material available in the public domain. 
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As Chapters 5 and 6 describe, this move was more complex than the purported rationale 
of regionalisation and the establishment of RMCs, discussed next. 
 
Regional Management Centres: RMC for East Asia 
Oxfam had eight RMCs,
 56
 established in early 2000 under FROSI. OGB was careful 
not to portray this process as a decentralisation of decision making to the regional level, 
but as a matter of relocating staff closer to the countries where Oxfam was working so 
as to be better able to support them, according to a senior manager from the East Asia 
RMC (Interview. Heller, 2006). Regional directors were apparently given a fair amount 
of flexibility in establishing their RMC, although some key positions were mandatory, 
mostly in senior management and internal functions. As a result, there was a lot of 
diversity among the regions.  
 
RMCs oversaw programming in country offices in the region. For example, the RMC 
for East Asia, based in Bangkok, was responsible for six country offices
57
. Until 2004, 
Oxfam’s East Asia programme was one of the smallest regional programmes, with 
about 100 staff and an annual budget of £6.5 million (Internal report. OGB, 2004c). The 
2004 Asia tsunami changed this: in 2005, the regional programme had over 1,000 staff 
and a budget of £27.6 million (Internal report. OGB, 2006h). In 2006, OGB’s East 
Asian regional programme included activities in all five of the organisation’s 
programming areas, with “sustainable livelihoods” the largest58. Its support for gender 
equality was £3 million or about 5% of the regional budget (ibid).  
 
The East Asia RMC had five broad roles: providing “overall strategic leadership” for 
Oxfam in the region in terms of its programming and planning; overseeing programmes 
that included regional-projects as well as country-level projects
59
; supporting areas such 
                                                 
56
 RMCs cover the regions of Southern Africa; West Africa; Horn, East and Central Africa; South Asia; 
East Asia; Caribbean, Mexico and Central America; South America and Middle East; and Eastern Europe 
and Commonwealth of Independent States. All RMCs are located outside of the UK except the latter, 
which is based in Oxfam House. 
57
 Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor Leste and Vietnam. Oxfam also has 
programmes in North Korea, Burma and China (the latter through Oxfam Hong Kong). 
58
 Excluding the tsunami response. 
59
 In 2003, all of OGB’s projects in East Asia were reformulated to fall under one of 13 regional thematic 
programmes, for example sustainable livelihoods or gender equality, in order to promote greater learning 
within the themes and across countries. In 2005, these were dismantled as too unwieldy to manage and 
projects were reverted back to country-level programmes. The regional programming approach had also 
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as finance and human resources as well as specific programming areas; ensuring 
compliance with Oxfam policies, objectives, standards and procedures; and providing 
representation for Oxfam in the region (Interview. Heller, 2006).  
 
Two types of regional staff feature particularly in this research.  
 
Regional managers 
The Regional Director, the Regional Programme Manager
60
, a Regional Human 
Resource Manager and a Regional Finance Manager made up the regional management 
committee, which was the most senior decision-making body. Their authority was 
measured by two factors: their spending approval authority and their “accountability” to 
headquarters. In particular, the Regional Director and RPM were able to approve the 
highest level of spending within the regional level and reported directly to the Director 
of the International Division in Oxford.  
 
The RMC also had a role in influencing policy and planning in Oxford. On major 
Oxfam initiatives, such as strategic plans or new programmes, the regions were 
consulted and asked for feedback. According to a senior regional manager, however, it 
was not always clear how much influence they really had (Interview. Heller, 2006). 
Sometimes, Oxford initiatives to which the RMC had contributed came back to the 
RMC in an unrecognisable form. According to a senior regional manager, “What I am 
not sure about, is that once [the initiative] is articulated, how it influences back what we 
actually do on the ground” (Interview. Heller, 2006). For example, in 2006, a new 
gender strategic framework committed the organisation to allocating an unprecedented 
20% of its funds to gender work, which was news for the regional managers. As a senior 
manager at the time states, “Oxford tends to make standalone decisions. We’ll meet on 
AIDS and get all excited. We’ll meet on Aim 5 and get all excited. So we make 
pronouncements, plans, decisions in isolation of each other without consideration of the 
other” (Interview. Fitzgerald, 2006). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
created a conflict between those responsible for regional programmes and country managers (Interview. 
Heller, 2006). 
60
 In 2005, the RMC introduced a second, temporary, RPM to oversee the Indonesia programme as well 
as the Asian tsunami response in Aceh, as the tsunami response was so large. 
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For one senior regional manager, how such decisions were communicated determined 
how he responded and followed through with the rest of the region. “I am not cynical 
about it, I just think that there are often times in Oxfam where strong statements of 
intent are made, and I am waiting to see [the] specific purpose in mind. [Was it made] 
as an influencing strategy or […] in order to get a message across?” (Interview. Heller, 
2006).  
 
In terms of the 20% decision, such pronouncements offered room for interpretation. As 
Heller states (ibid), 
 
What I am saying to the team, don't start re-planning your whole programme 
because this is not coming down as a dictate and everyone has to spend 20%. This 
is an idea that has come out of the meeting with the Director of Oxfam, it’s going 
to feed into a strategy. For me what is important is the direction setting rather than 
the target. So don't get hung up on the 20% figure. Let's see where that goes. 
 
Another issue relates to the clarity and consistency of messages from Oxford. For 
example, while the importance of mainstreaming gender and the need to make progress 
on gender have been made clear, the message had not been consistent. As Heller states, 
“the steers have been few and far between” (ibid) concerning gender, while others were 
both clear and consistent, particularly those concerning control, compliance and 
authorisations. 
 
Regional advisors 
Regional advisors consisted of different regional staff – advisors and coordinators – 
who provided advice, “technical” knowledge and support to strengthen capacity of 
managers and programme staff at the country and, to a lesser degree, regional level. 
Most worked from the RMC in Bangkok, a few work from country offices in Hanoi, 
Manila, Jakarta or Phnom Penh
61
. There were seven regional advisors and coordinators, 
including one for gender equality. 
 
                                                 
61
 This is primarily for pragmatic reasons. Oxfam is allocated a limited number of visas for foreign 
workers by Thai officials, so some advisors have to work out of country offices. The assignment of a 
particular advisor to a particular country office is ad hoc. 
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The distinction between coordinators and advisors related to their relative involvement 
in country programmes. Both provided advice in support of programmes, but 
coordinators also managed programmes, undertook activities themselves and had 
financial responsibility. They usually had country-level counterparts with whom they 
worked individually and regionally. For example, the Regional Humanitarian 
Coordinator (RHC) worked with humanitarian teams in each country providing advice 
on programme design and implementation and would also led humanitarian responses if 
necessary
62
. The role of the advisors, on the other hand, was generally limited to 
providing advice and support in order to strengthen staff capacities. They did not have 
country-level counterparts with whom they worked on a consistent and on-going basis 
and did not manage programmes and finances. For example, the Regional Gender 
Advisor worked with any country programme staff who requested assistance and, in 
some cases, national gender staff where such position existed
63
. While regions were not 
told by Oxfam House, when establishing the RMCs, for which areas they needed to hire 
regional advisors,  there was “a clear expectation that people they’d hire were more 
grounded [than Oxford-based advisors], close to programme” (Interview. Blair, 2007).  
 
Both coordinators and advisors were involved in the design of programmes and the 
development of proposals, although their participation was not mandatory, except in the 
case of the Regional Gender Advisor (explained later); their involvement of advisors 
and coordinators was left to the initiative of country programme staff.  
 
Country programmes: Oxfam GB in Cambodia 
OGB had some 70 country offices. These oversaw the organisation’s activities at the 
country level, primarily including humanitarian and development programmes and 
projects but also national-level campaigns. Each country office was structured 
differently but shared common positions and structures. Here, I describe the country 
office of Cambodia as an example.  
 
                                                 
62
 Over the period of my research, there were for the most part three RHCs. Since the RHC during my 
fieldwork, was a male, I will use “him” as the pronoun when referring generally to the post of RHC. 
63
 During the time of this research, this was the case in Cambodia and Indonesia. 
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Staff of Oxfam GB Cambodia  
In 2006, the Oxfam GB Cambodia office had about 30 staff, all of whom were 
Cambodian nationals except for the Country Programme Manager (CPM)
64
 and assorted 
regional staff attached to the RMC in Bangkok. The annual budget for the programme 
was about £1 million, and the essential role of the office was to manage these funds 
according to OGB’s strategic plan for the country and organisation-wide policies and 
procedures. 
 
The CPM, a senior manager, oversaw country programme design and implementation, 
particularly “quality” and cost-effectiveness, and was meant to ensure compliance with 
OGB policies and procedures (Interview. Smith, 2006). He reported directly to Bangkok 
and supervised five staff – four programme coordinators and a Programme Services 
Manager (finance and administration)
65
. The CPM managed multiple demands, some of 
which were generated from the RMC while others originated from various departments 
in Oxford, which added to the complexity of relations between Oxford, Bangkok and 
Phnom Penh. He often acted as a filter, deciding what messages, often “mixed”, should 
get through to country staff. This was a matter of negotiation with Bangkok and Oxford 
as well as “pushing back” against “the beast”, as the CPM referred to the Oxfam 
organisational bureaucracy (ibid).  
 
Of the programme coordinators, two were male and two female at the time of research. 
All, except one woman ,were Cambodians and had been working with Oxfam for at 
least 10 years. The fourth, a Dutch national, had joined in 2006. Each coordinator 
managed up to 10 programme officers and project assistants and was responsible for a 
discrete programme comprised of a number of projects.  Programme officers managed 
projects implemented, in most cases, by “partners”, chiefly Cambodian NGOs. They 
were also responsible for monitoring, which mainly involved reviewing interim 
narrative and financial reports and undertaking field visits. Often, their work entailed 
reworking proposals submitted by partners to conform to Oxfam’s requirements or 
working with partners to revise their proposals to meet Oxfam criteria
66
. Applications 
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 This title was changed to Country Director in 2007. 
65
 While OGB employs both women and men CPMs, the CPM for Cambodia during the period of 
research was a man, and I will use the male pronoun when referring to this position more generally. 
66
 Shutt (2008: 184) notes how this was a process of “translating the ideas of the local NGOs into the 
official development discourse and frames of their own organisations”. 
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were reviewed by the relevant Programme Coordinator and approved, depending on the 
size of the budget, by the Programme Coordinator, the CPM, the Regional Programme 
Manager or the Regional Director.  
 
It was at this point, during approval processes, that regional advisors often became 
involved, if they were involved at all. Regional managers made continuous efforts to 
encourage earlier involvement of advisors; in the case of gender-related staff, 
programme staff were “expected to draw upon gender resource people at an early stage 
of the humanitarian intervention” (Internal document. OGB, 2002b: 2) . However, 
depending on the size of the project and therefore who needed to agree to it, being able 
to demonstrate that the relevant regional advisor had reviewed and commented on the 
proposal was likely to enhance its chances of being approved. I often observed 
Cambodian staff evoking the names of advisors in defence of projects for which they 
were facing criticism (field notes).  
 
At the interface between OGB and project partners, the role of programme officers, as 
described by the organisation itself, was likened to the narrow part of an hourglass (field 
notes). They channelled all of OGB’s policies, strategies and procedures from a myriad 
of different sources within the organisation into complex and multifaceted 
environments
67
. Having to address difficult issues and deal with a range of Cambodian 
NGOs in what were almost always complicated relations, they were often overwhelmed 
and overburdened. In one staff meeting, programme officers
 
likened the magnitude of 
their pressures to that of a “whale”. Unlike regional or country managers, programme 
officers were rarely able to “push back” against “the beast”. Still, as described in later 
and in Chapters 7 and 8, they can exercise some discretion when it comes to working 
with “project partners” and community members68.  
 
                                                 
67
 In a presentation to the Council, the Head of the Programme Policy Team referred to programme 
officers experiencing “programme paralysis” owing to the different Oxfam requirements imposed on 
them. These include remembering Oxfam’s rights-based approach, contributing to Oxfam International 
campaigns and mainstreaming gender, among a litany of others (Internal document. OGB, 2005). 
68
 Similarly, Shutt (2008) challenges the popular perception that national staff of international NGOs take 
on the “(assumed) rationality” of their employers and have little discretion. She contends that such staff, 
while influenced by the organisation’s policies, also exercise “agency in ways that affected what 
transpired within relationships with local NGO” (ibid: n.r.). Still, in the case of OGB, I found staff facing 
a deluge of policies and procedures they were not able to totally resist; while they did exercise agency, 
such pressures affected their relations with partners and communities. 
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One role that they could not negotiate was the need to disburse funds. This was 
mentioned on numerous occasions throughout the organisation, not just in Cambodia, 
although the “pressure” stemmed from different sources. At the country level, 
programmes were provided with a financial allocation every year from the RMC. This 
was often established as part of an annual process, whereby country programmes 
estimated their financial needs and negotiated with the RMC, which more often than not 
did not have sufficient resources to meet all countries’ requests. Once country budgets 
were set, the funds had to be spent within a given fiscal year
69
 or would be returned to 
the general budget of the organisation. Under-spending usually occurred in the early 
part of the year, when staff were busy and there were delays in partners submitting 
proposals and Oxfam approving them. This resulted in a rush to spend funds allocated 
for 12 months within a shorter period. Although Oxfam managers actively discouraged 
rapid spending in a short period of time, for fear that quality would suffer (for example, 
see Internal communication. OGB, 2005a), spending of funds in the latter part of the 
fiscal year was common
70
.  
 
“Partnership” among unequals 
In 2006, Oxfam was working with some 20 “partners” in Cambodia, the majority 
established Cambodian NGOs and two of which were women’s organisations. The three 
Cambodian NGOs included in the gender impact assessment (TD, NRI and BIC)
71
 
undertaken as part of my research were illustrative of the types of organisations Oxfam 
worked with.   
 
OGB’s partners varied in size and scope. NRI was national in scope and based in 
Phnom Penh. Established in 1997, it used a typical hierarchal management structure 
with a director, coordinators and project officers. NRI had about 60 staff and worked in 
some 300 villages in 14 provinces across the country. Focusing on “ecological 
agriculture” and rural development, the organisation claimed to work with over 100 
international and Cambodian organisations, seven of which had been long-term 
supporters. OGB had been providing project funds to NRI since 2000.  
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 From 1 April to 31 March, for OGB, 
70
 Pressure to spend funds sometimes comes from Oxford, when the organisation is able to raise funds for 
a particular humanitarian situation, such as the Asian Tsunami of 2004. 
71
 These are fictitious names. 
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In contrast, BIC and TD worked exclusively in one province, where they were based. 
BIC, set up by Cambodians returning from refugee camps in Thailand in the early 
1990s, focused on community development and building civil society in northern 
Cambodia. It helped to establish and support different self-help groups in agriculture, 
savings and traditional Khmer dance and music. BIC had 16 staff and was non-
hierarchical: staff rotate roles and responsibilities and decisions were made by 
consensus (Simmons and Bottomley, 2001). OGB had supported BIC since the mid-
1990s as one of five long-term donors. 
 
TD was started as an Oxfam project but became an organisation in 1996. It also works 
in community development, with a focus on agriculture, fishing, small business, forestry 
and disaster management in south-eastern Cambodia. Operating in some 20 villages, it 
was a small organisation with a structure that followed that of NRI, although on a 
smaller basis. In 2006, OGB was the organisation’s key funder, supporting its 
sustainable livelihoods programme and “co-implementing” the CBDM project. 
 
Relations between international and Cambodian NGOs are often portrayed as ones of 
unequal power, mainly because international NGOs hold the purse strings (O'Leary and 
Meas Nee, 2001, Yonekura Yukiko, 2000)
72
. More nuanced portrayals highlight the 
agency of Cambodian NGOs and their staff, who are in a position to negotiate terms and 
conditions and gain benefit from what is otherwise portrayed as a constraining 
relationship and oppressive procedures and requirements (Shutt, 2008). Few studies 
interrogate the relations between Cambodians who work for international NGOs and 
those who work for Cambodian NGOs. As Shutt (ibid: n.r.) suggests, such relations are 
less concerned with Northern and Southern divides but still are concerned with power, 
mediated by “the attitudes, behaviour and relative levels of empowerment of the 
individuals concerned”. These themes of agency and negotiation are explored further in 
Chapter 8 and 9.  
 
 “Following the line” and “Feeding the beast” 
As previously suggested, development organisations are bureaucracies: they are 
hierarchical, have a strong divisions of labour and operate by their own “procedural and 
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 This situation of course is not limited to Cambodia. See Fowler (1998 and 2000) and Wallace et al. 
(2006). 
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cognitive mind-sets” (Razavi, 1998: 38). They also function as oligarchies where 
authority is vested in a select few, so-called managers. But within this category there too 
is a hierarchy: directors are managers with ultimate authority within particular remits 
with the Director having overall authority. Managers have authority usually over a 
particular programme area but are under the authority of Directors and/or more senior 
managers. The remainder, often generically referred to as “staff”, have little authority 
and are subordinate to their respective managers. Lastly, there are advisors, personnel 
who have status, due to an assumed level of expertise for which they are hired, but little 
decision making or control over budgets. Their power comes in their ability to access 
and influence managers and, more critically, directors. This understanding of OGB 
resonates with Eberle and Maeder’s (1997: 65) assertion of how to research 
organisations ethnographically: “the organizational ethnographer must be aware that 
different hierarchical and functional positions within an organization evoke different 
systems of meaning, different practices, different perspectives and voices.”   
 
Goetz and Sandler (2007: 166) describe development bureaucracies as “a little like 
armies – they are complex chains of command in which rank is a key determinant of 
what gets prioritized and becomes actionable”. In the OGB lexicon, following the chain 
of command when giving orders is referred to as working “through the line”. For 
example, in describing how the gender policy is implemented, a senior manager 
describes this as “Accountability…through the line. To deliver Aim 5 (gender and 
diversity), for the regional directors, it is through the line to do it” (Interview. Blair, 
2007). Similarly, a senior regional manager describes one of the roles of the RMCs as a 
“straightforward managerial function, that we are part of the line, to make sure 
performance management” (Interview. Heller, 2006). “Up the line” refers to navigating 
the organisation’s pecking order. For example, when advising staff how they could 
contribute to OGB’s 2007 strategic plan, Stocking advised them that “the best way is 
through your line management” (Internal communication. Stocking, 2006). 
 
The “line” describes both the chain of command, from which one cannot deviate, and a 
boundary, based on position and the authority vested in it, that cannot be crossed. “Line 
managers”, staff along the chain of hierarchy, are meant to control how staff “fall into 
line”; the “line” is concerned primarily with reporting and compliance. Still, this is not 
to say that organisations operate this way on a day-to-day basis. Throughout the “line” 
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are acts of defiance: the selective following of rules and uptake of dictates, as well as 
interpretations of what gets communicated. As noted previously, regional and country 
managers often use the term “the beast” to describe OGB’s bureaucracy. While 
completing paperwork or complying with procedures is sometimes referred to as 
“feeding the beast”, finding ways to navigate through the organisation is referred to as 
“fighting the beast”.  
 
This suggests a complicated set of relationships between different sites of OGB. On the 
one hand, there is the formal structure of command along the line that managers use to 
execute policy and decisions. For the most part, senior managers take this route despite 
sometimes also acknowledging that the degree to which they can decree is limited. 
When subordinate managers do not “fall into line”, they are seen as exceptions and dealt 
with accordingly. 
 
The view from below is not that much different, particularly in terms of the formal 
recognition of the hierarchical structure. Regional and country managers understand 
their roles and responsibilities within the line either in terms of following the line 
(downwards) or feeding the beast upwards. Their roles are also concerned with 
“managing” the flow of information and power in order to protect others from the 
“beast”. 
 
While the observation of both formal and informal ways of working within 
organisations is not new and has been made by others (Wright, 1994) and certainly by 
OGB staff at different levels, what is interesting is the relative orthodoxy about how 
things work. For senior managers in Oxfam House, their overriding belief is the ability 
of Oxford to make things happen through the line, despite acknowledgements that this 
does not always happen. For regional and country level senior managers, part of 
fighting the beast is to follow the rules but with the acknowledgement of the latitude 
they do have given the fallacy of the “line”. As a senior regional manager states 
 
I have this image of Oxfam [House]…trying to steer things, to make things 
happen, with puppets and strings. But actually what they didn't realize, right at 
the bottom, the strings aren’t actually connected. So actually the puppets are 
doing whatever they want to do and people that are writing the strategy [in 
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Oxford] do what they want…and the two things are not really joined up…So the 
idea that there is this command and control system where you issue something 
globally and it happens, it just doesn't happen.  (Interview. Heller, 2006) 
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FROM GADU TO GENDER MAINSTREAMING: SHIFTS IN STRATEGIES 
 
Introduction 
Women have been a concern for OGB since its early days, but it was not until the 
1980s, when it established its Gender and Development Unit (GADU), that the 
organisation first started viewing women beneficiaries as other than one group of 
vulnerable people
73
. In 1993 OGB established its first Gender Policy, in 1998 gender 
equality became one of the organisation’s long term objectives or SCOs and in 2003 
gender mainstreaming became a corporate priority (Internal document. OGB, 2003c). 
 
While the term was officially endorsed by the organisation in 2003, its usage can be 
traced back to 1994 (Presentation. Gell, 2001), when OGB established its Gender Policy 
Implementation Strategy (Internal document. Oxfam UK/Ireland, 1994) that included 
actions to integrate gender concerns into its analysis, accountability systems, strategic 
planning, monitoring and evaluation. As Gell (2001: n.r.) notes, however, “no profound 
transformation in structure and culture was envisioned”. Since then, the term was used 
in various reviews of OGB’s gender work and, later, adopted by the organisation’s 
managers. For example, the 1997 Gender Mapping Project identified a number of 
strengths in Oxfam’s analysis, women-focused projects, publishing and capacity 
building. It also concluded that mainstreaming was invisible and identified three areas 
for mainstreaming: “through the one programme approach across divisions, in Oxfam’s 
work on organisational development and diversity, and in the international programme” 
(Internal report. Rahman and Roche, 1998: 50).  
 
As mentioned previously, OGB conducted a strategic planning exercise culminating in 
the 1998 FROSI report that had a significant impact on the organisation and how gender 
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 In 1946, the Oxfam Committee for Famine and Relief highlighted that in particular “women and 
children, the old and the sick will suffer greatly…Your donation will save the lives of women and 
children” (cited in Whitaker, 1983: 16). Archival records concerning women and gender issues within 
OGB prior to GADU, however, are limited and mostly found in The Oxfam Field Directors Handbook 
(Oxfam UK/Ireland, 1976), which included “few specific references to women” (Internal report. 
Hardiman, 1979: 1). The second edition does acknowledge this shortcomings and need for improvement. 
See Eade (1999) for an account of incorporation of gender issues in this edition.  
 
There was also, prior to GADU, a Women’s Group, established in 1987 (also referred to as the Women’s 
Group on the Equal Opportunities Working Party), at Oxfam House, which included women interested in 
different issues affecting them “directly and indirectly” (Internal communication. The Women’s Group: 
n.d.).   
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mainstreaming was to be positioned within it. This is not to say that the review itself 
was particularly focused on gender issues; while it took women into account in its 
analysis, the proposed overall strategic directions were gender unaware
74
, save for the 
inclusion of gender equity as one of the Aims. Rather, it was the initiatives and changes 
resulting from FROSI and what it included – a shift to a rights approach, regionalisation 
– and excluded, that facilitated a deepening of gender mainstreaming. For example, 
Terry’s report (Internal report., 2000: 3), “Developing the Strategic Change Objective 
on Gender Equity”, intends “to develop thinking on the gender equity” as one of the 
Aims. It proposes a “‘rights’ approach to gender equity” that required integrating or 
mainstreaming gender concerns not only in the other Aims but into all programming 
processes in such a way that “all [OGB] interventions […] help to create ‘empowering 
situations’ for women, whether personal, political or economic” (ibid: 17).  
 
A reading of the Terry report provides insight on two issues. While highlighting gender 
mainstreaming and noting that it was “identified by [the senior manager team] as a 
responsibility for all managers” (ibid: 5), Terry also repeatedly calls for research into 
what gender mainstreaming means for OGB, acknowledging that others are struggling 
with the concept, particularly gender and organisational development. Second, Terry 
builds upon FROSI’s acknowledgment that women are disproportionately affected by 
poverty and makes the argument that while women’s equal rights is a route to “wider 
social and economic benefits”, they are important unto themselves. Drawing on 
FROSI’s stress on poverty and rights, Terry extends this to a “gender approach to 
poverty” and, emphasises, citing Sen, that poverty is not just material but concerns 
capabilities and achievements. This allows Terry to expound on how gender inequality 
is reproduced (within and in the household and in the market) and how achieving 
women’s rights across all of OGB’s Aims requires an understanding of the mutually 
reinforcing processes of gender inequality and gendered poverty. This is significant 
because Terry brings to the post-FROSI period a similar analysis that informed OGB’s 
1993 Gender Policy as well as the early work of OGB in gender and development, as 
described later. This stands in contrast to the 2003 update of the Gender Policy and 
understandings of the relationship between gender inequality and poverty during the 
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 During the time of the strategic review, gender was being considered. For example, the Gender 
Mapping Project review, cited previously, was undertaken during FROSI that “need[ed] to inform and be 
informed” by the 1998 gender review (Internal report. Rahman and Roche, 1998: 1). 
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period of this research, discussed in Chapter 5. Additionally, according to a gender 
advisor at the time, Terry’s  paper laid the basis for the 2002 Gender Review, discussed 
in Chapter 5 as well (Interview. Moore, 2011). 
 
Also in 2000, OGB’s senior management committee, the Corporate Management Team, 
agreed to a number of gender mainstreaming organisational requirements, such as the 
need for management responsibility and performance management to include gender 
criteria (Internal communication. Trujillo, 2000a). This was in response to another paper 
(Internal report. Trujillo, 2000b) other than Terry (2000) developed the same year
75
. 
Moreover, gender mainstreaming was then seen as relevant for the whole organisation 
where each division was required to develop gender mainstreaming objectives, and 
various “acupuncture points” were identified: finance, information management 
systems, the SCOs and the RMCs criteria (Internal report. Trujillo, 2000b). 
 
As FROSI did not include a substantial analysis of the organisation’s gender work, 
OGB undertook an extensive gender review in 2002 (Mohideen, 2002), discussed more 
fully in Chapter 5. Among its many recommendations, it called for further gender 
mainstreaming, and one result was OGB formally defining gender mainstreaming as “a 
process of ensuring that all of our work, and the way we do it, contributes to gender 
equality by transforming the balance of power between women and men” (Internal 
document. Gell and Motla, 2002: 5). Another, previously mentioned, was its adoption as 
a corporate priority in 2003.  
 
Gender mainstreaming progressively became part of the gender discourse in OGB: 
initially as part of a strategy to implement its Gender Policy, then as a management-
sanctioned requirement and later as a corporate priority. This increasing endorsement 
and adoption of gender mainstreaming is not, however, the only part of OGB’s history 
of engaging with gender and development issues.  
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 The Trujillo (2000b) review was based in interviews with Oxfam House staff and a review of FROSI 
related documentation including the gender mapping review (Rahman, 1998) but not Terry’s paper, which 
had been produced earlier in the year. Both the Terry (2000) and Trujillo (2006b) reports were written by 
 
short term, temporary OGB gender staff. (Interview, (Moore, 2011).   
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The legacy of Oxfam’s Gender and Development Unit 
 
The closure of GADU is unfinished business for Oxfam, which must be addressed 
before it can move forward effectively on SCO 5-1, and on gender mainstreaming 
in the organisation, more broadly defined. 
Internal report. Murison, 2002 
 
The history of the promotion of gender equality within and by OGB is a compelling and 
contested one. As Murison states above, a key feature of this history is Oxfam’s Gender 
and Development Unit (GADU). GADU is well known for its pioneering work within 
the organisation and its contribution to gender and development thinking more broadly 
within DNGOs. This section traces GADU’s history in order to situate the promotion of 
gender equality and the increasing implementation of gender mainstreaming as a 
strategy within OGB during the period of this research.  
 
To understand GADU, it is necessary to appreciate that there are different versions of its 
history (Williams, 1999): different actors who were involved over its 12 years of 
existence
76
 have different perspectives
77
. Also, GADU existed during a particular time 
and within specific circumstances within and outside of OGB, which need to be taken 
into account including the backdrops of gender and development research and 
scholarship as well as socio-political contexts within the UK and more globally at the 
time. Also, the challenges and opportunities GADU faced were during a certain era of 
OGB, and its history needs to be understood within the situation of organisational 
change (Interview. Stamstead, 2011) as well as changing organisational gender norms 
within which the Unit was working. What were acceptable attitudes and behaviours 
then, particularly about and towards women, would be frowned on today (Melrose, 
1999). Lastly, the history of GADU, as a stand-alone unit within an organisation, needs 
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 There is even a lack of agreement on the timeline of GADU. Some refer to GADU as existing from 
1985 to 1992, which is technically accurate, as it was then renamed the Gender Team (Porter et. al., 
1999a: 13). Others (Murison, 2002; Williams, 1999) view GADU as existing until 1996, when the Gender 
Team was merged with the Programme Development Team to become the Gender and Learning Team 
(GALT). For the purposes of this thesis, I use the latter timeline, given that 1996 represented a major shift 
as well as for ease of reference.  
77
 GADU was established 27 years ago and disbanded 13. While its history is the subject of several 
publications and is relatively well discussed, archival information of the historical record is selective. 
There is, for example, very little detailed documentation of internal GADU relations from 1993 to 1996. 
Memories of those involved are also patchy and selective not least because for some, the experience of 
working with GADU was personally painful. 
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to be understood within the wider trend, described in Chapter 2, of such structures 
giving way to gender mainstreaming, which was occurring more generally in 
development agencies. 
 
I argue that GADU represented a particular era for OGB in its gender efforts as well as 
DNGOs more generally. As a focus of gender for the organisation, it faced particular 
challenges that were unique to what was happening at the time in OGB and the gender 
discourse being introduced. This is not to suggest that GADU did not face challenges 
that gender units in other organisations faced: for example the unit was constantly 
under-resourced and lacked authority as a result of its “advisory role”. During the latter 
half of the 1990s, these constraints became more pronounced and symptomatic of what 
stand-alone units in organisations were facing, in OGB as elsewhere: a dismantling of 
dedicated units under the guise of gender mainstreaming (Staudt, 2002). But, ironically, 
it was GADU’s role as a pioneer that both built OGB’s gender reputation externally, 
while internally for some, left a legacy of how NOT to do gender. All organisations 
have periods of angst and change, but gender for OGB was unique, as described below. 
Also, the GADU experience foreshadowed a number of recurring issues with gender 
work in OGB.  
 
Getting gender on the agenda 
The impetus for GADU came largely from OGB’s field offices and women’s 
organisations (Williams, 1999), who expressed concern that the organisation was 
lagging behind other development organisations in taking on gender issues. Catalytic 
were the arrival of the new Director, David Bryer, of the then Overseas Division, the 
department responsible for international work as well as lobbying by GADU staff. As 
Bryer states in his first memo as Director, “there is a very considerable measure of 
agreement that Oxfam needs to do more than pay lip service […] it has become clear 
that there also needs to be an equal commitment in Oxford” (Archival communication. 
Bryer, 1984). 
 
Moreover, GADU was established during a critical period for women in the global 
arena. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women was adopted in 1979. The 1980 Copenhagen World Conference on Women 
made progress compared with more fractious 1975 conference in Mexico. And the 
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Nairobi Conference, marking the end of UN Decade for Women, occurred in the same 
year GADU was established. As Williams wrote, when asked about Oxfam’s efforts 
during UN Decade for Women, “I could save my bacon and refer to the creation of the 
Unit, and the work going on in Latin America now” (Archival communication. 
Williams, 1985c).  
 
Overall, this was a period of global social activism against the backdrop of what Young 
(1993: 31) calls “the lost decade of the 1980s”. The global economy was in crisis, 
external debt was crippling developing countries as were structural adjustment policies, 
which particularly adversely impacted women (Sen and Grown, 1985). For 
organisations such as OGB, it was a time of political action, alongside feminist demands 
for a “new agenda not the integration of women into dysfunctional structures and 
systems” (Williams, 1999: 180). This passion and commitment were said to imbue not 
only OGB but also the early days of GADU, as voices of Southern feminists were 
highlighted through the work of Southern-oriented organisations such as DAWN. 
Within UK development circles, women in various development agencies were 
lobbying internally for gender issues to be addressed within programmes and their own 
institutions (Interview, Stamstead, 2011). 
 
GADU’s original aims were to “act as a resource group for Field Offices and the 
Overseas Division and keep the issue of women in development to the forefront in 
Oxfam” and to ensure “practical measures […] for implementation in the field” 
(Meeting minutes. Oxfam UK/Ireland, 1985). What these relatively straight forward, yet 
significant, aims fail to reflect were the challenges GADU would face in getting gender 
on the agenda, let alone keeping it at the “forefront”. This was a time of pioneering – 
and with this came difficulties relating to the newness of the term and the idea of 
“gender”, and differences in understandings of the implications for the organisation, the 
role of GADU and its unique structuring. 
 
First, as a term, “gender” was new to most of Oxfam. As an idea, gender was 
understood as a way of seeing the position of women from a relational perspective, 
which was unique for the organisation. GADU was also concerned with understanding 
and connecting gender with other unequal social relations of class, caste, age, education, 
etc. (Walker, 1996). For GADU members, “Gender issues call just about everything into 
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question and so I expect we shall be looking closely at all issues, global or otherwise” 
(Archival communication. Williams, 1985a).  
 
These concerns reflected gender and development thinking at the time, particularly in 
the UK and the Institute of Development Studies at University of Sussex, with whom 
GADU staff were in contact. For example, its short-term training courses, such as 
“'Women, Men and Development” (Kabeer, 1991) was popular among NGOs such as 
OGB. Both drew upon earlier work of the SOW collective (Young et al., 1981), 
discussed previously, and its conference proceedings (IDS, 1979) were widely 
disseminated gender and development reference. GADU staff were also working with 
Caroline Moser, who together with Caren Levy, were  providing training in gender and 
development planning at the University of London, amongst others such as Kate Young, 
also a former IDS fellow. 
 
Second, for GADU, seeing gender and development from a relational and social 
institutional perspective meant challenging Oxfam. For example, its first workshop held 
in 1985, “Forward Looking Strategies for Oxfam”78, concluded that “A complete 
change […] is needed – piecemeal changes are not sufficient to improve the position of 
women; what is needed is not more women at the top, but fewer people at the top; the 
present structure is male-dominated, over-vertical, and static” (ibid: 6). And this was the 
first meeting, held within the first year of GADU’s existence. Still, these implications, 
and the potential for conflict, were also evident to others. For example, in reaction to the 
proposal for such a unit, a senior manager understood that taking initiative on gender 
issues “would lead us towards an entirely different kind of working style” (Archival 
communication. Brown, 1985). Similarly, Bridget Walker, one of GADU’s first staff 
members stated, noted that GADU concerned “a new language, new ways of learning 
and working” (Walker, 1996: 7). 
 
Yet, while perhaps clear to GADU and other select Oxfam staff, there were also 
differences in understandings of gender and organisational change and GADU’s role in 
this, which was evident in different perspectives on seeing GADU as a temporary or 
permanent feature within the organisation. From the beginning, Bryer envisioned 
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 The title of which was play on the “Forward Looking Strategies” resulting from the 1985 Nairobi 
World Conference on Women. 
  
Chapter 4 The Research Context 97 
GADU “not as a permanent institution but as a ginger and resource group with a 
lifespan of perhaps two to three years” (Archival communication. Bryer, 1984). 
However, Williams laments how GADU was always seen as a temporary, with the 
writing on the wall from the first days (Williams, 1999). 
 
Third, the role of GADU was seen differently from its inception. The Overseas 
Division’s Director and GADU’s first Coordinator generally agreed on the unit’s aims, 
but Bryer also saw it as a “monitoring group on, for example, the production of 
campaign materials to see the [issue] is not overlooked” (sic) (Archival communication. 
Bryer, 1984) whereas Williams suggested it build “on the experience from Field Offices 
for the formation of policy on gender issues” (Archival communication. Williams, 
1985c.  My emphasis). 
 
The ambiguity of the role of GADU was an on-going issue. During its first year, staff 
had to make continuous efforts to clarify GADU’s function (Archival communication. 
Wright, 1985) and a lack of familiarity in the organisation with its role and approach. 
The unit also faced an inability to reach out to the organisation as a result of overwork 
and limited resources. These contributed to GADU being seen as threatening and not 
engaging (Internal document. GADU, 1986b). Meanwhile, GADU was caught between 
competing expectations of being a resource and taking initiative. On the one hand, it 
was seen as needing to be responsive and was admonished when it took initiative. On 
the other, it was criticised when it failed “to ensure that decisions and issues reflect a 
Gender prospective” (Meeting minutes. GADU, 1987). Relatedly was an ongoing 
debate of the unit’s remit. While GADU acknowledged that changes in the “Overseas 
Programme [required] changes in attitude and structures within Oxfam itself” (Internal 
report. Williams, 1985b: 4), it did not have a remit to address organisational structure 
and staff policy issues.  
 
Fourth, GADU was challenging in terms of its structure and the organisational context. 
The unit itself was a cooperative, without hierarchy in terms of structure, decision 
making and pay grades. Its founders wanted “to break the mould of hierarchical, top-
down working” (Wallace, 1999: 190): they saw GADU as a “women’s organisation 
within a men’s organisation” and aimed to set an example for Oxfam as a whole 
(Williams, 1999: 180). OGB itself, however, was fairly loosely structured with mainly 
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men, in charge (Williams, 1999). Within Oxfam House itself, staff tended to work in 
silos with little interaction and coordination. This informal structuring also worked in 
GADU’s favour, though. GADU staff in the early days had a direct link to David Bryer, 
who remained open and supportive to GADU. His penchant for face-to-face 
communication, according to an early GADU member (Interview, Stamstead. 2011), 
was conducive to informal discussions and exchanges
79
.  
 
GADU was originally conceived as being composed of representatives from various 
area desks within the Overseas Division, who came to comprise the GADU committee. 
This committee proved indispensable for GADU, enabling it to communicate with the 
organisation and to learn about what was happening. Meetings were regular, well 
attended
80
 and served as a basis for information sharing among people concerned with 
gender issues.  
 
Still, while GADU was in many ways the antithesis of Oxfam, the unit undertook a 
number of other initiatives that proved to be foundational. It regularly organised 
presentations in Oxfam House and compiled articles and case studies, often written by 
Oxfam staff, that comprised the Newspack, produced six times a year and to be 
distributed to all field offices. The earlier Newspacks served as a basis for Oxfam’s 
1991 Changing Perceptions: Writings on Gender and Development, one of the first of a 
long tradition of the organisation publishing key texts on gender and development, 
another contribution of GADU.  
 
Much of GADU’s focus was on the field offices, not only through the Newspack and 
publications but also through training. In 1986, GADU had a full-time training advisor 
and a training strategy. It could not keep up with demand (Internal report. Seed, 1990) 
and had to scale down its plans, but these early years served as a basis for the 
development, much later, of Oxfam’s Gender Training Manual (Williams et al., 1995), 
which remains one of the organisation’s bestselling publications (Interview, Saunders, 
2008). 
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 It also makes archival research difficult. Despite numerous memos, reports and other communications 
from GADU to Bryer, Oxfam records include hardly any correspondence from him. 
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 Based on a reading of minutes from 1986 and 1987 of the committee’s bi-monthly meetings. 
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Besides the early years being characterised by a number of seminal initiatives, this 
period was marked by constant struggles. GADU members faced resistance and 
hostility. For example, GADU first annual report, which records “very deep resistance 
to accepting gender as an issue” (Archival communication. GADU, 1986a). This was 
manifested in different ways, from putting the onus for gender solely on GADU to 
shifting responsibility between the Overseas Division and the field; from not wanting to 
interfere with other “cultures” to accusations of cultural imperialism (ibid) 81. 
Meanwhile, Wallace writes how staff experienced “overt verbal hostility from staff in 
the UK and overseas”, with the most hurtful from European colleagues. They were 
treated suspiciously, with comments like, “What are you GADU ladies plotting today?” 
(Williams, 1996). For one of the founders, being interviewed for this research brought 
up painful memories, some 20 years after the fact
82
. 
 
As indicated previously, GADU was literally a women’s organisation within a male-
dominated one. A macho culture pervaded, whereby “organisational culture equated 
commitment with long hours spent at work” (Wallace, 1999: 189). As one informant 
states, “It was a world where [political correctness] was not yet enforced and personal 
attacks were ignored by [human resource managers]” (personal communication). In 
light of this, GADU members found themselves constantly having to prove themselves, 
in part because they were always being scrutinised, with “every fault magnified” 
(Williams, 1999), and in part because of the “radical demands that working on gender 
issues involves” (Wallace, 1999: 188).  
 
From GADU to the Gender Team 
OGB’s restructuring in the late 1980s and early 1990s, described previously, was 
supported by external consultants from the private sector who, according to one GADU 
member at the time, “didn’t understand what Oxfam was about” (Interview, Stamstead, 
2011). It focused on results, performance and increasing the organisation’s market share 
and shifted from field work to campaigning and advocacy. The informal style of 
working became more formalised, which sat uneasily for many staff who saw this as 
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 These are now well-documented resistance strategies documented by others (for example, see 
GIDP/UNDP, 2000). 
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 Moser (1993: 117) also documents hostility and resistance and the personal nature of these, suggesting 
that this is a common pattern. “When gender is first raised as an issue it is often dismissed as a joke; then 
personal attacks occur that question the sexuality of individuals”. 
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inimical to a focus on poverty (Williams, 1999). For gender advocates within OGB, 
there was a “profound unease” with these developments; they questioned their 
conduciveness to the “values of feminism and gender equality” (Porter et al., 1999a: 7). 
GADU was restructured and renamed the Gender Team in 1993; instead of reporting to 
the Overseas Director, it went through a series of line managers, effectively removing it 
from the locus of decision making (Interview, Stamstead, 2011).  
 
Within the unit, the number of staff was reduced to two from four, and their roles were 
perceived as being under-valued by the organisation. For example, the coordinator 
position was given a ranking of Grade 12, whereas department coordinators with similar 
responsibilities were Grade 13. At stake was the value of GADU’s work. As one of 
GADU advisors stated, in turning down the proposed Grade 12, “I personally feel that 
both my job and myself as a person are so consistently undervalued by Oxfam that 
securing a more appropriate grade is an absolute priority for me” (Archival 
communication. Stamstead, 1989b).  
 
With formal job descriptions, staff structures and reporting lines, membership of the 
GADU committee changed from those who were interested and committed to those who 
formally represented their departments. Over time, attendance waned, as participation 
was not in job descriptions and the committee was not included in the new 
organisational structure. Ironically, as a self-fulfilling prophecy, this contributed to 
GADU becoming isolated from the rest of the organisation, which supported 
accusations that the unit had become ghettoised and thereby needed to be brought into 
the fold of the organisation (Wallace, 1999)
83
. The restructuring of OGB was the 
antithesis of GADU (Wallace, 1999). It was conceived as a cooperative with no 
hierarchy; the new structure emphasized hierarchy. GADU was about informal ways of 
working, understood as creative and conducive for gender work; the re-structuring 
formalized structure. GADU was about shared decision making; the changes in OGB 
concerned a concentration of power.  
 
The Gender Team period was also marked by a number of milestones. One was the 
approval of Oxfam’s Gender Policy in 1993 after years of lobbying and two years of 
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consultation across the organisation. This followed compulsory and voluntary training 
for managerial and advisory staff in an effort to build understanding and consensus. 
There was also a major effort leading up to and during the Beijing conference with the 
Women’s Linking Project, seen as an innovative networking, mobilising and advocacy 
initiative with Southern feminists and gender advocates (March, 1999) and a 
manifestation of the Gender Policy. Oxfam produced significant publications, such as 
the Gender Training Manual and a guide to gender analysis frameworks (March et al., 
1999). 
 
Also, the organisation seems to have moved beyond the “getting gender on the agenda” 
phase to a more receptive organisational environment where the concept of gender-fair 
development seemed to have gained legitimacy (Piza-Lopez, 1994: 166). Gender was 
no longer a new term, although it was still often misunderstood (Williams, 1999). 
Gender training was popularised, particularly in the country offices, but stopped in 
Oxfam House in 1991 (Seed, 1999). Piza-Lopez, Walker and other contributors to 
gender works: Oxfam Experience in Policy and Practice refer to not only a substantial 
change in support for and appreciation of gender issues, but also an insertion of gender 
into the mainstream of OGB and an engendering of organisational processes to be 
utilised as entry strategies (see Walker, 1999 for example). However, they also note that 
to what degree gender permeated the organisation and was actually being taken on were 
questionable. 
 
As mentioned previously, it was this period that the strategy of gender mainstreaming 
was adopted in name if not in practice as well. Gell (Internal communication. 2001) 
cites the 1994 Gender Policy Implementation Strategy as one of the earliest Oxfam 
policies on gender mainstreaming (Internal document. Oxfam UK/Ireland, 1994). As a 
plan to implement the recently approved policy, it assumes its implementation as being 
integral to overseas planning processes and that managers will take responsibility 
“through the line management” (ibid: 10). It also envisioned the setting up of an Oxfam 
House-based “Gender Policy Implementation Task Group” comprised mainly of senior 
managers as well as the Gender Team, which was to act as an overall resource for the 
implementation of the policy. 
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Despite GADU’s accomplishments, this period seems to have been plagued by internal 
issues, as one former advisor commented (Interview. Weinstein, 2011). Little has been 
written about conflicts within GADU during this time, and while there had always been 
internal dynamics, these had seemed to be about creative energy (Interview. Heller, 
2006). During the late-1980s and mid-1990s, though, GADU seemed dysfunctional. 
Advisors left, not only out of frustration with the perennial challenges of working with 
the rest of the organisation, but also because of the intractable situation within the team. 
Oxfam’s Policy Director at the time observed that the gender team “was conflict-ridden 
[…] to the point of paralysis, much given to blaming each other and feeling victimized” 
(Melrose, 1999: 113). 
 
Wallace (1999) explains that internal dissent and disagreement ultimately contributed to 
the demise of GADU in 1996. Internal disagreements were initially hidden in the spirit 
of solidarity, but the unit’s cooperative ways of working proved problematic under the 
pressures staff faced with the restructuring. Senior managers offered little support, 
blaming GADU’s structure and cooperative working style. As Williams (1999: 185) 
writes, while internal divisions were not unique to GADU, they were “subjected to 
particular scrutiny and sanction within Oxfam, because the unit worked on gender-
related issues and was staffed mainly by feminist women”.  
 
The transformation of GADU into the Gender Team, in what Williams (1999) refers to 
as the beginning of the end, parallels similar slow declines of specialist units in other 
development organisations at the time. For example, Wallace (1998), in her study of 17 
British NGOs including OGB, notes the constant pressure faced by specialist staff, some 
of whom were attached to units, and found that “gender fell victim to any cuts made” 
(ibid: 169). Razavi and Miller (1995c), from their study of ILO, the World Bank and 
UNDP, observe the constant resource constraints faced by internal gender advocates and 
speculate that “It would be unfortunate if mainstreaming were used as a cover to avoid 
committing resources to WID/gender” (ibid: viii). 
 
The reining in of GADU 
The end of this period was marked by the “death” of GADU (Williams, 1999: 179 and 
its further immersion with its transformation into Gender and Leadership Team (GALT) 
in 1997. GALT was a combination of the Gender Team and the Programme 
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Development Team or, as Williams argues, the integration of the former into the latter 
accompanied by a reduction in the number of advisors from five to three, with one made 
redundant and another’s contract not renewed (Williams, 1999). Later, GALT was 
folded into the new Policy Department that followed the establishment of new corporate 
directors – who were all men (Wallace, 1999: 195).  
 
Ostensibly, the transformation of GADU was concerned with implementing the 
organisation’s Gender Policy as a responsibility of all staff. Approval of the policy was 
seen as an indication that gender was now an organisational priority (Gell, 1999, 
Melrose, 1999, Padmanabhan, 1999, Porter et al., 1999b). As the Head of Policy at the 
time wrote, “Now we are making a conscious shift to a new phase in the implementation 
of Oxfam’s Gender Policy, in seeking to widen ownership of gender as a priority for all 
of us” (Internal communication. Melrose, 1996). The implication for GADU was that it 
had done its job of getting gender on the agenda and there was no need for a “team of 
gender experts” (ibid).  
 
More than that, the establishment of GALT, or more accurately the termination of 
GADU, was concerned with bringing the unit into the mainstream. Since its 
establishment, GADU faced continuous accusations of being a ghetto and not reaching 
out to the rest of the organisation. Moser suggests that GADU came into being due to 
the decree of a senior manager, Davis Bryer, and thereby lacked ownership and 
embeddedness in the organisation. This, however, contradicts Williams’ (1999: 182) 
contention that GADU was established after consultation and with endorsement of field 
and Oxfam House staff, particularly those in campaigns. Still, as mentioned previously, 
the isolation of GADU was in part a self-fulfilling prophecy with the restructuring of 
Oxfam in the 1990s and the eventual waning of the GADU committee, which was the 
unit’s link to the rest of the organisation. This isolation was confirmed, as Williams 
(1999: 183) writes, “when GADU put up barricades and later on failed to build on the 
growing network of support in other parts of the organisation”. As Wallace (1999: 2) 
contends “the unit's structure was blamed and the solution was to bring the unit into line 
with the new, hierarchical, streamlined management”.  
 
The dissolution of GADU under the auspices of what was ostensibly gender 
mainstreaming was not unique to Oxfam. The 1995 Beijing conference signalled an 
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endorsement of the strategy and a shift away from stand-alone units to a parcelling out 
of responsibility. As described above, this meant the widespread elimination of 
structures, such as GADU, dedicated to gender issues and a change in strategies. As 
Harcourt (2006) says of this period, “This was a complex and fraught period marked by 
the hope that government promises and policy could be “put into practice on the 
ground”. It saw the emergence of gender mainstreaming...”. 
 
Within Oxfam, it was also about curtailing gender advisors. As a former senior manager 
states of the time, “people used to talk about the old gender unit as the gender police 
[…] There were real battle lines drawn around this stuff.  The first move to diminish 
that was when (the former head of the policy team) merged the gender team with the 
rest of the policy advisory team” (Interview. Wright, 2008). As she observes, the unit 
members 
 
certainly created an impression of being a team that did not want to play ball 
within an organisational corporate environment. I suspect there was a reaction.  
There were some very strong powerful people who were pushing and 
challenging the organisation in […] ways that you would consider today as 
completely inappropriate.  There was deliberately not doing things that had been 
agreed, making very strong political statements, and maybe it went all too far 
and blew up in reaction. [sic]  
 
The irony of GADU staff being perceived as the “feminist thought police” (Walker, 
1996) was that they themselves felt constantly scrutinised and ready to be pounced on 
when they made mistakes. Also, GADU was not envisioned by its founder as a “panel 
of experts, but rather as a group made up of representatives from each area desk who are 
concerned with the issue and prepared to put some time into it” (Williams, 1985c).  
 
In my research, some 20 years after GADU was established, OGB informants 
consistently referred to GADU but in different ways. There are those such as Heller, 
who worked for Oxfam for 15 years, who refers to GADU years as the “Golden Era” 
compared to when gender later became a “technical issue of how to do it rather than an 
organisational commitment issue” (Interview. Heller, 2006). Others, however, as will be 
explained in Chapters 5 and 6, associated GADU with a time in Oxfam’s history of 
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promoting gender equality from which the organisation has moved on and one from 
which the organisation needed to distance itself in order to do so. In both cases, what 
becomes clear is the need for organizational ethnography research to take into account 
the past, not only as a way to understand the present but as part of a continuum of 
becoming (Pettigrew, 1973).   
 
Gender mainstreaming infrastructure within Oxfam 
As previously mentioned, OGB established a Gender Policy in 1993, and this was 
“updated” in 2003 as described in Chapter 5. Compared to the GADU era, when the 
organisation had a dedicated unit to support the addressing of gender issues, the 
infrastructure developed during this period and in place during the research period from 
2001 to 2006 represents the adoption of gender mainstreaming by OGB at three 
different levels of the organisation: globally, regionally and in country programmes.  
 
Global structure
84
 
Generally, three types of staff were involved in promoting gender equality at the global 
level. First, there were those whose gender equality roles were in addition to other 
management responsibilities. For example, two global gender leads, or “Aim leads” for 
gender, were senior managers who also coordinated Oxfam’s gender equality work and 
took decisions regarding gender equality policies
85
. Aim leads were supposed to be 
members of the International Division Senior Management Team or the Campaigns and 
Policy Division Senior Management Team
86
, so they had the authority to affect 
programmes and as they were thought to be best placed to understand programming. 
What was not a criterion was background or experience relevant to the Aim. The 
Gender Leads, for example, had no former professional experience working directly 
with gender issues.  
 
The second group were staff whose full-time job was to support gender mainstreaming 
and specific gender-related initiatives. These included global gender advisors, the 
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gender advisor of the Humanitarian Department as well as staff involved in developing 
and sharing gender resources such as the Gender and Development journal. Third were 
what I am calling gender advocates, staff who did not have a formal remit for gender 
such as with the first or second groups, but still nevertheless were involved in gender 
issues in OGB, such as with the Gender Leadership Team, described below. They were 
invited to join these groups because of their interest and commitment to the issues. 
 
In particular, the Policy Department Gender Team comprised of two global gender 
advisor positions (one focused on programming and organisational issues and the other 
on Oxfam’s South Asia Campaign to Eliminate Violence Against Women). These 
positions were assumed by three staff at the time of the research, with two people job 
sharing; all had been working as gender advisors for a number of years, mostly with 
OGB, and had gender-related post-graduate education backgrounds. Their role was to 
support policy development and strategic planning, such the 2006 update of the Gender 
Policy, advise on advocacy campaigns and regional and country programmes and 
support learning and knowledge management by “acting as a bridge to harness learning 
within Oxfam”, which included compiling reports for OGB’s senior management teams 
(Interview. Moore, 2007). Much of the policy and strategy work as well as reporting 
was in conjunction with and in support of the Global Gender Leads, while advisory 
support was undertaken directly with regional and country programmes, usually in 
conjunction with Regional Gender Advisors (see below). 
 
OGB also had a loosely structured, global Gender Leadership Team, which included 
senior managers and staff representing different divisions and regions of the 
organisation. From Oxford, the Gender Leadership Team included staff who have a 
specific responsibility for promoting gender equality such as the Gender Equality 
Programme Resource Officer as well as representatives from the Humanitarian 
Department, Publishing and Human Resources (the Diversity Coordinator and Advisor). 
It also included Regional Gender Leads and Regional Gender Advisors (discussed 
below) and gender advocates. The Gender Leadership Team was led by the Global 
Gender Lead and served as a mechanism to gather information, input and feedback for 
global initiatives, such as the 2003 update of the Gender Policy.  Global gender advisors 
regularly solicited progress reports as well as policy contributions from team members 
that were considered inputs from their respective areas of the organisation, such as the 
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RMCs (Interview. Barlow, 2006 and Internal document. Pialek, 2006). It also acted as a 
conduit to disseminate policy originating from Oxfam House where members were 
expected to spread new initiatives out and down and support their implementation. 
 
Regional gender structure in East Asia 
Each of the OGB’s regional programmes had its own approach to gender 
mainstreaming, albeit with some similarities, generally following arrangements in the 
global structure. For example, regional structures included both Oxfam staff whose 
gender equality roles were in addition to other management responsibilities as well as 
Regional Gender Advisors, whose full-time job was to support gender mainstreaming. I 
use the structure of East Asia as an illustration of the regional gender infrastructure. 
 
The East Asia region had its own Regional Gender Mainstreaming Strategy (Internal 
document. OGB, 2003a) that aimed to contribute to “women and men experiencing less 
gender discrimination, and women having greater access to and control of resources” 
(ibid: 1). Adopting OGB’s definition of gender mainstreaming, the East Asia strategy 
focused on promoting more equitable gender relations, human resource management, 
accountably and capacity building as well as introducing incentives and sanctions. The 
latter covered a series of gender “minimum standards”, initially introduced for 
humanitarian programmes in 2002 then extended to cover all programming in the region 
in 2003. These included, for example, that all programmes are required to have a gender 
analysis (ibid). 
 
Gender mainstreaming was led by the Regional Gender Lead, a position established in 
2000 and which was appointed by the regional management team. In this research, the 
Regional Gender Lead was also the CPM for Vietnam
87
 and undertook the role in 
addition to and as part of her role as CPM. Her international development experience 
was in management and she had no formal experience working in gender issues. The 
Regional Gender Lead worked primarily through the regional management team, to 
follow up on its decisions, and to whom reported on progress on gender in the region.   
 
                                                 
87
 In some cases in other regions, the Regional Gender Lead is a regional manager. 
  
Chapter 4 The Research Context 108 
As previously described, the regional gender advisor position was introduced as part of 
the post-FROSI establishment of the RMCs
88
 and the first regional gender and diversity 
programme (2001-2004) that focused on gender-based violence, trafficking of women 
and children and gender mainstreaming (Internal document. OGB, 2001c). As the plan 
was an ambitious one, the regional management team agreed to establish the new post 
of Regional Gender Advisor in 2002, that was to be filled by someone with “practical 
skills” as well as experience with gender mainstreaming, particularly gender analysis, 
gender training and strategy development (Interview. Heller, 2006). This position was 
occupied by myself, 2002-2004 and another person from 2004 to 2005. Both of us had 
worked previously with development NGOs as gender advisors. My experience was 
mostly with gender mainstreaming while my replacement had a background working 
with women’s organisations. For East Asia, the main role of the Regional Gender 
Advisor was to support policy development and the implementation of the regional 
gender strategy through the provision of advisory and capacity strengthening support. 
The gender advisor primarily worked with country teams and, if such a position existed, 
gender advisors of the country programmes. The position also called for advising and 
reporting to the regional management team on progress in implementing the regional 
strategy. 
 
As members of the Global Gender Team, both the Regional Gender Lead and Advisor 
were also supposed to represent the region providing input to global gender initiatives 
and reporting to the global level of gender work in the region.  They were as well a 
conduit for disseminating policy developments and related information to the Regional 
Management Team as well as country programme managers. 
 
The Regional Gender Lead also chaired a loosely organised regional working group 
comprised of the Regional Gender Advisor and country gender leads, either gender 
officers or national staff with a gender remit. This was a peer group as well as a 
mechanism informing the development of regional initiatives, such as the Regional 
Gender Mainstreaming Strategy, discussed above. Members of the group were regularly 
asked for inputs for planning and reporting purposes and also served as a distribution 
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 Three RMCs had Regional Gender Advisors at the time: Southern Africa and West Africa in addition to 
East Asia.   
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mechanism for information from both regional and global levels to respective country 
programmes and country level gender infrastructures, described next. 
 
The promotion of gender equality by OGB in Cambodia 
The promotion of gender equality featured prominently as part of Oxfam‘s Cambodia 
strategy for 2005-2008 as well as its Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for Cambodia for 
2005-2008 (Internal document. OGB, 2006b)
89
. As part of the latter, the organisation 
had a structure that aimed to support Oxfam staff and partners. The Gender Programme 
Officer acted as the main gender resource for both Oxfam staff and project partners and 
also managed partner NGOs concerned with domestic violence. She advised staff on 
project proposals, provided gender training to project partners, participated in needs 
assessments and project appraisals and led two gender working groups (GWG), which 
featured in the strategy.  
 
One GWG was internal to Oxfam and consisted of a “gender focal point” from each of 
the four programme areas. Their main role was to act as a gender resource for 
colleagues; as they initially did not have prior experience providing such support, much 
of the focus of the group was on building their own capacity. The gender impact 
assessment, which features in my research, was undertaken by this group and was seen 
as an opportunity to strengthen members. Staff became gender focal points by 
volunteering for the position, often with encouragement from the Gender Programme 
Officer. Members during the time of my research said they joined the group to increase 
their own understanding of gender issues.  
 
The second GWG consisted of about 20 gender focal points from project partners. The 
group met every three months for a day to update each other on progress in 
implementing their gender mainstreaming plans, address problems and generally share 
their experiences and knowledge. These focal points were appointed by project partners 
at the request of OGB in Cambodia. Some partners had gender policies, sometimes 
developed at the suggestion of Oxfam. Most of the gender focal points had other 
responsibilities occupying different positions whereas OGB in Cambodia’s partner for 
                                                 
89
 The Gender Mainstreaming Strategy was established after the country strategy and provides greater 
detail of the latter’s focus on ensuring “that each programme team is working proactively on their own 
gender mainstreaming strategy” (Internal document. OGB, 2006a: 6). 
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the project featured in this research, Takeo Development, was the only one with a full-
time gender focal point. 
 
Downward information dissemination; Upward reporting  
This overview of the various levels of gender infrastructure in OGB suggests that for the 
most part, they share similarities. They all included OGB staff who were a mixture of 
either those with other responsibilities besides that for gender, and those with a full time 
remit, as gender advisors, for promoting gender equality. For the most part, the former 
as gender leads were senior managers who had little or no former professional 
experience working with gender and development issues. Their primary role was to 
keep gender on the agenda, and they pursued this through the management and 
reporting line. The latter, as briefly described, had previous experience working as 
gender advisors and, in most cases, relevant educational backgrounds in contrast to 
gender leads.  
 
All levels of infrastructure had some variation of a committee or working group that 
brought together different staff and additionally, in the case of OGB in Cambodia, 
progamme partners. The structures were meant to be networking bodies but also served 
as ways to get information out as well as to centrally collect information and feed it 
upwards through cross memberships of these committees. For the most part, however, 
such cross membership allowed for “upwards” involvement; staff from lower levels of 
the organisation participated in committees from higher levels, but not vice versa. This 
served to fulfill an upwards reporting function and downward dissemination of 
information from higher levels. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This aim of this chapter has been to introduce the research context. I have described 
OGB as a large, complex organisation with a long and contested history. It has 
undergone significant changes in its size, approach to addressing poverty and structure 
that have in many ways followed similar paths to those of other northern-based 
development NGOs. Starting in the late 1980s, it has become a more formal and 
hierarchical organisation in an effort to “professionalize”, or more accurately, become 
more “manageable”. New lines of authority and reporting served to reinforce and 
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integrate organisational structure. Although managers at different levels are able to 
exercise discretion, their roles in reporting and compliance are solidified within this 
structure. 
 
OGB’s history of working on gender issues is as rich, long and contested. It parallels 
changes in the organisation overall and corresponding shifts in OGB’s gender 
infrastructure. With the introduction of a more formal structure and, later, the changes in 
advisory functions overall, GADU advisors were brought into the fold of the 
organisation.  
 
Still, centring around GADU, organisational challenges concerning the promotion of 
gender equality were unique to the promotion of gender equality. These shifted from 
initially getting gender on the agenda to later reining in those forces that got gender on 
the agenda in the first place. The integration and consolidation of OGB also allowed for 
the bringing Oxfam House’s seminal gender infrastructure into the mainstream. 
Initially, GADU was a quasi-independent entity that was structured and operated 
differently in comparison to the rest of the organisation. Organisational changes 
subsumed the unit and clipped its wings. Moving on from GADU has been an on-going 
project within OGB, initially described in this chapter and continued in Chapters 5 and 
6 as I analyse changes in OGB’s gender infrastructure after 2001. As suggested above, 
GADU is unfinished business but how has its legacy informed the understanding of 
promoting gender equality in Oxfam House? 
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I described Oxfam’s adoption of gender mainstreaming and its increasing dominance in 
comparison with the organisation’s original approach with the establishment of GADU 
and in conjunction with the dismantling of a specialised team of staff. More than a 
structural change, this increasing adoption of gender mainstreaming served to 
undermine GADU and eventually contribute to its demise. The elimination of a 
standalone unit simultaneously represented a diffusion of energy in terms of who was 
seen as doing gender in the organisation, as well as a concentration of responsibility on 
managers. It also was a condemnation of what GADU had represented. These shifts in 
OGB paralleled trends in international DNGOs and development agencies more 
generally: the establishment of specialised women focused and gender units which were 
then dismantled, particularly after Beijing with the rise of gender mainstreaming 
discourse.  
 
In particular, OGB previously did not have such a strong architecture of managers 
acting as gender leads, gender advisors at regional levels as well as inter-linked gender 
committees. In some ways, these developments can be seen as concrete steps towards 
mainstreaming gender in the organisation and broadening out those involved. Senior 
manager are taking more prominent roles and staff from across the organisation are 
being involved through different committees. The next chapters turn to examining in 
greater detail how these developments can be understood within the context of OGB’s 
history of promoting gender equality and as its prioritising gender mainstreaming.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Shifting Meanings of Gender Mainstreaming 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4, I described OGB’s adoption of gender mainstreaming and its increasing 
dominance. I also discussed how OGB undertook a strategic review that was to make 
profound changes for the organisation as well as its gender work for years after. 
 
This chapter and the next focus on the entrenchment of gender mainstreaming within 
OGB and how its meaning changed. Chapter 5 picks up on the period following FROSI 
and analyses key moments that represent further adoption of the strategy and is 
comprised of two main sections. The first section describes and analyses key gender 
assessments undertaken during this period of OGB’s gender work: the 2002 Gender 
Review and two Oxfam International reviews, undertaken in the context of the Strategic 
Plan 2001-6. The second section focuses on the updating of the 1993 gender policy, 
which was a recommendation the 2002 Gender Review. I explore how policy emerges 
and what the 2003 update represents in terms of understandings of gender equality and 
its promotion during this period. In examining the responses to these assessments and 
the process of establishing the 2003 policy, I explore what ideological positions came to 
the fore through an examination of the micro-politics of making policy. The case of the 
2003 highlights the contingent nature of policy making and allows for an examination 
of the interpretive processes at play.  
 
GENDER ASSESSMENTS DURING THE POST-FROSI PERIOD 
The 2002 Gender Review 
The 2002 Gender Review came on the heels of a number of organisational changes in 
OGB: regionalization, greater emphasis on advocacy and campaigns and a 
“strengthening of its organisational development systems” (Internal report. Mohideen, 
2002: 17). As described in Chapter 4, Oxfam’s dedicated gender unit had been dis-
banded five years previously and its replacement, a team called GALT, had been further 
subsumed into the more general Programme Policy Team. The 2002 review was one of 
the first major tasks of this team and was to “inform the development of an 
organisational gender mainstreaming strategy for implementation in 2002-3” (Internal 
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report. OGB, 2001a: 1). In addition, the review was undertaken in the context of FROSI 
and the introduction of Aims
90
, one of which was focused on gender equality (Internal 
report. Murison, 2002). The development of an objective focused on gender was starting 
to emerge as a stand-alone theme as opposed to one related to the other four. This was 
contrary to the initial proposal that it provide an overall framework for integrating 
gender and addressing women’s rights in all the Aims, as discussed in Chapter 4. As a 
gender advisor from that times states, the Gender Review “was part of trying to clarify 
[...] our aims and objectives and action plans” (Interview. Moore, 2011)91.  
 
The purpose of the review was to “evaluate the impact of OGB’s work on gender equity 
and assess the ways in which the mainstreaming of gender has contributed to this” 
(Internal report. OGB, 2001a: 1). The focus was on the extent to which gender analysis 
had been integrated into OGB’s programmes and factors contributing to success and 
failure. The review was also to provide a benchmark against which future achievements 
towards gender equality could be measured (Internal report. Mohideen, 2002). As a 
review of gender mainstreaming, it was supposed to result in options for “taking 
forward” the strategy for consideration by OGB’s most senior programming committee 
(Internal document. OGB, 2001b).  
 
The intention was that the review would consist of case studies and to be “relatively 
light using existing processes where possible i.e. annual impact reporting” (Internal 
document. OGB, 2001b: 1. My emphasis). It consisted of nine separate “evaluation” 
components that covered different areas of OGB’s programming (development, 
humanitarian assistance, campaigns, advocacy), women’s human rights, internal 
organisational issues and OGB gender publications. In addition, two other components 
covered a review of OGB evaluations and its Annual Impact Reports (AIRs), and there 
was an overarching synthesis report
92
. Except for these latter three, the evaluations 
                                                 
90
 The strategic change objectives (SCOs) were the original names given to what were become Aims. The 
term SCOs was retained, however, to describe a lower order of objectives that were subsumed under the 
Aims as they were finally known (see Chapter 3). 
91
 The review was also related to FROSI and its emphasis on the need for OGB to understand its impact: 
it was conducted as part of the Annual Impact Review process, introduced after FROSI, which focused on 
a particular theme every year, gender being the focus for 2002. 
92
 The components were undertaken by different people who, for the most part, were external to OGB 
and included a number of well-known gender specialists, such as Helen Derbyshire and Elaine 
Zuckerman (Internal report. 2002) and Masha Freeman (Internal report. 2002). While many came from a 
background of working with mainstream development, such as Murison who had worked as a senior 
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generally employed the same methods of documentation review and interviews with 
OGB staff based in Oxfam House and in the regional offices (by telephone).  
 
Overall, the review found that “Despite some important successes and instances of good 
practice, the overall picture of how OGB's programme is contributing to enhanced 
gender equality remains patchy” (Internal report. Mohideen, 2002). The findings 
applied to two dimensions of OGB: its programmes and institutional issues. 
Programmatically, the review found that OGB’s four impact areas93 did not 
“consistently integrate a commitment to gender equality” (ibid: 18). There were 
instances of addressing gender issues, such as in humanitarian work, but they were “ad 
hoc” and often due to “commitment of key individuals” (ibid: 13) that was contrasted to 
an overall unevenness of commitment and lack of understanding (ibid: 13). For 
example, it found that regional plans and plans for programming for different Aims 
inconsistently addressed gender issues in their analysis. The case study from Senegal 
found that while economic development improved women’s status, they were 
overburdened because men were unwilling to assume reproductive roles. Women 
benefited at the household and community levels but their participation in local 
governance was limited (Internal report. Dem and Hopkins, 2002).  
 
Similarly, in the case of its advocacy work on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs), OGB’s efforts contributed to greater civil society involvement in PRSP 
processes but this did not translate into engendering them. The evaluation cited policy 
evaporation, conceptual confusion and lack of staff capacity as contributing factors 
(Internal report. Zuckerman et al., 2002). OGB’s campaigns work with intellectual 
property rights and the cost of patented drugs lacked a gender analysis during planning 
that resulted in gender unaware campaigns (Internal report. Pearson, 2002).  
 
Overall, the different components pointed to three common areas in its assessment of 
OGB’s programming. One was the need for “learning and development/capacity 
                                                                                                                                               
manager with UNDP’s gender programme, others, such as Ruth Pearson (Internal report. 2002), came 
from an academic and gender and development background. Other components, particularly those 
examining internal documents such as evaluations and AIRs, were undertaken by OGB staff. 
93
 As cited previously, these are the rights of individuals to be secure, skilled, healthy, safe and heard 
(Internal document. OGB, n.d.-a).  
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building” to address the “need for greater consistency in the integration of gender 
equality issues into OGB's work, structures and organisational culture” (Internal report. 
Mohideen, 2002: 18). Second was a need to integrate “gender equality issues” in 
analysis and planning, particularly for Aims and regional plans (ibid: 19). The third 
concerned the lack of staff with gender expertise to implement quality programmes. 
“Gender experts are too thinly and inconsistently spread to be able to advance gender 
equality issues in OGB's work” (ibid: 19).  
 
The original proposal for the review did not include an examination of internal 
organisational issues but the “Assessment of OGB’s Institutional Arrangements for 
Gender Equality” (Internal report. Murison, 2002) proved “to be the most significant 
[addressing] how OGB overall might resource and organize its work on gender to 
optimise impact” (Internal communication. Amhurst and Farrell, 2002). Its focus was 
“to assess the effectiveness of current organisational arrangements to achieve SCO5-1, 
and propose changes for greater effectiveness” (Internal report. Murison, 2002: 12). The 
author considered the report to take a  
 
broader perspective on gender mainstreaming [and aimed] to identify those 
aspects of OGB's organisational culture and structure that impact positively and 
negatively on staff ability in practice to ensure that management, planning, 
evaluation and reporting processes take full account of the relevant aspects of 
gender relations. (ibid) 
 
The report recognized a number of “organisational strengths and opportunities for 
gender mainstreaming” and considered FROSI-related organisation changes as “pre-
conditions for effective gender mainstreaming” (ibid: 19). These included the 
introduction of a “flatter, more decentralised and dynamic” structure (ibid), a new 
performance management system and new approaches to staff development and 
learning. It recognized motivation and conviction among staff, a “clear commitment to 
gender equality” among managers at different levels as well as leadership support that is 
“expressed and reinforced in OGB's very clear policy commitment to gender equality” 
(ibid: 14). Still, staff commitment and understanding of gender issues were found to be 
uneven (Internal report. Mohideen, 2002) . 
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The analysis of “organisational constraints to gender mainstreaming” is similar in its 
findings to the other components of the review that dealt with internal organisational 
issues. One concerned a lack of individual staff understanding of what they are 
supposed to do and among managers of their specific responsibilities. It noted how 
OGB had “not yet succeeded in ensuring that its programme staff fully understand the 
ways in which work on poverty for example, is incomplete without a gender equality 
perspective” (Internal report. Murison, 2002: 17). Communications and capacity were a 
second area of concern: staff faced difficulties knowing what, to whom and how to 
communicate about gender equality. Also, there had “been no systematic capacity 
building on the knowledge, skills or aptitudes needed to advance gender equality for 
many years” (ibid). 
 
The review included 12 “priority” recommendations and 73 related “other 
recommendations/options” that focused on five areas. The first concerned 
programming, with the need to ensure “that gender equality issues are integrated in 
every aspect and at every stage of programme work” (Internal report. Mohideen, 2002: 
3). Second was “Leadership, Responsibility and Accountability” and included 
recommendations to establish a Corporate Plan of Action to implement OGB’s gender 
policy. It recommended updating and simplifying it, and providing a full time 
Organisational Lead to “drive the gender mainstreaming process forward” (ibid: 4). It 
also included a recommendation to reconstitute a “corporate” gender group as a “gender 
advisory/focal point network” (ibid). A third area was related to knowledge 
management and overall recommended the development of a plan to communicate and 
promote learning on gender equality issues. A fourth area concerned the establishment 
of “an overall learning and development plan designed to increase OGB's capacity in 
gender analysis, programming and management” (ibid: 5). Fifth was about 
strengthening internal capacity, such as increasing the number of gender experts in 
Oxfam House, as well at regional levels, to support staff capacity development (Internal 
report. Murison, 2002).  
 
In May of 2002, a summary of the review was presented and discussed by OGB’s 
Corporate Management Team (CMT) which agreed to a number of follow up actions. 
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Most concerned OGB managers such as “gender work [needing] to be done through line 
management” with line managers working through “how to deliver” (Meeting Minutes. 
OGB, 2002a). CMT members also recognised that follow up actions involved different 
levels. All staff needed to understand what they had to do to be gender sensitive; 
regionally the plan needed to be taken forward in a way that they could learn from each 
other; and leadership needed to be “high calibre and strategic, inspirational not 
dogmatic, capable of celebrating good practice” (ibid). Details of further follow up was 
delegated to International Directorate Senior Management Team (IDSMT)
94
 while areas 
concerning “organisational gender issues” (ibid) were to be handled separately from 
programming issues. 
 
IDSMT discussed the Gender Review in June 2002 for half a day. Prior to that, a senior 
manager shared a memo to IDSMT members concerning the Institutional Arrangements 
report, in particular, to provide “an initial steer […] on the direction [OGB] needed to 
go (Internal communication. Pilkington, 2002). The “steer”95 included reiterating an 
understanding about gender: that it’s a central to OGB’s work on poverty and suffering 
and that it concerns not just women but women and men and their relationships. It 
underscored that gender was the responsibility of the whole organisation as well as 
individuals and line managers, the latter of whom needed support. Lastly, it emphasised 
how the CMT and Council wanted the organisation to “develop pragmatic, practical 
approaches that make it easy for all staff to build gender issues into their work” (ibid). 
IDSMT was expected to come up with “clear and straightforward” conclusions which 
“must not be complex. The work itself may be demanding and require great skills and 
care, but that does not mean our organisational arrangements need to mystify” (ibid). 
The memo also included a caution about internal changes proposed by the review: OGB 
“may or may not” need a formal internal gender group and there may need to be some 
staffing changes, though this was “small-scale and not the central issue” (ibid). There 
was a concern about making such changes and increasing gender staff without a clear 
idea of what and how it was to be done.  
 
                                                 
94
 IDSMT was the most senior management committee for the International Division that and oversaw 
OGB’s programmes. 
95
 This was a common term used by OGB managers when I conducted my research. It implied direction 
provided by senior managers, which in OGB parlance, was deemed a priority but was left to line 
managers to take into consideration and to implement as they deemed necessary (ref?) 
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The discussion at IDSMT in June 2002 focused on the review’s key question of what 
was constraining the organisation and produced an agreement that the organisation 
should be using “existing processes and resources to implement the recommendations”, 
many of which could be started straight away (Meeting minutes. OGB, 2002c). The 
emphasis should be on “everyone’s everyday work” and not “ghettoised” by using 
experts other than as support (ibid). The result was an action plan with inputs from the 
IDSMT meeting (ibid) as well as from select OGB staff who worked on the review. The 
covering memo to the plan stressed that it had been “deliberately […] kept simple – and 
manageable” and they had to “just do it” (Internal communication. Blair, 2002). It also 
addressed the issue of resourcing the plan, confirming plans for a four-person team 
based in Oxfam House and the need for regions to determine their own resourcing needs 
but that it was “vital that the key Regional staff working on gender [were] fully engaged 
and taking lead roles in sharing and shaping the way forward” (ibid). For the senior 
manager mostly involved with the plan, the emphasis of the plan was on making it “do-
able… and practical, not overly ambitious…[otherwise] it would be put on the shelf in 
the 'too difficult' box”, which was observed by the manager as a common fate for 
OGB’s plans. “We're very good at producing beautiful plans but not at implementing 
them” (Interview. Blair, 2007) 
 
The review and its recommendations represent the further entrenchment of gender 
mainstreaming for OGB in a number of respects. First, it was all encompassing and 
affected all parts of the organisation and all staff. The relative privileging of “everyone” 
doing gender is a mainstay of gender mainstreaming (Tiessen, 2007). Second, which is 
related to an integrationist notion of the approach (Jahan, 1995), it worked within 
existing structures and organisational processes. Gender mainstreaming was to be 
implemented “though the line” with an emphasis on leadership from existing senior 
managers. Current programming and internal procedures, such those related to 
monitoring and evaluation and human resources needed to be engendered but not 
necessarily revised themselves: gender just needed to be integrated. Third, OGB senior 
managers were encouraged to take on more leadership responsibility, and the 
development of the Action Plan was a case in point: it was senior managers, as members 
of CMT and IDSMT, that led the post-review processes.  
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Still, the Action Plan also needs to be understood within the context of OGB’s history 
with addressing gender issues (discussed in Chapter 4) and of the period when the 
review took place; post-FROSI. Three issues in particular stand out. One concerned 
GADU: the review notes that the elimination of the unit was “unfinished” business 
(Internal report. Murison, 2002: 11). Its legacy had been a stand alone gender resource 
and the impression that it had had a “critical rather than a supportive attitude to the rest 
of the organisation” (ibid). This was still alive in OGB and continued “to be attached to 
all work for gender equality” (ibid). While the review did not suggest a re-instatement 
of a stand-alone gender unit, it did recommend increasing the number of gender 
advisors and “reviving a very positive aspect of GADU, this time enhanced by a more 
integrated structure and stronger coordinative and knowledge sharing mechanisms” 
(ibid: 11).  
 
Nevertheless, the subsequent Action Plan, as well as senior managers’ responses, were 
cautious about increasing gender advisory resources, justified in part because the needs 
were not yet known and the matter was not a “central issue” (Internal communication. 
Pilkington, 2002). In addition, such specialised persons were seen as contrary to making 
gender everyone’s responsibility, rather than ghettoised by using experts (Meeting 
minutes. OGB, 2002c). The direction of the Action Plan was towards greater 
involvement of managers leading gender mainstreaming as well as a de-limiting of the 
role of advisors. As one gender advisor at the time observed “contrary to previous 
efforts, we (gender advisors) were not even invited to the meetings of CMT and 
IDSMT” (Interview. Moore, 2007). It was senior managers who presented the review’s 
findings and led the development of the Action Plan, with limited input from OGB’s 
gender advisors. 
 
The second and related issue is the importance attached in the Action Plan to being 
simple, practical and manageable and not overly ambitious, complicated and 
mystifying. The emphasis was on being do-able and implementation was a matter of 
“just doing it”. It was simplified in so far as it included about a third of the number 
recommendations of the review. The more complicated recommendations of addressing 
women’s rights, those that were specific to particular programme areas and other that 
held staff accountable were not included in the Action Plan. Moreover, the emphasis on 
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practical measures was also related to the need to be positive. As a senior manager 
recalls of the Gender Review, “it was incredibly negative actually, about we hadn't done 
this, hadn't done that” (Interview. Pilkington, 2007). 
 
The third issue related to the post-FROSI context is the emphasis of the Action Plan on 
the Regional Management Centres, as manifestations of FROSI described previously, 
assuming much of the responsibility for implementing the plan, as per their discretion. 
Such delegation is consistent with the further entrenching of gender mainstreaming, 
particularly in terms of extending the responsibility throughout the organisation.  
 
While, the Action Plan undoubtedly further embedded gender mainstreaming in OGB, 
following from the overall thrust of the Gender Review, it was a particular 
understanding of gender mainstreaming that arose out of the historical context of OGB’s 
past efforts to address gender issues. While related to GADU and the role of gender 
advisors, it also came out of the new emphasis on the role of OGB leadership and 
managers. In this sense then, the plan was also a response to post-FROSI shifts in 
structure of the organisation.  
 
The Oxfam International Gender Assessments 
As indicated previously, two Oxfam International (OI) reviews of their gender work 
were significant for OGB, not so much for what they found  (their findings were similar 
to the Gender Review just discussed) but for how the findings were perceived by OGB 
senior managers. Both were conducted in relation to OI’s Strategic Plan (2001-2006): 
one was part of the 2004 mid-term review of the plan and the other was a 2005 gender 
evaluation of the same. OGB senior managers’ responses to the OI assessments give 
some indication of how the understanding and directions of gender mainstreaming were 
strongly shaped by OGB’s past. 
 
The Mid-term Review was undertaken by an independent consultant to take “stock of 
significant changes in the external environment and monitor progress towards the goals 
of OI strategic plan that focused on ‘Global Equity’” (Internal report. Burrows, 2004). It 
reviewed specific areas of joint OI
96
 work on trade and markets, humanitarian response, 
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 In other words, the mid-term review only looked at work where Oxfam affiliates were collaborating. 
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the right to be heard and promotion of gender equity, the latter two were reviewed as 
cross-cutting, not stand-alone, issues. It echoed earlier reviews of OI’s performance: 
progress on gender mainstreaming in the key areas of the OI strategic plan was “poor 
overall. There are patches of very good joint work, but they are isolated” (ibid: 3). 
While it noted that stand alone gender work may be better, there was a need for a deeper 
appreciation of the essential value of having others participate, have control and speak 
for themselves. Staff needed to improve competence in gender mainstreaming
 
and there 
was a lack of mutual accountability among OI affiliates.  
 
The gender evaluation was undertaken a year after the mid-term review, also by an 
independent consultant
97
, to explore in more depth issues raised by the Mid-term 
Review, just discussed. Similarly, it only looked at joint work of OI affiliates and the 
extent gender was being mainstreamed focussing on four countries of Ethiopia, 
Palestine, Nicaragua and Bangladesh. It included field visits and a review of relevant 
documentation. Overall, the evaluation affirmed the conclusions of the Mid-term review 
and assessed OI’s gender work as, “with a few notable and shining exceptions, 
mediocre in terms of its potential contribution to gender equality” (Internal report. 
Stuart, 2005: 31). It highlighted leadership, along with follow-through, investment, 
systems and accountability, as key areas requiring strengthening.  
 
For OGB managers, the OI mid term review and OI evaluation are two examples of 
inputs that were seen as too critical and unhelpful. As one senior manager recalls,  
 
There was quite a lot of negativity that was not very helpful, [the review] wasn’t 
helpful at all...[it] came across as being very negative about all the things going on 
in gender issues in OI [...] So I found it very counter-productive actually. It just 
made people feel bad again. (Interview. Pilkington, 2009.  My emphasis.) 
 
OGB senior managers also felt that the OI evaluation was too critical by not being 
“balanced”. As Blair recalls, it “was unrealistically negative [… the evaluator] wanted 
to shock us. But [...] incredibly not giving credit to what positive things had happened” 
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(Interview. 2007). Such imbalance was considered unproductive and discouraging to 
staff.  
 
I have suggested that the 2002 Gender Review and these two other assessments of the 
OI strategic plan were critical for OGB not only in terms of what they found, which was 
essentially a reiteration that OGB’s gender work was wanting, but also in terms of the 
responses they provoked. They were considered too critical and, as indicated in the 
Action Plan, there was an emphasis on greater senior management leadership on gender 
issues, on practical follow up actions and regional management centres assuming much 
of the responsibility for implementing the Action Plan. The following explores these 
first two themes by looking more closely at one of the Gender Review’s 
recommendations that was implemented. 
 
THE 2003 UPDATE OF OGB’S GENDER POLICY 
The Gender Review recommended that OGB update, streamline and simplify OGB’s 
original 1993 Gender Policy “in the light of recent structural changes and the 
organisation’s experiences, so that it is easier to operationalise” (Internal report. 
Mohideen, 2002: 9). In 2003, OGB updated its original policy. The purported rationale 
for this was to make the language more accessible and in line with contemporary 
thinking on gender and development: the original policy was by then ten years old and 
the language was deemed “outdated”, as one senior OGB manager commented 
(Interview. Blair, 2007). The organisation’s various gender-related policy statements 
were also seen as disparate, and an updated policy was to provide “a ‘framework’ 
document against which to set our Action Plan” (Meeting minutes. OGB, 2003b). In 
particular, the idea was to make the policy’s “Principles, Goals and Strategies more 
clear for all staff” (Internal communication. Walker, 2003b).  
 
The purpose of the 2003 Gender Policy is to represent OGB’s “organisational 
commitment to gender equality” and to “to help staff and volunteers ensure that work 
improves the lives of both women and men and promotes gender equality” (Internal 
document. OGB, n.d.-b). It is a brief statement comprising four principles, which 
concern an understanding of gender equality and poverty, how the organisation will 
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work and for what purposes, an emphasis on empowering women and girls and a focus 
on internal organisational issues.  
 
It also includes 11 strategies. The first two are overarching: 1) OGB’s work will be 
informed by “a thorough understanding of the different concerns, experiences, 
capacities and needs of women and men”; and 2) OGB will work at the level of 
“policies, practices, ideas and beliefs” that are at the root of gender inequality (OGB, 
n.d.-d). Four strategies are that the organisation will 1) “seek to ensure the full 
participation and empowerment of women”; 2) “promote women’s rights as human 
rights”; 3) work with “both men and women, together and separately”; and 4) emphasise 
the importance of gender equality in overcoming poverty and suffering and 
communicate its “commitment to gender equality” (OGB, n.d.-d: 1-2). 
 
The remaining five strategies expand on the fourth principal concerning internal 
practices: 1) encourage sharing of “learning and best practice” where “gender training 
will also be made available”; 2) “devise and report on measurable objectives and actions 
relating to the gender equality policy”; 3) use “gender awareness and understanding […] 
as a criterion for recruitment and development of staff and volunteers”; 4) demonstrate 
OGB’s commitment to gender equality in the setting of team and individual objectives 
as well as the allocation of staff and resources; and 5) pursue “family friendly work 
practices” so men and women can “participate fully in work and family life” (OGB, 
n.d.-d: 1-2). 
 
The two policies compared 
On the surface, the 2003 policy appears as an update of the 1993 original, but there are 
significant differences. In comparison with the 1993 policy, the 2003 policy introduces 
new language, not included in the 1993 version, such as “performance objectives” 
(A7)
98
 and “family-friendly policies” (A18), as well as new programming issues – the 
need to work with men (A11) and references to OGB partners, for example. 
Structurally, the two policies are also similar – both include a Preamble, Principles and 
Strategies. However, there are two main exceptions. The 1993 policy includes 
Objectives and provides specific strategies for different parts of the organisation: 
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Overseas, UK Programme and Management (see Annex B). In contrast, the 2003 policy 
does not have any Objectives and excludes the assignment of strategies for particular 
organisational areas. Also, the 2003 policy is about a third of the length of the 1993 
version (687 words compared with 2,212)
99
. 
 
Additionally, the 2003 update and OGB’s original 1993 Gender Policy are different in 
terms of goals and understandings of gender equality, framing of issues and 
commitment. What do these differences tell us about understandings of promoting 
gender equality in Oxfam House during the post-FROSI era?  
 
An analysis of the 2003 policy demonstrates a dilution of OGB’s commitment to 
promoting gender equality, when compared with the 1993 document, which is 
manifested as five interrelated dimensions. The first concerns the policies’ respective 
treatments of the notion of gender equality itself. The 1993 policy recognises specific 
issues facing women and addresses them accordingly with objectives specific to 
women. For example, the Preamble includes a 700-word description of the different 
positions held by women compared with men in various aspects of society and the 
differential impact poverty and development has on women and men. Accordingly, the 
overall Objective is to make the “lives of women better”, and three of five related 
objectives are specific to women (B20).  
 
In contrast, the 2003 policy privileges equal and undifferentiated treatment of women 
and men and, by obscuring the subordinate position of women and their related gender 
needs through using this equal treatment discourse, results in dilution. While it too 
acknowledges the particular issues women face, mainly in an 80-word section of the 
Preamble, its’ emphasis is on the same treatment for women and men, as evident in its 
emphasis on the same entitlements, the same respect, the same opportunities and the 
same access to power for women and men (A1). Accordingly, it aims to “help staff and 
volunteers ensure that our work improves the lives of both women and men and 
promotes gender equality” (A3. My emphasis). 
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 The 2003 policy does, however, include a 1,338 word supplementary “Rationale”, which explains the 
position of women globally. For the purposes of this analysis, it is excluded, following OGB’s 
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The second dimension concerns recognition of the differences between women and men 
and related to policy perspectives. The 1993 acknowledgement of women’s needs and 
interests comes from the standpoint of women. For example, the policy stresses women’s 
agency and efforts, particularly those of Southern women, and the influence this has had 
on OGB’s thinking (B34). It also recognises the diversity among women and that age, 
class, ethnicity and religion, in addition to gender, are inter-related factors affecting 
women’s position in different ways depending on the context (B9). 
 
Such beliefs are reflected in its policy prescriptions. For example, the 1993 policy states 
that OGB needs to be “sensitive to local circumstances and respect the pace, capacity and 
strategies of local women for change” and will promote women’s own prioritising, 
confidence building and organisation (B16). At the same time, it conveys commonalities 
among women and how their subordinate position is relational to men; such relations are 
power relations, mutable and contextual. With this understanding, the policy states that 
gender relations need to be transformed (B17) and underlines how “OGB’s vision and 
policy cannot be static, adjustments and changes may be required over time” (B21). 
 
In contrast, the 2003 policy makes no reference to women’s agency, diversity of 
experience or the multiple, intersecting discriminations they face. No mention is made 
of the need to adapt to diverse and changing contexts. When the policy does refer to 
women’s empowerment, it is from the organisation’s perspective: “women and girls will 
be empowered through all aspects of our work” (A5)100. In this respect, policy dilution 
comes from an absence of a relational perspective from the standpoint of women, from 
the homogenisation of women’s experiences across space and time and from a failure to 
consider women as agents for change. 
 
The third dimension of policy dilution is the positioning of gender and development 
issues and their interrelationships. The 1993 policy considers gender inequity an issue in 
itself and the promotion of women’s position and rights ends in themselves. The policy 
gives equal and independent weighting to addressing poverty and gender inequity: 
“Fully integrating gender into OGB’s programme should tackle the causes of women’s 
poverty and promote justice to the advantage of women as well as men” (B3. My 
                                                 
100
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emphasis). Additionally, it elaborates on the mutually reinforcing interrelationships 
between gender inequity and poverty. It not only states the need to address “gender-
related inequalities [...] to achieve sustainable development and alleviate poverty”, but 
also elaborates on how poverty exacerbates the condition and position of women, 
thereby justifying the addressing of poverty to confront gender inequity (B15). 
 
In contrast, the 2003 policy has a more limited and unidimensional understanding of 
gender and development. There is less emphasis on promoting women’s position and 
rights as ends in themselves; the dominant rationale is to make OGB’s development 
efforts more effective. For example, it states that there is “a common understanding that 
gender equality is key to overcoming poverty and suffering” (A4). Also absent are 
understandings of how poverty exacerbates women’s condition and position. Dilution 
results from the policy not pursuing gender goals in their own right and its narrower 
focus on “gender-related poverty”.  
 
The fourth dimension of policy dilution results from differences in understanding, 
perspectives and framing of particular issues and policy prescriptions. With its 
recognition of the differences between women and men, the 1993 policy emphasises 
women’s strategic gender interests, such as body integrity, independent access to 
resources such as land and employment and women acting collectively (B27-30). 
 
With its limited acknowledgement of the differences between women and men, the 
2003 policy includes fewer policy prescriptions that specifically address women’s 
position and related strategic interests (two versus ten in the 1993 policy). When 
women-specific measures are included, they are sometimes instrumentalised by 
becoming a means to an end (as opposed to ends in themselves), as well as de-gendered. 
For example, OGB is to address “the policies, practices, ideas and beliefs [that] prevent 
women and girls (and sometimes men and boys) from enjoying a decent livelihood, 
participation in public life, protection and basic services” (A9). Here, the policy is 
limited to the areas which concern OGB, and addressing constraints is implicitly to do 
with making OGB’s efforts more effective. Also, the concern with “policies, practices, 
ideas and beliefs” is not that they are gendered but that they happen to affect women 
and sometimes men. Absent is a gender analysis of social institutions that points to the 
  
Chapter 5 Shifting Meanings of Gender Mainstreaming 128 
 
systemic discrimination of women in particular (the 1993 policy includes such an 
analysis in its references to patriarchy and social structures). In sum, the 2003 policy 
represents a dilution of commitment to gender equality in its refutation of women’s 
gender strategic interests that emerge from gendered social institutions that (re)produce 
discrimination and subordination unique to women. 
 
The fifth dimension of policy dilution concerns the extent of policy commitment. For 
instance, the 1993 policy employs more assertive language; as a goal, it speaks of 
“confronting the social and ideological barriers to women’s participation” (B6. My 
emphasis). The 2003 policy adopts language that is more au courant within OGB and 
also uses less assertive terms: “We will address the policies, practices, ideas and beliefs 
that perpetuate gender inequality” (A9. My emphasis). Overall, the 2003 policy is also 
more tentative with its use of qualifiers and less certain terms. For example, the 1993 
policy states that the organisation is “committed to [...] developing positive action to 
promote the full participation and empowerment of women [and] recognising and helping 
women exercise their rights over their bodies and protection from violence” (B5. My 
emphasis). In contrast, the 2003 policy uses more qualified language. It states, “We will 
seek to ensure the full participation and empowerment of women [...] and will promote 
women’s rights as human rights, particularly in the areas of abuse and violence” (A10. 
My emphasis).  
 
Explaining the differences 
In chapter 2, I discussed how development bureaucracies tend to distil and shape 
information in ways that reflect the gender politics and interests of the intended users 
and the organisation’s own development paradigm. This often leads to an elimination of 
potential controversial issues and a neutralisation of political content. This suggests that 
the differences between the 1993 and 2003 policies be understood for what they 
potentially represent. In this section, I explore how the differences highlighted above 
relate primarily to the respective organisational political contexts in OGB in which the 
policies were being defined, in terms of both external influences and internal dynamics.
 
 
 
The 1993 policy resulted from years of struggle by GADU in terms of making 
organisational inroads and getting gender on the agenda. As Chapter 4 described, 
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GADU’s work reflected gender and development (GAD) thinking at the time; it is titled 
“Oxfam’s Gender and Development Policy”. GAD was influenced by socialist 
feminism and its concern with class and gender and by feminist anthropology with its 
privileging of differences across cultures and within them (Pearson and Jackson, 
1998a), as well as the voices and agency of “third world women”. Gender relations were 
seen as social, not as a biologically given, and as mutable and contextually informed. 
GAD was informed by a concern about women’s subordination and interrogated 
“development” for its purported benefits for women as long as they were integrated. 
GADU pursued women’s interests for their own sake, not solely as a means to increase 
effectiveness or address poverty. As Jackson (1998: 59) states “gender justice is not a 
poverty issue and cannot be approached with poverty reduction policies, and […] it is 
important to assert the distinction between gender and poverty in the face of the 
tendency in development organisations to collapse all forms of disadvantage into 
poverty”. Moreover, as a collective, GADU’s concern was for working in solidarity 
with women and men, both within OGB, with GAD advocates in the UK and in the 
countries where it was working, to strengthen women’s voice and agency.  
 
OGB’s “approval” of the 1993 policy represented an organisational acknowledgement 
of gender but also a recognition of the legitimacy of pursuing gender equality in its own 
right. This is evidenced in the policy’s understanding of the promotion of gender 
equality as a means to address both poverty and women’s subordination. Still, 
organisational commitment was not certain, and the policy reflects its emphasis on 
commitment in processual terms: it was “seen as the next essential step in OGB’s 
commitment to gender” (OGB, 1993: 3), and any references to organisational 
commitment are treated as dynamic. For example, the policy states that it will continue 
“to expand OGB’s knowledge of and commitment to gender issues” and “promote the 
understanding and commitment of OGB staff” (B15). 
 
In contrast, the 2003 policy emerged during the post-FROSI era, when OGB senior 
managers were being challenged to demonstrate commitment to gender which was 
considered embedded
101
 but which the different internal OGB gender assessments found 
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to be inadequate. For example, as the 2002 Gender Review notes “There is a strong 
commitment to gender equality at all levels of the organisation [...] this commitment, 
and especially the exercise of leadership on gender equality, is uneven” (Internal report. 
Mohideen, 2002: 19. Original emphasis). 
 
‘Commitment’ is manifested in two ways in the 2003 policy. First, the word 
“commitment” is used relatively more frequently compared with in the 1993 policy 
(five versus three times). Second, and more critically, “organisational commitment” is 
taken for granted as already existing in OGB, whereas the 1993 policy was concerned 
with promoting such commitment. The 2003 document assumes extant commitment, 
stating upfront, for example, that the “policy represents our organisational commitment 
to gender equality” (A3) and “our own internal practices, and ways of working, will 
reflect our commitment to gender equality” (A7) 102.  
 
The 1993 policy’s concern with cultivating commitment is a de facto acknowledgement 
that commitment is wanting; the 2003 policy’s sole aim to “represent”, “reflect” and 
“demonstrate” commitment discursively creates the sense that commitment is not lacking; 
it already exists. The issue of a lack of commitment is effectively eliminated by assuming 
commitment and emphasis is shifted to the need to better communicate it. As Mosse 
(2003) contends, development agencies have little control over events but do exercise 
control over the interpretation of them. To counter uncertainty, “authoritative 
interpretations have to be made and sustained socially” by enrolling actors with 
representations as reality (Mosse, 2003: 8). The projection of “commitment” is a narrative 
that is more easily understood than the more difficult one of posing a problem (Apthorpe 
and Gasper, 1996), such as the lack of commitment. It is an attempt to exercise 
bureaucratic power in the face of uncertainty (Wallace et al., 2006) 
 
Still, in the face of constant feedback that OGB’s work was wanting, the 2003 policy is 
also about managing expectations and not “making commitments [we] didn’t 
                                                                                                                                               
 
These internal communications, known as “Letters from Barbara Stocking”, are monthly updates from the 
Director to staff and volunteers. They also serve as her monthly reports to the Corporate Management 
Team. 
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 Other examples include “Our communications will also highlight our own commitment to gender 
equality” (A13) and “In all our work we will demonstrate commitment to gender equality” (A15). 
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understand how on earth we were going to fulfil”, says one OGB senior manager 
(Interview. Blair, 2003). Such reluctance is evident in the use of general, vague and 
conditional language as well as the generalising of organisational accountabilities, as 
discussed previously. In this light, the changes from the 1993 policy also reflect a 
“moving of the goal posts” in light of reluctance to making commitments that could 
potentially be unmet and thus seen as yet another failure of the organisation. The 2003 
policy lowered the standards against which the organisation could be assessed. For 
example, fuzzy and qualified language allows for vague commitments. Also, the issue 
of a lack of accountability of managers is removed, on the one hand, by eliminating 
references to what is expected of them and, on the other, making everyone responsible 
but no one accountable (Lewis, 2006: 125). As Mary Kilpatrick, a gender advisor at the 
time recalls, the changes were to “lower the bar but also redefine what gender equality 
meant, so tools were established, with simple quantifiable measurements that had no 
real meaning, and no time line for compliance and no follow-up to see if measures were 
complied with” (Interview. Kilpatrick, 2008).  
 
Most critically, the 2003 policy emerged during a time when OGB was adopting a 
“rights-based approach”, which had a particular influence on the organisation’s 
understanding of gender equality. The emphasis on human rights and associated liberal 
notions that all humans should be treated equally without discrimination was conflated 
with treating women and men the same, without differentiation (Mukhopadhyay, 
forthcoming). To do otherwise, to provide special treatment for one group but not another, 
would enable accusations of discrimination
103
 and strengthen demands for the same 
treatment regardless of differences in backgrounds and experiences. This influence is 
evidenced in the 2003 policy’s undifferentiated treatment of women and men. 
 
Moreover, the 2003 policy reflects a liberal feminist discourse (Tong, 1989) with its 
emphasis on “equal treatment of women and men”, which displaced the privileging of 
women and women’s subordination in the 1993 policy. The dominant use of the 
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similarly situated test—the requirement that those who are similarly treated should be treated similarly. 
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undifferentiated term “both women and men” in 2003, which is reminiscent of gender 
equality discourses that treat men and women the same (see Chapter 2), acts as a 
refutation of gender concerns specific to women as well as the need to address gender 
inequity as an issue in itself (Baden and Goetz, 1998, Goetz, 1994). Here, the promotion 
of gender equality has not only occurred for instrumental reasons but also served to 
actively undermine “the feminist commitment to political struggle and change” 
(Pearson, 2005: 176). 
 
Liberal feminism is also reflected in the 2003 policy’s adoption of a reformist agenda 
(Barriteau, 2000) distinct from the 1993 emphasis on, for example, transformation of 
gender relations, “changes [that need] to take place in the economic, political, social and 
cultural spheres” and addressing root causes of women’s poverty and injustice. The 
updated policy does not mention the term “change” once, let alone specifying a type of 
change. It makes no mention of transforming gender relations (Rathgeber, 1990). It is less 
challenging but also instrumentalist in its emphasis of gender-related poverty and 
addressing gender inequality so as to reduce poverty and suffering
104
. Moreover, this, 
along with a lack of acknowledgment that “development” itself can be inimical for 
women, conveys an integrationist agenda. This makes gender not only more appealing 
but also more palatable and therefore “accessible”. 
 
In this section, I have demonstrated how OGB’s 2003 Gender Policy was more than just 
an update of the original 1993 policy and argued that it represents a dilution of policy 
commitment and reflects liberal feminist discourses. Yet OGB was known for its 
challenging gender and development approach, described in Chapter 4. How did this 
change come to be? I have suggested that the policies were specific to the contexts 
which they were generated. So what was happening during the post-FROSI era? 
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to legitimise a gender perspective, saying that, without it, OGB would be unable to alleviate poverty and 
suffering effectively (Internal report. Terry, 2000). Instrumental strategies are not in themselves 
depoliticising: they can serve strategic purposes. For example, when Terry (ibid) argued for a “gender 
approach to poverty” in establishing gender equality as part of OGB’s rights framework, she also 
emphasised “Women’s equal rights [as being important] important for their own sake” (ibid: 17) and the 
need for addressing social relations and women’s position and drew upon feminist analysis (ibid: 19).  
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The 2003 update of Oxfam GB’s Gender Policy: How it came to be 
In this section, I describe how ideological positions came to the fore during the updating 
of OGB’s Gender Policy and explore what was going on and how and why certain 
positions were privileged. 
 
The drafting and finalisation of the 2003 policy was a contested process. An OGB 
gender advisor was tasked to lead a process that was initially meant to include only her 
and the editor of the Gender and Development journal. After the 2003 global meeting of 
OGB gender advisors and managers and staff with a gender remit, and at the behest of 
the Gender Leadership Team, the process of updating the policy was expanded to 
include the team. Members expressed the need for stronger and more definitive 
language about the organisation’s aims, the expectations of staff and how the policy 
would be implemented. For example, Jennifer Downey wrote that “The first sentence is 
a bit simplistic: ‘will make the lives of women better’. Let us be a bit more concrete 
again. […] Instead of encouraging and promoting, why not supporting (which implies 
commitment financially etc.)” (Internal communication. Downey, 2003). Others voiced 
a concern for more accountability. For instance, a Regional Gender Advisor, Sarah 
Marshall, wrote, “One thing we could consider […] to make the policy more binding by 
obliging, within the policy, that all regions submit a yearly gender action plan that is 
budgeted, based on a time table with indicators and the obligation to report on the 
implementation” (Internal communication. Marshall, 2003).  
 
The draft policy, developed with inputs from the Gender Leadership Team, was not put 
out for comments or consultation but was “edited” by an OGB staff person from the 
Marketing Division. In this edit, “brevity seemed the main guiding principle”, according 
to an OGB gender advisor (Personal communication. Walker, 2003a). She confirmed 
that neither she nor the Gender Leadership Team had been informed about or consulted 
in what was to her a “radical edit” (ibid) and what Kilpatrick, member of the Gender 
Leadership Team, calls “a much watered down and even weaker policy than the one that 
already existed” (Personal communication. Kilpatrick, 2009). 
 
In contrast, the senior manager involved in the process recalls “tinkering” with the draft 
and “taking a red pen to the policy. Not only in the sense of watering it down, yes, but 
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also in the sense of making it easily understood, but also practical, do-able” (Interview. 
Blair, 2008). The reason proffered for the edit was that the draft read “a bit like it’s 
drafted by a committee. It wouldn’t inspire staff to read it and want to know more as 
part of their induction” (Internal communication. Blair, 2003). Contrary to the 
contention that there were a “few minor amendments [...] but none of substance” (ibid), 
what did emerge was an edit of the draft that was substantially different. In the end, the 
draft was more similar to the 1993 original version whereas the final was much more 
different to the original. 
 
The final version makes less strong commitments by introducing qualifiers, omitting 
key adjectives and using weaker language. For example, while the draft states that “We 
prioritise work which specifically raises the status of women due to the systemic gender 
based oppression women face” (C6. My emphasis), the final version includes qualifiers, 
such as “We will often prioritise work which specifically raises the status of women” 
(A6. My emphasis). The 2003 draft is more nuanced and specific. For example, in 
working with men and men’s groups, the draft states the condition under which this will 
happen: “when they are collaborative, and not competitive, with programmes supporting 
women’s rights” (C11). The final only states that “We will ensure that any work we do 
with men and men’s groups supports the promotion of gender equality” (A11). 
Similarly, the final draft is less specific, for example, as to who is accountable for the 
policy and what staff are accountable for. As with the 1993 version, the strategies of the 
2003 draft are structured around key departments within the organisation (C25, 30, 33), 
whereas the 2003 final does not specify any departments. Also, in terms of 
accountability, the 2003 final version expects less of managers. For example, while it 
states that managers are to “encourage groups and forums […] to share learning and 
best practice on gender equality” (A14), the draft went further stating that “Managers 
will promote the understanding and commitment of all Oxfam staff to gender equality 
objectives, by leading cultural change and through performance management and capacity 
building” (C16). Similar to the difference between the 1993 Gender Policy and the 2003 
final version, the 2003 draft and the 2003 final version also differ in how they privilege 
poverty and gender inequality and the interrelationship between the two. The 2003 final 
version is limited to “gender-related poverty” (A4, 5 and 11), where poverty becomes 
the sole reference point. 
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Eyben (2007) describes recurring battles over text and images in WID booklets 
produced for a bilateral agency. The resulting documents were outcomes of internal 
struggles about maintaining or transforming policy concerning women, informed by 
particular wider “currents of ideology shaping aid policy” at the time a particular book 
was being produced. As Eyben writes, “In the case of the WID booklets, there was one 
audience to please and another to persuade. Senior management was trying to please the 
external lobby and the gender specialists were trying to persuade the ministry staff” 
(ibid, 67). 
 
Similarly, the “battle” over the “updating” OGB’s 1993 Gender Policy was concerned 
about competing perspectives of individuals involved with OGB’s gender work that 
represented wider agendas. Gender advisors and advocates saw the “updating” of the 
policy as an opportunity to address current gender issues in the organisation, such as the 
perceived need for stronger commitments and terms of accountability. In this way, their 
audience was managers. On the other hand, the senior manager involved in finalising 
the policy was concerned with managing expectations and damage control. Her edits, as 
she says, were for a broader audience for which she wanted to make gender accessible, 
not only in terms of the language being used but how the policy was conveyed in vague 
and inoffensive terms
105
. As the gender advisor at the time says about the final version, 
it became a “marketing document [with] the depth taken out” (Interview. Spence, 2008). 
It was also about demonstrating change; after a series of assessments about the lack of 
organisational commitment, commitment was produced in the turn of text, just as Eyben 
writes that the “impetus […] to produce a new booklet [was] to demonstrate change 
(ibid, 71). 
 
For the senior manager involved, battling over the revisions was a response to a wider 
agenda. As she recalls,  
 
I certainly remember, for example, around the gender policy, some quite heated 
discussions around their version and my version. Why we were going the way 
we were. Through all of this, I might have got to thinking, well I’m not an 
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expert, of course I’m not, so I’m backing off. [But] I would very much be 
seeking to deliver on agenda which [Barbara] felt very strongly about. And 
would only be delivered to do the sorts of things I was doing. And by driving 
change through in a quite hard-nosed kind of way, really. (Interview. Blair, 
2008) 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have documented how the 2002 Gender Review had an influence 
during the post FROSI period on how OGB was pursuing gender mainstreaming. The 
significance of it and the OI assessments are two fold. First they represent a further 
entrenchment of gender mainstreaming as a dominant strategy to promote gender. 
Second, senior managers’ responses to these assessments signaled a change in how 
gender mainstreaming was being understood. As an example of this and a follow up to 
the 2002 Gender Review, I analysed the 2003 update of OGB’s original 1993 Gender 
Policy. In addition to demonstrating policy dilution, I also analyse changes made to the 
original policy for indications of a change in understanding of gender equality and 
gender mainstreaming.  
 
I concluded that changes that resulted in the 2003 policy were due to a senior manager 
pursuing what she felt was an organisational agenda. Literature on gender 
mainstreaming demonstrates the impact individuals can have. Were the radical changes 
represented in the 2006 policy the result of an idiosyncratic individual or is there 
something more? Jackson (1997: 162) suggests that organisational staff are “are 
subjects constituted partly by the constellation of institutions within which they exist”. 
The imperative of the findings of the 2002 Gender Review, despite senior managers 
finding them overly critical, were compelling, as indicated by the Action Plan which 
focused on taking action. The updating of the 1993 policy, as one of the first acts 
undertaken by OGB senior managers in response to the review, was a critical test case 
to take forward the promise of do-able actions made by senior managers in the lead up 
to the development of the plan. The 2003 update was also supposed to representative of 
commitments that the organisation could make, which I suggested was a case of 
“moving of the goal posts” as well as the deployment of vague and conditional 
language. 
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Still, Goetz (1997b: 15) suggests, “structuralist assumptions […] over-determine the 
impact of power relations and resource endowments on individuals.” In other words, 
staff are not just pawns to the whims and fancies of their organisations or their leaders. 
Staff exercise agency and where choices are “not as a given by institutional structures of 
control and subordination but [are] contingent and performative” (Jackson, 1997: 162). 
Paraphrasing Baviskar (2007a: citing Moore, 1999), such framing of structure and 
agency does not, however, do justice to complex practices. It is not possible to claim 
intentionality on Blair’s part, in the sense of purposeful dilution of feminist aims, as this 
appearance only becomes possible after the fact though “factual reconstructions” 
offered by ethnographic research (Jiménez, 2007: xx). Rather, Blair was caught between 
“backing off” and delivering on an agenda that the Director was promoting and felt that 
it had to be driven through in a “hard-nosed way”. The next chapter explores this 
agenda, its impetus and basis. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Oxfam GB’s Imperatives: Leadership and Making Gender Accessible 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that OGB’s 2003 gender policy update represents a shift in 
understanding of both gender equality and its promotion compared to the 1993 policy, 
which resulted in a dilution of policy. This shift can be understood within the post-
FROSI organisational context of OGB adopting a rights-oriented framework and 
repeated calls for the organisation to do better in its gender work. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, key individuals were involved. Are these changes indicative of a wider 
organisational change or the influence of particular individuals? Where does the 
impetus come from for such change? What is the meaning of such changes for gender 
mainstreaming in the case of OGB? 
 
This chapter extends the analysis of how gender policy emerges and its drivers, with a 
focus on the balance between institutional and individual imperatives and ideologies. In 
particular, I explore two gender mainstreaming policy imperatives resulting, in part, 
from the 2002 Gender Review and underscored by how it and the Oxfam International 
gender assessment were perceived by senior managers. One concerned the 
mainstreaming of gender leadership. This emanated from the perception that OGB 
organisational leadership was wanting in the face of the organisation’s perennial 
challenges in promoting gender equality. I explain the different influences that affected 
a change in approach by OGB’s director from hands-off to being more directive. Also, 
part of this shift was the reinforcement of senior managers as organisation-wide Gender 
Leads.   
 
Another related imperative was “making gender accessible” in order that staff would 
know what to do. I explain and analyze senior managers’ rationale and understanding of 
gender and how the agenda was tied into “simplifying gender” and, relatedly, a shifting 
of gender advisory support was provided. I suggest these imperatives and related shifts 
were informed by and resulted from perceptions of previous experiences in OGB with 
the promotion of gender equality as well as understandings resembling liberal feminism. 
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GENDER LEADERSHIP AND MAKING A DIFFERENCE 
The 2002 Review, as well as previous assessments of OGB’s gender work, cited, among 
other issues, a lack of organisational leadership on promoting gender equality. It 
recommended the “development of management capacity to lead and guide gender 
mainstreaming processes in ways that are relevant to their respective units, and bring 
results” (Murison, 2002: 10. Original emphasis). In this section, I explore senior 
managers’ efforts to make progress on gender during the post-FROSI period and, in 
one’s words, “to make a difference” (Interview. Blair, 2007) through their own 
leadership. What was behind this imperative? How was gender “leadership” 
understood? What does this tell us of understandings to promote gender and gender 
mainstreaming in particular? 
 
Compared with previous OGB directors, Barbara Stocking was more involved in the 
promotion of gender equality and, over time, took a more direct approach. This was 
informed partly by her own professional experience and by continuous feedback on the 
organisation’s unsatisfactory progress on gender equality. In addition, the shift in 
leadership strategies entailed other senior managers taking on the gender agenda and 
leading particular areas. With the increased prominence of senior managers in gender 
leadership positions came particular understandings not only of gender equality but also 
of its promotion. 
 
In 2001, Stocking came to the directorship determined to make a difference in OGB’s 
gender equality work. As a close colleague recalls of Stocking’s reaction to the Gender 
Review, 
 
It was fairly early in Barbara’s time and it had an impact on her, it was 
something she personally thought was important anyway. And hearing that we 
were so patchy and quite unsatisfactory in our gender work galvanised her to say 
this was something she wanted to prioritise and move forward on.” (Interview. 
Blair, 2008) 
 
According to Blair, a senior OGB manager, the Director took leadership on gender 
issues as a result of her “personal commitment, which she brought with her into the 
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organisation and partly from her experience, earlier in her career, in leadership as a 
woman in a world where that wasn’t common at all” (Interview. Blair, 2007). Stocking 
came to OGB as a successful career bureaucrat. With a degree in Natural Science and a 
Masters in Reproductive Physiology, she previously worked in health: for eight years, 
she undertook various senior management positions with the National Health Service 
(NHS). She sought the position of NHS Chief Executive before starting with OGB, but 
was unsuccessful in part because “I wouldn’t have said ‘yes, Mr Milburn’ [former 
Health Secretary] and they probably recognised that” (Davidson, 2004: n.r.). She was 
known for her “can do” attitude (Slater, 2003: n.r.), which she claims she gained from 
studying and working in the US. Within the not-for-profit sector in the UK, she is 
credited with being ambitious, productive and driven
106
. Stocking also traces many of 
her characteristics to her upbringing (Davies, 2007). As an only child, she says “there 
was no sense that girls did one thing and boys another. [My parents] thought it was 
possible for me to do anything” (Davidson, 2004: n.r.). Similar was her experience 
studying at an all women’s college at Cambridge (Davies, 2007). These characteristics 
are evident in her outlook. Her forte is considered her communication skills, in 
particular her ability to “communicate simply and unthreateningly that comes from 
decades of working in big organisations” (Nguyen, 2009: 18-19).  
 
Stocking certainly displays a concern for the plight of women. In her public speeches 
and interviews as well as in her communication with staff, she often highlights the 
impact of poverty on women and girls. Her statement that “being female affects women 
in poverty” (Nguyen, 2009: 20) is characteristic of her overall understanding and 
fundamental belief that gender is fundamental to poverty. For example, her monthly 
letters to staff often describe the harsh conditions as well as the abuse and oppression 
women face, often with an emphasis on women taking charge. For example, she wrote 
of her visit to Nicaragua (Internal communication. Stocking, 2003b), “In Siuna, we 
work with agricultural, public health and women’s rights partners. I was particularly 
impressed with the work with women on rape, incest and domestic violence. Seeing the 
women becoming so much more confident, open and able to exert their rights was 
impressive.”  
 
                                                 
106
 Stocking is regularly featured in popular media in her role as Oxfam GB Chief Executive Officer. For 
example, see Davidson (2004); Davies (2007); Ho and Ong (2006); unknown (2005). 
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She has a strong belief in women’s leadership; for her, “women are good at managing 
different stakeholders and [...] put a lot of passion into what [they] do” (Interview with 
Stocking by Jesi, 2009). Ainsley Moore, former gender advisor, recalls how Stocking 
“latched onto women’s leadership very quickly” (Interview. Moore, 2007) and how she 
felt that “equal numbers of women and men in power in institutions across the globe 
would impact hugely on many of the issues we deal with such as conflict, basic 
services, etc.” (Internal communication. Moore, 2005). But the Director also feels that 
women themselves need to take the initiative. For example, in advising others on how to 
replicate her success, she says “Do the best you can and if you are suited you will get it. 
Acquire management skills” (Interview with Stocking by Davies, 2007). 
 
Stocking’s initial approach to the promotion of gender equality in OGB was non-
directive for two inter-related reasons. One reason was that, as one OGB gender advisor 
recalls, Stocking initially “didn’t want to go right out on a women’s rights platform. She 
didn’t want to be seen as another woman leading on woman’s rights. My impression 
was that she wanted to gain her credentials across the board then push the gender thing” 
(Interview. Moore, 2007). Second, she also felt that staff needed to be inspired not 
coerced into taking on a gender agenda. For example, in response to calls from members 
of the Gender Leadership Team in 2003 to address what they considered a “lack of 
consistent and accountable leadership” (Internal report. OGB, 2003e: 3), she wrote, 
 
Gender mainstreaming is not something you can instruct people to do. I believe 
we must generate a sense that this is expected of them, that people can be helped 
to take some steps in their areas of responsibility and that there is 
accompaniment to help people. Above all, we want people to do this because 
they are enthusiastic and committed, not because they have been told to do so. 
(Internal communications. Stocking, 2003a: My emphasis) 
 
However, Stocking became increasingly frustrated by repeated reports that OGB was 
wanting in its gender work and in interviews colleagues suggested this led her to change 
her approach
107
. One impetus was the Gender Review, cited previously, and another 
was OGB’s internal Annual Impact Review (AIR) for 2004, which was taken up by the 
                                                 
107
 For example the Director was described as “quite stressed at the slow progress” (Interview. Blair, 
2007). 
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organisation’s most senior management committee, the Corporate Management Team 
(Interview. Hogan, 2005). Based on an internal assessment of 41 OGB projects from 
around the world, the AIR report concluded that “despite the encouraging results that 
we see in individual projects and programmes, we know that a step-change in approach 
is needed by us and others if gender inequalities are to be addressed in a fundamental 
way” (Internal report. OGB, 2005b: 11)108. That the 2004 AIR had such a message is 
not surprising. First, it followed closely after the 2002 Gender Review, which was the 
AIR for that year
109
. Senior managers had already shown their determination and 
leadership to address shortcomings raised in 2002 but, again, the report came back its 
gender work was wanting. Secondly, the internal reporting process in the AIRs uses 
information generated by staff themselves. So that the 2004 AIR conveyed, again, the 
same message as in 2002 could not be dismissed as easily as external assessments such 
as the OI reviews. This bottom-up identification of OGB’s inadequacies is similar to the 
calls that established GADU in the 1990s, as described in Chapter 4. 
 
Following the 2004 AIR report, at a 2004 Corporate Management Team meeting, 
Stocking voiced dissatisfaction with progress on gender mainstreaming. According to 
Margaret Hogan, member of the gender team, she felt that, while a non-directive 
approach was producing “some good work”, something more direct was needed 
(Interview. Hogan, 2005). One particular incident, which apparently made the Director 
“hopping” mad (Interview. Blair, 2007), was catalytic. While on a programme visit to 
Darfur, Pilkington discovered that women in camps were not being provided with 
sanitary towels. As she wrote in her November 2004 Letter from Barbara (Internal 
communication. Stocking, 2004), 
 
I have been really disappointed to find that in Chad, in Darfur and in Bangladesh 
(and these are just the ones I have heard about) we were not distributing sanitary 
towels/clothes/pants (whatever the women say they need) in our hygiene kits. I 
know that our best gender work will be when we ask women properly what they 
                                                 
108
 The Annual Impact Review consisted of country programming staff analysing a particular focus of 
their work, based on criteria established by Oxford.  Country reports went to their respective regional 
management centres, where an aggregate regional report was produced aggregating. These, in turn, were 
used to produce an organisation-wide report the Oxford monitoring and evaluation staff.  
109
 The difference between these two AIRs is that the 2002 focused on gender issues whereas the 2004 
exercise included gender concerns as part of an overall review of OGB’s programmes. 
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want and need and that this is a wider issue than sanitary towels. But I am still 
sad that we are not thinking that a really humiliating issue for women must be 
that they can't keep themselves clean and able to move about during 
menstruation.  
 
This is only one of a few examples in her monthly letters to staff where Stocking 
expressed particular disappointment with the organisation’s performance. She then 
initiated the “gender non-negotiables” in 2005 (Internal communication. Stocking, 
2005s), a set of minimum standards for staff
110
 – a measure she had previously rejected 
as being too directive (Internal document. OGB, 2003e)
111
. These were part of her 
acknowledgement that more needed to be done for “gender issues [to be] built in 
everywhere in the analysis and [for the] delivery of programmes that are appropriate to 
men’s and women’s different needs and that seek to shift the power balance between 
them” (Internal communication. Stocking, 2005b: 2)112. 
 
Around that time, Stocking called for a “step-change” in OGB’s gender work (Internal 
communication. Moore, 2005). In a November 2005 briefing meeting with Ainsley 
Moore, an OGB gender advisor, to clarify what “being more ambitious” would mean, 
the Director again communicated that gender mainstreaming was “not going to help 
women achieve their rights and […] a step-change” was needed (Internal 
communication. Moore, 2005). She emphasised women’s rights and leadership, 
particularly political leadership, to contribute to poverty alleviation and to generate 
internal support for the step-change.  
 
                                                 
110
 The “gender non-negotiables” included: 
a) As a requirement of recruitment, candidates will need to demonstrate a willingness to treat men 
and women with equality in all aspects of life and, where relevant, to address inequalities 
between men and women within their area of work. 
b) Performance Management: [staff] will include within their performance objectives (and, as 
appropriate, their Personal Development plan) practical action in support of Oxfam’s policy on 
gender equality. (Internal communication. Stocking, 2005a) 
 
111
 At a 2003 meeting of Oxfam gender advocates, participants recommended that the organisation “make 
gender mainstreaming a non-negotiable function of management” (Internal Report. OGB, 2003e: 6). 
112
 Stocking’s initial caution was borne out. As one senior manager recalls, “we were tasked to take the 
non-negotiables forward but were not very keen about them. They weren’t going to go anywhere. Still we 
finalised them and sent them down the line mainly because we were asked to do so.” 
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This represented a more directive approach in two ways. First, Stocking had previously 
not been so involved in shaping OGB’s gender work. Her briefing meeting with the 
advisor was a new phenomenon: before she had not initiated such meetings nor made 
such direct recommendations (Interview. Moore, 2007). Second was the specification of 
women-specific activities. Beforehand, the Director had emphasised the improvement 
of women’s position only through and as a result of OGB’s ongoing development and 
humanitarian work.  
 
Around this time, Stocking was also influenced by Oxfam International’s 2005 
Consultative Forum organised by Oxfam Novib to contribute to the development of 
Oxfam International’s 2008-2010 Strategic Plan. As a member of the Gender Reference 
Group noted, “Barbara came back from the women’s forum asking why everybody [was] 
talking about women’s rights when OGB was going gender mainstreaming” (field notes). 
According to the conference proceedings, participants called for “more significant 
campaigning on gender equality” on issues such as violence against women, women’s 
leadership, women’s work and women’s rights because gender mainstreaming was 
insufficient (Internal communication. Oxfam International, 2005: 5).  
 
Stocking’s call for a step-change seems to have been driven partly by the reports of 
lacklustre progress and, in parallel, by her “can do” attitude and resolve as well as her 
commitment to showing leadership. Frustrated by repeated signals that the 
organisation’s gender approach was wanting, first by the Gender Review and later by 
the Oxfam International gender assessments, and then by being personally affronted by 
the sanitary napkin incident, Stocking was caught between two parallel dilemmas 
thrown up by changing a bureaucracy from within, as discussed in Chapter 2. The first 
concerns how change happens within organisations. On the one hand, OGB is a 
hierarchical organisation where, formally, policies and decisions are executed “through 
the line” (see Chapter 4). On the other, staff at different levels operate with discretion. 
As one senior manager comments, “compared to other organisations Barbara and I have 
worked with, the ability to decree anything [in OGB] is quite limited” (Interview. Blair, 
2007). As discussed later, the reluctance to dictate change, even a “step change”, was 
gendered: it was also informed by perceptions of senior managers of how resistance to 
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gender initiatives in OGB existed in the first place was related to how gender was 
promoted.  
 
The second and related dilemma is specific to gender mainstreaming (Tiessen, 2007): 
OGB, as with other organisations, pursued the strategy as an all-encompassing 
organisation wide process where gender was everybody’s responsibility. Of course this 
process of change is slow and bound to be iterative, particularly given senior managers’ 
reluctance and limited capacity to decree change. Yet the need to change was urgent: 
personally, and as the leader of OGB, which was facing external pressures from Oxfam 
International to take a stronger position to address women, discussed in Chapter 5, 
Stocking wanted and needed to see progress towards improving the position of women. 
“Step-change” was a particular initiative that was pursued in these directions. 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the initiatives taken by OGB after 2001 
solely to Barbara Stocking and her influence. After FROSI and the introduction of the 
Aims, OGB established Aim leads and teams (see Chapter 4). The then Marketing 
Director was appointed in 2000 as the first Aim lead on Aim 5, on gender and diversity, 
but was seen as not very effective. As an OGB gender advisor at the time recalls, he was 
“given the role a gender lead because he was a man who needed to know about gender. 
We spent a lot of time inducting him on what it’s all about. [He] had absolutely no idea 
about gender at all” (Interview. Moore, 2007 and 2011). Subsequently, from 2002 to 
2003, two women senior managers were appointed as co-leads for gender. 
 
Jane Cotton, Director of Human Resources, was appointed by the Director in 2002 with 
a particular agenda: “to get some cut-through here, to get some things happening, to 
make things happen, and to make things happen differently from the past”, according to 
one senior manager (Interview. Blair, 2007). In particular, this meant making gender 
accessible. For example, in response to the Oxfam International mid-term review, 
previously discussed in Chapter 5, Stocking reported to staff that “There are also areas 
where we need to improve, for example, on all staff […] understanding of gender and 
diversity issues. Jane Cotton, our HR Director, will be leading some work to make that 
possible, simply for example having some material on OI in all affiliates’ induction 
processes” (Internal communication. Stocking, 2004). Cotton was the lead of OGB’s 
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gender work from 2002 to 2003, and on a number of occasions followed Stocking’s 
initiative. For example, following the 2003 meeting of the Gender Leadership Team, the 
Director informed the organisation in her monthly letter that “Jane Cotton, who leads 
this work, and I will be going through these recommendations this week to see how we 
will take them forward” (Internal communication. Stocking, 2003b: n.r.). Before Cotton 
joined OGB in 1999, she held various personnel roles with the British civil service for a 
period of 20 years.  
 
For OGB, the increasing prominence of women in senior management positions as well 
as within the gender infrastructure concerned getting women into decision-making roles, 
particularly decision making fora. The role of the global gender leads was to keep gender 
on the agenda. More than this, though, the privileging of senior managers as global 
gender leads was related to increasing the managerialism of gender leadership. As a 
senior manager states, gender “needs to be much more open and driven by 
management” (Interview, Pilkington, 2009. My emphasis).  
 
By 2003, OGB had three women in senior positions, which was significant in a number 
of ways. After years of male dominance of leadership and senior management positions, 
OGB, for the first time, had women occupying the positions of Director, Director of 
Human Resources and International Director. This also changed the balance on the 
Corporate Management Team, which now comprised 30% women, the highest 
representation of women ever. These changes meant that there were “women senior 
leaders in the organisation who were really committed to moving the organisation on 
this issue [of gender]. Not necessarily the way everyone wanted them to, but it was no 
longer lip-service”, recalls Sarah Wright (Interview. 2008), who had worked in the 
Policy Department for a number of years. 
 
Certainly the increase of the number of women in both senior management and gender 
leadership positions represents an achievement for OGB’s gender mainstreaming aims. 
Still, the rise of women managers in gender leadership positions came with particular 
understandings of gender equality that reflected liberal feminism. One was the faith in 
women’s leadership as an expression of individual choice and initiative (Interview. 
Blair, 2008). This was manifested not only with Pilkington and the global gender leads, 
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as women, but also in their promotion of women. Second, and related, was Stocking’s 
emphasis on an equal number of women and men in decision making positions. Third 
was a reformist agenda. Senior managers were attempting to affect change from within 
using their authority. Still, they also understood that using their positions to decree that 
gender be promoted was bound to fail; that was exactly the problem they saw with 
previous efforts: change was being forced. Rather staff needed to be inspired in part by 
addressing gender inequity as a way of alleviating poverty
113
. Also, gender needed to be 
made accessible by making it simple and practical, which is the focus on the next 
section. 
 
MAKING GENDER ACCESSIBLE 
I have discussed how the Director and global gender leads assumed a more prominent 
role in promoting gender equality. Along with this shift, I describe in this section an 
agenda pursued by senior managers to make gender accessible and explain the thinking 
and rationale behind this imperative. Overall, it meant using simple and clear language 
and breaking down gender so staff would understand what it meant and know what to 
do. “De-mystifying” gender would motivate staff by demonstrating its relevance to 
OGB and its “do-ability”. Staff could then be assisted, through practical support and 
encouragement, to know what to do and gain confidence. Making it accessible would 
mean that staff would be “able to apply it and [know] why it’s relevant to their jobs”, 
explains a senior manager (Interview. Barlow, 2006). As Stocking says, “I had a strong 
feeling that we needed to take very practical approaches. And articulate it in a way that 
the majority will get it” (Internal communication. Stocking, 2005a).  
 
The final version of the 2003 update of the Gender Policy, described the Chapter 5, is an 
example of this understanding of making gender more accessible. The main rationale 
for the “radical edits” was the need to make the policy easily understood, practical and 
do-able. As I explain below, however, and as the case of the update demonstrates, 
making gender accessible also entailed a shift in understanding of gender 
mainstreaming compared not only to understandings of gender and development from 
                                                 
113
 This of course throws up the question of why the Director introduced the “non-negotiables” which are 
a form of decree. This decision is partially explained by the frustration reached at that point with Oxfam 
GB’s continued impasse (Pialek, 2008). It also is representative of the different options to power persons 
with organisational authority have. The indirect approach was concerned with latent power (Lukes, 2005) 
whereas the deployment of the non-negotiables was about episodic power (Clegg, 1989) 
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the GADU days, but also from the FROSI period and understanding of gender 
mainstreaming, such as that proposed by Terry (Internal document., 2000), described in 
Chapter 5. 
 
For senior managers, perceptions of the complexity of gender had led to resistance. As 
the Director wrote in one of her monthly letters to staff, “My feeling is that there is little 
resistance to gender issues in OGB but people, especially men, are rather frightened of it 
and don’t know what they can do about it” (Internal communication. Stocking, 2002a). 
It is not that managers denied that gender mainstreaming was complicated. One 
Programme Manager recalls being told by a senior manager of the RMC for East Asia 
“that […] gender mainstreaming is so difficult, and [she doesn’t] think anyone has the 
answer what to do” (Interview. Smith, 2006). As Blair says, “We are not saying poverty 
is not complicated, gender isn’t complicated. But writing intellectual treatises and 
telling them it’s complicated is not exactly any way to make progress” (Interview. Blair, 
2007).  
 
Part of making gender accessible was, as one senior manager claims, to demonstrate 
that gender work was “a normal thing to do, not you-have-to-be-a-specialist thing to do, 
[such as] working on things like the ‘Pick Up and Go’ [training] on gender. So we were 
sort of saying you can learn how to do this and it’s not that hugely complicated”, 
(Interview. Pilkington, 2009). The idea that nearly anyone with some previous 
experience could be a gender trainer epitomised the notion of gender being accessible. 
For example, the criteria for delivering OGB’s introductory and gender mainstreaming 
training modules were that trainers should have training and facilitation experience as 
well as “experience of mainstreaming gender in development, humanitarian or advocacy 
programmes, or in Oxfam” (Internal document. OGB, 2004a: 3). 
 
As an example, Pilkington, s senior manager, cited on different occasions the 
experience of delivering the ‘Pick Up and Go’ on gender mainstreaming to staff. “I was 
going to Liberia and sort of modelling that you can do this [as] a normal part of what 
senior managers needed to be taking on” (Interview. Pilkington, 2009). For the 
manager, it was surprising how easy it was to deliver. “I read it in 30 minutes, did the 
half day as a workshop. I did it very well. I was amazed by African staff, they really got 
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it” (field notes). That the training seemed so easy to conduct only served to reinforce the 
perception about promoting gender.  
 
I remember [...] doing that very basic thing of getting them to describe to each 
other how men and women experience being in the camps in different ways [...] 
Actually beginning to start understanding it, which is the first basic part of it 
[that] can be done by talking, and insight, and thinking really. I think they 
[gender advisors] made it too complicated too soon and being very judgmental 
about it in some cases. (Interview. Pilkington, 2009) 
 
This account of “successful” delivery of gender training reinforces a number of notions 
about doing gender work that prevailed among senior managers. First is that specific 
knowledge, skills or experience is not required. Without any previous gender training 
experience and, with only 30 minutes preparation, the manager was able to deliver the 
training
114
 (Macdonald, 1994: 38). This populist notion of gender knowledge, described 
in Chapter 2, contrasts with the idea that gender work, such as gender training, requires 
specialised knowledge (Goetz and Sandler, 2007: 167) and “expertise” (Miller and 
Razavi, 1998b: 7)
 115
.  
 
The idea that senior managers take more leadership and become more actively involved 
in promoting gender issues is not being challenged here. Rather it is the wholehearted 
adoption of a populist notion of gender knowledge. Another example is Barlow, a senior 
manager who had a gender remit. She did not have a formal professional or educational 
background in gender and much of her experience was primarily in management in the 
corporate and non-profit sectors and several years in development, many of which were 
with OGB in senior management positions. She came to her gender role with a 
“practical” approach:  
 
                                                 
114
 Ahikire (2007: 24) comments on the belief by development agencies that gender training requires only 
“general knowledge” and not “much preparation”. 
115
 As discussed in Chapter 1, Beveridge et al. (2000: 390) characterise this dichotomy as differences 
between the “expert-bureaucratic model” and the “participatory-democratic model”, where the former 
involves those with specialised training and the latter is the “prerogative of administrators [who are] 
unlikely to possess a highly developed understanding of gender relations”.  
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I don't come to this with a gender background. When people ask me, when people 
talk about WID [women in development], feminist ideology, I am awful, my 
conceptual underpinning is very weak. So, I come at it from a very practical 
[perspective] I strongly feel we need to take very practical approaches and 
articulate it in a way that the majority of Oxfam can get. Whether or not what we 
say about men and women having equal access, having equal power, having equal 
rights, how that’s different from previous analysis, I struggle to know. (Interview. 
Barlow, 2006) 
 
Barlow’s conceptualisation is illustrated by the establishment of the title of the Strategic 
Framework. Initially, “Putting Women at the Heart of All Our Work” was included in 
the communiqué from the meeting where the title was discussed (Internal document. 
OGB, 2006a)
116
. During the drafting of the framework, the global gender advisors in 
Oxford suggested that the phrase be revised to “Putting Women’s Rights at the Heart of 
All Our Work”, as they saw that this better represented the framework’s focus. For the 
gender advisors, the one word made all the difference between the Strategic Framework 
being universal and empowering and it being potentially condescending and 
disempowering (field notes). In contrast, Barlow saw the change as inconsequential: ‘To 
be honest, it’s become an issue because one or two gender advisors felt wedded to the 
issue of rights. They wanted women’s rights in there […] I’d prefer we use the vision 
statement, which is about women gaining power […] I think there has been unnecessary 
excitement about the need to change wording.” (Interview. Barlow, 2006)  
 
Second, and related, is that “doing gender” is a matter of how it is done: talking to staff, 
having insights and thinking as well as not making it “too complicated”, as Pilkington’s 
account of her gender training experience suggests. The implication is that those with 
specialised knowledge are not engaging with staff, do not have insight and are not 
thinking. The above assessment by the OGB manager suggests that gender advisors are 
unable to have similar engagements because they have made gender too complicated 
and are judgemental. That the Pick Up and Go “training” was engaging is not being 
challenged here; rather, I am highlighting the conflation of an experience of facilitating 
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 This is another common Oxfam practice following any significant meeting: to develop a communiqué 
for Oxfam staff and volunteers which usually includes a very brief description of the meeting and 
decisions taken. 
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a session with other practices undertaken by gender advisors that do require specialised 
knowledge and skills, such as being able to frame gender equality outcomes as rights. 
Moreover, the example of gender training concerns how a different language about 
gender was employed, discussed next. 
 
The language of gender 
Making gender accessible in OGB concerned mutually reinforcing acceptable and 
unacceptable ways to discuss and “do” gender. Talking about gender in upbeat terms 
was encouraged and embraced; only those ideas that inspired and mobilised staff were 
acknowledged and rewarded. Moreover, talking in ambitious terms was privileged. It is 
almost as if there was a direct correlation between level of ambition and acceptability: 
the more aspirational the gender goals, the greater their ability to mobilise support and 
be condoned. Such aspiration is created by and in turn generates energy. A major factor 
is the absence of what is perceived as “negative energy” which, in the context of Oxfam 
House, was associated with negative ways of engaging. The concern was not so much to 
prevent criticisms being raised but rather to put limits on how they were raised: being 
upbeat was seen as part of being ‘balanced’. 
 
A case in point is the Director’s monthly staff letters, which she claimed were inspiring 
for staff. She tries “to write about things that the organisation expects from people [...] 
not in that heavy-handed way but by trying to both describe what we were trying to 
drive on as an organisation and provide examples” (Internal communication. Stocking, 
2002a). For example, in six letters between 2002 and 2004, the Director made a case 
that the organisation needed to be doing better on promoting gender equality, always 
prefaced with an acknowledgement of what progress had been made. She used different 
general descriptors such as “a long way to go”, “more to do”, the need to cover all their 
work and not being as good as the organisation thought. For example, she wrote:  
 
Oxfam GB has had a reputation for being in the lead on gender issues. This still 
remains, but I think all of us are concerned that we are not doing all that we 
should. We are therefore reviewing our gender work, to see how best we can 
maintain it, and to see how staff in Oxford can best be used to support staff as 
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well as developing our knowledge. (Internal communication. Stocking, 2002a: 
n.r.) 
 
Although judgmental, the future oriented framing of Stocking’s assessment avoided a 
direct assessment. For example, she did not describe OGB’s work as “patchy”, as have a 
number of other assessments of OGB’s gender work (Internal report. Mohideen, 2002), 
but rather said “we are not doing all that we should”. Both statements give the sense of 
mixed practice, but the Director’s framing acknowledged that efforts were being made 
and it was a matter of doing more. In this sense, the framing of the issue is future-
oriented, providing a sense of progression and movement while avoiding a categorical 
description of the state of affairs. 
 
The Director’s letters often discussed gender issues within the context of future 
intentions or plans. For example, for the 2003 Strategic Plan, she stated that the 
organisation needed to ensure “that gender issues are central in all the work we do” 
(Internal communication. Stocking, 2002b: n.r.). For the 2007-2010 Oxfam 
International Strategic Plan, which informed the OGB plan, she wrote how Oxfam 
members were discussing “the need for a step change in our gender work” (Internal 
communication. Stocking, 2005b: n.r.).  
 
A reading of the Director’s letters shows that her “balanced approach” was not reserved 
for gender issues: she typically employed similar language when addressing other 
issues. She acknowledged what the organisation was doing, as an assessment from the 
perspective of the future, and provided indications of future plans. For example, “in a 
study of Sustainability we scored highly on accountability. But we must not be 
complacent, we must always try to be more accountable” (Internal communication. 
Stocking, 2003a). Being “balanced”, in the framing of problems and solutions (Gasper 
and Apthorpe, 1996), was a reasonable strategy in the context of OGB, where it is 
difficult to make pronouncements to motivate staff action.  
 
Still, such “management speak” had particular implications in the context of speaking of 
“gender” in OGB. Stocking’s balanced approach is concerned with modeling the 
antithesis to what senior managers felt was lacking with the approach of those who 
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always pointed out that “you haven't got it right because you haven't gone all the way on 
it”, as one senior manager says (Interview. Pilkington, 2009). This latter approach 
apparently discouraged and intimidated staff, whereas a balanced view presents the 
particular issue in a more accessible manner by privileging the positive: acknowledging 
what the organisation is doing and emphasising the future by focusing on what more 
needs to be done and future plans. The emphasis on the future is a mobilising trope as it 
serves as encouragement: something can be done and is being done. Moreover, it is an 
effective strategy to deflect any possible criticisms: how can one be criticised if 
promises to take action have been made? 
 
Talking in future-oriented terms is one way to refer to gender; another is with 
enthusiasm. In this, those who emulate a balanced approach are given legitimacy. For 
example, as a senior manager states about the difference in gender advisors’ approach, 
“Two [advisors] were in the ‘isn’t-it-dreadful-why-don’t-they-do-it-better’ sort of mode. 
But even they weren’t as extreme as before. They were much more constructive [...] 
there was more energy around the whole thing. The old method not only wasn’t 
effective, it made the people unhappy” (Interview. Blair, 2007). 
 
Referring to gender issues in positive terms serves another purpose. It mobilises support 
in spite of the ambitiousness of any policy, the potentially confrontational nature of an 
initiative and the resistance from staff to being instructed. It feeds into dominant 
development narratives by conveying the prospect of success unfettered by any 
association with negative energy. As Sarah Wright, long-time OGB advisor and counsel 
to senior managers, states of OGB’s violence against women campaign in South Asia, 
“We Can”: 
 
People in Oxfam won’t do things if you tell them to. You have to find other ways 
to get people to do things. From meaning, excitement, from being part of success 
[...] I do think the ‘We Can’ campaign started to get at that because the campaign 
offered a positive engagement across the organisation [...] people could say yes 
this is what we are about. It is a radical proposition, got right to the core of the 
issue. It was kind of a perfect way, if you look at it, nobody accused them of being 
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‘gender police’, but they were working on quite profound issues. (Interview. 
Wright, 2008) 
 
The corollary to all this was clear: there were “unacceptable” ways to discuss gender, 
namely, being too critical or judgmental and thereby lacking positive energy, and not 
being balanced by not acknowledging good work being done. The 2002 Gender Review 
and the Oxfam International evaluation are two examples of inputs that were seen as too 
critical and unhelpful, as discussed in Chapter 5: they were seen as exceedingly 
negative, as not acknowledging progress that had been made and as discouraging staff. 
Unacceptable ways of talking about gender were also to be found among gender 
advisors themselves. For example, Armstrong emphasises how not to talk about gender. 
For her, gender advisors who pointed out only what was wrong only served to reinforce 
the perception that gender advisors were always complaining and had nothing 
constructive to offer. This only “[made] my job more difficult next week” because, 
when she had to engage with staff, she faced ‘downbeat’ perception, of the kind she had 
worked hard to get rid of (Interview. Armstrong, 2009). 
 
The distinction between using “upbeat, motivating language” and being “too critical and 
judgmental”, thereby “lacking positive energy” is illustrated by a discussion during a 
2006 meeting of 25 “experienced OGB staff from across the organisation, including 
advisors, managers, and others” representing Oxfam House and five regions (Internal 
document. Pialek, 2006: 20). The meeting was convened “to deepen understanding of 
OGB’s global work on gender equality as well as to develop a shared vision for 
programme work for 2007/2010” (ibid: 13). During the meeting, participants struggled 
over the finalisation of the wording of the vision statement that was to be used in the 
framework. On the one hand, members of the programme department gender team 
wanted the focus initially to be on what changes were required internally, and then to 
proceed to what external changes may be desired (ibid). For them, taking into 
consideration the organisation’s past experiences and challenges was critical. In 
particular, meeting participants agreed that there was a lack of management 
accountability, support and, as some participants started to ask, commitment. On the 
other hand, some participants felt that the draft vision, developed in advance to be 
considered at the meeting, was too internally focused and needed to be more externally 
  
Chapter 6 Oxfam GB’s Imperatives: Leadership and Making Gender Accessible 155 
 
oriented. For them, OGB identifies external changes and then sees what needs to be 
done internally: “this is the way we do it in Oxfam”, according to one senior manager 
(ibid: 9). This concerned having “people say in the [organisation] ‘I want to be a part of 
it’ […] it is about getting people passionate about gender” (ibid). It was also about 
making gender accessible by having “a clear strap line, such as women gaining power, 
so that the business incorporates this and makes all staff responsible for something clear 
and achievable”, as suggested by Barlow, a senior manager (ibid: 10). Also, more than 
instilling excitement, it was about needing to make a break from the past by shifting 
“energy from trying to get ‘nay’ sayers on board and focus on what we do well” (ibid).  
 
Moreover, the proponents of an externally derived vision were frustrated with the 
eternal debates and discussions on how the organisation itself needed to change
117
 
(Internal document. Pialek, 2006: 20). For example, Sandra Blackwell, a long-time 
gender advisor, stated that OGB needed “more frank language [that gender 
mainstreaming] is a tool, not a way of making a project more palatable for staff 
[…that’s a] disconnect between feminism and gender” (ibid: 9), Norris, a long-time 
senior manager, stated that they “needed to stop thinking about ourselves, it is pathetic 
[…] we need to look at what we can change in the world” (ibid: 9). For her and the 
proponents of an externally derived vision, dwelling on the past was not going to move 
the organisation forward, particularly when it concerned what the organisation was not 
doing. As Blackwell recalls of the meeting, Norris “didn’t want to think about the past, 
particularly when it concerned analysing how we strayed as an organisation. This was 
negative for some, and they were fed up with constantly hearing this. They wanted to 
look forward, as if the past didn’t exist” (field notes).  
 
These relative starting points, whether internal or external, represented two different 
perspectives on change, both of which are related to the past. The inward approach 
acknowledged the limits of the organisation and proposed that visions be set 
accordingly. Part of this perspective was a recognition that perennial challenges, such as 
resistance by managers and resource constraints, were very real obstacles for the 
organisation in achieving its gender equality aims. The outward perspective was about 
creating change by making gender accessible and inspiring staff. Focusing externally 
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 Pialek (2008: 223), who was present at the meeting, notes that “Oxfam’s management were upset that 
the vision of what a gender mainstreamed organisation would look like was too inward looking.” 
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would allow staff to become excited about gender and, as Norris’ rebuke suggests, this 
entailed breaking from the past, and related associations such as “feminism”, because it 
was too negative. Ironically, this perspective was related to the past but represented a 
different way of dealing with it. Looking forward and being inspiring meant  nothing 
less than an ambitious agenda. The draft framework considered at the meeting, as the 
meeting facilitator wrote, was “criticised for being ‘modest’ – only hugely ambitious, 
outward-looking targets, transforming millions of women’s lives, are deemed 
acceptable within the organisation” (Internal communication. Kirkwood, 2006). 
Focusing outward was also concerned with focusing on the future as a way to break 
from the past, which was associated with the constant bad news of the organisation’s 
failings on gender. 
 
This is where the contradiction of the agenda to make gender accessible lies. The 
argument is that “gender” needs to be simplified in order to be accessible and do-able. 
Past efforts created negative energy around gender because it was apparently made too 
difficult to apply due to its abstractness
118
. In contrast, ambitious targets, which 
arguably are just as difficult to realize, are embraced. It would seem that the issue about 
inward or outward perspectives is not just about their relative do-ability, but their 
perspectives on the past. As described in Chapter 4, OGB has a long, well-known and 
significant history in gender and development. For some, this is an illustrious past; for 
others, it is one to be disconnected from. The latter and the agenda to make gender more 
accessible had direct implications for how gender advisors were seen, which are 
discussed next. 
 
The shifting of gender advisory support 
 
There was a sense that we wanted [advisors] who would accompany in a supportive 
way, give people practical help in what they should do. Not go and shake a finger at 
them and tell them what they were doing wrong. That was very much the sort of theme 
we were looking for from people in that [gender] team.  
 
(Interview. Blair, 2007) 
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 van Eerdewij (2009) makes a similar point from her research of Dutch DNGOs. 
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The period after 2001 saw two shifts in gender advisory support. The first was 
quantitative. In 2000, with the dissolution of GALT, Oxfam House had four full-time 
gender advisors. In 2002, this was increased to five, but there were only three by 2006. 
Second was a qualitative shift: the gender team
119
 in 2006 comprised a different ilk of 
gender advisors. As I argue in the following, it is reasonable to perceive this change as 
having been achieved by shifting the terms of how gender was to be promoted by 
advisors, in part as a response to perceived shortcomings of how they worked in the 
past. 
 
These gender team changes were part of a wider change in how advisory services were 
structured in Oxfam House during the early 2000s, as described in Chapter 4. There was a 
perceived general need to move advisors out of Oxfam House to the Regional 
Management Centres, coinciding with the establishment of regional-level advisor 
positions. But there were also particular arguments for gender advisors: gender advisors 
sitting in Oxford were seen as unable to support staff from afar and poorly connected to 
programme realities. So the shifting of gender advisors away from Oxfam House was 
related to a broadening of gender mainstreaming efforts. “In fact we had a gender unit at 
the time I arrived and that got pruned down quite significantly with the view it’s a 
gender mainstreaming thing if you like, it’s that we actually have to get this embedded 
in our programmes” (Interview. Pilkington, 2009). 
 
This vision for the qualitative shift is consistent with those of the senior managers who 
saw a need to renew the gender advisors as well as the need for gender to be more 
accessible.  
 
[We] needed [advisors] who knew it wasn’t simple but could simplify it for 
people they had to work with, particularly people who could be encouraging, 
supportive, in a very accompanying kind of way […] You still needed expertise. It 
was the style, the way of working that needed to be different. Not that they didn’t 
have to just have expertise. (Interview. Blair, 2007) 
 
                                                 
119
 I use this term to describe of overall gender infrastructure of gender advisors in Oxfam as opposed to 
the Policy Department gender team comprised of Global Gender Advisors 
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The changes represented “a big cultural shift”, says one senior manager (Interview. 
Blair, 2007) as compared early days, which were “dire actually, in terms of attitudes and 
the way gender experts behaved”, says another senior manager (Interview. Pilkington, 
2009). For managers, the shift also concerned the inclusion of men, not only as gender 
advisors but also, more generally, through OGB staff getting involved with gender 
issues. Pilkington recalls that, when she first joined OGB, “The thing I found more 
difficult was the idea that you could work on gender and exclude men” (Interview. 
Pilkington, 2009). She and other managers therefore welcomed the involvement of men 
in OGB’s gender work.  “Some people stayed and realised that the old method didn’t 
work and they were thinking about it differently. The sense that this is something we do 
together and evolve together […] And the nice thing is that some are men” (Interview. 
Blair, 2007). The welcoming and embracing of men’s involvement in gender issues 
echoes the 2006 Gender Policy’s undifferentiated treatment of women and men, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. The de-privileging of a focus on women and their specific 
needs, as compared to the 1993 policy, seems to be an additional example of how and 
why the policy was to be made more accessible. Employing an equality discourse that 
features women and men seems to have been a direct response to previous efforts that 
were perceived as “excluding men”.  
 
The regionalisation of Oxford-based advisors and the downscaling of the gender team 
also provided an opportunity to move gender advisors who were seen as inimical to the 
new agenda. As Blair states, 
 
It was an active decision but probably not a very transparent decision. A 
combination of [new managers coming in and other managers] saying it ain’t 
working, [that we] decided to cut numbers. That was the transparent thing we did 
[…] We were determined quite frankly to get rid of them. And there were people 
frankly ready to move on. (Interview. Blair, 2007) 
 
Although this could be seen as “weeding out”, others identified it as a shift in how OGB 
promoted gender, as explained in Chapter 4, from getting gender on the agenda to 
ensuring compliance and then to a focus on supporting. As Sarah Wright, a long time 
programme manager explains (Interview. Wright, 2008), 
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The kind of trajectory in my view is one where there was an internal battle to be 
fought from pre-GADU and GADU, [which] was the first history, getting a 
Gender Policy, and nursery and all that era was hugely important putting some 
foundations down. The more difficult stage came when how do we actually make 
this part of our organisational thinking and culture. And there have been various 
stages of how to do that. And one was this kind of expert way and more kind of 
regulatory compliance approach, which was felt by a lot of people as kind of 
policing. That approach that was being taken wasn’t about weeding out. I think 
the shift was more about this was not working. What is it about advisors and 
gender that needs to be done with differently? What I don’t like about the weeding 
out about the gender police because it sounds quite personally oriented.”  
 
While some advisors went, others who did change were retained: those who “stayed and 
realized that the old method didn’t work and they were thinking about it differently” 
(Interview. Blair, 2007). As described previously, as in the case of Pilkington’s gender 
training experience, part of the agenda of making gender accessible was promoting and 
modelling particular ways of doing gender. Those advisors who successfully 
demonstrated such approaches were the ones who stayed. One example is Ainsley 
Moore, “who figured out how to work with different people, especially managers. She 
comes across as constructive and not overly critical. She is able to get things done” 
(field notes). For senior managers, Moore epitomised the change they wanted to see and 
the types of people they wanted to work with. “But when I look [the current gender 
team], I think it’s totally different from the past. And Moore, although both have been 
around a very long time, in particular, she may have changed her ways of working very 
significantly. And that sort of conflict, I just don’t hear it anymore” (Interview. Blair, 
2008).  
 
The shifts of the gender team in Oxfam House were accompanied by the establishing of 
regional gender advisor positions. Ostensibly, this concerned getting advisory services 
closer to programmes, but what it meant in practice was a shift in the types of advisors 
hired. As mentioned above, RMCs were given latitude to staff their centres, apart from 
those in relation to mandatory management positions. Still, they were expected to hire 
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“practical” regional gender advisors, to fit the accessibility agenda. “We got 
increasingly regional gender advisors who got good at, I keep on using the word, 
practical or pragmatic […] they cared about the issues but they also helped people 
translate it into meaningful things that could do in their programmes” (Interview. Blair, 
2008). 
 
In many respects, the cohort of gender advisors established by 2006 was very different 
to that which was associated with GADU
120
. Early GADU member came to the unit 
from different professional trajectories, but for the most part were relatively new to 
working for development agencies. They had limited experience with working at the 
organisational level to integrate gender issues: the discourse of gender mainstreaming 
had yet to pervade the development sector. Many of those who worked with the unit 
until the late 1990s came from activist backgrounds, particularly in the developing 
world but also in the UK. As one of the longer-serving GADU members states, “We 
talked of activism and I would argue that involvement in activism here (in Europe), no 
matter how local e.g. campaigning against a motorway proposal, demonstrating against 
the Iraq war, enables us to understand something about working for change from the 
inside” [sic] (personal correspondence).  
 
Post-FROSI advisors had less activist experience, like other OGB staff at this time. This 
was an era of “professionalisation”: staff were hired for experience working in 
mainstream development organisations, gained from working in OGB or other 
development organisations for a number of years, and with other qualifications such as 
relevant education. In particular, the regional advisors were products of the 
“professionalization of gender and development” (Standing, 2007: 110), related in part 
to the rise of “postgraduate and other training programmes in gender and development” 
(ibid: 103). This is not to say that staff during this time lacked any political agenda or 
felt dispassionate about social injustice. Similarly, post-FROSI gender advisors in 
Oxfam House and in the regions had more experience working in mainstream 
development organisations, gained from working in OGB or other development 
organisations for a number of years.  
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 This section is based on an analysis of interviews and of biographical data of select GADU members 
as members of the gender team during the post-FROSI period. 
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This difference was striking to those involved in GADU, An early GADU member 
describes the difference between current OGB gender staff and GADU: 
 
If you come from somewhere else, you come with a certain […] sense of what 
it’s about. But it’s a bit different […] if it’s a professional job for you. You don’t 
share the same values, you don’t want the same things and you probably come 
with a different sense of urgency. (Interview. West, 2011)  
 
The shifting of gender advisors and how advisory support was done in the post-FROSI 
period was as much about the types of advisors who were preferred as much as the type 
of knowledge that was desired. The shift seems to be about moving from grounded 
feminist knowledge to formal gender knowledge gained from taking formal gender-
related courses and work experience in development. This shift also represents a change 
in the idea of what constitutes gender expertise, an issue highlighted in Chapter 2 and 
which here can be seen as s shift from an activist notion to one more that is more 
developmentalist. 
 
The myth of the gender police 
 
I know when I started […] I had never heard of the expression Gender Police. But 
within months, almost every new hire (male) person I inducted as they were going 
out into the field either mentioned it directly or alluded to it as the type of gender 
people within Oxfam. Where did they get it from except thru meeting with other 
Oxfam […] staff before they reached me? 
 
(Walker, 1996: 7) 
 
As previously mentioned, the 2002 Gender Review noted that “GADU was unfinished 
business” (see Chapter 4). Murison (Internal report. 2002: 11) observed that the unit had 
taken on the “mythical status of an ‘urban legend’” and associated with it was the image 
of the “gender police”. The report’s author does not explore this notion but observed 
that it would “continue to have a devastating effect on action for gender equality in 
OGB, and for social and organisational change more broadly defined” (ibid). During my 
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research, the term “gender police” was commonly used by a number of informants to 
characterise particular OGB staff, mostly gender advisors but also others who have 
gender as part of their remit. But the term had different interpretations. Sometimes it 
was used for advisors who were seen as always complaining about OGB’s gender 
equality efforts and challenges and making little effort to support understanding. In 
other cases, it referred to surveillance and people looking out for mistakes. In other 
situations, the term was about “busting people”121 if they made mistakes even before 
they were fairly judged. In this section, I attempt to trace the term and its various 
associated meanings. I propose that the notion of “gender police” is a myth in the sense 
that, more than just a characterisation, it was deployed both to prevent particular ways 
of promoting gender equality and to encourage others.  
 
As suggested, the term’s origin in OGB is associated with GADU, whose members 
were referred to as the “feminist thought police” (Interview. Wright, 2008). According 
to West, a long time OGB manager, “people used to talk about the old gender unit as the 
gender police” (Interview. West, 2011). Another early GADU member recalls how, 
after she joined the unit, having previously worked in another section, her former 
colleagues would jokingly say “Oh, so you are now with the gender thought police”122 
(Interview. Kilpatrick, 2008). Liz Picker, another early GADU member, recalls that 
“The police idea probably came from us going back and saying ‘You can’t support this 
project. You need to ask these questions.’ People hadn’t been pushed before and 
suddenly were having their assumptions challenged. And their opinions challenged and 
so on” (Interview. Picker, 2009). 
 
Years after GADU had been dismantled, the term if not the notion of “being policed” 
was still in use. Kilpatrick recalls coming across the term for the first time when she 
joined OGB in 2001, never having heard it previously. For example, after introducing 
herself, colleagues would reply “Oh, you’re the gender police” (Interview. Kilpatrick, 
2008). Also, my experiences as a researcher of gender in Oxfam House in 2005 helped 
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 This phrase extends the “police” metaphor and refers to people being “busted” or arrested for an 
offence. 
122
 Early members of GADU reject the notion that they undertook a policing function, if anything because 
they didn’t have the power. As one recalls, “there was no way we could be police because we had no 
power and indeed often felt that we had to lay our souls out for people to show them how nice and 
experienced we were so they would engage” (Personal communication. Stamstead, 2011). 
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me to understand not only the suspicion gender advisors faced, but the intimidation they 
experienced from attempts to keep them in line. For example, at one of the very few 
meetings of the Corporate Management Team I attended, members made reference to 
me only as someone who was checking up on them. For example, Bloomer asked me if 
I was going to count the number of times they mentioned gender. Peters asked me if I 
was going to “push the gender button” if they said something wrong. Shaw inquired if I 
was going to “test them about gender in reports”. While these comments were made in 
jest, there was certainly a common theme of me surveying them. Later, when talking 
casually with Shaw after the meeting, I asked him about his comments. He replied “it 
seemed that’s what gender folk do, they check up on people” (field notes). That there 
was an intimidating environment was a sentiment shared by other OGB senior 
managers. As Pilkington remembers from when she first joined in 2000, there were 
“certainly people, the [Corporate Management Team] back then, men who felt they 
you’d be taken apart if you said slightly the wrong things, somehow. If you didn’t buy 
into the agenda, debated it in anyway, it wasn’t sort of ok” (Interview. Pilkington, 
2009).  
 
For the most part, the gender police were associated with gender advisors and 
specifically, the term was associated with the specific ways advisors were perceived to 
be working and the effect they had on the organisation. They were seen to consider 
themselves experts and to make people feel inadequate. Blair, a senior manager, recalls  
 
Certainly when I first started to get involved in gender work in Oxfam in 2001-
2002, that was very much the view. There was a bunch of people regarded 
themselves as immense experts on gender, probably were in most cases. I'm not 
criticising that they were, but [they] then made everyone feel inadequate... 
(Interview. Blair, 2008)  
 
Moreover, the ‘gender police’ referred to advisors who were perceived as not helping 
people to do better on gender. As Smuthers explains, “when the gender police bust you, 
they don’t tell you what could be different, there are reasons for this reasons for that” 
(Interview. Smuthers, 2006). Related to this perception was that such advisors had little 
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practical experience, as “a northern bunch of people who knew the theories but actually 
did not have much practical experience” (Interview. Blair, 2007). 
 
For some staff, the way gender advisors worked was related to the political nature of 
gender work, which meant facing resistance, having to push and constantly being 
frustrated. Kay Saunders, who has worked with gender issues in OGB for many years 
but not as a gender advisor, reflects that, while advisors may not sometimes act in the 
most constructive manner, this is understandable given the context in which they work 
and the nature of the role:  
 
It probably goes with the territory that if you’re in that kind of job. Unless you’re 
a saint, then your patience can run out […] I think its absolute poisoned chalice 
being a gender advisor. It is a terrible fate […] the thing is you don’t get your job 
satisfaction from the conventional quarters […] your manager is not particularly 
likely to appreciate you or reward you, you know colleagues aren’t particularly 
likely to appreciate you or reward you. And you have to draw on endless inner 
reserve of strength and somehow live without getting external observation. 
(Interview. Saunders, 2008)  
 
Whether gender advisors identified themselves with feminism or not did not dispel 
despairing associations and characterisation of the gender police as implicitly linked to 
feminism, as Pilkington’s comment suggests. “This is not new. I experienced this 
previously. The negative part of feminism if you like. Women must fight this all 
together […] I felt it was a right-on feminist perspective which I found very 
uncomfortable. It wasn’t encouraging to [think] about men, either” (Interview. 
Pilkington, 2009). For Blair, it was a particular perception of feminism. The “[gender 
police] came from a white, northern British, feminist perspective, which itself is not 
wrong, but the way that played out, the way they presented it” (Interview. Blair, 2007).  
 
For some advisors, the association of the “gender police” with feminism had detrimental 
effects. Walker recalls the perception managers had of her and her reasons for leaving: 
“You try to introduce some intellectual rigour into gender but it was seen as feminism, 
and feminism was seen as polarising, uncomfortable analysis that no one wanted to 
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associate with. And that’s where it got stuck. I got stuck in that ally” (Interview. 
Spence, 2008). Added to this was the suspicion of a “feminist conspiracy” that the 
‘gender police’ were solely concerned with women’s issues and not poverty or gender-
related poverty. For example, following staff input into Oxfam’s Strategic Framework, 
senior managers and members of the International Directorate Senior Management 
Team agreed there was a need for a “clearer and unanimous understanding of how 
gender and poverty/injustice are linked; there is a feeling that there is a separate feminist 
agenda unrelated to poverty and injustice” (field notes). 
 
Most gender advisor informants could not recall behaving in ways that would have 
justified such a characterisation, particularly as they lacked the power to enforce policy 
(Interview. Stamstead, 2011). Ironically, the image of the gender police included the 
idea that that they did have such power:  
 
The gender police are able to [bust you as a] result of the institutional corporate 
power behind them. They don’t have to justify, they don’t have to argue their 
case, all they have to say is ‘gender’ and you are busted. Like the police, stop or 
I’ll shoot. It’s pretty definitive with gender. (Interview. Smuthers, 2006). 
 
Others who spoke of the ‘gender police’ had not actually experienced them but knew of 
them. For example, Pilkington had not personally experienced the “wrath” of the police 
although she had a clear picture of to what the term referred. Similarly, staff who were 
new to OGB already knew of them, as Kilpatrick claimed. But still the image was 
perpetuated, even by people who had not experienced the police themselves. Why did 
this perception of gender advisors continue? For what purpose? 
 
The “gender police” serves as a metaphor for the past and the “bad old days”, when 
gender advisors “really left a bad taste in the organisation”, as Spence recalls 
(Interview, 2008). It also acts as a constraint on what gender work can be done. When 
concerns are raised in relation to women’s subordination, a common rhetorical device to 
discredit the claim is to imply, by referring to previous similar instances, that such 
complaints are “whingey”, evoking the image of the gender police. I observed on a 
number of occasions how such evocations would be used to shut advisors down. For 
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example, during a 2005 planning meeting for the Strategic Framework to consider 
OGB’s basic social services strategy, a long-time gender advisor, Sandra Blackwell, 
raised concerns that gender issues were being left out of the discussion. In response, a 
senior manager said that she, Blackwell, was “always complaining” and asked that they 
move on (field notes). For Blackwell, this put her in a Catch-22 situation that 
discredited her and her opinions and effectively silenced her. If she pursued the concern 
that gender was being ignored, she would be seen as argumentative and difficult, 
thereby proving the senior manager’s point. Seen as “whingey”, her point of gender-
unaware practice would be discredited. If she ceased giving feedback, the issue would 
not be raised. As a long-time advisor observed, “whether they [gender advisors] are 
[“whingey” and unconstructive] or not, coming across that way is just a reminder of the 
gender police” (Interview. Armstrong, 2009). This leaves little room for gender issues 
to be further pursued. As Murison writes, the image of the gender police, and by 
extension associations with GADU, “directly undermines diversity of opinion [... and] 
has a powerful agency” (Internal report. 2002: 11).  
 
What these examples show is that references to the “always-complaining gender 
advisor” are attempts to shut down perceived dissent by placing the onus for appearing 
constructive on those raising the concerns – which often limits the extent to which 
issues can be pursued. While such rhetorical devices are common strategies, they have 
particular significance when it comes to gender issues in OGB. As Wright observes  
 
Other advisors don’t get that sense that they are being labelled as police, like 
gender advisors. So what is that about? There are some issues about gender work 
that make it more challenging to people so they identify them as police because 
it’s actually uncomfortable to deal with these issues, more so than dealing with 
labour or agriculture or whatever.  (Interview. Wright, 2008)
 123
 
 
In part, the notion of gender advisors as police is a function of the gender 
mainstreaming structure established by OGB as well as many other development 
agencies. Advisors are positioned late in organisational processes – whether this 
                                                 
123
 Blackwell makes a similar point, that the term applied to gender so easily, given the history of gender 
in Oxfam. It wouldn’t be applied to other areas (such as the monitoring and evaluation police) (Interview. 
Blackwell, 2008).  
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concerns the development of a policy or of a project, they are one of the last to be 
involved 
124
. As a result, they are always playing catch-up and have to work to 
“integrate” issues that have already been formulated and developed. Their role then 
becomes one of filling gaps and making it known that such gaps exist. As shown by 
Picker above, and as observed by other informants, this does not go down well. 
Saunders sums ups this predicament as being in a position of “being asked to look for 
violations […] They’re looking for transgressions and violations and holding people to 
account, in a police-like way. Because you know, police come after [...] a crime has 
been committed don’t they?” (Interview. Saunders, 2008)125.  
 
This portrayal of gender advisors as police is not unique to OGB, however. For 
example, Crewe and Harrison (1998: 65-66) note how some men “felt daunted by 
particular gender ‘experts’ who were seen as aggressive” and how this contributed to 
“feelings of being misunderstood, excluded, or alienated”. Similarly, Standing (2004: 82 
and 83) recalls how donor representatives “scold[ed] some of the bureaucrats for their 
‘misunderstanding’ of gender, particularly in talking about women’s health, rather than 
gender relations. The effect is to confuse and silence the very people who are expected 
to operationalize the strategy.”  
 
Still, what is unique for OGB is how the notion of the gender police became a myth. As 
indicated above, Murison termed the gender police concept an urban legend, an 
“interesting and powerful social [phenomenon], part of whose effect is to ‘punish’ those 
who step out of line” (Internal report. 2002: 11). I prefer to see the concept as a myth, in 
the sense of both Sorel and Barthes. In using this term, I draw on Cornwall et al.’s 
(2007a: 5) reference to Sorel that the point of “myths” is not whether they are true or 
false but rather what they do. The authors see their value in how they “work for 
development by encoding ‘truths’ in narratives that nourish and sustain convictions. 
And development’s myths gain their purchase because they speak about the world in 
ways that lend political convictions the sense of direction that is needed to inspire 
action.” 
                                                 
124
 Oxfam regional and country advisors Donna Winslet (field notes) Sokha Cheat (Interview. 2006) also 
observed this. Jahan (1995: 61) makes a similar point about gender work in CIDA. 
125
 van Eerdewij (2009: 2) makes a similar point about the “tools” gender advisors have to work with, 
such as targets, non-negotiables: “The quantitative character and the annual monitoring of the targets 
create an atmosphere of ‘being policed’ and as such create negative energies around gender.” 
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I also draw on Barthes, who “reversed Sorel’s categories. Myth prevented rather than 
stimulated action” (Tager, 1986: 632). Drawing on the notion of doxa, or what is 
accepted as “normal”, myths have the “capacity to convert historically determined 
outcomes into natural phenomena” (ibid). While constraining, myth works by “not 
deny[ing] things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies 
them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives 
them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact” 
(Barthes, 1991: 143).  
 
I refer to the gender police as a myth for a number of reasons. As a characterisation, 
informants rarely questioned it: it was accepted as fact. Managers and advisors alike 
spoke of the gender police as real people, but few could be specific as to who the police 
actually were; some had inherited the myth as it was passed from one person to another. 
Moreover, the term meant different things to different people who used it – although it 
remained a term used to condone or condemn particular ways of working. In addition, I 
suggest that the continual reference to gender advisors as the gender police was a trope 
that was used to evoke an image from the past as part of the reproduction of the 
simplifying gender discourse. Characterising particular gender advisors in this manner 
maintained a metaphor of “the bad old days”, and objectified and turned them into 
villains so as to delimit them – privileging certain types of advisors and how they 
worked while demonising others. The trope reinforced the binary between acceptable 
and unacceptable ways to promote gender and reproduced the framing of the “problem” 
as one that concerned how the promotion of gender was structured and who was seen as 
responsible for doing the promoting – the gender advisors. It was also a multivalent 
trope used in different contexts to refer to negative experiences from institutional 
attempts to draw attention to gender issues, as a way to tie and tidy “up the messiness” 
of past events by inventing persons “onto which to pass the buck for original 
responsibility” (Jiménez, 2007: xx). 
 
As a long-time time member of the OGB gender team states, 
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You know the sort of stereotyping. A lot of feminist witches who are all part of 
the problem. And actually […] everybody was terribly well meaning and thought 
[gender] was naturally something that we would be good at in Oxfam; if we could 
just get rid of these people who are sort of perverting by their […] evil ways [...] 
then you know, then it could flourish. (Interview. Saunders, 2008) 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter focused on the further embedding of gender mainstreaming in Oxfam 
House with the assumption of organisational leadership for gender being largely taken 
over by senior managers. During the post-FROSI era, OGB managers pursued an 
agenda to make gender accessible: under the auspices of gender mainstreaming, gender 
was seen as the responsibility of everybody, and demonstrating that it was do-able by all 
staff was paramount. The agenda was pursued as a way of breaking what Pialek (2008) 
has termed a “policy impasse” to describe the perennial challenges faced by OGB to 
institutionalise gender concerns. 
 
This increased preponderance of senior managers in gender leadership roles was also 
accompanied by a shifting of how advisory support was being done. The numbers of 
gender advisors in Oxfam House was decreased, and approaches that were deemed 
unconstructive discouraged, partly through the reproduction of the myth of the “gender 
police” while new approaches were encouraged, partly through a modelling of supposed 
inspiring and constructive approaches. This was similar to what happened during the 
UN Decade for Women:  
 
In most organisations, solutions to the structural problems of the machineries 
were sought in individual personalities: individuals holding WID/GAD positions 
were either acclaimed or blamed for their personal traits rather than their 
professional qualities. In the early years of the Decade, agencies recruited 
feminists from outside to fill WID positions, but later the agencies turned to 
‘managers’, as it was believed that feminists were confrontational and pushed 
their male colleagues too hard! (Jahan, 1995: n.r. cited by Williams, 1999: 186). 
 
The purpose of focusing on the agenda of making gender accessible is not to criticize 
the overall sentiment. Making gender ideas and concepts intelligible is a laudable goal. 
Rather, what this analysis demonstrates is how particular interpretations of the past and 
understanding of it is needed to break an “impasse” and drive change. In particular, 
what this and the previous chapter demonstrate is how gender mainstreaming 
orthodoxy, in this case that organisational leaders take more responsibility for 
promoting gender issues, allowed for such interpretations of the past to become 
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authoritative where senior managers with structural power were able to impose 
particular meanings (Wright, 1994). The previous examples demonstrate exercises of 
three-dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) : the coopting editorial processes and shifting of 
gender advisors; propagating notions of acceptable to discuss gender; and perpetuating 
the myth of “gender police”. This allowed for the de-politicization of gender 
mainstreaming through structuration of agenda of making gender accessible and the 
confirming of such structuration.   
 
These political processes to assert definitive interpretations are revealed through an 
analysis of critical interfaces of policy making, such as the updating of the 1993 gender 
policy, and operationalizing its intent of making gender accessible, that allowed for 
policy taking on meaning (Long, 1989). But more than a perception of the past, the 
agenda of making gender accessible is also representative of how senior managers 
viewed gender policy. They understood that decreeing that gender be mainstreamed was 
unlikely to produce the desired effect. A less direct approach, of making gender 
accessible, was pursued in an attempt to inspire staff. The 2003 Gender Policy is an 
example of this. While offering an alternative to previous efforts, senior managers still 
held the belief in the power of organisation policy to affect practice: if the policy was 
right, practice would more or less follow. At the basis of their efforts was an assumption 
not only of a linear and positivist relation between policy and practice, but also and 
overall implicit notion of a homogeneous organisation. The next chapters explore these 
understandings by following the commitment and “putative relationships” (Marcus, 
1995: 98) from the perspective of the practice of gender mainstreaming and the focus on 
a single OGB project. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Community-based Disaster Management in Cambodia: a model gender 
mainstreamed project 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 5 and 6 discussed the shifts in how OGB promoted gender equality which 
were in part related to structural organisational changes overall as well as changes in 
OGB’s policy and gender infrastructure, including a shift in its gender leadership. These 
changes represent an entrenchment of gender mainstreaming informed by competing 
institutional post-FROSI imperatives, individual agendas and perceptions of past gender 
work in and by OGB.  
 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 explore gender mainstreaming in OGB at the level of programme 
implementation. I suggest that while the taking up of gender mainstreaming was 
furthered by post FROSI structural changes, with regional and country strategies also 
adopting the approach, the practice of gender mainstreaming was informed by different 
contingencies. I explore how the local site of implementation plays a more critical role 
in the practice of promoting of gender equality than does organisational policy, both of 
which, however, were informed by post-FROSI organisational changes. I also look at 
what differences OGB makes to women’s lives and their integration into the 
organisation’s work. 
 
These chapters focus on OGB’s Community-based Disaster Management project in 
Cambodia, which the organisation considered as a “model” of disaster management and 
an example of gender mainstreaming. As a case study, it stands in contrast to gender 
assessments of Oxfam, described in Chapter 5, that reiterated that its gender work was 
wanting, particularly the integration of gender concerns in programme analysis, design 
and implementation. This case concerns different representations and understandings of 
gender and how these relate to the practice of gender mainstreaming. 
 
Chapter 7 provides the context for the project and outlines its main features. I present 
OGB’s claims of having established a model in community based disaster management 
that also addressed women’s concerns by mainstreaming gender. I explore what 
constitutes a successful gender mainstreamed project in OGB in Cambodia’s eyes. 
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However, claims of it being a model were contested, mainly by OGB advisors. I explore 
what, despite these contestations, assertions of having a model achieve. 
 
The chapter is comprised of three main sections. The first provides the regional OGB 
context for the project. The second is largely descriptive to provide an overall 
understanding of the case study. I present the stated aims and activities of the project 
and how it is represented by OGB as a “gender-mainstreamed” project addressing the 
needs of women as well as improving their position. The third describes OGB’s claims 
about the project and the dominant interpretation of the project, as well as contestations 
of this interpretation.  
 
GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN OXFAM GB EAST ASIA 
As discussed Chapters 4 , the establishment of Regional Management Centres (RMCs) 
by OGB in early 2000 was a result of post-FROSI efforts to relocate staff positions from 
Oxfam House closer to countries so as to be better able to support them. In addition to 
management roles, this change in organisational structure also affected advisors based 
in Oxford: OGB decreased their numbers based in Oxfam House while enabling RMCs 
to structure advisory services and employ regional advisors as they deemed fit. For the 
RMC in East Asia, as described in Chapter 4, this entailed a Regional Gender Lead, 
who worked with regional management team to establish and follow up on regional 
gender strategies, as well as a full time Regional Gender Advisor
126
, who provided 
support to country based staff and reported to the regional lead. Both these regional 
positions were intermediary roles between Oxfam House and the country programmes. 
They were to provide regional leadership for and support to country programmes to 
advance organisational OGB policy while, at the same time, represented country and 
regional interests at the level of the organisation overall, such as providing inputs on the 
2003 Gender Policy, while also performing an upward reporting function to Oxfam 
House. 
 
While needing to work within the overall policy framework of OGB, regional staff had 
the leeway to establish their own strategies for the region. As noted in Chapter 4, while 
Oxfam House senior management expressed an expectation that regions would hire 
                                                 
126
 As reminder, I was the Regional Gender Advisor from 2002 to 2004 then again from 2007 to 2008. 
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gender advisors who “were more grounded” than Oxford-based advisors (Interview. 
Blair, 2007), regional managers were free to hire who they wanted. Still, their 
preferences coincided. As David Heller, a regional senior manager at the time, states, 
“we wanted an advisor who had practical experience and who could help and support 
people not with theories, but with real practical advice” (Interview. Heller, 2006). The 
privileging of the regions and regional-based staff is not to say that gender advisors in 
Oxford were completely displaced: they still supported country-based staff but their 
relationship was more ad hoc and sporadic than national staff had with regional staff, 
the latter of which often mediated and coordinated relationships between globally-based 
and nationally-based OGB staff. 
 
The latitude of regional-based gender staff is demonstrated by two examples of the 
relationship between overall OGB policy emanating from Oxford and regional strategies 
and initiatives. One is the role the 2003 Gender Policy had in OGB in East Asia and its 
country programmes. As one regional manager at the time, Sharon Davies, states “It had 
very little effect” (Interview. Davies, 2011). This was mainly for two reasons. First, 
while it was distributed as OGB policy, it was not widely popular among regional staff 
for its perceived weakness compared to the original 1993 policy. As Davies, a regional 
senior manager, writes after reviewing the 2006 Gender Policy “My personal opinion 
[…] is that it would make sense to maintain the 1993 policy until such time that the 
organisation can review the 2 new papers properly” (Personal communication. Davies, 
2003). Second, described in Chapter 4, the OGB East Asia regional programme had its 
own gender mainstreaming strategy established in 2003 (Internal document. OGB, 
2003a). The 2003 Gender Policy was distributed to staff in the region but, in light of the 
criticisms, was not strongly highlighted (Interview. Davies, 2011). The East Asia gender 
mainstreaming strategy was the preferred policy document, not least because staff in the 
region participated in its development, mainly through the regional gender working 
group, referred to in Chapter 4. 
 
The second example is that of the gender “minimum standards” 127. They originate as a 
series of “non-negotiables” for OGB’s humanitarian work in East Asia, which were 
                                                 
127
 These standards pre-date OGB’s gender non-negotiables introduced by the Director in 2005 for the 
entire organisation, described in Chapter 5. The East Asia guidelines were cited as an example of the use 
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developed at a workshop I attended in 2002 in Hanoi. Staff were struggling with 
understanding what gender meant for them and their work, which was a similar 
observation made by senior managers in Oxfam House. After two days of reviewing 
gender concepts, understanding the relevance of gender issues to humanitarian work, 
sharing of experiences and reviewing Oxfam’s 1993 gender policy, participants, most of 
whom were OGB staff working in humanitarian programmes in the region, requested 
clarification of what was minimally expected of them. The result was a set of “Gender 
and Humanitarian Interventions – Non Negotiables” that was developed by a senior 
regional manager drawing largely on existing humanitarian standards produced by the 
humanitarian team in Oxford. Accepted by the participants (Internal report. Demontis, 
2002), they include reference to the 1993 gender policy and require staff to mainstream 
gender “in all stages of disaster management” (ibid: 19), particularly the need for gender 
analysis. They also state that “Staff are expected to draw upon [OGB] gender resource 
people at early stage of the humanitarian intervention” (ibid: 20). 
 
This meeting was also the first time I met country-based staff, as I had just joined OGB, 
and when I was introduced to the Community-based Disaster Management Project as a 
successful initiative in community mobilisation, as OGB Cambodian staff also attended 
the workshop. The confluence of an OGB project success and the introduction of 
regional gender mainstreaming initiatives and resources serve as the basis for an 
analysis of the former. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT 
Background to Oxfam GB in Cambodia
128
 
OGB has a long history in Cambodia and a strong reputation. This is mostly because it 
led a handful of international NGOs that defied international pressure not to provide 
relief to Cambodia
129
 so as to isolate the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom 
Penh that routed the Khmer Rouge in 1979. As two prominent scholars on Cambodia 
write, “More than 25 years later Cambodians still fondly remember Oxfam’s 
                                                                                                                                               
of a gender standard when Oxfam House approved the ones for OGB more widely (Interview. Blair, 
2008).  
128
 The Kingdom of Cambodia has had different names since its independence in 1953. For ease of 
reference and consistency, I use the name Cambodia. 
129
 See Whitaker (1983) and Black (1992) for detailed accounts of Oxfam’s efforts to deliver assistance to 
Cambodia. 
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commitment and determination” (Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2004: 20). The organisation also 
has a reputation for its gender work in Cambodia and has been recognised for initiatives 
to address gender concerns (discussed below). This has not always been the case, however. 
During its early years, according to Mehta (1993a: 40), OGB staff working in Cambodia 
had no or little gender awareness. The provision of relief did not differentiate between 
women and men, and the latter were assumed heads of the household and the primary 
recipients of agricultural tools (Mehta, 1993a, Mehta, 1993b). This is despite the fact 
that women comprised an estimated 60-65% of the population, and 30-35% of 
households were headed by women (Sonnois, 1990: 1)
130
.  
 
The signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 ushered in a new era. The UN 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, deployed in 1992, was instrumental in facilitating 
the holding of Cambodia’s first elections in 1993. This period also saw an influx of 
international NGOs as well as the rapid growth of Cambodian NGOs (CNSN, 1997), 
including women’s organisations. Mehta (1993b: 25) observed during this period that 
women, particularly female heads of households, became recognised as a priority, 
especially for economic development, and “as a highly vulnerable group in need of 
special support [...] Programmes specifically targeting these women were developed”131. 
The first initiatives developed by international agencies assumed a “Women in 
Development” (WID) approach that “aimed to integrate women in the mainstream of 
development” (Mehta, 1993b: 25). Missing was an understanding of women, 
particularly meanings of “widowed”, “divorced” or “single”, in the context of 
Cambodian society. This, along with an exclusive focus on material development, left 
unaddressed “the issue of women’s role and position in the larger community and 
dynamics within the community which serve to create and maintain women’s 
vulnerable position” (ibid: 46). 
 
OGB was one of the few development agencies in Cambodia to have “specifically 
attempted to break out of the [WID] model and develop a more gender focused 
                                                 
130
 Sonnois (1990: 27) notes the lack of reliable statistics; these figures were confirmed by village surveys 
conducted by different agencies. 
131
 Internationally, being a female-headed household was also being conflated with the status of being 
particularly vulnerable (Baden and Goetz, 1998). Vlaar and Ahlers (1998) challenged this assumption for 
Cambodia; still the assumption that female-headed households are the most vulnerable continued in OGB 
Cambodia throughout the research period. See Chapter 7. 
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approach” (Mehta, 1993b: 46)132. It made efforts to introduce a gender perspective into 
the organisation and its programmes and to raise the gender awareness of staff. In 1993, 
it conducted a series of gender workshops
133
, and in 1996, it hosted OGB’s annual 
gender workshop for staff from the Asian region (Mehta, 1993a)
134
. In addition, the 
recently approved Oxfam Gender Policy was translated into Khmer and provided along 
with staff job descriptions, and job adverts and interviews included gender references 
(Padmanabhan, 1999). Additionally, according to OGB staff in Cambodia reviewing 
their work in 1993, gender issues were integrated into programmes, gender impact 
assessments were being undertaken and gender was “fully integrated into the strategic 
planning process and [would] continue to be of significance in the future” (Mehta, 
1993a: 42).  
 
This shift from a WID approach to a gender perspective seems due to a number of inter-
related factors. While Oxfam House gender advisors were not directly involved with the 
Cambodia programme, GADU had an over-riding influence. It facilitated the initial 
OGB-sponsored research (Mehta, 1993b) which aimed to assist the OGB Cambodian 
programme to “better able to integrate gender issues into its problem analysis and 
programme planning” (ibid: 1). The training that followed the research (Mehta, 1993a) 
was undertaken by Mehta and Julia Cleever Moose, the latter of whom contributed to 
OGB’s seminal book on gender and development, Changing Perceptions: Writings on 
Gender and Development (Wallace and March, 1991) and went on to write Half the 
World, Half a Chance. An Introduction to Gender and Development (Mosse, 1993). In 
addition, the GADU initiative in the run up to Beijing, the Women’s Linking Project, 
was also influential as a South-South networking, mobilising and advocacy effort 
among Southern feminists and gender advocates (referred to in Chapter 4). For the OGB 
                                                 
132
 While OGB was one of the first NGOs, by 1995 gender and development discourse had be 
popularised. A 1995 survey of 63 international and 18 Cambodian NGOs found that 23 organisations 
claimed to have personnel specialising in GAD or WID, and the majority were conducting gender training 
for their staff (Lott and Sarann Phanny, 1995).  Given the latter results, the authors rightly point to the 
need to ask how agencies define gender training and question the quality of such training. Ironically, Lott 
and Sarann Phanny’s suggestion of greater reflection could have benefited them as well. Santry (2005) 
suggests that their guidance on establishing a gender policy spoke to Cambodian NGOs seeking funds as 
having such a policy was a condition for receiving financial support if not registering as an NGO 
(Personal communication. Santry, 2010). 
133
 These were conducted as part of the Oxfam House-initiated “Women’s Linking Project”, referred to in 
Chapter 4. 
134
 The workshops, called “Action for Gender Relations-Asia”, continued into the research period e.g., the 
workshop where the gender humanitarian “non-negotiables” were developed and approved was part of 
this series. 
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country representative at the time, “these links helped boost gender issues in the 
programmes an at the office level” which helped the OGB programme in Cambodia to 
lay “the foundations for a central gender perspective” (Padmanabhan, 1999: 123).  
 
Padmanabhan’s account of the Cambodian programme’s achievements were, however, 
different from my experience with the Cambodian programme (2002-2004) when I 
worked for OGB. During this period, a number of what she cites as accomplishments 
had to be re-done: the 1993 policy had to be re-translated into Khmer, gender criteria 
needed to be re-included in hiring and job descriptions, and gender analysis needed to 
be re-introduced. It is also during this time that I became more familiar with the context 
of the CBDM project which is described next. In order words, results of gender 
mainstreaming efforts from the 1990s had all but disappeared but then re-appear in the 
post-FROSI period. 
 
Project context 
Annually, the Mekong River floodplain in Cambodia is inundated with water, which can 
rise up to 15 metres, bringing both prosperity and misery. On the one hand, floodwaters 
support two large sectors of the economy and people’s livelihoods: fishing and rice 
cultivation. Inundated lands become vast fishing grounds while the floodwaters provide 
critical irrigation and nutrients for rice cultivation, the main agricultural activity for 
97% of households in Takeo province, where I undertook research (data for 2004 from 
WFP, 2010). On the other hand, the floods also bring misery. Accompanied by wind 
and rain, the flooding season, which lasts from about July to December, wreaks havoc 
on people’s lives. Houses are flooded or blown away, people’s livelihoods are 
disrupted, and they can be stranded for weeks unless they have a boat allowing them 
limited access to the surrounding area. Daily routines are risky ventures, and animals, 
often among the few assets families have, are sometimes lost. Incomes – normally 
derived from farming, mice catching
135
 or casual labour – disappear. Food becomes 
scarce, and health declines as a result of poor nutritional intake and water-borne 
diseases. These effects also cause family debts to increase.  
 
                                                 
135
 This activity entailed catching wild mice that were sold in Vietnam (field notes). 
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It is not uncommon for a few people, mainly women and children, to drown. In 2000, 
the floods were particularly severe: some 3.4 million Cambodians were affected and 
350 died (Kazama et al., 2002). The floods of 2001 and 2002 were not as serious but 
still caused widespread damage. They were followed by two years of “lower than 
normal” flooding, with the 2005 floods considered “normal” (MRC, 2005).  
 
OGB’s Community-based Disaster Management (CBDM) project took place in Takeo 
province, which borders Vietnam in south-eastern Cambodia. It is the fifth-largest of the 
24 provinces in Cambodia, with about 880,000 people in 2004, which represented 8% of 
Cambodia’s 13 million people (NIS, 2004). A total of 95% of Takeo’s population lives 
in rural areas, much of which is difficult to access owing to weak infrastructure. It is a 
poor province and was ranked in the top five in terms of child morbidity and mortality 
during 1996-2000 (WFP, 2010). Government assistance to the province is weak and 
support from NGOs and other development agencies is limited. In 2006, they together 
disbursed about $7.3 million to Takeo, representing 1.3% of all development assistance 
provided to Cambodia. NGOs were the second-largest provider, after the European 
Union, contributing 26.4% (CDC, 2007). In the villages included in this research, the 
OGB project was the only “development” initiative being undertaken by non-
governmental sources, although this is not to say that communities were isolated, even 
if they were difficult to access. People had access to media, namely, radio and 
television, as well as markets in neighbouring Vietnam (field notes). 
 
Objectives, scope and approach of a gender mainstreamed project 
The extent to which Cambodians are adversely affected by floods is related not only to 
the severity of the flood but also to their “vulnerability” to disaster. It is in this regard 
that OGB in Cambodia established the CBDM project in 2003, as the main initiative of 
the Joint Oxfams Disaster Management Programme
136
. The initial aim of the three-year 
pilot project was 
 
to develop a pilot DM [disaster management] programme in Takeo province that 
will demonstrate to key stakeholders the importance of a comprehensive 
                                                 
136
 The overall goal of the wider programme was that “Fewer people die, fall sick, and suffer deprivation 
as a result of armed conflict or natural disasters” (Internal document. Oxfams Humanitarian Programme 
Office, 2002: 3). The programme was led by OGB with financial support from other affiliates: Oxfam 
America, Novib (from the Netherlands) and Oxfam Hong Kong. 
  
Chapter 7 Community-based Disaster Management in Cambodia 180 
 
approach to DM that includes community based initiative and the sustained 
involvement of government and civil society partners and which can be 
replicated in other flood prone provinces and form the basis of a national DM 
operational policy (Internal document. Oxfams Humanitarian Programme 
Office, 2002).
 137
 
 
The project purportedly directly benefited some 340 households and 1,750 people 
(approximately 50% female)
138
. A number of other people were supposed to benefit 
indirectly from the pilot project as a result of exposure to it. For example, by 2005 OGB 
had provided training on disaster management-related issues to some 500 people from 
government and NGOs (Internal report. OGB, 2006d). With a budget of about £145,000 
per year, the project was managed and implemented by OGB in Cambodia’s Disaster 
Management staff: the OGB Humanitarian Programme Coordinator for Cambodia and 
two Programme Officers, Lay Sokroeun and Phoung Tola
139
. As mentioned previously, 
Oxfam worked with a Cambodian NGO, Takeo Development, using a “semi-
operational” approach, where OGB in Cambodia staff were directly involved in 
implementing the project.  
 
The overall approach of the project was to decrease communities’ vulnerabilities to 
flooding and strengthen their capacities to survive and recover. This characterises 
OGB’s and other international organisations’ understanding and ways of dealing with 
humanitarian emergencies: they result from the combination of disasters, whether 
natural or human-made, and “vulnerability” (Internal report. Demontis, 2002). By 
reducing the latter, mainly by working with communities, the impact of the disaster, 
hence extent of humanitarian emergency, are supposed to be lessened. In this respect, 
the CBDM project was an integration of OGB’s two mandates: alleviating poverty and 
suffering, through development and humanitarian assistance.  
 
                                                 
137
 The aim of the project changed on numerous occasions after its inception. 
138
 This statistic differs from the previously cited figure of 60-65% of the population being comprised of 
women because this was a generalized figure for the whole country and is from the late 1980s/early 1990s 
whereas the CBDM figure concerns s small sample of project beneficiaries over 10 years later.  
139
 These staff were authors of the various project documents cited in this research, unless otherwise 
stated. The relevance of this and the impetus for the integration of gender concerns are discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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For Oxfam project staff, “gender” was an integral feature of the project and gender 
mainstreaming a key strategy, as Lay Sokroeun, a programme officer, states: “All the 
[village committees] have women because this is a gender-mainstreamed project and we 
want to empower women” (field notes). Dikorn Ieng, a senior manager of OGB in 
Cambodia, also claimed that “Gender is one of our strengths in terms of our gender 
analysis” in the project (field notes). OGB focused on women in the project given “deep 
rooted gender disparities” in the project area and an “understanding that women and 
children are the most vulnerable to disasters” (Internal document. OGB, 2006f: n.r.).  
 
In particular, the provision of assets, such as water containers (referred to as “giant  
jars” 140), was considered by OGB “very helpful for the family especially women and 
girls to reduce the fear of kidnapping, raping, reducing the distance and time to collect 
the water” (Internal document. OGB, 2006f: n.r.). The relating of “fear” with 
vulnerability, the latter of which was part of the project’s dual strategy, described 
previously, was common: increasing communities’ confidence and capacity to respond 
to floods was about having less fear of floods and the damage they can cause. “Fear” 
was particularly associated with women, who, along with children, were considered the 
most vulnerable to floods (Internal document. OGB, 2006e). For example, the 2004 
project proposal justified its provision of boats, life-saving equipment and vegetable 
platforms partly because they reduce a specific “whole range of flood-related fears” 
experienced by women and causing them “immense physical stress” (Internal 
document. OGB, 2004b: 7). These included women’s fear of boat transportation (more 
than men’s), thereby decreasing their mobility; of drowning, although OGB noted that 
men were not necessarily better swimmers; and of not being able to access medical 
facilities (ibid)
 141
. 
 
The project also aimed to “encourage women to express their own ideas, to participate 
in decision-making and to contribute their direct support to the community (Internal 
report. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005: 11). It aspired to “support change in relations 
between women and men in terms of control over and access to resources at the level of 
community and family; in terms of participation in community decision making; and 
                                                 
140
 Large concrete water cisterns. 
141
 The report from which this information was taken (see the next chapter for an account of this) states 
that none of the research informants had seen a crocodile except on television and that “people are also 
affected by their own perceptions of risk” (Care International, 2002: 23). 
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reducing incidence of domestic violence” (Internal document. OGB, n.d.-c: 4). By 
undertaking particular activities for women (described below), OGB wanted to ensure 
that both men’s and women’s needs were not only identified but also met, by ensuring 
women’s and men’s access and control over project resources (Internal document. 
OGB, 2004b). Women’s needs, particularly those of female-headed households, 
included boats, fishing equipment, vegetable platform and private areas in common 
spaces where villages take refuge during floods (Internal document. Oxfams 
Humanitarian Programme Office, 2002). 
 
The project was not only considered, by project staff and OGB in Cambodia managers, 
a model in community-based disaster management, but also a gender mainstreamed 
project in terms of its gender analysis and objectives of decreasing women’s 
vulnerability and addressing their needs such as participation in decision making and 
domestic violence. It was also seen as gender mainstreamed initiative from the types of 
activities it undertook and, more critically, what OGB in Cambodia had claimed to 
achieve for women, as described next. 
 
Project activities  
Overall, there were three groups of activities related to the project: mitigation of the 
effects of floods, community development and capacity development. A fourth group, 
advocacy, was part of OGB in Cambodia’s strategy to have a wider impact over and 
above the actual pilot project. 
 
The main activity was the provision of assets to mitigate the effects of floods on 
households. Assets included building materials to strengthen houses against storms and 
to raise them above flood levels. Cash was provided to compensate for labour provided 
by villagers to undertake these activities. OGB distributed other assets to help villagers 
to sustain themselves and to earn an income during floods, such as fishing gear and 
boats. The project also included the provision of water filters and giant jars as well as 
vegetable seeds and vegetable platforms (raised gardens)
142
 to individual beneficiary 
households in order to provide a safe source of potable water and, in principle, a source 
of vegetables. Moreover, OGB introduced concrete latrines to a limited number of 
                                                 
142
 “Gardens” is a misnomer as they are actually platforms about 2m2 large enough for several pots of 
herbs. 
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homes as part of a pilot hygiene and sanitation initiative. Oxfam provided these assets to 
village beneficiaries free of charge but with certain understandings: they could not sell 
them and were supposed to take care of them. In the event of divorce or domestic 
violence, the assets were to belong to the wife. This condition was apparently included 
in contracts with recipient households and is explored further in Chapter 9.  
 
Other activities were meant to help villagers in times of emergencies such as the 
building of hills or “safe areas” as evacuation centres for families and their animals 
when it was unsafe for them to remain in their homes or if they had lost their homes. 
Boats as well as a limited number of lifejackets and life buoys were available to help 
save people lost in floodwaters or to be borrowed if villagers had to venture out during 
floods. Finally, the project provided first aid kits and training to equip community 
members to address small medical emergencies.  
 
The second major set of activities concerned the village committees for disaster 
management (VCDM); the main mechanism to involve community members in the 
project and the main feature of Oxfam’s community development approach to disaster 
management
143. For OGB in Cambodia, they were considered “embryonic civil society 
organisations” (Internal report. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005: 7). In each village, 
Oxfam established a committee made up of five members, who were supposed to have 
been elected by village members
144
. The chair and two additional places were reserved 
for women to promote their own ideas and their participation in decision making, as 
previously described, and to empower women by increasing their knowledge and 
confidence (Internal report. OGB, 2004a: 19). Also, having women on the committees 
was supposed to “help to address women’s practical needs and, more importantly in the 
longer-term, their strategic interests” (Internal document. Joint Oxfams Disaster 
Management Team, 2005: 15). For example, “more equal influence in family-decision 
                                                 
143
 The notion of a “village” in the Cambodian context needs to be clarified, although further discussion is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. There is some debate on the extent of intra-household household links and 
kin networks in rural Cambodia, particularly in the post-Khmer Rouge period. For example, Ovesen et al. 
(1996: 86) assert that households are relatively autonomous. They are linked within the context of a 
village but this is a matter of culture and ideology rather than being social-organisational.  On the other 
hand, others (Ledgerwood, 1998; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002) describe strong reciprocal relations 
within villages that extend beyond kinship, some of which are characterised as relations of patronage. See 
Chapter 9 for further exploration. 
144
 Field observations revealed some inconsistencies in the election process. 
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making” was one of the identified strategic needs of women (Internal document. OGB, 
2004b: 9).   
 
The VCDM’s role was to coordinate and monitor project activities. They were 
responsible for managing and caring for community-based project assets, such as the 
safe area, lifejackets and first aid kits. During the flooding season, members were also 
supposed to lend assistance to community members. Another main function of the 
VCDMs was to liaise between community members and CD and OGB in Cambodia. 
Members met regularly with CD and attended trainings by Oxfam, after which they 
would hold village meetings to convey what they had learned. Also, they notified 
community members of any project meetings in the village.  
 
The third major set of activities of the project was developing the capacities of project 
participants – government officials, VCDMs and community members as well as CD 
and Oxfam staff – on different aspects of community-based disaster management and 
other development and management-related subjects. Every year, OGB in Cambodia 
delivered a host of training activities. For example, from May 2005 to April 2006, 
VCDMs and community members, including commune council members, attended 13 
training workshops (some refreshers), covering subjects such as Community-based 
Disaster Preparedness, Village Leadership and Management, First Aid, Public Health 
and Gender. CD staff, including a seconded member of the government Provincial 
Community Disaster Management Committee, attended five courses and workshops 
covering a wide number of subjects, including General Management, English Language 
and Humanitarian Accountability. During the same period, OGB project staff attended 
some 10 workshops covering subjects such as Partner Relations, Restricted Financial 
Management, Good Governance and Accountability, Problem Analysis Training and the 
Logical Framework Approach (Internal report. OGB, 2006d). Based on reports from 
previous years, this number and scope of trainings was not atypical for the project. 
 
In order to have a wider impact beyond the direct beneficiaries, the wider Joint Oxfam’s 
Disaster Management programme undertook a number of activities to raise awareness of 
floods and of its “successful” community-based disaster management approach (Internal 
report. OGB, 2006d: 10). Through its work with government and other NGOs, Oxfam 
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aimed to promote the replication of its model and encouraged others to partner with it. 
This was achieved mainly through the provision of training to government officials and 
NGOs in Cambodia and the region and hosting visits to the project, discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 9.  
 
GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND A “MODEL” PROJECT IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT  
 
Many people, Oxfam in Cambodia members, OGB advisors, etc., agreed and see the 
project as a pilot and now it become like a model. 
 
(Internal communication. Dikorn Ieng, 2003a) 
 
OGB believed that it had established a tested and revised model that was ready to be 
replicated in other flood- and drought-prone provinces in Cambodia (Internal 
documents. Joint Oxfams Disaster Management Team, 2005, OGB, 2006d, Joint 
Oxfams DM Team, 2005). By 2006, the community-based disaster management 
approach was being used by OGB in Cambodia in four other provinces with the aim, in 
three years, of benefiting a million Cambodians. The organisation also claimed that “It 
is still quite conceivable that the expanded model will provide the basis for a future 
(national) operational policy for the government throughout the country” (Internal 
document. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005: 36). 
 
This section outlines OGB’s stated achievements that served as the basis for its claims 
of having established a model of community-based disaster management; namely, that 
the project had resulted in improved living standards, in increased confidence and 
capacities to respond to floods and in community mobilisation. Gender was integral to 
the model, according to a senior OGB staff member with the project (field notes). 
Additionally and in contrast to different reviews of OGB gender work (Chapters 4 and 
5), OGB in Cambodia claimed that the project had substantially benefitted women, as 
described below: their needs were addressed and their workloads had decreased. The 
project had increased women’s participation in decision making and community work, 
enhanced their confidence and empowered them. Furthermore, domestic violence had 
reduced as a result of OGB in Cambodia’s efforts.  
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What this section conveys is the official interpretation of the project (Fish, 1980) by 
OGB in Cambodia. It is based on project documentation, such as proposals and reports 
written by OGB Cambodian project staff for the purposes of communicating what the 
project will do, in the case of the former, and what the project has done, in the case of 
the latter. Their primary audiences are project sponsors: OGB and Oxfam International 
affiliates that were funding the project. As Mosse (2005b: 165) observes, rhetorical 
devices such as reports help “to provide an enduring map of the territory, lending 
stability to knowledge about the project, affirming its models and creating the 
comforting illusion that the project implemented policy and was successful because it 
was well designed”.  
 
Improved living standards 
According to OGB in Cambodia, the injection of physical assets and funds had 
positively impacted livelihoods and household incomes. Annual reports from both 2005 
and 2006 state that “community members’ living standard are generally better and the 
communities’ sense of well-being and security higher” [sic] ] (Internal reports. Joint 
Oxfams DM Team, 2005: 6, OGB, 2006d: 3). The provision of cash, such as per diems 
to attend meetings and workshops and money provided to villagers to work on 
infrastructure activities, were noted inputs, especially the latter. Each household 
working on strengthening the foundations of their houses as well as building the safe 
area received 450,000 riel
145
 or about $106 (Internal reports. OGB, 2004a, Joint Oxfams 
DM Team, 2005). 
 
Fishing equipment apparently enabled the catching of fish and boats the collection of 
aquatic plants, both of which reportedly provided a source of food during floods and a 
source of income (Internal reports. OGB, 2004a, Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005, OGB, 
2006d). Beneficiaries also were reportedly able to save from increased incomes as well 
as not incurring certain costs, for example by no longer having to rent boats. These 
savings were said to have helped villagers during periods of flood and to purchase other 
assets, such as animals and additional boats, to use to generate further income. Women 
in particular were highlighted as being able to generate more income. For example, 
                                                 
145
 $1 was equivalent to about 4,225 riel in 2006. 
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boats were also said to help them to gather aquatic plants and to go to fields to collect 
mice to then sell. As a CD staff member stated, “before women didn’t know how to 
make money but with the project, [they] now have materials to make money” 
(Interview. Im Ching, 2006). 
 
According to OGB project reports, beneficiaries’ nutrition and health status also 
improved. As a result of the provision of water filters and water storage facilities as well 
as training on nutrition, sanitation and hygiene practices, community beneficiaries 
apparently no longer drank unfiltered water and incidence of water-borne diseases 
decreased. For example, the 2006 report states that “Most of the villagers especially 
children, stop drinking un-boiled water and keep practicing clean drinking water from 
water filters [...] Project beneficiaries reported that since they have received water filters 
[...] it reduced diarrhea and typhoid” [sic] (Internal report. OGB, 2006d: 16). The 
project also potentially contributed to decreasing incidence of HIV and AIDS as “Cash 
for work can also help to reduce number of villagers, usually men, migrating to town. 
This in turn can help to reduce the risk of STDs such as HIV/AIDS” (Internal report. 
OGB, 2004a: 17).  
 
In addition, raised vegetable “gardens” were said to have provided a source of nutrition, 
benefiting especially children and women, in particular pregnant women (Internal 
report. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005). For example, more households were observed to 
be growing vegetables, when they did not before, and “Women, children especially 
pregnant women have improved their nutrition by having more vegetable to eat all year 
round” (Internal report. OGB, 2006d: 10). Also, a ready supply of vegetables meant 
women no longer had to venture out to collect aquatic plants (Internal reports. OGB, 
2004a; Joint Oxfams Disaster Management Team, 2005)
146
. This, and the presence of 
water cisterns and filters, which apparently decreased women’s and girls’ labour and 
time as they did not have to travel up to 6km to neighbouring Vietnam, supposedly 
reduced their fears for their safety (Internal reports. OGB, 2004a, Joint Oxfams DM 
Team, 2005).  
 
                                                 
146
 This claim, however, was contradicted by the same reports that women experienced increased income 
from being able to collect such plants, as previously mentioned. 
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Increased confidence and capacities to respond to floods 
OGB in Cambodia claims the project’s flood mitigation measures resulted in a sense of 
security among beneficiaries. As a result, it states that the “project saves lives and helps 
to protect vulnerable communities from the ravages of flood, drought and poverty” 
(Internal report. OGB, 2006b: 7). Participants felt more protected, better prepared, more 
resilient and more able to take action (Internal reports. OGB, 2004a, Joint Oxfams DM 
Team, 2005, OGB, 2006d). For example, an excerpt from the 2005 annual report 
represents a recurring theme in project documentation: 
 
After their houses were repaired, the sixty beneficiaries had better and stronger 
homes and this security brought with it less fear and anxiety. With the capacity of 
villagers improving through training and the acquisition of hard assets their 
vulnerability was being mitigated. The worry of losing their children or their 
belongings has been markedly reduced. This new security has meant that the 
beneficiaries feel as safe as other more prosperous and less vulnerable villagers. 
(Internal report. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005: 20) 
 
In particular, the provision of assets allowed beneficiaries to better prepare for annual 
floods. For example, the 2006 annual report stated that they had the “capacity to cope 
with flood and improve their living conditions. The community members have prepared 
food, firewood, strengthened houses, family boat, plant more tree for this year floods” 
[sic] (OGB, 2006b: 10).  
 
In particular, women, especially female-headed households, were cited as feeling safer 
and less threatened by the floods: “[the] elevation of homestead to be higher than the 
level of water reduces the fear or concern or worries of women and their family from 
the impact of strong wind during the flood and or when the level of water goes up to its 
highest peak” (Internal document. OGB, 2006f). 
 
Community mobilisation  
One of the main noted project achievements was the establishment and strengthening of 
the VCDMs and their engagement with community members. The committees and 
alleged increased community involvement not only enhanced communities’ capacities 
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to respond to floods, but also were an attempt “to empower communities to speak out 
and demand their basic rights” (Internal document. Joint Oxfams Disaster Management 
Team, 2005: 16). OGB also stated that the VCDMs were effective mechanisms in 
preparing communities for the flooding season. They reminded community members to 
ready themselves by strengthening their houses and foundations as well as maintaining 
project assets, such as by keeping water cisterns and filters clean and filled with water.  
 
They also were helpful during floods as they raised the alarm when there were 
problems. The first year’s report provided an example of the functioning VCDMs: 
 
In mid May this year two houses in Sangkae Chur village were hit by storm. 
VCDMs reported to the village chief. The village chief also reported immediately 
to CD and Oxfam about the situation of the two family members and damages. 
CD and Oxfam staff went to the village to assess the situation and reported that 
two houses were destroyed but the two affected families managed to find a 
neighbour's house to stay in temporarily. (Internal report. OGB, 2004b: 20-21) 
 
OGB also claimed that the project resulted in a number of changes in the community 
that were not part of the original aims. For example, OGB contended that the project 
contributed to decreasing illegal fishing as villagers used project fishing equipment and 
nets and discontinued their use of “illegal fishing equipment”147 (Internal report. OGB, 
2006b: 16). The other claim concerned the protection of Cambodian territory. The 
building of safe areas and decreased migration by beneficiaries who were now able to 
remain in their villages during floods apparently contributed to protecting “Cambodian 
territory along the border with Vietnam” (Internal report. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 
2005: 36)
148
.  
 
Moreover, it is the VCDMs that OGB cited as the main vehicles through which 
women’s participation in community activities and decision making increased (Internal 
documents. OGB, 2004a; Joint Oxfams Disaster Management Team, 2005; OGB, 
2006b). Women’s participation was described in different ways: such as increased 
                                                 
147
 Illegal fishing equipment included particular styles and sizes of fishing nets and the use of dynamite 
for fishing. 
148
 This is a reference to a long-standing and still current dispute over border demarcations between 
Cambodia and Vietnam. 
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number of participating women, women’s leadership of VCDMs, increased level of 
activity in the community and more involvement in decision making. For example, 
women’s numerical participation was seen as an indicator of their increased access to 
and control over project assets (Internal reports. OGB, 2004a; Joint Oxfams Disaster 
Management Team, 2005). As the 2004 report states,  
 
Out of 396 people, there were 66 women who came to receive water filters at the 
distribution site. This is one more positive sign that women are having more and 
more access to and control over the water filters as well as several other family 
resources. It is one of those small step in promoting and building gender 
awareness and equality. [sic] (Internal reports. OGB, 2004a) 
 
According to OGB, as a result of the project and their participation in the VCDMs, 
women gained confidence and were undertaking roles they previously had not. They 
had been empowered, particularly VCDM members, in terms of increased confidence to 
speak up. For example, the 2006 report claims “women are now more vocal than before 
and without any hesitation they raised their voice regarding various issues and problems 
they faced during implementation” (Internal document. OGB, 2006f: n.r.) 149. For OGB, 
women’s participation in the VCDMs had led to “remarkable changes” in women’s 
participation in decision making in the community (Internal report. OGB, 2006d: 28). In 
particular, the ability to speak up was seen as a success and, as discussed in Chapter 8, 
was integral to the engendering of the project as a “success”. 
 
Also, women were said to have greater gender awareness. For example, OGB observed 
that “Women just thought that the serious human rights violation [of domestic 
violence …] committed by their husband was normal and it should not be punished. 
Women did not realized about their heavy workload that they have been carried so far 
and never give any value at all” [sic] (Internal report. OGB, 2006b: 28). This, according 
to OGB, contributed to decreasing incidence of domestic violence in the project 
communities. Decreased domestic violence was also attributed to the provision of 
inputs, such as fishing nets (Internal reports. OGB, 2006d, OGB, 2004b, OGB, 2004a). 
Less poverty and greater security during floods were reported to have resulted in life 
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 O’Leary and Meas (2001) note that, in the Cambodian context, “empowerment” is often associated 
with being able to speak out. 
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becoming less stressful. For instance, “The situation of Mr. Sim Sopheak’s family has 
significantly changed since his house repaired. He stopped drinking alcohol and his 
domestic violent is reduced. He has changed his behavior and attitude and does a lot of 
housework to help his wife” [sic]. (Internal report. OGB, 2004a: 15). Also, as 
mentioned previously, the project introduced a condition that assets would be 
confiscated in the event of domestic violence and be turned over to the wife (Internal 
report. OGB, 2006b: 16). The condition was apparently included in the contract with 
project recipients on receipt of assets.  
 
Increased awareness about domestic violence from gender training provided by the 
project was also cited by OGB as a reason for decreased violence, as men and women 
realised that it was against the law
150
 and should not be accepted. As one OGB annual 
report stated, gender trainees “said that if they can apply [learning from gender training] 
in their real life, their families and community member would live in harmony, free of 
violence with good environment and good health” (Internal report. OGB, 2006b: 45).  
 
The decrease in domestic violence and other claims by OGB constituted official 
interpretations of the project, mainly as documented by project reports and echoed by 
OGB staff. These claims, however, are only part of the representation of the project.  
 
Challenges to the CBDM project as a model 
Over its life, the CBDM project was “the subject of intense debate” (Internal document. 
OGB, 2006f: n.r.)
151
, according to a senior manager of the OGB’s Cambodian 
Programme. Challenges came internally from OGB staff, particularly regional advisors, 
during critical interfaces to develop strategies for the humanitarian programme in 
Cambodia, of which the CBDM project was part, as well as annual proposals for the 
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 Cambodia passed the Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and the Protection of Victims in 
2005 “to prevent domestic violence, protect the victims and strengthen the culture of non-violence and the 
harmony within the households in society in the Kingdom of Cambodia” (Royal Government of 
Cambodia, 2005). 
151
 While the project has had a contentious history, this is not to say that all inputs and comments from 
Oxfam staff or outside observers have been challenges.  Indeed, throughout the life of the project, 
different managers, coordinators and advisors have provided a plethora of comments.  Some of these are 
positioned as challenges, considered in this section; others have been less confrontational and form 
“exchanges and suggestions”, analysed in the next chapter.  Visitors from other organisations have also 
provided their feedback and project staff themselves have responded to challenges and suggestions.  
These are considered in Chapter 8 as part of a discussion on establishing and reproducing project 
“success”.   
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project itself. From 2002 to 2006, project staff and advisors engaged in developing two 
strategies (2003-2005 and 2005-2008) and three annual proposals for the CBDM project 
from 2003 to 2005. Email exchanges and, to a lesser extent, meetings concerning the 
drafting of these documents, as well as project reviews such as the Gender Impact 
Assessment, became interfaces for criticism. 
 
A key point of contention was the project’s status as a pilot and as a model. Throughout 
project documentation and in the ways OGB staff discussed the project, the terms 
“pilot” and “model” were used interchangeably. For example, at its start, the project 
was conceived of as a pilot to experiment in Cambodia with new approaches to disaster 
management that were community based. While this approach had been used in other 
parts of the world, such as by OGB in Bangladesh, which was the inspiration for the 
Cambodian project, OGB had yet to try working with communities and providing 
assets in Cambodia, according to project staff (Internal documents. OGB, 2003d, OGB, 
2004b). In previous disaster management interventions, OGB had used different 
aspects of the model, but not a “whole package” that included community mobilisation 
through village committees, provision of assets and “capacity building” (Internal 
communication. Sao Si and Sokha, 2003). As a result, OGB considered its work 
experimental and an opportunity for learning, as described by one of the project staff.  
 
What we call pilot project, because we want to learn […] because it was a new 
project to us and Oxfam, to partner, CD, and probably other NGOs in the country 
[…] The new was the flood preparedness and mitigation, not normal development 
[…] the word pilot we use because we don’t know how it will go […] but we 
commit to learn. Anything fail, we learn. [sic] (Interview. Dikorn Ieng, 2006) 
 
The project also aspired to be a model that was supposed to be developed over the 
project’s life. As stated in the initial proposal, “By focusing on one province the model 
can be tested, revised and replicated for application in other disaster-prone (flood and 
drought) provinces and provide the basis for an operational policy for government 
throughout the country” [sic] (Internal document. Oxfams Humanitarian Programme 
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Office, 2002: n.r.)
152
.
 
Thereafter, references to the project as a “model” became 
increasingly common in project reports and other documents, starting in the first year. 
For example, five months after being initiated, the project was stated as a model 
(Internal communication. Dikorn Ieng, 2003b). Also, by the first year, OGB was already 
reporting that the Cambodian government agency responsible for disaster 
management
153
 (Internal document, OGB, 2003d) was “to use the model of the pilot 
project and [it] would implemented nationwide” (Internal report. OGB, 2004a: 24). By 
the end of the second year, OGB claimed it had established a model ready for 
replication (Internal document. Joint Oxfams Disaster Management Team, 2005). 
 
The terms “model” and “pilot” were often used confusingly. While OGB claimed it was 
experimenting with different approaches, it also claimed it was modelling such 
approaches. For example, the 2002 strategic plan for OGB’s disaster management work 
in Cambodia stated that “The proposed activities are small scale and geographically 
focused in Takeo in order to model best practices and to advocate for specific 
government involvement and replication on a larger scale – and at a later date (Internal 
document. Oxfams Humanitarian Programme Office, 2002). Project staff seemed 
unclear as to whether they were implementing a pilot to establish a model or had a 
model in hand, and OGB documents commonly referred to the project as a 
“pilot/model”. In other cases, they used the terms “pilot” and “model” interchangeably. 
For example, “model” was used to convey the idea that the project was to have a wider 
impact beyond the 13 villages in Takeo (Internal document. Joint Oxfams Disaster 
Management Team, 2005). “Pilot” was used to justify the facts that further work on the 
model needed to be done and there were unanswered questions and further learning was 
required.  
 
Confusing uses of the terms “pilot” and “model” led to questions as to what the project 
was really aiming “to achieve” (Internal report. Wood, 2004). As the Humanitarian 
Officer, based in Oxford with the Humanitarian Department, pointed out after reviewing 
the project, the project had a number of contradictory aims. On the one hand, it was 
experimental in nature, being the first time OGB in Cambodia had used “community-
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 Later project documents reiterated the same intent (Internal documents. Joint Oxfams Disaster 
Management Team, 2005; OGB, 2003d). 
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 National Committee for Disaster Management. 
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based” and “participatory” approaches to disaster “preparedness and mitigation”. On the 
other, it was meant to demonstrate to the National Committee for Disaster Management 
“the strengths and weaknesses of involving beneficiaries” (ibid).  
 
As a “pilot”, the project was challenged by OGB advisors mainly on account of how 
knowledge and learning were to have been generated, which would be expected from an 
“experimental” project (Mattingly, 2008). One issue related to its design: it was not set 
up as an initiative to try and test innovations in community-based disaster management. 
For example, the regional programme advisor, in her report after visiting the project, 
stated it was  
 
A pilot project would require that some innovation be undertaken [… The project] 
is not backed up by an intervention design that is a) clearly linked with the 
findings from the evaluations (of previous Oxfam interventions), b) linked to the 
gendered analysis, c) clearly demonstrating a novel approach from Oxfam’s 
previous work in Takeo. [sic] (Internal report. Nixon, 2003: n.r.)  
 
A second issue concerned the initiative that was supposed to develop learning; the pilot 
was also challenged on what exactly was being learned. As the Regional Humanitarian 
Coordinator wrote in an assessment of the proposal for the second year of the project, 
“There is no substantive evidence of learning from the pilot project implemented during 
the last [year]” (Internal communication. Norseman, 2004). 
 
Third, OGB regional staff and, to a lesser degree, humanitarian staff in Oxford were 
unclear what “the model” was. According to a regional advisor, who was asked to 
support the development of an advocacy plan in order to persuade development 
agencies and the Cambodian government of Cambodia to adopt the model, OGB staff 
“don’t have an idea of what works and what these ideas [of the model] are” (field 
notes).  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the CBDM project as a “model” and “success” and one that was 
gender mainstreamed, as claimed by OGB. The features of this model, such as 
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community mobilisation through the establishment of village committees, also served as 
the vehicles for women’s participation and their empowerment. Not only were 
communities claimed to be more prepared for floods, women, who were seen as 
particularly vulnerable, were seen as having benefited in particular from decreased 
workloads and exposure to disease. Improved preparation against floods increased 
communities’ confidence in their ability to mitigate potential damage caused by floods 
and, in particular, women’s sense of safety. 
 
The project was, however, controversial. Efforts to claim and insist on a model having 
been established can be seen as strategies to mobilize support both outside and inside 
the project. Externally, as Mosse (2005b: 163) observes, “affirming the project as a 
replicable model enhanced its appeal in donor circles”. This is understandable given the 
need to show success when “funding is often linked to their ability to produce narratives 
of progress” (Baviskar, 2007a: 307). Internally, the trope of having a replicable model 
can be seen as serving to build coherence among diverse actors that included not only 
project staff, but also OGB in Cambodia and regional senior managers and an array of 
advisors sitting in Cambodia and Bangkok as well as Oxford. The trope of a “model” 
rallied staff around the notion not only of success but a replicable success. As Mosse 
(2005: 164) observes “Senior staff and managers worked hard (through meetings, 
events, displays) to foster a project culture and identity around its approach so as to hold 
staff together, to encourage loyalty, counter staff turnover and contend with the de facto 
contingency of staff action”. In addition, the positioning of the project as a “pilot” 
provided excitement from exploring something unknown and possibly stumbling across 
innovation, thus catalysing further cohesion. 
 
But for some OGB advisors, the mere claim of having established a model was 
insufficient. Unlike mainly project staff whose “critical faculties” had been suspended 
(Baviskar, 2007a: 307), others remained sceptical. And it was these criticisms mainly 
from OGB advisors, which challenged the raison d'être of the project, that were resisted 
most fervently. Still, while OGB in Cambodia’s claim remained contentious, the 
organisation could point to “achievements”, particularly the project being ‘gender 
mainstreamed’ and regarding the participation of women. How did the project become 
gender mainstreamed? What is the relevance of these contestations about having a 
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model to the claim that the project was mainstreamed? These are the focus of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 8  
 
The Engendering of Proposals and Reproduction of “Success” 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the history of the CBDM project was contentious; OGB in 
Cambodia’s claims of having established a model were challenged continuously. Still, 
according to OGB in Cambodia, the CBDM project is considered an example of gender 
mainstreaming. In proposals and reports, the organisation claimed to have integrated 
strategies and measures to empower women, to ensure more equitable decision-making 
and to promote women’s strategic interests, such as enhancing their leadership and 
decreasing gender-based violence. Certainly compared to reviews of OGB’s gender 
mainstreaming discussed in Chapter 5, the CBDM project can be seen as a successfully 
mainstreamed project. How did this come to be? In this chapter I describe the 
engendering of project proposals and compare how other advisors were less successful 
in influencing project staff. Why was this? How can one describe the relationships and 
interactions of project staff and gender advisors in the engendering of proposals?  
 
Part of the appeal for OGB in Cambodia project staff of working with gender issues in 
the project was its main impetus, to reduce vulnerability of villagers to floods. I describe 
how the logic of the project itself led to how gender was integrated: women’s 
vulnerability became not only part of the project discourse of its rationale and therefore 
its integration of gender issues, it also became part of the project discourse of a 
successful project in community based disaster management. How did this work? What 
other purposes are served in addition to the promotion of the position of women? How 
is the discourse of “success” engendered and reproduced? 
 
This chapter focuses the claims of gender mainstreaming and how these came to the 
fore and comprises four sections. The first documents the process of engendering 
project proposals and the ways in which advice regarding gender was adopted. The 
second explores how gender became integrated into the project, seemingly as a result of 
the acquiescence to advice provided by gender advisors. I particular I look at the 
relationship between regional gender advisors and OGB staff in Cambodia. Section 
three expands this discussion and establishes how the notion that women are particularly 
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vulnerable pervaded the project and how this provided the context for addressing gender 
issues by the CBDM project. The last section analyses how the discourse of women 
being particularly vulnerable was propagated through activities such as gender training 
and how OGB advisors and visitors to the project were part of the reproduction of the 
idea of the project’s success.  
 
THE MAINSTREAMING OF GENDER IN PROJECT PROPOSALS 
This section focuses on the integration of gender issues into proposals for the CBDM 
project. While the development of proposals represents a specific and perhaps limited 
instance of the life of the project, the act of writing of proposals is part of the way 
“development ideologies are produced and reproduced” (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 
191). A substantial amount of effort is dedicated to this activity
154
, which is concerned 
with “power dynamics” between staff who have a role in writing them (Shutt, 2008: 
232). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the inspiration for the CBDM project came from both OGB 
in Cambodia’s experience with working in flood-prone areas and OGB in Bangladesh’s 
experience with community based disaster management. The Regional Humanitarian 
Coordinator
155
 at the time, Justin Bailey, was familiar with the Bangladesh experience 
and suggested that OGB in Cambodia staff working with the humanitarian programme 
visit the South Asian project (field notes). The staff did visit the project and 
subsequently incorporated features from Bangladesh with activities already used by 
OGB in Cambodia to produce the design of the CBDM project. In this way, the CBDM 
project was a “pilot”, as discussed in the previous chapter: OGB in Cambodia was 
trying new activities, and in combination, which had not been done before (Interview. 
Dikorn Ieng, 2006).
 156
 
 
OGB project staff in Cambodia were responsible for developing project proposals and 
seeking approval for them from the County Programme Manager or, if warranted, the 
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 For example, Shutt (2008: 232) found in her study of Cambodian NGOs that “Staff devoted large 
amounts of time to learning how to ‘professionalise’ and produce proposals and reports”. 
155
 Regional Humanitarian Coordinators are regional positions who are overall responsible for 
humanitarian work in the region. They manage, along with Country Program Managers, Humanitarian 
Programme Coordinators who have responsibility for humanitarian work in a specific country. 
156
 When referring to Cambodian names, I use the convention of their full name with the family name 
coming first. 
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Regional Programme Manager
157
. In the case of the CBDM project, this involved 
Dikorn Ieng as well as Lay Sokroeun, Choueng Samkol and Phoung Tola, all 
Cambodian. The process included the drafting of the proposal, led by the Humanitarian 
Coordinator with inputs from the project officers, and its circulation for comments 
among various regional advisors as well as colleagues in the Humanitarian Department 
in Oxfam House. At some point, either before or after this step, depending on the 
urgency involved in getting the proposal approved, OGB in Cambodia’s Senior 
Management Team, which included the Country Programme Manager and other 
programme coordinators, would also review if not discuss the proposal and offer 
comments. Based on the nature of the feedback provided, as described below, the 
proposal would be revised by the Humanitarian Coordinator based on his discretion. 
The final version would then reviewed by the Country Programme Manager, who would 
edit and make sure that the proposal was appropriate and understandable (field notes). 
Over the three year life of the project, three annual proposals were developed: 2003-
2004, 2004-5 and 2005-2006. 
 
The step of seeking comments from advisors was left for the most part to the discretion 
of project staff and the Country Programme Manager, with the exception of OGB 
gender advisors, whether global, regional or national. Gender advisors’ involvement had 
been mandatory since the introduction of the Gender Humanitarian Non-Negotiables, 
established in 2002, as discussed in Chapter 7. Nevertheless, OGB programme staff in 
the region tended not to seek the inputs of OGB gender advisors. If inputs were sought, 
this was often last minute (Interviews. Winslet, 2006 and Sokha Cheat, 2006) and at the 
behest of the Regional Programme Manager, who made project approval conditional on 
a review by and the go-ahead of the Regional Gender Advisor (Interview. Fitzgerald, 
2006)
158
. Such practice positioned the advisor in an influential position, but not 
necessarily in a powerful one, as described later. 
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 This depended on the scale of the project budget. 
158
 This was also a practice when I was working as a Regional Gender Advisor. There were numerable 
instances when approval of projects and programmes would be conditional upon their meeting Oxfam 
GB’s gender humanitarian non-negotiables (Internal document. OGB, 2002). 
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The case of the CBDM project was an exception, however. OGB in Cambodia staff 
actively sought advice from the Regional Gender Advisors
159
, and also from different 
advisors and coordinators from the Humanitarian Department in Oxford and the RMC 
in Bangkok. My participation in the project was at the suggestion of the Regional 
Humanitarian Coordinator, who wrote to his Cambodian counterpart: “I strongly 
reccomend Franz or anoither person with strong gender focus (from Cambodia or the 
region) be asked to contribute” [sic] (Internal communication. Bailey, 2003). As I 
suggest in the last section of this chapter¸ “consulting” with a number of OGB staff was 
as much an effort to mobilise support for the project as it was one to solicit advice. I 
explain the exception of the CBDM project and how contributions from OGB “experts” 
were represented as endorsements of the project in a bid to represent “success”.  
 
Still exchanges about the project between OGB advisors, whether based in Oxford or 
the region, and project staff were discordant, particularly when concerns were raised by 
the former disputing the project’s claims of being a pilot and having established a 
model. Responses tended not to respond to the substance of the challenge, but rather 
their critical nature. For example in 2003, the regional programme advisor’s challenge, 
cited in the previous chapter, to what was being piloted and the lack of innovation 
design, elicited strong reactions from project staff. In reaction to her report, Dikorn Ieng 
of the project team wrote 
 
I am a bit disappointing after reading such a negative report by having no 
discussion before written but hope [the Country Programme Manager] will 
understand this because he also understand the project. It would be better if the 
report comes out in a more constructive and encouragement way with 
recommendations and suggestion to improve rather strongly pointing out only the 
negative things” [sic] (Internal communication. Dikorn Ieng, 2003a)  
 
Similar to OGB House managers who were critical of how particular gender advisors 
provided advice, OGB staff in Cambodia were ostensively reacting to how feedback 
was provided; that it was not balanced by acknowledging what has been achieved and 
providing “constructive” feedback. At the heart of the matter, however, was a defensive 
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 From 2002 to 2004, this was myself, and thereafter, Donna Winslet. I refer to us collectively as the 
Regional Gender Advisors or by name, as relevant. 
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reaction to what was seen as a challenge to the project’s discourse of being a model and 
success. When the raison d’être of the project was not being challenged, exchanges 
between the Humanitarian Coordinator and advisors were generally mundane. These 
comments tended to focus on a number of other recurring themes, including 
clarification on how the project would advocate its adoption by the government, 
appropriateness of proposed activities, capacity strengthening of project partners and 
other implementation details.  
 
Exchanges with advisors and project staff concerning gender issues were of a different 
nature than those that questioned the project’s rationale. They were not an exchange as 
such but rather a request for and the provision of comments and suggestions. In none of 
the cases did advisors who provided inputs have a chance to review the subsequent 
version of proposals, nor was there “dialogue” per se. For example, for the 2003-2004 
proposal, other advisors as well as myself raised a number of gender issues. A former 
manager of a previous OGB in Cambodia disaster management project, on which the 
CBDM project was based, enquired as to the results of the provision of boats to women. 
“I think you should also ask about the success of the boats and houses from the 2002 
project […] Also interesting to ask what the women have done with their boats [...] have 
they sold them? Had them stolen? This is a really important question for me, and one I 
would like to know the answer to” (Internal communication. Ballard, 2003). In 
response, one of the CBDM project staff commented  
 
You are completely right […] that we need to follow up on these [house and boat] 
[…] Using the previous experience and based on our discussion with partner I 
have proposed and put some budget for some boats again in the project and also 
allocate a lumpsum of money to be use after need assessment with community 
people. [sic] (Internal communication. Dikorn Ieng, 2003b). 
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Similarly, for the most part, our comments as regional gender advisors were 
accommodated - in some cases wholeheartedly
160
. For example I suggested, in 2003 for 
the 2003-2004 proposal, that, the proposal include a gender analysis and strategy 
(Personal communication. Wong, 2003). This suggestion followed from the East Asia 
“non-negotiables”, mentioned in Chapter 7, which stated that  
 
Staff are expected to mainstream gender concerns in all stages of our DM work. 
This must entail a comprehensive gender analysis, with disaggregated data, and 
include specific strategies to promote gender equality, with agreed indicators to 
assess progress. (Internal document. OGB, 2002b: 1) 
 
Based on this, I listed what in hindsight was a litany of suggested areas that “such an 
analysis and strategy would include”, such as the identification of practical needs and 
strategic interests (Personal communication. Wong, 2003). The result was a new five-
and-a-half-page section “Gender Analysis and Gender Strategy”, which was included in 
the final version of the proposal, written, as described later, by one of the project staff. 
The “analysis” essentially followed the structure of my initial comments, with each of 
my points used as a sub-section heading and centred on how floods increased women’s 
workloads as they spent more time undertaking their usual roles and, in some cases, new 
ones. Decision-making in the family apparently differs “marginally” during floods 
compared with in “normal times”. A special point was that security is a greater concern 
for women than for men
161
. 
 
The gender analysis also outlined women’s and men’s respective “practical” and 
“strategic” gender needs. While they were said to have the same practical needs (clean 
water and sanitation, food and nutrition, fishing equipment, shelter materials, 
transportation, health care services, seeds) and some of the same strategic needs 
(warning systems, communication facilities and evacuation procedures, increased 
income-generating opportunities and capacities), they also had different strategic ones. 
Women’s strategic needs included 
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 In some cases, as detailed below, CBDM project staff confirmed the source of revisions, while in other 
cases it is an assumption on my part based on the exact reproduction of comments in subsequent revised 
proposals. 
161
 The following analysis is based on a comparison of the draft proposal sent for advisors’ comments and 
the final version, which I uncovered during my research. 
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changing pattern of cultivation, changes in gender relations as a result of new 
earning capacities in the family, increase literacy level for women and girls, 
promote more equal status for women and more equal influence in family-
decision making and women to take on more leadership roles within the family 
and community and knowledge about gender. (Internal document. OGB, 2003d: 
7) 
 
In contrast, men’s specific strategic needs were said to be “stockpiling of supplies for 
immediate mobilization, reconstruction of house, homestead raising, safe area 
development, public education and gender awareness raising and community 
organisation for disaster management” (ibid: 7-8). 
 
While none of the project’s main strategies or aims was revised to reflect the gender 
analysis, the “strategy” did include a number of intentions and activities “To address 
practical and strategic needs through the preparedness activities” (ibid: 8). Some of 
these activities were general to women and men, such as “Distribution of vegetable seed 
to 130 families” (ibid: 9); others were relabelled as specific to women or men. In other 
words, they were already included in the initial version of the proposal but were not 
specifically listed as activities to address gender needs, nor were they specific to men or 
women – but they appeared as gender specific in the revised proposal. For example, the 
original proposal included the provision of a boat for the community; the revised 
proposal added that this was “so that women going to sell fish, buy rice at market, 
seeking external medical care etc” [sic] (ibid: 8). 
 
The above example, as well as others from the regional gender advisor who replaced 
me, illustrate how suggestions by gender advisors were largely adopted in a wholesale 
fashion. In none of these cases were advisors’ comments queried or challenged. Some 
of the changes to the proposals were a direct result of our comments and a replication of 
what the advisor suggested. In other cases, as described in the next section, the changes 
to the proposal were a result of a process of interpretation of what the advisor was 
suggesting or asking. As I explore later, such changes were part of a mutual beneficial 
exchange of rhetoric. 
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As Dikorn Ieng, project staff, recalls, “We sent the proposals to all advisors for their 
comments. When we got yours, we realize that we didn’t follow the non-negotiables 
about gender analysis. So I asked [the programme officer] to do one and I included it in 
the proposal. We did it because gender is non-negotiable” (field notes). According to 
the programme officer, the analysis was completed because I “told them that they had to 
have some gender analysis for the project so that’s what I did [...] we were told we 
needed a section on gender” (field notes). 
 
It would seem that part of the rationale for how and why the gender revisions were 
made in the manner they were was to oblige the gender advisors. As Imam (2005: 71-
72) observes, “due to the immense presence of international donors, the ideologies they 
bring with them and the dearth of qualified Cambodians to fit the eligibility of ‘experts’ 
and ‘advisors’, the say of expatriates in matter of approach is enormous”. This, 
however, does not provide a satisfactory explanation but is further explored next.  
 
Gender hegemony or the maintenance of project relations? 
I have suggested that challenges to project’s status as a  purported model raised by 
regional and Oxfam House advisors, as described previously, were met with defiance 
and resistance by project staff, whereas gender advice was adopted unquestionably. To 
what degree can the adoption of advisors’ gender comments be seen as “appeasement” 
and be attributed to what Standing (2004: 83) refers to as a “gender and development 
hegemony”? 
 
It is tempting to view the “expert knowledge” propagated by gender advisors as imbued 
with modernist assumptions of the superiority of Western knowledge and the under-
privileging of other forms of knowledge (Parpart, 1995: 236), as discussed in Chapter 2. 
For example, unproblematic use of terms by advisors (such as “gender needs and 
interests” by myself) came with epistemological assumptions that ignored the 
possibility of other ways of knowing. Also, acquiescence to advisors’ suggestions and 
the unchallenged adoption of gender and development language by project staff can be 
seen as evidence of a dominating discourse propagated by gender advisors in particular. 
And certainly, the efforts of OGB in East Asia to create a “gender infrastructure” – the 
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appointment of regional gender advisors, the non-negotiables – underscore Lazreg’s 
(2002) contention that gender expertise has become part of the landscape of Aidland 
(Apthorpe, 2005).  
 
Is this a sufficient explanation of the different reactions to gender issues being raised 
compared to others? In both cases issues, raised by advisors and project staff need to be 
seen from the perspective of hierarchies among OGB staff. There were differences in 
status between the gender advisors and project staff and even the Humanitarian 
Programme Coordinator, which is a relatively senior position within OGB in Cambodia, 
for a number of reasons. First, hierarchy is structurally embedded in OGB’s system of 
job classification and commensurate salary brackets, two strong signifiers of status in 
Cambodian society. Regional advisors have a higher job grade and are remunerated 
better than national staff. As O’Leary and Meas write (2001: 23), “Power and wealth are 
seen as twin forces and are often regarded as indicative of merit.” Also, hierarchy 
among OGB staff was also partially informed by status provided by position: advisors 
were hired for their supposed “specialist” knowledge gained from experience and 
educational qualifications. The critical question is how such knowledge is perceived. In 
the Cambodian context, knowledge is a commodity which is seen, within the context of 
development, to come from the outside, with advisors and workshops the main conduits 
for knowledge (O'Leary and Meas Nee, 2001).  
 
Second, there was an inherent differentiation among expatriates and Cambodians, 
whereby the former “with their position of influence, automatically get relegated to a 
higher position in the hierarchy” in the context of development in Cambodia (Imam, 
2005: 75). In this case, gender advisors were foreigners and project staff Cambodians. 
 
Still, this does not explain the different reactions to concerns raised about the project. 
Personality certainly is a factor (Shutt, 2008), as is the nature of the “challenge”. Strong 
responses by project staff were in reaction to questions about the very raison d’être of 
the project – the fact that it was a “model”. But why did gender advisors’ questions and 
criticisms not elicit the same reaction, particularly when gender was also part of the 
project’s identity as a success? In contrast to challenges to the “model”, the issues raised 
mostly by regional gender advisors were in the realm of the status quo; they were 
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integrationist in nature (Jahan, 1995). Gender advisors’ suggestions and questions were 
not seen as challenging and could be addressed by the incorporation of gender 
discourse, such as gender analysis and gender needs, and with statements of increased 
intent with the aim of mutual enrolment.  
 
As Mosse (2005: 38) observes of a project in India,  
 
[…] contradictory points of view or arguments between consultants and their 
collaborators, or within the consultant or donor adviser teams were [...] resolved 
by being written into the design of the project [...] key sentences can be read as 
bargaining positions in ongoing disputes over strategy within the agency or 
project teams. 
 
The difference between Mosse’s example and the case of the CBDM project is that 
there was no observable conflict in the latter. Rather, it was latent (Lukes, 2005), and 
exchanges between gender advisors and project staff were manifestations of 
“disciplinary power” (ibid: 99) and following of the “rules of the game” concerning 
how projects become real through the ritual of proposal development. Latent conflict is 
managed through “predictable structuration and confirm-structuration practices” 
(Haugaard, 2003: 107), with OGB gender advisors and project personnel “inculcated 
with routinized behaviour”, such as exchanges around the development of proposals 
where “appropriate actions and reactions become virtually reflex” (ibid, 108).  
 
The resulting “engendered” proposals were about pleasing and persuading, in this case 
in relation to the fact that gender had been addressed, rather than informing or 
describing (Apthorpe, 1997, cited by Eyben, 2004: 74). Consequently, they are “so 
complete, so comprehensive, so enveloping” (Latour, 1996: 103, cited by Mosse, 
2005b: 35) that they read like a litany of campaign-like promises, such as the resulting 
list of how gender needs were going to be addressed. This allowed for the maintenance 
of relations between gender advisors and project staff and their positions in the web of 
aid relations (Eyben, 2006). Mosse (2005: 130) states that projects are about not only 
implementing policy but also “sustaining a set of relationships that secure a person’s 
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identity and status. [Because] stability in the world of action does not come from 
coherent policy, but from effective relationships.”  
 
Project officers and advisors needed each other and were intertwined in a relationship of 
reciprocity and practices of structuration and confirm-structuration. On the one hand, 
project staff required the endorsement of advisors in order to increase the chances of 
their projects being approved. Also, appearing to address the ‘non-negotiables’ and 
cooperating with the regional gender advisor could be parlayed in “symbolic capital”, 
with which comes prestige and status, (Bourdieu 1977: 179, cited by Ebrahim, 2004: 
13-14) to support claims of success. OGB in East Asia, through the establishment of the 
regional gender advisor position and the gender non-negotiables, had signalled to staff 
its privileging of the promotion of the organisation’s gender policy. At the same time, 
these regional initiatives raised the profile of gender mainstreaming in OGB’s 
programmes in the region and also increased its purchase. In other words, by integrating 
gender concerns into existing processes, such as project approval, and thereby further 
entrenching the mainstreaming of gender, the stakes to address gender issues were 
raised, as well as the potential to reap the benefits of increased status.  
 
By engaging with gender issues and those associated with promoting gender equality, 
such as regional gender advisors, the project gained credibility – or rather, the 
credibility of the project was promoted by referring to the advice provided by gender 
advisors, which in this case was nominal. A constant refrain I heard was “[…] and the 
project has gender because so-and-so gender advisor was involved”; when addressing 
questions about women’s involvement, a common reply was “but […] so-and-so gender 
advisor told us […]” (field notes). An example of how the position of regional gender 
advisors was evoked to gain credibility was when the Gender Impact Assessment team 
was discussing initial observations from data collection for the CBDM project. When 
questions were raised by team members of the impact of the project, a project staff 
member evoked me as gender advisor for the project as a testimony of the project’s 
purported success: “We got input from Franz and that is how we got high impact” (field 
notes)
162
. 
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 Lay Sokroeun made a similar comment at a different meeting (February 2006 ) of the GIA team  
mentioning a number of times how I had provided training to project staff and commented on the first 
proposal as an indication of the project’s good gender work (field notes) 
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Such references become part of the project discourse of success. For example, the 2005 
evaluation of the project stated that  
 
Planning is well organized with the strategic plan turned in to an annual operation 
plan (and distributed through the Oxfam GB network for technical advice and 
comments including perspectives on gender, health and nutrition, food security, 
humanitarian content and including an overall financial review). According to one 
team member, ‘there is a lot of external input into the annual plan’. (Internal 
report. Rowe and Menh Navy, 2005: 18) 
 
On the other hand, the act of consulting with the regional gender advisor and being able 
to claim that what was asked was done, such as the inclusion of a gender analysis, also 
provided credibility and cachet for the gender advisor. As described previously, OGB 
advisors in general and gender advisors in particular occupied precarious positions (see 
Chapter 4). Their identity as “specialists” and “knowledge brokers” was only valid as 
long as their advice appeared to have been taken. In the case of the drafting of the 
CBDM proposals, this appearance was provided by project staff taking on advisors’ 
recommendations. Unlike the “knowledge encounter” described by Long (1992: 14), 
which concerned actors were convincing each other to “accept particular frames of 
meaning [and] winning them over to their points of view”, regional OGB initiatives to 
promote gender equality provided a framework that enabled reciprocity in aid relations 
between OGB project staff and gender advisors as well as “mutual enrolment and 
cooptation” (Mosse and Lewis, 2006: 14). The gender non-negotiables mandated 
consulting with gender advisors; when this did happen and advice appeared to have 
been taken on board, gender advisors attained symbolic capital for they could feel and 
claim that gender issues were integrated
163
.  
 
By suggesting mutual beneficial relations, the “strategic groups” (Bierschenk, 1988) 
implicated and their respective roles within the project are critical. It’s no coincidence 
that the analysis thus far of the CBDM project centres on project proposals and reports. 
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 Everjoice Win (2004: 61) makes a similar argument of how seeking out the “poor and powerless 
African woman”, thereby perpetuating this stereotype, legitimizes the gender programme officer who 
“has to always demonstrate that her work is always about the very poor marginalized woman”. 
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As mentioned previously, these devices are key signposts in the life and indeed 
maintenance of a project; they lend “stability to knowledge about the project” and 
affirm representations to project sponsors (Mosse, 2005b: 165). Project staff are the 
ones who maintain these representations through the writing of reports and, in the case 
of the CBDM project, annual proposals. So it is not surprising that these documents are 
highly derivative, repeating from document to document, from year to year, similar if 
not identical information. For example, the proposals for 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 
included almost verbatim the same case study of how one participant’s income 
improved due to the project. For advisors as well, “revised” proposals are a sign that 
given advice was in fact taken on.  
 
Is there more than relations of reciprocity, which Theobald (1983) claims pervades all 
social relations? Certainly, drawing on a now familiar patronage explanation would be 
tempting, particularly given the context of Cambodia. I argued above that differences in 
status existed among OGB staff involved in the project and Cambodian staff were prone 
to defer to expatriate advisors. I am not suggesting, however, that project staff obeyed 
gender advisors’ every wish and command, as suggested by prototype notions of 
patronage. Nor should advisors’ influence “be viewed as an absolute capacity conferred 
on individuals by their professional position” (Shutt, 2008: 52). Additionally, such a 
view ignores the complicit role of project staff and their agency.  
 
In the end, despite power differentials, both gender advisors and project staff secured 
their place in Aidland. Rather than hegemonic gender knowledge in the sense that 
Parpart (1995) alludes to, relations between gender advisors and project staff were 
relations of difference and consent, where both prevailed over other without threats of 
coercion by implicitly accepting the “rules of the game” of reciprocity in Aidland 
(Haugaard, 2002: 306). As Lazreg (2002: 133) writes, gender knowledge, as “part and 
parcel of international order of things” is sustaining of this order rather than upsetting.  
 
Coherence in this case comes from the seeming convergence of interests among project 
staff, managers and advisors, whose jobs and livelihoods are contingent on carrying 
forward their respective policy remits, whether this concerns humanitarian 
programming or gender equality. Project approval is not necessarily based on how 
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respective interests are actually addressed, but on the fact that they somehow appear 
addressed. Project staff and advisors, in particular, become embroiled in obligatory 
mutual exchanges of rhetoric, and the “resulting” project design is concerned with 
accommodating and enrolling different strategic groups, as long as the status quo, such 
as the notion of the project as a model, is not disrupted. This echoes Wright’s (1994) 
suggestion of how anthropological concepts of culture in organisational ethnography 
shy away from dichotomous understandings of dominance. Still, contrary to her 
assertion that a “consensual notion (of culture) is unhelpful” (ibid: 27), the case of 
gender advisors and project staff inter-locked in by consenting to the “rules of the 
game” which helped them make meaning in similar and different ways.    
 
In interviews with other regional advisors, a constant refrain was the lack of influence 
they had on OGB country level managers and staff. If “addressing” organisational 
policy provided cachet, why didn’t other OGB staff in Cambodia or the region also seek 
the advice of advisors as did the CBDM project staff? This study did not include a 
comparison making an exploration of this question difficult. The difference may be that 
that not all staff in the region appreciated the opportunity that “compliance” with gender 
non-negotiables provided. Also, other areas in which advisors worked were not as 
“mainstreamed” as gender was, with the establishment of strategies, infrastructure and 
compliance requirements. An explanation may also stem from the rationale for OGB in 
Cambodia’s gender efforts in the project - the notion that women are vulnerable to 
floods - that served as a unifying trope, as explored in the next section.  
 
“WOMEN ARE VULNERABLE TO FLOODS” 
This section examines the dominant justification for integrating gender into the project – 
that women are more vulnerable to floods than men – and how this idea was reproduced 
and elided with gender inequity, women’s subordination and gender stereotypes. As an 
example of the reproduction of this discourse, I focus on the case of the development of 
the gender analysis for the project which took place at the behest of myself acting as a 
gender advisor. I show how dominant understandings of women as vulnerable were 
reflected in the selective use of secondary literature that was used in the analysis. This 
was not the case of a project staff person privileging this discourse; it permeated 
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throughout the project and OGB in Cambodia among various “strategic groups”, as 
explained next. 
 
As described in Chapter 7, the project’s overall approach concerned increasing 
communities’ confidence and capacity to respond to floods while reducing their 
vulnerability, with the former also about having less fear of floods. Fear and 
vulnerability were particularly interrelated and were associated with women who, along 
with children, were considered the most vulnerable to floods, according to project 
documentation written by project staff (For example, see Internal document. OGB, 
2006e). This understanding was conflated with the promotion of gender equality where 
the focus on women owed to “deep rooted gender disparities” (ibid: n.r.) in the project 
area. “As the result of the learning and experiences in the past years and understanding 
that women and children are the most vulnerable to disasters, OGB together with 
partners, is committed to promote gender equity and equality and mainstream gender” 
(ibid: n.r.).  
 
OGB in Cambodia’s Gender Mainstreaming Strategy also includes this notion and links 
women’s vulnerability to subordination: 
 
Women tend to be further marginalised […] by a traditional system of values that 
place women in a position of subservience to men. Hence women remain more 
vulnerable during emergencies and continue to have limited opportunities to 
participate in the development process and local governance mechanisms. The 
historically high proportion of death and disability within the male population, as 
a result of war, has left a substantial number of female headed households who 
remain vulnerable if not provided with opportunities to gain access to information, 
technologies and livelihood assets, nor provided with a voice within decision 
making forums. (Internal document. OGB, 2006c: 1) 
 
The notion that women are more vulnerable than men, whether to disasters, poverty or 
abuses of power, was echoed by a number of OGB in Cambodia staff. For example, Tep 
Viphou, a Programme Coordinator, stated that OGB involves women “because we think 
that women is the more vulnerable of poverty in terms of beneficiaries. If we're talking 
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about men and women in any level, women always below already […] women is the 
most vulnerability in the community family or community” [sic] (Interview. Tep 
Viphou, 2006). 
 
When this view is intertwined with OGB in Cambodia’s approach to disaster 
management, it takes on particular relevance, as a project staff member explains: 
 
Women benefit more than men [from the project], I can say, because more or less 
we focus on that. For example, I can give you from DM programme, when we 
distribute something to people […] we start from the level of vulnerability, we 
know women are physically weak in general. We know they are the most 
vulnerable group. Our target is the most vulnerable group that we would like to 
help.” (Interview. Dikorn Ieng, 2006)  
 
The notion that women are vulnerable was also embedded in OGB in Cambodia’s 
gender discourse and was propagated by the organisation: “OGB provided the idea that 
we should work with women, children who are the most vulnerable”, a member of TD 
states (Interview. Pha Lina, 2006). Similarly, a number of Gender Impact Assessment 
informants claimed that they learned of women’s vulnerability from gender training 
provided by the project. For example, a VCDM member from Anchang stated at about 
training “We analysed sex, don’t hide things, discuss with each other. For example, 
women has disease, if you hide it will get worse. Women are vulnerable to disease” 
(FGD). Also related to women’s physiology, one woman said she learned that “Women 
and men biologically different, he won’t get disease if he stays in water, women get 
sick” (VCDM member FGD. Bantey Slek). Women’s vulnerability was also related to a 
dependence on men. A female committee member said that he learned that “during 
flooding season, women sometimes alone, men away. So if she’s sick or pregnant, she’s 
vulnerable” (FGD. Anchang). 
 
The “gender analysis and strategy” in the proposal for the first year (2003-2004), which 
was included at my suggestion, is a significant case as it set the stage for formalising the 
project’s gender equality goals and approach, which were reiterated in subsequent 
proposals, particularly for the second year of the project (2004-2005) and, to a lesser 
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extent, the third (2005-2006). The case also shows how the understanding that women 
are vulnerable became reproduced as part of OGB in Cambodia’s analysis. 
 
Much of the “analysis” was copied, mostly verbatim, from a 2002 CARE International 
study on the effects of floods on women and girls conducted in a province close to 
Takeo: Prey Veng
164
. Given the time constraints expressed by Lay Sokroeun and OGB 
staff in Cambodia, as described in Chapter 4, the use of secondary information was a 
reasonable strategy. Prey Veng is close to Takeo and, while there some differences 
between the two provinces
165
, they are similar demographically, economically and 
socially. They are also both prone to floods, as they are located in the flood plains of the 
Mekong and Bassac Rivers, respectively. Information from the CARE study certainly 
provided more understanding on how women and men experience floods
166
.  
 
Still, how the data were used is significant. The OGB “version” included a number of 
omissions. For example, CARE’s references to women’s capacity and agency were all 
excluded. A main CARE research finding of women overriding “strong culturally 
gendered constraints on mobility” (CARE International, 2002: 13) was also excluded. 
While the OGB proposals acknowledged women’s role in negotiating loans, they did 
not mention the lengths women went to and the risks women took to address household 
finances, but instead emphasised their immobility. For example, the 2004 proposal 
stated that, during floods, “women especially have reduced mobility due to fear of boat 
transportation” (Internal document. OGB, 2004b: 9. My emphasis). 
 
References in the CARE report that contextualise women’s fears were not included. For 
example, OGB’s proposals excluded the report’s findings that “it was surprising that no 
women or girls interviewed expressed increased concerns about privacy or sanitation” 
(CARE International, 2002: 26) and that women felt safer against sexual violence 
during floods. Rather, the proposals emphasised women’s fears. For example, “Women 
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 Nowhere in the proposals did Oxfam GB in Cambodia cite the source, but it claimed that the proposals 
were based on “assessments, reviews and evaluations”, as indicated in the respective proposals (for 
example, see the 2004 proposal, OGB, 2004) 
165
 Prey Veng is about 15% more populated than Takeo, 1 million people compared to 880,000 
respectively (National Institute of Statistics, 2004), though slightly less dense (212 vs. 250 persons/sq km 
(WFP, 2010). It also has a higher infant mortality rate than Takeo (WFP, 2010). 
166
 It should be noted that the research was undertaken by a women’s organisation in Cambodia, 
Womyn’s Agenda for Change, mentioned previously in the example of organising commercial sex 
workers, that is well known for its feminist analysis and advocacy (Interview. Singa, 2006).   
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highlighted more risks, and expressed deeper concern, about those risks than the men. 
Women and girls were much more worried about animals that are perceived to be 
dangerous – snakes, crocodiles, leaches and centipedes” [sic] (Internal document. OGB, 
2003d: 3). While acknowledging these fears, the CARE report contextualises them: 
 
It is also necessary to add that people are also affected by their own perceptions of 
risk [...] women and girls were much more worried than men about animals [...] – 
snakes, crocodiles, leaches and centipedes [...] This is despite nobody interviewed 
being aware of anyone, or of any livestock, that had ever been bitten by a snake in 
the flood time, nor could anyone even claim to have seen a crocodile, at anytime, 
except on television. (CARE International, 2002: 29). 
 
The purpose of highlighting this last reference from the CARE report and its omission 
in OGB’s documents is not to refute women’s fears: these are real inasmuch as they 
were stated by women. Rather, the difference is in how they were treated. In 
recognising they concern “perceptions of risk”, the CARE report recommends a number 
of strategies to change these perceptions, with the acknowledgement that women have 
the capacity to feel secure. In contrast, OGB proposals accepted that women were more 
fearful, which, as described previously, is linked to their vulnerability. 
 
This reinforced women as the weaker sex requiring male presence and protection. The 
CARE recommendation of ensuring “women and girls without adult male presence do 
not have shelters on periphery of the evacuation site” (ibid: 42. My emphasis) was 
replaced with “To ensure women and adult male presence and try to group these 
vulnerable women and girl together” (Internal document. OGB, 2003d: 9. My emphasis) 
as one of the preparedness strategies to address men and women’s strategic and 
practical needs. 
 
It is difficult, however, to analyse the interpretive process involved in the use of the 
report. In discussing the development of the gender analysis, Lay Sokroeun confirmed 
its source but could not recall that she changed the text nor how this happened. “I got 
the report from CARE and included what I thought was needed in the gender analysis 
that you had required us to do” (field notes).  
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This point of this comparative analysis is not that OGB staff copied reports for their 
own purpose
167
. As van Maanen (1979: 544) suggests, it is the recognition of the 
falseness of the proposal that is of value to organisational ethnography, for “people lie 
about the things that matter to them the most”. The challenge is to be able to 
analytically interpret what matters and why. Accordingly, the previous analysis of the 
two documents is also not to refute that women are more physiologically susceptible to 
water-borne disease or suffer more from floods due their social position. Rather it 
concerns different notions of women’s vulnerability and how these are conflated and 
reproduced. The idea that women are more vulnerable to floods was implicitly extended 
and interpreted as being socially vulnerable and elided with gender inequity. The overall 
rationale and logic of the project, to make people less vulnerable to inevitable floods, 
provide a lens though which gender was interpreted and understood. Moreover, the 
dominant understanding of women as vulnerable is similar to Crewe and Harrison’s 
(1998: 67) observation that “existing gender power relations rely on women being 
defined and redefined as vulnerable […]” and needing protection and “assertiveness” 
training. Organisationally, the narrative worked well, as it is “one in which the 
development agency plays the part of hero” (Cornwall and Edwards, 2010: 4): it 
provided a context in which OGB in Cambodia could rationalise its gender work and 
claim that it had empowered women which contributed to the overall “success” of the 
project. 
 
THE REPRODUCTION OF ENGENDERED SUCCESS  
This section analyses how the engendered discourse of success was reproduced. I look 
at how gender training reinforced the notion of vulnerable women and, paradoxically, 
was also concerned with the representation of project “success”, with its focus on 
increasing the confidence of female project beneficiaries to communicate with visitors. 
Part of the reproduction included visits to the CBDM project by OGB staff as well as 
those from other organisations, presented as “learning” events by OGB in Cambodia. 
Analysis of project documentation and field data also suggests that these were part of a 
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 This was not the only instance where I found Oxfam GB in Cambodia staff duplicated reports. For 
example, the GIA report was copied verbatim for another gender impact assessment of a different project 
that was supported by Oxfam GB by one of the GIA team members. The scope of my research did not 
allow me to explore the contexts in which this occurs or epistemological assumptions. 
  
Chapter 8 The Engendering of Proposals and Reproduction of “Success” 216 
 
cyclical process of reproducing the discourse of success that incorporated claims of the 
project being gender mainstreamed.  
 
Gender training was the main capacity-building strategy to promote gender equality, 
from the beginning of the project. OGB in Cambodia’s Gender Officer provided gender 
training to CD, and together they delivered training to the VCDMs, community 
members, village authorities and government counterparts. By 2006, all VCDM 
members had received gender training at least once, and training had been provided to 
all 13 villages on an annual basis. For example, from 15 February to 10 March 2006, 
gender training was provided to community members in all villages for 488 participants 
– 274 women and 214 men (Internal report. Flood Preparedness and Mitigation Team, 
2006)
 168
. This was such a key strategy that community members were not considered to 
have any knowledge of gender issues unless they attended training, as the CD Disaster 
Management Coordinator stated (Interview. Pha Lina, 2006).  
 
For the most part, gender training was provided as part of the project’s three-day 
disaster management course. With its emphasis on “the impact of floods of women 
villagers” (Internal document. Oxfams Humanitarian Programme Office, 2002), the 
typically three-hour session included presentations and discussions on the difference 
between sex and gender, the importance of gender to CBDM and men’s and women’s 
roles and different vulnerabilities during floods (Internal document. OGB, 2003f). In 
discussing the purpose of the training, Lay Sokroeun noted that they wanted participants 
to understand that both women and men are vulnerable to floods but in different ways: 
“We wanted them to know that women are more vulnerable. They get sick more. They 
have no power. So we need to focus on them more” (field notes). 
 
For OGB, gender training raised awareness of gender issues among community 
members and resulted in changed relations between women and men. In a discussion 
about gender training conducted in 2005-2006, OGB states that 
 
The community members were very impressed about the gender training […] 
Some women were excited and cried because before they participated in the 
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 The claim that both women and men attended gender training contradicts a number of GIA informants 
who said that it was mostly women who attended gender training. 
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training they did not know how to analyze their own situation. Women just 
thought that the serious human rights violation, which committed by their husband 
was normal and it should not be punished. Women did not realized about their 
heavy workload that they have been carried so far and never give any value at all. 
There were remarkable changes within the community such as women played 
important role in decision-making and earning income for their family. Domestic 
violence cases and pressure within the family also decreased. [sic] (Internal report. 
Flood Preparedness and Mitigation Team, 2006: 26)  
 
Gender Impact Assessment informants concurred that they had learned from the gender 
training, but some of their accounts differed from OGB in Cambodia’s account. As 
previously described, a number said they learned of women’s vulnerability from 
project-sponsored training. Also, Nget stated that he had learned 
 
[…] about violence in the house, educating children about gambling, [what] 
women should do in family: provide food, that is her responsibility. Men to go on 
women behalf if they can’t access […] we will go because she is not as strong as 
men. We know some from parents but not as clear as after training (male 
community member, FGD. Bantey Slek). 
 
The CBDM project also trained women in ‘leadership skills’ to enable them to gain 
confidence, as evidenced by their ability to speak to foreign visitors. For example, in a 
discussion of the “Community-Based Disaster Preparedness and Gender Training”, 
delivered in November 2004, OGB notes that “Participants practiced communication 
and presentation skills each evening so that they would feel confident in communicating 
with others and could present their project activities to visitors and donors” (Internal 
report. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005: 15)
 169
. As an impact of such trainings, OGB 
claimed that VCDM members “were confident in answering and presenting the project 
activities to visitors” (Internal report. OGB, 2006b: 25).  
 
Comments from GIA informants confirmed women community members’ increased 
confidence to speak out (see Chapter 7) as well as to speak to visitors. For example, 
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 A similar claim is made in the previous year’s report for 2003-2004. 
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Siem said that “Now I speak to visitors. Before wouldn’t even serve water” (Interview, 
Bantey Slek). Similarly, the mid-term evaluation of the CBDM project noted that 
“Villagers are learning how to answer the questions of frequent visitors in a polished 
manner” (Internal report. Rowe and Menh Navy, 2005: 15).  
 
That project beneficiaries were also trained to communicate with visitors underscores 
the positioning of community members as part of the engendered discourse of success. 
Gender training delivered by OGB in Cambodia had two complementary aims: to 
convey that women were more vulnerable to floods and increase their confidence as 
both served the reproduction of the notion of the project as a success. 
 
With OGB in Cambodia declaring gender as a non-negotiable, the issue became part of 
the discourse of project success and its reproduction. For example, as mentioned 
previously, during the GIA, one male VCDM member was keen for us to visit his 
house. When we did, we saw him in an apron cooking some food. He said this was his 
new role as a result of gender training. When we asked his daughter, she said this was 
the first time he had ever cooked (field notes). I also observed when conducting the 
assessment that beneficiaries’ “polished” responses were enhanced by project staff. 
During the assessment, Lay Sokroeun coached women VCDM members on interview 
questions the evening before the actual interviews were to occur. Using our interview 
schedule as a guide, she prompted members to speak of their empowerment and 
leadership (field notes)
 170
.  
 
The notion that beneficiaries adapt behaviour and responses is not a new observation 
(Crewe and Harrison, 1998). What is different is how this was part of the reproduction 
of the project discourse of success which implicated OGB’s gender efforts. The training 
of beneficiaries to speak confidently with visitors and represent the project was part of a 
recycling of project information perpetuating the appearance of success. Under the 
auspices of sharing its model approach, OGB in Cambodia invited visitors to the 
project, who were shown a model supported by testimonials from well-rehearsed, 
particularly female, beneficiaries. The visitors then mirrored the model in their 
                                                 
170
 I also observed such coaching on gender issues occurring with another Oxfam GB partner as part of 
the gender impact assessment. 
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comments about the project, which were then used as evidence of a model in reports and 
for the next visitors.  
 
The project had numerous visitors every year: a total of 93 came from 10 organisations 
over the life of the project. In 2004-2005, 14 people from four different regional and 
international organisations, as well as OGB, visited the project in five visits. The annual 
report for the same year states that “The high quality of the work of the Disaster 
Management Programme has been frequently praised by the many visitors and other 
agency representatives who visited the pilot project’s village sites” (Internal report. 
Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005: 6).  
 
One such visitor was the Emergencies Coordinator from Oxfam Australia, who wrote 
after his visit in 2004 (the first year of the project), “It was very interesting to visit your 
pilot project of Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation. I was especially impressed by the 
efforts of two VCDMs that we visited. Fantastic to see illiterate women empowered to 
work with their communities and enthusiastic to learn and share their learning” (Internal 
communication. My emphasis).
171
 
 
Such comments were collected and used as testimonials of the project’s success. For 
example, the above excerpts were from letters I found in the project files. When I asked 
why they were being kept, Dikorn Ieng replied that they were evidence that the project 
had established a model. The testimonials from visitors were thus indicators of 
“success”. The status of the witness, and their assumed gravitas, was also a gauge. For 
example, when I was visiting the safe area and asked about the project’s achievements, 
Lay Sokroeun responded “The Minister for Disaster Management attended the opening 
ceremony of the safe area” (field notes). But also important was what they represented: 
most were working also in disaster management, such as those cited above, and brought 
with them “the skills in interpretation necessary to frame and sustain” the project’s 
claims of success (Mosse, 2005b: 162). Often it was the more senior of the project staff 
who would accompany visitors. As Baviskar (2007b: 303) writes about the use of visits 
to promote a watershed project in India,  “Implicit is the notion that an outside visitor 
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 This was a year of less than normal floods and the flood preparation and mitigation measures had not 
been “tested”.  As the Oxfam GB Country Programme Manager stated in 2004, after the second flooding 
season during the project, “we still don't know how effective the project interventions will be in coping 
with flooding, because there was no serious flooding last year” (Internal communication. Smith, 2004) 
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expects/should be given a certain representation of the mission which is best supplied 
by a high-ranking state official […] Most visitors come away enthused.” 
 
OGB project staff likewise used the involvement of OGB management and advisors in 
the project to validate the project’s design and achievements. As in previously provided 
examples of how my involvement in the project was used as a testament to the gender 
mainstreaming of the project, the following reference to such pre-eminent people in the 
2005-2008 strategic plan was commonly found in other project reports and proposals: 
“The programme is built from the 3 years strategic planning exercise […] where all 
stakeholders were consulted. Advice and consultation had been made with RMC
172
 
Regional Director, RPM
173
, Regional Programme Quality Manager, Regional 
Humanitarian Programme Coordinator, Regional Gender Adviser, CPM
174
 and other 
OGB programmes staff (in Cambodia)” (Internal document. OGB, 2006f). 
 
Colleagues’ observations were sometimes included in reports but were limited to praise 
for the project: reports excluded any criticism. For example, the 2004-2005 report cites 
a visit by OGB’s Regional Humanitarian Coordinator and states that he was impressed 
by the project (Internal report. Joint Oxfams DM Team, 2005). In his trip report, 
however, the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator also raised a number of questions and 
concerns, particularly about the cost of the project and therefore its replicability as well 
as the lack of baseline data (Internal report. Smuthers, 2004). These comments are 
excluded from the report.  
 
Baviskar (2007a: 303) writes “the creation of a record of a particular kind is crucial, a 
record that is legible to outside audience”. Testimonials by OGB staff and visitors, 
based on accounts from field visits with rehearsed and groomed project beneficiaries, 
served as this record, such as reports, which include “information […] selected to 
substantiate the claim that the mission is working as planned” (ibid), but also for future 
visitors to read and be inspired.  
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 Regional Management Centre 
173
 Regional Programme Manager 
174
 Country Programme Manager 
  
Chapter 8 The Engendering of Proposals and Reproduction of “Success” 221 
 
I have suggested that gender training, visits to the project and project documentation 
were inter-related to sustain claims that the project was a success. To conclude a neat 
system of deceit and cause-and-effect linkages, however, is too convenient. Also, the 
point is not to question the value of increasing women’s ability to speak out, even if in 
the context of visitors, which should be considered extraordinary given the remoteness 
of the project sites. Speaking “with” and speaking “out” are, however, different. As 
described in Chapter 9, what and how women were able to speak about was constrained.  
 
Rather, the inter-relationship between gender training, visits and project documentation 
should also be seen as being interconnected in support the reproduction of the discourse 
of success, which was not, however, gender specific,. Rather, gender was part of the 
landscape of Aidland or, similarly as Lazreg (2002:133) contends about gender 
expertise, cited previously, it has become “part and parcel of an international order of 
things, the arrangement of which it sustains rather than upsets”. In this case, gender was 
mainstreamed into the production of the notion that OGB in Cambodia had established a 
CBDM model, thereby creating an illusion of coherence and stability supporting an 
authoritative interpretation of the project (Mosse, 2005b) as a success, which contrasted 
to criticisms of the initiative, discussed in the previous chapter. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have recounted interactions between OGB regional gender advisors and 
project staff responsible for developing project proposals and ask how adoption of the 
former’s advice by the latter can be understood within the context of relations of 
Aidland (Apthorpe, 2005). Such exchanges were reciprocal in nature where the 
integration of gender equality was concerned with the maintenance of relations between 
project staff and advisors as well as their positions. They were unique compared to 
others, and I suggest the efforts to mainstream gender by OGB, particularly at the 
regional level, allowed for the compliance of gender standards a certain purchase, for 
both project staff and advisors alike. 
 
The “engendered” nature of the CBDM project - its rationale for promoting gender 
equality and its focus on women – was in part due to the dominant understanding that 
women were particularly vulnerable to floods. The engendering of the project 
reproduced this trope, through its “gender analysis” and project-sponsored gender 
training. Such a notion also became conflated with being socially vulnerable reinforcing 
the understanding of the dependence of women on men. Portraying women as 
vulnerable also contributed to OGB in Cambodia’s claims to have empowered women: 
they are vulnerable yet showed leadership and confidence, which when demonstrated 
served to reproduce the project as a success. Gender training, visits to the project and 
project documentation supported this reproduction as a self-perpetuating re-cycling of 
information. 
 
So far I have discussed the involvement of women as passive project participants 
seemingly caught up in the reproduction of the discourses of vulnerability and 
“success”. This contradicts OGB in Cambodia’s contention that women were actively 
participating and empowered in the process. What was their involvement? This is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
  
Chapter 9 The Integration of Woman in the Name of Success 223 
 
Chapter 9  
 
The Integration of Women in the Name of Success 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Previously I highlighted how, from the mid-1990s, NGOs in Cambodia, including OGB, 
aimed to assume a gender and development approach. As elsewhere, the adoption of 
GAD language in Cambodia did not necessarily entail a change in thinking and practice: 
many NGOs still saw the improvement of women in terms of enhancing their condition 
and ensuring they benefited from “development” without disrupting the status quo 
social relations of gender
175
. OGB in Cambodia claimed to have transitioned from a 
WID to a GAD approach during the 1990s when gender issues became a central issue 
(Padmanabhan, 1999); this shift seems to have been more in rhetoric than in practice. 
Similarly, the CBDM project adopted language associated with GAD, such as 
addressing women’s strategic needs and empowering them. 
 
I have shown that the CBDM project is a contested “success” and demonstrated in the 
last chapter how the production of the discourse of “success” involved the notion of 
women as vulnerable that was reproduced through project activities where women 
participated, such as gender training and visits to the project. Also part of the projection 
of the project as being gender mainstreamed included claims that women benefited not 
only in terms of their practical gender needs being addressed but also their strategic 
interests, such as through greater decision making and reduced domestic violence, as 
described in Chapter 7.  
 
These contentions – that women were actively involved and benefited from the project, 
and that they were part of the project discourse – are not necessarily contradictory, but 
they do not tell us much about the actual roles of women in the project nor what their 
integration means in terms of their involvement. My aim in this chapter is not to 
evaluate the project’s impact on women but rather to understand, if there were outcomes 
for women as OGB in Cambodia claims, under what circumstances did these happen? 
                                                 
175
 This contrasts the common assertion that gender mainstreaming has meant getting rid of a focus on 
women as the CBDM project prioritised the integration of women. Still, as with experiences of the loss of 
focus on women, “prevailing and unequal power relations [are left] intact” (Mukhopdhyay. 2007b: 144). 
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How can these claims be understood within the wider discourse of project success and a 
gender mainstreamed project? 
 
This chapter is comprised of two sections and draws on my findings concerning the 
project from the Gender Impact Assessment, which, as described in Chapter 3, I 
supported as a volunteer. The first section examines OGB’s claims that the project 
increased women’s participation, decision making and reduced domestic violence. The 
second situates this analysis within the context of the primary vehicle through which 
women participated in the project, the Village Committees for Disaster Management. 
 
INTEGRATION IN THE PROJECT  
Findings from the assessment suggest that OGB’s claims of increased women’s 
participation and decision making need to be understood within the context of the 
gender division of labour. For example, mainly male interviewees confirmed an 
increase in women’s participation. They not only attended meetings and training more 
than men, but also were more active in such meetings. For example, Menh, a male 
VCDM member from Sang Ke Chaur village, stated that “More women are 
participating in the project, before only men” (FGD). Krel, a VCDM chair, said that 
“Before women were quiet in the meeting, now they speak a lot […] Women are brave 
to speak, that is never seen before” (interview).  
 
Women’s ability to attend meetings, however, was dependent on a number of gender-
related factors: if the meetings were held in the community, the nature of the meeting 
and if the husband was busy. For example, men tended to attend project events if they 
were outside the village. “Women never attended training because far away. So now can 
attend meeting if in village” said Horn, a male community member from Bantey Slek 
(FGD). This seemed related to who had access to project resources; beneficiaries 
received cash per diems when they travelled outside their village for meetings or other 
project-sponsored events. Moreover, if the meeting was about “gender”, women would 
attend. “If know they will talk about gender, will let wife go because it’s for women” 
said Vannsin (FGD, Bantey Slek). Lastly, women participated when their husbands 
were already occupied. A comment by VCDM member, Hy, that “Women mostly come 
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to meetings because men busy with rice cultivation” (FGD, Sang Ke Chaur) was echoed 
by a number of others. 
 
Attending meetings is one issue; the level and quality of participation in such meetings 
is another
176
. Comments from different sources suggest that community members in 
general, and women in particular, were not participating to a great extent
177
. A CD staff 
involved with the project stated that, while women were attending meetings more than 
they used to and the level of their participation in committee meetings had increased, 
they still participated to a lesser degree compared with men: 
 
Before we had meetings, women were very quiet. Mostly men answered. Now it’s 
changing. Before only men joined. Now it’s almost equal number of participants. 
[interviewer: do they participate willingly?] Yes. In some areas women mostly 
participate, some areas mostly men. But can say overall women not in leadership, 
they just have some strength […] Even though women participate more in the 
meeting but men also still dominate. (interview) 
 
So while women were participating in the project, their involvement was gendered. 
Still, OGB claimed women’s participation led to increases in their decision making. To 
some degree, the Gender Impact Assessment supported this. For example, Siem, from 
Bantey Slek, stated that “before I could not made any decision because my living 
condition is terrible. Now I become VCDM, I am considering deeper before I do 
something and can make decision” (FGD), which was a sentiment echoed by a number 
of others. A number of male VCDM members also spoke of changes in decision making 
with their lives, mainly in reference to consulting women more. For example, Samkol 
from the Bantey Slek VCDM stated that, “Before doing some things, I did not discuss 
with my wife, now discuss” (FGD).  
 
A number of male and female VCDM members claimed that decisions were made 
jointly (for similar claims, see Harrison, 1997: 73) and after discussion. What is clear is 
that discussing decisions, making joint decisions and decision-making control were 
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 O’Leary and Meas (2001: 42) found that, among Cambodian development practitioners, “The common 
perception is that participation is necessary to make the project successful but often what is considered is 
the number and presence of people rather than their active involvement in making decisions”.  
177
 O’Leary and Meas (2001) found a similar situation when observing participation in village meetings. 
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often confused. For example, Sav stated that “all discussion are discussed within the 
family” but went on to say “I explain to my wife so she understands, and I also give 
space to my wife to be fully involved in decision making” (FGD, Sang Ke Chaur). 
Menh, from the same committee, was clearer: “Every small or big decisions are 
discussed together, before no. Large purchase we discuss together, but men make final 
decisions” (FGD). This was reiterated by others: increases in women’s decision making 
was largely confined to “small decisions” and even when decisions concerned the 
household, the domain of women with in the gender division of labour, this was still the 
purview of men. “All decisions are made by me and husband together. Because my 
husband who earns money, I decide only the thing related to the household, big thing 
must ask permission from my husband”, says one VCDM member (FGD, Bantey Slek). 
 
OGB’s claims of increased women’s participation through the VCDMs were 
substantiated by community members and women themselves; their involvement in the 
public sphere should not be underestimated. According to CD staff member, “now 
women can participate in big ceremonies such as inaugurating the safe area. They were 
very happy to attend because wouldn’t attend before” (Interview. Im Ching, 2006). Yet, 
beyond their formal designated positions on the VCDM, female members’ descriptions 
of their activities generally followed defined gender roles. For example, a number of 
community members observed that women generally invited people to come to 
meetings while men “write down notes, people’s requests” as Sik said (interview, 
Bantey Slek). Also, female members’ activities were closer to the village while male 
members purchased trees, for example, and were the ones involved in rescuing 
community members (Chu’un, FGD, Sang Ke Chaur). 
 
That changes were mediated by dominant gender divisions of labour and social relations 
is not so surprising. Attending meetings in public spaces, even if representing token 
participation, can be seen as initial confidence building steps to “empowerment”. Still 
the transformation of gender roles is a long and complex process, perhaps requiring 
other strategies more attentive to social transformation than the project introduced 
(Clarke and Oswald, 2010; Cornwall and Edwards, 2010). What is more interesting is 
what compelled project proponents to make such claims and cloak them in the GAD 
discourse. I have already described the link between project-sponsored gender training, 
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aims to increase women’s confidence and the reproduction of project success (Chapter 
8). This suggests women’s involvement in the project served another purpose, other 
than addressing their needs and interests. 
 
A related explanation possibly lies in the so-called “shift” between WID and GAD, 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 7. While OGB in Cambodia claimed to have adopted a 
gender perspective and mainstreamed gender, the analysis of women’s participation 
suggests that this was mediated by the gender division of labour and the status quo left 
intact, signalling an integrationist understanding of gender mainstreaming (Jahan, 
1995). Why does the notion of “integration” stubbornly remain whilst ideas of social 
transformation remain as rhetoric? One reason is the relative level of difficulty. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, integrating women in already existing development processes is 
a relatively easier proposition than integrating “gender” in such processes or even 
transforming them. So was this just a matter of poor transition from one conceptual 
framework to another or does the integration of women in dominant development 
paradigms with the concurrent adoption of language serve another purpose? I explore 
these questions by looking at what the outcomes for women were. 
 
OGB in Cambodia’s claims concerning increased confidence among women were 
reiterated during the Gender Impact Assessment, as suggested in Chapter 8. It stated 
that the project empowered women, particularly in terms of increased female VCDM 
members’ confidence, especially to speak178. Findings from the assessment confirmed 
this. Female VCDM members, especially the chairs, uniformly stated that they had 
experienced increased confidence, gained knowledge and been able to take action, such 
as helping fellow community members and solving conflicts. What was most common 
was a stated sense of being braver to speak in public and of having earned greater 
respect and recognition from community members. Siem’s comments were typical 
among female VCDM members: “The first time as VCDM chair I sweat, couldn’t speak 
out but I tried and now I am brave and can work for the community” (FGD, Bantey 
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 O’Leary and Meas (2001: 37) state that, while their research on Cambodian development workers 
showed a lack of clarity on what empowerment means, “most commonly, empowerment was described in 
terms of people ‘daring to speak, but there was little clarity regarding strategies to promote empowerment 
or what exactly people are being empowered to do – or speak about [...] There is strong assumption by 
practitioners that the physical presence of people in the activity means that they are empowered. 
Generally empowerment is perceived to be restricted to project management of the NGOs activities”. 
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Slek). This ability is a valid indicator of newfound voice, particular when considering 
the limited exposure rural Cambodians have to people from outside the village (Tarr, 
1994). It can also been seen as providing women with an increased profile and respect. 
Chruy, a female VCDM co-member, observation of “husband of VCDM leader [who 
now] appreciated her that she can now speak out in front of the community” (FGD) was 
noted by others.  
 
Still, these assertions need to be understood within the broader context of the project. 
First, women’s participation and increased self-confidence came at the price of an 
increased workload. Interviews with VCDM members revealed that their participation 
increased their overall workload by adding to their work in the household, as one 
woman VCDM member, in Sang Ke Chaur, of a number stated (FGD): 
 
[My tasks have] increased 10 times, before did only family [work]. Now we give 
water, visit house-to-house, clean toilet, take care of giant jar. Not much rest time 
because do community and my family works […] I'm so busy, wake up, boil 
water, prepare food, pack lunch, go to field, bathe, cook, prepare bed. Children 
[are] grown.  
 
None of the women who experienced an increased workload expressed regret, however. 
For some, it was accompanied by improved living conditions, such as having more to 
eat or less debt. For others, their labour was in service of the community, even if this 
meant having to shoulder much of the responsibility
179
. One example was Ravy, an 
elderly committee chair in Anchang village. She could not convince other committee 
members to accompany her to the district centre, a three-hour boat trip away, which 
meant staying overnight, to obtain building materials for the project. It was harvesting 
season and other members, particularly men, were busy. However, the materials had to 
be delivered in time for construction to begin before the rainy season. Sokha Cheat, a 
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 The enrolment of women’s labour in service of the community is not unique to the CBDM project.  
For example, during the 1980s and donor-imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 
community committees run by women “volunteers” provided social services, such as day care and 
supplementary feeding programmes, in the absence of government programmes that were eliminated as 
part of SAPs (Moser, 1993).  The difference is that women’s labour was enrolled by the CBDM project 
under the guise of increasing their participation and empowering them, whereas SAPs made no such 
presumptions but rather aimed to make development more efficient by tapping into previously 
underutilised resources offered by women (ibid).   
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GIA team member, was upset that the chair not only had to make this arduous trip 
herself but also by the way CD staff treated her. She was made to wait all day in their 
offices until the materials were ready (field notes). 
 
Increases in women’s participation also need to be understood in relation to changes in 
productive roles and who has access to the benefits of increased income. There was a 
financial incentive for VCDM members and their families, the value of which should 
not be underestimated, given the impoverished context in which the project was taking 
place
180
. A CD staff member commented that “husbands help at home, otherwise 
impossible for her to come. Spouses support each other. She makes money from per 
diems, so husband sees her generating income [and supports her participation in the 
project]” (Interview. 2006). Interviews with men confirmed an appreciation for 
increased women’s income generation capacities. The following comments by Py and 
Sokha, who attended gender training and subsequently become gender focal points
181
 
for the community, are illustrative. 
 
Women see their work equal to men’s. They didn’t value their work before, now 
they do. They have access to training, knowledge of hygiene. Now she can work, 
she has the same rights […] Men say that women can do anything so men just stay 
at home” (Py, FGD, Sang Ke Chaur). 
 
Still, while such support represents an appreciation for women to take on productive 
work and financially contribute to the family, it was also seen as reducing men’s 
workload and increasing their leisure time, which stands in contrast to women’s 
workload increasing and less leisure time. This observation of increased workload for 
women from engaging in income generation activities is not unique to the CBDM 
project and one that has been made since the WID era (Mayoux, 1995, Moser, 1993). 
What it does reinforce is the idea that while women had access to particular resources 
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 These per diems were different than previously mentioned: these concerned VCDM travel outside the 
village for project-related activities such as annual retreats and training which often were held in resort 
towns in distant provinces. The per diems mentioned previously were for community beneficiaries to 
attend meetings outside their village but within the province.   
181
 Gender focal points are community members who have attended gender training and are then 
appointed to share what they learned with others. 
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project resources, they did not always have a say in controlling them or the benefits 
from increased access.  
 
According to some female VCDM members, increased community roles were 
accompanied, in some cases, by more support from husbands. Sman stated that “Now 
my husband helps, picks vegetables […] Now we are helping each other, we’re used to 
it.” (FGD, Sang Ke Chaur). Male VCDM members also said they had experienced 
changes in their household roles. Some helped more at home: “After [the project] 
training I help my wife. If we help each other we eat quickly […] Before men and 
women divided their tasks, now when I return from the rice field or community work, I 
help my wife with cooking, carry water and look after children,” said Hy of the Sang Ke 
Chaur committee (FGD and interview). Still, similar to increased decision making, the 
change in the division of labour was selective and sometimes left to men’s discretion, 
which they could exercise. Some husbands were said to be taking a greater share of such 
duties, but mainly when their wives were busy with community work. As Sim of the Ke 
Chaur VCDM stated, her husband “agreed with me to work as VCDM members, he 
shares with me to take care of children when I go to work in community” (FGD). When 
men were busy harvesting, Ravy, mentioned previously, was left to arrange the 
transportation of supplies on her own. In other cases, claims by male beneficiaries 
seemed to be for the benefit for the assessment (for a similar observation, see Harrison, 
1996), as illustrated with the previous example of the VCDM member claiming he 
cooked and cleaned when his wife attended meetings. 
 
Moreover, women VCDM members were facing a number of constraints, including 
increased dependency owing to illiteracy, both in terms of how they perceived 
themselves and how they were perceived by others about being illiterate, particularly 
illiterate women. In rural Cambodia, not only was literacy low (71%), but also there was 
a wide gender gap: 83% for men and 62% for women (NIS, 2004). In the case of the 
project, all female committee members were illiterate, whereas most of the men were 
not. For OGB, that female committee members were illiterate only underscored the 
project’s claims of success in promoting women: even illiterate women could serve on 
committees and lead them (Internal documents. OGB, 2006a; Joint Oxfams Disaster 
Management Team, 2005; OGB, 2006b).  
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In interviews, VCDM members consistently cited illiteracy as a limitation to performing 
their duties as members and influencing how they felt about themselves. Tola’s 
comment, “I’m like blind” (FGD, Sang Ke Chaur) conveyed the sentiment shared by 
others about not being able to read or write. In particular, it affected their ability to 
access resources and benefits offered by the project. As the chair of the same committee 
said, Sman could remember only 20% of her training because she was illiterate and that 
she would feel more confident if she was literate (field notes). While illiterate men also 
said they lacked self-esteem, women who were illiterate were more marginalised in the 
community and seen negatively, even if they had achieved a certain level of status due 
to the project. A male VCDM member, Chu’un, commented that  
 
Women had less work in early 90s. Only did washing, cooking, collecting 
vegetables. Since development she can go to training, work and [get] food ready 
when husband comes back. Women join the committee. They educate us on good 
hygiene. They mobilise us to do agriculture. But she’s not in society because she 
is illiterate (FGD, Sang Ke Chaur, my emphasis). 
 
Similarly, some male community members in Sang Ke Chaur felt that, while the VCDM 
chair (Sman) was a good leader, she was ultimately constrained by her illiteracy because 
she was limited in what she could remember and therefore convey. According the 
gender focal point, the VCDM chair attended training but couldn’t remember anything 
from it (field notes), despite her saying above that she recalled 20%. Conversely, those 
who could write – male deputies or clerks – were recognised for being literate and 
accorded more status. Samarl stated that the “clerk has more burden because he reads 
and writes, so he does everything” (FGD, Bantey Slek). Horn, from the same 
community, concurred. 
 
The combination of being illiterate and being in a position of responsibility ironically 
can create more dependency. OGB project staff and community members were keen to 
share the fact that husbands of VCDM leaders as well as male clerks were willing to 
support illiterate leaders by reading, taking notes and writing letters. While certainly 
admirable and possibly an indication of shifting social relations of gender, this also 
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meant women were again dependent on men. Sary of the Anchang committee stated that 
“Yes it’s difficult that I am illiterate [...] I will go to village chief, commune chair, clerk 
or deputy to write a letter” (FGD): all these positions are usually occupied by men. The 
leader of the Bantey Slek committee, Siem, had to be more cautious. She asked her 
children to verify what her husband had read on her behalf, “especially when he does 
not read aloud” (FGD). Those who were not numerate asked male committee clerks to 
report on financial aspects (Interview. Hem).  
 
Community members and VCDM members as well as village authorities and CD staff 
consistently reported a reduction in domestic violence in all three communities, in terms 
of both the severity of the offences – for example no more physical violence but still 
verbal – and the frequency. All communities reported that domestic violence remained, 
though. Chu’un said domestic violence had reduced by 70% (FGD, Sang Ke Chaur); 
Kheng in a different village coincidentally said that 30% remained. When asked how 
they knew, most claimed that it was easy to tell if there was still violence in a family. 
Houses are located close to each other so neighbours can hear if there is violence
182
. 
 
Different reasons were provided for the decrease in domestic violence, and these echoed 
OGB’s explanations. A common one was better living conditions as a result of 
improved physical security, livelihoods and food security, as reported by Kheng (FGD, 
Anchang) “Domestic violence is not much. Problem is poverty. Men get angry when 
they come home and there’s no rice to eat. We are so poor, we try”. Beneficiaries also 
reported “being educated” and having more “knowledge” of domestic violence as 
another reason for its reduction. It was difficult to determine what specific knowledge 
had been attained, except that domestic violence is against the law and women have 
human rights. Much of this knowledge came from project training as well as the 
VCDMs, although some community members said that radio and TV as well as 
government initiatives were also sources of information. Improved living conditions and 
increased knowledge were also linked to decreases in drinking among men which was 
said to be another reason for decreases in violence: 
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 The Gender Impact Assessment did not employ any specific methods to measure the incidence of 
domestic violence understanding that this is an extremely difficult process (Pickup, 2001) and Oxfam GB 
in Cambodia did not have any baseline data. 
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Changing a lot because have security. People feel secure when house is secure. 
I'm not so terrible. Used to drink but not anymore because disease therefore can’t 
drink. Friend used to come invite to have drink. I used to do violence after 
drinking. But after Ankar
183
 came and educate me, I stopped. I don’t fight even if 
she does violence against me. I let her win. (Khim, FGD, Anchang)  
 
Another main change was the way men and women behaved towards each other. While 
greater respect was noted by some as one change, a common behaviour change 
mentioned by a number of interviewees was how men and women treated each other: 
“Before my husband and I had violence, now we respect each other” (Ses, FGD, Sang 
Ke Chaur). For men, the shame that domestic violence brings to the family was a 
motivating factor, as Bopha (FGD, Anchang) says “Before, my husband beat me, now 
he has stopped because the children are growing up and he is old and shamed now”, 
which was echoed by a few others.  
 
For the most part, however, reductions in domestic violence were attributed to wives 
being less angry and behaving more nicely to husbands. Sman (Interview, Sang Ke 
Chaur) states that “The relationship between men and women has changed, and violence 
was reduced because VCDM members help and educated women to know how to 
advise their husband, to use sweet word”. That the VCDMs and the CBDM project were 
credited with inspiring men and women to change their ways was echoed by a number 
of project participants who mainly cited their counselling and education work conducted 
with villagers about domestic violence and human rights. Siem, VCDM chief from Sang 
Ke Chaur, described how she counselled couples and the messages she gave to men and 
women, which was characteristic of the overall approach to domestic violence by 
VCDMs: to avoid violence men should show their love and women should respect their 
husbands, not antagonize them and do not fight
184
.  
  
                                                 
183
 Ankar is the Khmer word for “organisation” and is commonly used to refer to NGOs. Unfortunately, it 
is also the name that was used to refer to the Khmer Rouge, including by the regime itself. 
184
 Other researchers have come across similar approaches being used by those who mediate incidents of 
domestic violence in Cambodia. See Giles (2004), Lim (2009), Luco (2002) and Surtees (2003). 
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People run to me about domestic violence. I counsel them. Tell them not to be 
rough. With wife, [I tell them to] speak softly […] In domestic violence, [I] tell 
men that women and men have equal right, you should support each other, love 
your wife and children. If you continue, means you don’t love your them […for 
women I tell them] don’t speak loud to men, don’t fight back […] Use sweet 
word, use bad word is not good women when he comes back from work. If he 
does something wrong, just educate him. Not question of good or bad word. 
(FGD)  
 
Such messages were intertwined with those relating to power over the beneficiaries 
invested in VCDM members by the project. Siem, who was the only VCDM member to 
articulate her motivation is this way, stated that “We tell that if they do violence we’ll 
take everything back. No contract. We have agreement” (FGD). Her motivation was 
concerned with woman’s rights but also her fulfilling her obligations to the project and 
Oxfam, the only real sources of social welfare in the project villages. She stated that the 
violence “condition” was “[…] never enacted because no violence. What will I do if 
domestic violence? Ankar will blame me that I am not managing well, how will I 
respond to Ankar?” (FGD). 
 
Although the condition had never been enacted, it carried weight, at least among those 
few beneficiaries who could recall it. Sokha, quoted previously as saying that domestic 
violence had decreased since his wife had attended gender training, recalled the 
“agreement” said “Don't do violence or will lose boat. Was told by my daughter […] I 
asked if they were serious about domestic violence. They said yes but don’t believe 
them, think just a warning” (FGD, Sang Ke Chaur). Vannsin , however, suggests some 
beneficiaries did take the condition seriously and seemingly understood the gravity of 
the clause and its implications as project beneficiaries: “Domestic violence is reduced. 
There was domestic violence, now don’t see much. Only verbal violence. Question of 
serious or not serious [...] because the law, those against law will be punished. If you 
know law and commit violence [...] you’ll lose property” (FGD, Bantey Slek). 
 
While the Gender Impact Assessment validated many of the purported achievements of 
the project, these need to be understood within the social context of the communities in 
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question. Women’s increased participation relied “heavily on the elasticity of women’s 
labour in both their reproductive and community managing roles” (Moser, 1993: 73). 
Increased decision making and empowerment were limited by men’s discretionary 
power as well as the very real constraints faced by women that OGB in Cambodia, at 
least in the case of illiteracy, did not address because it fell outside their remit. When 
asked if OGB had considered offering literacy classes, Lay Sokroeun, OGB project 
staff, said they had previously held such classes in neighbouring villages but did not any 
more because OGB no longer worked in education (field notes)
185
. This was despite Lay 
Sokroeun identifying women’s literacy as a strategic need for women in the proposal for 
the first year of the project (Internal document. OGB, 2003). 
 
The point of the examples of illiteracy and how domestic violence was addressed is to 
highlight the need to understand projects within the wider context relations of aid and 
Aidland, which is the focus on the next section. 
 
VCDM MEMBERS AS BROKERS AND TRANSLATORS 
As previously stated, OGB in Cambodia viewed the VCDMs as key mechanisms for 
enabling community participation in the project. Moreover, they were envisioned as 
future community structures to promote villagers’ rights. While NGO fieldworkers are 
usually the ones at the interface between development projects and those who are 
supposed to benefit (Harrison, 1997), in the case of the CBDM project they were not 
present in communities on a permanent basis. OGB required interlocutors 
(Soontornwong, 1996): brokers, who mediate between development funders and 
recipients, and translators, who work to enrol diverse interests (Long, 1992). According 
to de Sardan (2005: 173), “brokers represent the local social bearers of a project, those 
situated at the interface between the target population and the development institution, 
those who are supposed to represent the local population (or to express their ‘needs’), 
the interlocutors of support and financial aid structures”.  
 
                                                 
185
 Until 2006, Oxfam was actively engaged in educational projects in Cambodia, but it withdrew from 
this area in an effort to focus its country programme.  The organisation decided that it no longer offered a 
comparative advantage as there were many other organisations with more expertise in education. Im’s 
comments echoed O’Leary and Meas’ (2001) finding on Cambodian NGO staff being “project oriented” 
and unable to consider options outside the confines of project documents. 
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I suggest that, within the CBDM project, VCDM members acted as “brokers” – as 
management boards in service of the project – not as “incipient CBOs” as claimed by 
project evaluators (Internal report. Rowe and Menh Navy, 2005: 33)
186
. For example, 
one of their main roles was to disseminate information members gained from project 
training. As Sarom, a male VCDM member from Anchang, suggests, their role was 
limited to when the project needed their help. “We only initiate [meetings] if there is 
information to share. Have to inform [village] chief. If not, can’t have meeting” (FGD). 
In relation to this, another VCDM role was reporting when there is a need. For example, 
the role of the chair was “is to visit people and report and, during flooding season, plead 
for help” (Interview. Kheng, a male beneficiary, Anchang). The other reporting function 
related to when there were transgressions. Sarom states “If someone sells boat, don’t 
know what we'll do but will inform Ankar. Can’t stop people” (FGD, Anchang).  
 
These comments also suggest that the VCDMs operated in the lower echelons of the 
project’s web of relations (Eyben, 2006), dependent on both CD and OGB, as their 
reporting role suggests. Sarom had to seek permission from the village chief to hold 
meetings, and the reporting function was upwards to CD. In another example, during the 
2005 flooding season, as included in an OGB report, committee members reported 
“immediately to CD and Oxfam about the damages” who, in turn, undertook a damage 
assessment and reported to the commune council, which resulted in the release of 
emergency food support from provincial military officers (Internal report. OGB, 2006d: 
27). It was not the VCDM that undertook the assessment or liaised with local 
authorities, but rather the project sponsors
187
. 
 
Still, as brokers, VCDMs became the new “patrons” (Soontornwong, 1996, Vijghen and 
Ly Sareoun, 1996b, Vijghen and Ly Sareoun, 1996a) within the context of village-level 
power dynamics. At the interface between beneficiaries and OGB, beneficiaries were 
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 This is not a unique observation in the Cambodian context. For example, Conway (1999) found village 
development committees (VDCs) to be functioning primarily, at the behest of aid organisations, as a 
vehicle for organising villagers for meetings, communicating with outsiders and reporting to the NGO. 
Unlike my research findings, however, Conway found the VDCs he researched to be generally inactive, 
lacking initiative and incentive. See also O’Leary and Meas Nee (2001: 17) for the advantages of village 
committees for NGOs in expediting project implementation. 
187
 This is an example of how “Role reversals, as advocated in PRA [participatory rural appraisal] for 
example, are typical of many rituals and can act to confirm rather than challenge the status quo. Thus 
ideologies expressed in the ritual of projects legitimize the power of aid-givers without posing a real 
threat to the existing social order” (Crew and Harrison, 1998: 192). 
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dependent on them. Although positioned differently and relatively subordinate to OGB 
and CD, they did have some authority
188
. For example, they had discretionary decision-
making powers in relation to who received project assets – which included themselves. 
For instance, while the majority of project beneficiaries participating in the Gender 
Impact Assessment expressed gratitude for the VCDMs’ efforts and admiration for their 
hard work, four community members from Bantey Slek were particularly critical. They 
suggested that those who fit the criteria and should have received project assets didn’t: 
“People who should get, didn’t. For example, old and infirm don’t have” (FGD, Bantey 
Slek). Also: “I didn’t get anything even though I have 7 kids” (FGD, Bantey Slek). 
They also accused committee members of benefiting more than others and not following 
their own criteria, particularly in terms of who received project inputs and how they 
needed to be used. One commented that “ “VCDM doesn’t use giant jar. Family of three 
don’t use jar or latrine. Five committee members got everything. Not jealous, they 
worked hard, went to training […] No one asked us how we feel. No one comes to 
people’s houses” (Vassin. FGD, Bantey Slek).   
 
This authority was also manifested in the VCDMs’ policing role, which facilitated their 
functions as translators. Ses, a beneficiary who said the VCDM operated well, also 
confirmed the influence that they yielded: “committee comes to remind us to fill water 
filter. If don't, causes us trouble […] If we don’t do what they say, they’ll blame us in 
public” (Interview, Sang Ke Chaur). Through public shaming, VCDM members were 
able to enrol beneficiaries to toe the line. Similarly, their role in mediating in cases of 
domestic violence was partially concerned with ensuring beneficiaries fell into line and 
followed project dictates. In other words, VCDMs became an extension of “the line”, a 
term as I explained in Chapter 4 that described staff relations within OGB. 
 
Meanwhile, members of the VCDMs were not just pawns of development but also 
social actors and one strategic group in the web of relations of aid. They had varied 
motivations for volunteering for the community. As stated previously, they dedicated 
considerable time and energy to the task and they also benefited directly. There were 
financial incentives, in the form of per diems to attend meetings outside the village. 
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 This is similar to Mosse’s (2005: 114) observation of a project in India where jankars (village 
representatives) became the project’s field-level staff, “mediating relationships with staff and filtering 
benefits within their own villages. They monitored and supervised physical works [...] with the power to 
assess work and sanction payment.”  
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They attained “symbolic capital” through the increased status that their positions 
conferred and the opportunities the project provided, such as through travel outside of 
the village to seaside resorts in Cambodia for “annual project reviews”. In some cases, 
this status was enhanced by the fact that the VCDM chair was married to the village 
chief. For example, VCDM meetings were generally held at the chair’s house, which 
sometimes meant the village chief’s house, as the VCDM chair was, in at least one case, 
the spouse of the chief
189
. This constrained community participation. As one community 
member commented, “Always to chief’s house. Meetings at chief’s house. Don’t dare 
speak at meetings because it’s chief’s house” (Nget, FGD, Bantey Slek).  
 
VCDM members’ status as new patrons was ensured by maintaining relations with CD 
and thereby OGB in Cambodia, who represented their own patrons. And it was these 
relations with which they were primary concerned. For example, the chair of the 
Anchang VCDM states of her rationale to stop illegal fishing, “[I] won’t allow people to 
use boats for illegal fishing because fishing authorities will see it’s an NGO boat […] 
Ankar will get in trouble. Will report to CD if people misuse boat” (interview)190. 
Similar were concerns expressed by Siem if domestic violence occurred, mentioned 
above. These instances should be seen as part of the VCDM’s role as translators and 
enrolling beneficiaries in service of the project. The VCDM chair’s reference to OGB’s 
logo suggests preventing OGB, because its logo was on all project assets provided to the 
communities, from being associated with “illegal” activity. As O’Leary and Meas 
(2001: 94) observe, “the project committees [...] established to manage the project 
activities are almost always held accountable to the NGO who comes to monitor and 
check their activities, rather than to people intended to benefit from the project”. Their 
position as patrons was also secured through their role as translators: the functions of 
reporting, policing and mediation in cases of domestic violence were concerned with 
enrolling beneficiaries in service of the project.  
 
                                                 
189
 The Gender Impact Assessment findings raised some question as to how the VCDM members were 
elected, despite Oxfam’s contention of being freely elected committee members. For example the VCDM 
deputy in Anchar was appointed by the deputy village chief, her husband, after the first nominee declined 
the appointment.  
190
 “Illegal” fishing is a complicated and contentious issue in Cambodia (see, for example, Sneddon, 
2007), one which this thesis cannot do justice to. Suffice it to say, fishing is one of the largest industries 
in Cambodia, providing many people with a livelihood. However, commercial fishing enterprises are 
awarded fishing lot “concessions” that deprive subsistence and/or household-based fishers of their 
livelihoods (Ballard, 2007). 
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As brokers and translators, their role was critical to the project and was self-
perpetuating. For example, undertaking the Gender Impact Assessment reinforced the 
status of the VCDM chair position. The chairs also benefited financially, as they were 
paid for our room and board. I recall feeling uncomfortable that we ate, slept, held team 
meetings and conducted many interviews at chairs’ houses: the presence of visitors and 
a foreigner only served to enhance the status of VCDM chairs (field notes). But to do 
otherwise
191
 would have been a snub to the chairs, thereby undermining their authority 
and making both the project and the impact assessment difficult, as both OGB and the 
assessment team needed the support and cooperation of these actors. In other words, 
acquiescing to village-level power dynamics, thereby reinforcing them, was needed to 
undertake the project. 
 
Jacobson (2008: 6-7) states that “power in the Cambodian context rests upon a complex 
network of social relationships [where] the conditions for political power are 
determined by other pre-existing power relations”. VCDM members were positioned as 
patrons of and brokers for project beneficiaries, as well as acting as “project 
management boards” in service of OGB, a position that was ensured as long as they 
assured compliance with project rules. As they performed their duties in this regard, 
what were the extant power relations and to what degree do these determine power 
within the development context? In what sense and to what degree did VCDM members 
draw on pre-existing ideas, namely, patronage
192
 (Mosse, 2005b), in their role as 
brokers and translators? What is to be made of their interpretations?  
 
These are complicated questions to answer. Patronage is said to permeate all aspects of 
aid relations in Cambodia, reflecting a wider system of hierarchy and patronage in 
Khmer society
193
. The lens of patronage relations has also been used to document how 
village development committees (VDCs) have become the new patrons (Soontornwong, 
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 This would entail staying at another community member’s house as commercial accommodation is 
unavailable in these villages. 
192
 I specifically use the term “patronage”, as opposed to “patron-client”, to emphasize a type of relation 
not a specific linear, fixed, clearly-defined relationship, as characterized in proto-type notions (Scott, 
1972). 
193
 Cambodian NGOs themselves are noted for internal hierarchical structures dominated by patron–client 
relations (Richardson, 2001, cited by O’Leary, 2006). Similarly, patronising perspectives are said to be 
held by Cambodian development workers, particularly in reference to rural communities. O’Leary (ibid: 
103) indicates, but does not explore, how international NGOs are hierarchies, as are their relations with 
Cambodian NGOs. 
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1996), acting as brokers as a result of their monopoly over contacts with external 
sources of resources. Vijghen and Ly Sareoun (1996b) provide one of the only – and 
most detailed – accounts of how “traditional” patronage relations become imbued in 
relations between VDCs and communities, based on their research of 12 villages in 
Takeo province, the site of my research. Their account starts with an assumption that 
patronage relations existed before the introduction of the VDCs, particularly during the 
UNTAC period (see Chapter 7). At this time, previous to the introduction of 
development assistance, villager chiefs acted as patrons for villagers, given their links to 
government resources. When UNTAC withdrew in 1997, such resources were no longer 
available, and village chiefs lost the basis for such patronage positions. Around this 
time, international NGOs arrived in rural communities and started VDCs to coordinate 
the distribution of resources. By commandeering committees, either directly or through 
proxies, such as through relatives chairing or participating in committees, former 
patrons were able to regain their positions as brokers of development assistance. VDCs, 
as the new patrons, could also assume and share roles that were previously the domain 
of the village chief, one of which was resolving intra-household conflict. As Vijghen 
and Ly Sareoun (1996b: Annex 1: 14) note, “Traditionally conflicts were resolved by 
the village leadership within the village. In matters relating to development activities, 
the leadership is the VDC.” At an interpersonal level, it is usually the respective patrons 
of those involved in conflict who negotiate solutions (Rasmussen, 2001, cited by Santry, 
2005: 35). 
194
 
 
What is interesting about this literature on patronage in relations of aid in Cambodia is 
that it is speculative. There are few detailed studies except for Vijghen and Ly Sareoun 
(1996b) and, but to a lesser extent, Soontornwong (1996). Second, much of the 
literature emphasises what Cambodians gain from these relations and, relatedly, they 
view them primarily as disrupting development, particularly as a potential source of 
corruption (Biddulph, 1996, Soontornwong, 1996, Vijghen and Ly Sareoun, 1996b). 
There is little attention to how such relations interact with others, such as relations of 
aid. Third, and relatedly, while this literature does point to the importance of 
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 This section is not a comprehensive treatment of Cambodian society or specific aspects of hierarchy 
and patronage but provides an overview of the key socio-cultural dimensions that are the most relevant to 
my understanding of the making of ambitious gender claims through the CBDM project. For more 
detailed descriptions, see Ledgerwood (n.d.; 1990); Marston (1997); Vijghen and Sareoun (1996a and 
1996b). 
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understanding Cambodian development practice in terms of hierarchal social relations 
where patronage is highlighted, to see these as determining is limited: this explanation’s 
“psychology is too anemic and [its] sociology too muscular” (Geertz, 1973: 202). This 
is not to dismiss the import of such relations, but rather to acknowledge their existence 
within relations of aid and other mitigating factors. 
 
In performing their duties as project management boards while ensuring the own 
positionality as brokers, VCDM members, as both patrons and clients within the aid 
web, seem to have drawn on pre-existing ideas, namely, the notions of patronage and 
village-level leaders as those who resolve conflict (Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002) in 
the case of domestic violence. This represents a mixing of ideas of those that existed 
before (patronage) and ones introduced by the project (VCDMs as proto civil society 
organisations) through a process of internalisation (Long, 1992). While this concept 
helps us to understand what happens to “external” ideas, it does not tell us how ideas 
become understood – it only describes what happens, that external factors are drawn on 
and mean different things to different people (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). 
 
Harrison’s (1997: 73) notion of the “hybridization of externally induced values” is a 
more nuanced description, in that the focus is on the result of a partial process of 
internalisation – a synthesis or integration of ideas. Her use of “values” is particularly 
relevant in the context of development, as Aidland is implicitly and explicitly 
constituted by and concerned with values (Mowles, 2008, O'Leary, 2006). The inclusion 
of values gives more weight and significance to what gets introduced and privileged as 
well as what gets hybridised. Still, the notion also stays clear of normative judgments by 
placing emphasis on the external while implying “directionality” (Purvis and Hunt, 
1993: 497): development values do have an influence. Using the term “induced” 
provides sufficient scope to acknowledge this influence without concluding too much 
attribution. Lastly, Harrison’s description of the process of “hybridization” as a process 
of giving and making of meaning
195
 is critical, as it acknowledges the interpretive nature 
of internalisation. 
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 Mosse (2005: 170) and Shutt (2006a) make similar assertions. 
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VCDM members acted within their interpretive horizons which, for the most part, were 
informed by their tacit knowledge (Haugaard, 2003). For this reason, it is difficult to 
speak of committee members’ “real” motivations. In addition, given that much of what 
informed understandings and motivations was tacit knowledge within a web of aid 
relations permeated by power dynamics, motivations were likely fluid and shifting and 
cannot be reduced to material gain (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). 
 
More importantly, the evidence from the Gender Impact Assessment suggests that 
patronage worked well in projecting the CBDM project as a model of success. VCDM 
members’ roles as brokers were facilitated by norms of relations among differently 
positioned persons. Members had two sets of patronage relations – one with OGB and 
the other with beneficiaries – in which they undertook different roles. In prioritising 
their relations with OGB, for example in favouring the protection of OGB’s reputation 
over illegal fishing, VCDM members secured their roles as clients in relation to the 
NGO (Soontornwong, 1996). This relationship also located them as project brokers, 
whereby they related to project beneficiaries through patronage relations. In order to 
maintain the former relationship, they took on the role of translators, enrolling 
beneficiaries using different strategies – one concerned policing; another related to 
benefiting particular families.  
 
CONCLUSION 
My aim in this chapter was to understand OGB in Cambodia’s claims of women’s 
participation in the project and, as a result, their empowerment. I have shown that these 
claims need to be understood within wider contexts, which are what drove the basis for 
such claims, as well as the claims themselves. One such context is that of social 
relations of gender and how outcomes for women, as a result of the project, were 
mediated by the gender division of labour, a main driver for how women were involved 
in the project and upon what basis. I suggest that women’s labour was enrolled in the 
service of the project and the potential for accessing the benefits of the project was 
constrained by their social position that, in some cases, created more dependency on 
men. Women beneficiaries had access to project resources, but they were not in control 
of them nor of the benefits derived from them. While the project was couched in terms 
of gender and development, it operated within the realm of women in development. As 
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with the creation and reproduction of the CBDM model, of which gender 
mainstreaming was a part, this adoption of gender and development discourse served to 
mobilise support, particularly among women community members. 
 
The second and related context is that of “development” and relations of aid. Under the 
auspices of enhancing women’s participation and their decision making, particular 
efforts were made to position women as senior members of the VCDMs. The 
infrastructure established by OGB in Cambodia served to co-opt women and their 
labour as part of the relations of aid, which also allowed for the making of claims of 
having established a model in community-based disaster management that was gender 
mainstreamed. In particular, the VCDMs were brokers and translators; they acted as 
mediators between project sponsors and beneficiaries in the communities, often 
performing reporting and policing functions at the critical interfaces of 
“accommodation, negotiation, selective appropriation” (Arce and Long, 2000: 3). Also 
in order to undertake their role, perceived or otherwise, brokers needed to enrol 
beneficiaries where they used the nominal authority vested in them by the project. In 
this case, the driver of women participating in the project was concerned with fulfilling 
and, to some extent, preserving their particular roles in Aidland. I suggest, however, that 
in doing so, VCDM members may have drawn in extant social relations of patronage. 
This “hybridization of externally induced values” needs, however, to be understood not 
only from the perspective of preserving VCDM’s position within relations of aid, but 
also as acting within their interpretive horizons. In this sense, contrary to literature on 
Cambodian development assistance and patronage, such acts did not disrupt 
development but rather facilitated the CBDM project and its projection as a gender 
mainstreamed success.  
   
Chapter 10 Conclusion 244 
 
Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to explore the question “What are the relationships between different 
conceptualisations and representations of the policy and practice of gender 
mainstreaming, in the case of Oxfam GB?”.  Much of the literature on gender 
mainstreaming points to a failure of policy, particularly to guide practice, which is often 
described as gaps in implementation. I drew upon anthropology of development 
literature concerning the purpose of policy and the role of strategic groups to understand 
the micro-politics of gender mainstreaming policy and practice in OGB. 
 
In this chapter I provide a summary of the policy and practice of gender mainstreaming 
in the different sites of OGB that I researched. Concluding that the understandings of 
gender and its promotion were driven by different contingencies in the respective sites, I 
explore why there were different drivers. I end this chapter with some reflection on 
gender mainstreaming in and by DNGOs. 
 
THE POLICY AND PRACTICE OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN OXFAM GB  
This thesis has concerned the relationships between different conceptualizations and 
representations of gender equality mainstreaming. I examined the case of OGB and 
focused on two sites of organisational policy and practice. Since the mid-1990s, OGB 
had increasingly adopted this strategy to promote gender equality, which by the period 
of study, 2001 to 2006, had become the dominant approach. Yet my research shows that 
how it evolved in the sites of policy and practice is different. 
 
In Oxfam House, gender mainstreaming can be traced back to when OGB established its 
strategy to implement the recently approved Gender Policy in 1993. Thereafter, gender 
mainstreaming became increasingly adopted, culminating in it becoming a corporate 
priority in 2003. As I document in Chapters 5 and 6, senior managers not only took on 
the strategy but became much more involved in driving gender policy compared to 
previous OGB managers. With this came an agenda to make gender accessible through 
a discourse of simplification that promoted particular ways of speaking about and doing 
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gender while censuring others. It also involved a shifting of how gender advisory 
support was being provided. 
 
I suggest that post-FROSI priorities facilitated the agenda to make gender accessible 
rather compelling and demonstrated how institutional history and politics were 
important drivers (Chapter 7). Senior managers in Oxfam House were keenly aware of 
the perennial challenges the organisation had been facing in making its gender policy 
effective. During the period of this research, the 2002 Gender Review was particularly 
influential in catalysing senior managers’ increased involvement in leading gender 
efforts and their determination to make a difference. In this sense, the reaction to the 
gender review also represented a further entrenchment of gender mainstreaming; it was 
an attempt to address a common finding not only of OGB but other development 
agencies more generally: the lack of leadership and management commitment.  
 
With increased involvement of senior managers, under the auspices of taking 
leadership, came particular understandings of gender equality and its promotion. I 
argued in Chapter 7, that this was informed not only by individual personal experiences 
but also perceptions of how gender was promoted in the past. Gender was said to been 
made overly complicated by previous efforts of former gender advisors who tended to 
make staff feel inadequate. This resulted in resistance among staff who were 
intimidated. Accordingly, the agenda of making gender accessible included simplifying 
gender so that is was more understandable and do-able. As I showed using the example 
of the 2003 updating of the original 1993 policy, this agenda also involved a dilution of 
gender policy away from its more radical aims. 
 
The account of gender mainstreaming in the CBDM project of OGB in Cambodia is 
also a story of organisational historical contingencies, particularly the effects of FROSI, 
and also represents an entrenchment of gender mainstreaming. However, how Oxfam 
House supported such efforts was different. Unlike previous times when GADU was 
directly and indirectly supporting country programmes (see Chapters 4 and 7), the 
influence of OGB’s headquarters during the post-FROSI period was mediated by the 
Regional Management Centre for East Asia, established during this period, and the 
subsequent adoption of a gender mainstreaming strategy and infrastructure specifically 
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for the region, including increasing the authority of the gender advisor. The 
establishment of these, as well as enforcement mechanisms, such as the non-
negotiables, can be seen as good gender mainstreaming practice. In addition, they also 
represent a deepening of gender mainstreaming in OGB more generally and, 
consequently, at the level of the Cambodian country programme. This is not to say, 
however, that in the case of the Cambodian programme that gender mainstreaming was 
only introduced during the post-FROSI era.  
 
In Chapter 8, I demonstrated that CBDM staff took on requirements such as the need to 
include gender analysis and seek the advice of gender advisors. I suggest that there is 
more to the taking on of gender advisors’ advice than either seeing such advice as 
valuable or acquiescing to OGB staff situated higher in the hierarchy of the 
organisation. I argue that there was a relationship of mutual benefit and reciprocity 
between regional gender advisors and project staff: each needed to work with the other 
to secure their place in Aidland. 
 
On the face of it, claims by OGB that the CBDM project was a gender mainstreamed 
initiative can be substantiated. Still, as I showed in Chapters 8 and 9, gender 
mainstreaming efforts were tied into the notion of the project as a success and a model 
in community-based disaster management. In the face of continual questions about these 
claims, being a gender mainstreamed project was one trope that could be claimed to 
support the claim that OGB in Cambodia had established a model. Moreover, women 
and their empowerment, such as being able to speak up, were implicated in claims of 
success and became part of the reproduction of the discourse of project success. The 
integration of women, as discussed in Chapter 9, was however in service of the project. 
Unlike the drivers of policy in Oxfam House, the drivers of the practice of gender 
mainstreaming were the demands and uncertainties of Aidland and, in the light of these, 
the maintenance of project relations and reproduction of “success”. They also concerned 
localised contingencies of social relations of gender and relations of aid. Outcomes for 
women claimed by OGB were constrained by the gender division of labour and related 
gendered differences in access and control of project resources and resulting benefits 
while women’s participation in village project committees was mediated by the roles of 
the committees as brokers and translators. 
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DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL LOCATIONS-DIFFERENT DRIVERS 
This thesis has demonstrated that policy and practice of gender mainstreaming are not 
necessarily linked; policy did not drive practice as conventional wisdom holds and 
Oxfam House senior managers tended to believe, although sometimes somewhat 
skeptically. I have suggested that different drivers are at play. Why are they different in 
the two contexts of Oxfam House, as a site of policy making, and the CBDM project, as 
a site of policy practice? 
 
The first reason for different drivers concerns a seemingly rudimentary explanation: the 
two sites occupy different organisational locations that have their own functions. This is 
not just a matter of being physically located in separate parts of the organisation, but the 
diverse institutional politics inherent in these different organisational sites of policy and 
practice. As Gould (2004b: 7) states, these entail “quite different social contexts, 
perceptions and judgments”. Policy definition is future oriented (van Ufford, 1993). For 
senior managers, the need to mobilise support as part of policy definition came from a 
perceived need to address what were seen as past failures of gender policy in order to 
move forward into the future. This required the deployment of discursive strategies in 
order to bring coherence to contested issues and the mobilising of support through the 
reproduction of policy models and narratives, such as that of the “gender police”. For 
CBDM project staff, concerned with implementation, the present was uncertain as they 
faced challenges to their claims of having a model in community-based disaster 
management.  These challenges potentially affected continued funding support. In the 
face of this uncertainty, diverse strategic groups needed to be enrolled and mobilized. 
This included the reproduction of the idea that the project was gender mainstreamed and 
a gender success. The engagement over the rhetorical devices of practice, such as 
proposals, is not so much concerned with informing implementation as with negotiating 
positions and mutually beneficial relations, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
This of course had implications for how OGB gender advisors were seen and 
positioned. Given the unfinished sense of gender history in Oxfam House and 
perceptions of what went wrong, gender advisors were managed by senior managers to 
undertake their work in particular ways that conformed with the new agenda of making 
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gender accessible. This was partly achieved by the reproduction of the myth of the 
gender police and the discourse of “acceptable” and “unacceptable” ways of doing 
gender work. In contrast, the regional gender advisor position and the overall regional 
gender infrastructure were new. This combined with the absence of “baggage” about 
gender advisors in the Cambodian OGB programme, allowed for a fresh start and, in the 
case of the CBDM project, mutual enrolment.  
 
The second explanation for different drivers is related to differences in policy space. In 
Oxfam House, authority was vested in relatively few people. I mentioned in Chapter 2 
how development bureaucracies can be seen as oligarchies and the restricted 
involvement of key senior managers in the setting of gender policy was evident from the 
case of the 2003 gender policy update and efforts to “organisationally outflank” others 
(Clegg, 1989: 220). The space of policy making was relatively narrow compared to that 
of the CBDM project where policy space involved a more diverse array of strategic 
groups, each of which brought their own interpretations of development and gender 
discourse informed by their own ideologies and imperatives. It was much more diffused 
and informal.  
 
Both sites were concerned with hierarchies imbedded in OGB’s formal structure, but 
there are differences concerning distance. Contrary to the observation that gender 
advocates are usually not close to the seats of power (Goetz, 1995), the assumption of 
leadership for gender mainstreaming by the Director and the appointment of senior 
managers as Gender Leads placed authority for gender mainstreaming in the highest 
echelons of power in OGB. With senior managers working directly with Oxfam House 
gender advisors and advocates, this put them in close proximity to each other, offering 
opportunities to closely engage and exert influence. In the case of CBDM project staff 
and regional gender advisors, while structurally and hierarchically linked, they operated 
two or three steps removed from each other with an array of intermediaries, such as the 
Country Programme Manager, who acted as intermediaries. Their ability to influence 
each other was different but not absolute, which helped establish a mutually reciprocal 
and beneficial relationship. 
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At the same time, there are differences in scale and influence related to these policy 
spaces, or as Eyben (2005: 2) writes, ‘regime’ and ‘reach’ in her reflections of multi-
sited ethnographies. The former refers to “an embodied set of practices, rules and values 
that makes an impact on people’s freedom of movement through space. A regime 
‘jumps scale’ when it is able to gain a wider reach.” While I have stated that the space 
for making policy is quite narrow and the purview of a few in Oxfam House, the regime 
with which senior managers were concerned with was quite wide: it was supposed to 
affect thousands of staff and hundreds of thousands of people benefiting from OGB. In 
such cases, a strategy of the lowest common denominator, such as making gender as 
simple as possible, is a reasonable decision to reach out to the regime
196
. In contrast, the 
reach of the regime with which the CBDM staff were concerned was quite narrow in the 
sense that while having national ambitions, the practices, rules and values of OGB in 
Cambodia affected a limited number of people in a localised setting. A broad 
generalised strategy was not needed; rather one that was specific to the context and 
relevant to existing discourses, such as the conflation of being vulnerable to floods with 
the vulnerability of women, was a viable option.  
 
A third explanation for the differences in drivers in these sites concerns their respective 
organisational histories, which I argued previously is critical in organisational 
ethnography to understand the present (Bate, 1994).  The trajectories of efforts to 
promote gender in Oxfam House and OGB in Cambodia were influenced by different 
factors to varying degrees. These included organisational changes in OGB, historical 
and political contexts external to these sites as well as internal historical dynamics 
within the respective gender infrastructures. As described in Chapter 4, OGB has a long 
and contested history around the promotion of gender equality and much of this history 
centres around Oxfam House, not least because this is the headquarters of the 
organisation but also where GADU existed at one time and, later, from where gender 
mainstreaming efforts were centred. Past battles and GADU in particular are unfinished 
business as their legacies live on, for example as in the myth of the gender police (see 
also Internal report. Murison, 2002). OGB efforts to promote gender issues have also 
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 This is a different assertion and one that Eyben (2005: 3) questions. She asks “how do we know that 
one regime has a wider reach than another one? […Is] there a risk of conflating the global head office 
[…] with the scale of the organisation as a whole and making assumptions that the practices/values/rules 
of a group of people running the head office of a ‘global organisation’ must necessarily have a wider 
reach than those sitting in Kathmandu?”  
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been externally influenced by wider events within Great Britain, feminist scholarship 
and, more recently and closer to OGB, Oxfam International.  
 
While influenced by Oxfam House, namely GADU, as well as gender and development 
advocates during the early 1990s, the evolution of the taking on of gender issues in 
OGB’s Cambodian programme was quite different. While both OGB and its Cambodian 
programme emerged out of a response to conflict, the latter however was much more 
enmeshed with the socio-cultural specificities of post-Khmer Rouge Cambodian society 
than was the Oxfam Committee was with Greece when it first started in 1942. Gender 
issues were popularized during the re-building of a nation in Cambodia where 
international influences, through the UN and OGB for example, were particularly 
strong. In other words, OGB influenced the external context that, in turn, created a 
conducive environment for the organisation to pursue gender issues. Perhaps this 
explains what appears to be a relatively less stressful and conflict ridden process of 
introducing gender and development to the OGB in Cambodia as compared to what 
GADU experienced 10 years previously, which also was a different socio-cultural 
context. There was no sense of “historical baggage” that was evident in Oxfam House. 
Rather than being driven by a perceived need to be rid of the past, work with the 
Cambodian office at times felt like working tabula rasa and little sense of the 
organisation’s history with gender issues. 
 
If acquiescence to gender advisors’ suggestions was concerned with mutually beneficial 
relations in the case of the CBDM project, why, for example, were gender advisors in 
OGB House not accorded with the same acquiescence and instead faced opposition, as 
described in Chapter 4? Gender advisors in these two sites were given different levels of 
authority. In Oxfam House, gender advisors were vested with little decision making or 
influence over senior managers and decisions. As the case of the 2006 gender policy 
update demonstrated, control over decision making was exercised by senior managers 
through overt power manifested through an observable conflict between senior 
managers and gender advisors and advocates (Lukes, 2005). Historical contexts and 
perceptions of past efforts to address gender issues informed the relative conferring of 
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authority on gender advisors, which in turn, affected their participation in and ability to 
influence change
197
. 
 
Regional gender advisors, as discussed before, were vested with authority provided by 
the regional gender mainstreaming infrastructure introduced in the post-FROSI period. 
As described in Chapter 8, this did not confer overt power but rather latent power 
(Lukes, 2005). Regional advisors and CBDM project staff were involved in a conflict 
about how to engender project proposals but were unaware of this, none the least 
because there was no observable conflict, unlike the case of other regional advisors and 
staff who engaged with the project. Rather project staff conformed with the interests of 
the regional gender advisors because they felt it was in their interests to do so. As 
explained in Chapter 8, obliging the gender advisor provided cachet and furthered the 
projection of the project as a success.  
 
Related to this explanation is the specific cultural context in which such exchanges were 
taking place. The relationships between gender advisors and project staff, as a 
manifestation of Aidland, are informed, though not determined (Jacobson, 2008: 10), by 
those “that have historically existed in society”. In a twist on Shutt’s take on conflict 
among Cambodians in development agencies, complementarity and reciprocity in 
relations of aid are not only concerned with organisational positions and identities, but 
also are part of the “inter-play between the power structures of Aidland and embedded 
power relations in Cambodia”, where power is “the product of inter-subjective power 
relations between particular individuals who react to the rules, procedures and cultures 
experienced in Aidland in varied ways” (Shutt, 2008: n.r. My emphasis).  
 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SITES 
My suggestion of the sites of policy and practice not being linked is not the same as an 
absence of relationships between sites. This is similar to Gould’s (2004b:7) observation 
about the relationship between an agency’s headquarters and their projects in some 
“rural corner”; “there would seem to be nothing of substance linking the two localities 
[…] besides the nominal translocal presence of the private aid agency”. But I disagree 
that the presence of an aid agency, or rather a development bureaucracy, is nominal. 
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 This was ironic, as one previous advisor pointed out, for they were seen, and accused in the case of the 
image of gender police, for wielding inordinate amounts of power. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, development bureaucracies are comprised of complex webs 
of relations among different strategic interest groups. In OGB jargon, they are related by 
the “line”. This is not to suggest a linear relationship of complete command and control. 
Where these sites are located along the line is significant because these relationships are 
influenced by groups’ relative positions within Aidland and the dominant aspects of a 
particular relationship. How these relationships play out has as much to do with 
structure as well as agency of strategic interest groups and how agency is exercised. For 
example, the Oxfam House-East Asia Management Centre-Cambodia programme 
relationship was dominated by flows of information concerned with organisational 
compliance that had a conforming influence but was also characterized by deployment 
of resistance strategies, such as “pushing against the beast”.  
 
The research revealed a particular contradiction concerning senior managers 
engagement with the line at all levels, although to varying degrees. On the one hand, 
they believed in the line or, in other words, the authority vested in particular 
organisational positions to decree action. This belief was not so much concerned with an 
absolute power to make pronouncements that would result in action, but a faith that 
“down the line”, subsequent managers would “fall into line” and execute decisions and 
actions accordingly. Regionalisation, while projected as a move to shift decision making 
closer to the country programmes, was also concerned with strengthening the line. For 
example, many of the decisions taken after the 2002 Gender Review were delegated to 
the RMCs.  
 
On the other hand, senior managers were also keenly aware of the limits of their ability 
to decree a decision but from different perspectives and to varying degrees. For 
example, this was evident in Oxfam House senior managers’ initial reluctance to 
assume a strong and direct approach to mainstreaming gender and their desire for a 
more accessible approach that would make mainstreaming gender desirable and 
intelligible. Similarly but conveying a much stronger sense of a disconnection, as the 
senior regional manager described in Chapter 4 contends, Oxfam House didn’t realise 
the extent to which could not actually control “the strings” and what was happening 
down the line. Part of this disconnect was due to the power managers down the line 
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could exercise. While not necessarily the authority to do so, regional and Cambodian 
senior managers “pushed back” using various selection strategies. They chose when to 
respond to policy initiatives, as in the one regional manager stating how he waits to 
determine the intent of the Oxfam House initiatives, and which initiatives they were 
going to push down the line, as in the Cambodian senior manager filtering and 
prioritizing externally driven OGB messages for Cambodian staff. Much of this was 
concerned with self-preservation and preservation of others. 
 
There was almost an engaged ambivalence when senior managers from different sites 
spoke of these contradictions and resulting tensions. Despite their scepticism, they still 
engaged with and in “the line”. For example, after acknowledging what actually 
happens in the line, senior managers talked about their role in it – sending decisions 
down and information up – as this is what they do. Why did they continue to maintain 
the myth of the line when they also understood that it was broken in various places? 
Hauggard (2003: 93), as mentioned in Chapter 8, discusses how power produces social 
order that where “Causal predictability [is] created through the reproduction of 
meaning” through structuration and conﬁrming stucturation”. The line is a structuration 
of power relations within OGB; engaging with the line are acts of conﬁrming 
stucturation. To not engage is a refutation of the hierarchical power structure upon 
which “order” in the organisation is built.  
 
This is not to say, however, that senior managers throughout the line, but particularly at 
regional and country level, were concerned only with preserving order in OGB. 
Participating in the line was also a source of power. Selectively engaging with the line, 
by fulfilling roles such as compliance and reporting up the line, gave the appearance of 
following the line and therefore staying in line. This allowed regional and country 
senior manager to then step out of line as they deemed necessary. So when regional 
managers speak of waiting or selecting what to follow, these were strategies to resist or 
“push back against the beast”. These strategies were not seen as systemic resistance by 
senior managers in Oxfam House but as anomalies to be dealt with on a case by case 
basis (see Chapter 5), which could explain the persistence of the myth of the line: 
indications of systemic resistance were misdiagnosed as anomalies not as a system of 
mutual deceit. In contrast, it is no wonder that those farthest down the line, programme 
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officers who were situated in the thin part of the “hour glass” (Chapter 4), exercised the 
least amounts of power. Still, as discussed in Chapter 8, they, as members of the web of 
relations of aid, deployed power that fell outside the formal structure of OGB but with 
which they were endowed with the establishment of gender infrastructure in the region. 
It facilitated a mutually beneficial arrangement through an exchange of rhetoric between 
project staff and regional gender advisors. 
 
MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN DNGOS  
In many ways, the experience of OGB could be seen as an example of good practice and 
contrasts with other experiences with gender mainstreaming, as described in Chapter 2. 
In fact, you can say gender was being mainstreamed and OGB efforts addressed many 
criticisms of gender mainstreaming and related recommendations of, for example, the 
Gender Review. The research offered insight into these common prescriptions, which I 
discuss next. 
 
One concerns leadership for and commitment to gender mainstreaming among senior 
managers as well as programme officers. In OGB and other development agencies, this 
is often seen as lacking. In my research, gender was not ignored but taken on by senior 
managers. But, as described in Chapter 6, with this came with particular assumptions 
and understandings about gender equality and its promotion, which I suggest resulted in 
policy dilution. The idea of promoting organisational leadership and commitment needs 
to be alongside an understanding that leadership and commitment are informed by 
fundamental ideologies about women, gender and, relatedly their promotion which may 
not be the same as those held by those encouraging leaders to be more active and 
committed. As Kabeer (1992) shows well, different understandings of gender are 
attached to different ways of approaching gender, whether concerning analysis, 
planning or its promotion. 
 
The second reflection on gender mainstreaming concerns gender advisors. The literature 
on the role and experiences of gender advisors and advocates, usually constituted as 
gender units, is replete with assertions of being marginalised, under-resourced and 
lacking decision making influence,  if not decision making authority altogether. The 
examples of this research about the interactions between regional gender advisors and 
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programme staff suggest otherwise. As described above, regional gender advisors were 
provided with a fair amount of leeway as well as access to decision making. In Chapter 
7, I discussed how senior regional managers made seeking advisory support a 
requirement and project approval conditional upon the endorsement of regional gender 
advisors. This would suggest a certain authority held by regional advisors. But in the 
same way that Byrne et al., (1996) speak of the double-edge sword of being close to 
centres of power and decision making, the elevated authority of regional gender 
advisors too was bittersweet. I’ve suggested in Chapter 8 that this facilitated a mutual 
exchange of benefits. In other words, while regional gender advisors became 
“mainstreamed”, they also became enmeshed in the relations of aid and the bargaining 
and negotiating that this entails (Wallace et al., 2006). Partly because of this, women 
VCDM members also became part of Aidland and their participation and labour were 
enrolled in service of the project under the auspices of gender mainstreaming. 
Standing’s argument (2004: 85), while referring to development bureaucracies, ring 
true: “the main myth of gender mainstreaming […] is not so much a myth of political 
transformation without politics, but more mythic relocation of the possibility of political 
transformation to an inherently non-transformatory context.”  
 
Related to this is the question posed by Evelien and Bacchi’s (2005), “What are we 
mainstreaming when we mainstream gender?”, which concerns the direction of the 
mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming, in its basic form, is supposed to be about 
integrating gender concerns in development processes, but the research throws up the 
question, what is being integrated into what? While Jahan’s (1995) typology of 
integrationist and transformatory gender mainstreaming helps answer this question to 
some degree, it does not explain the co-option of gender, as in the case of the CDBM 
project. This concern about co-optation is not that women became more vocal but that 
they were trained specifically to be more confident to speak to visitors, who played a 
critical role in the recycling of success.  
 
If gender mainstreaming is about change, what changes? My research suggests that both 
do: both the mainstream as well as notions of gender, but in different ways. In the case 
of this study, the mainstream is development bureaucracies and “development”. I have 
already discussed the intransigence of bureaucracies to change. Concerning 
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development, Gould (2004a) notes that development assistance is concerned with an 
exercise of disciplinary power, which can be both repressive and empowering, but not 
directly coercive. It is this disciplining influence that I argue brought “gender” into the 
fold of development in this research, not vice versa, as the notion of gender 
mainstreaming conveys. As I described in Chapter 9, women were brought into the 
service of the project and the reproduction of success under the auspices of gender 
mainstreaming. As I note, this should not been seen just as an domination of VCDM 
members in particular, but as acts of agency to take advantage of the various tangible 
and intangible benefits the project offered through their taking on roles as brokers and 
translators. Also, I am not suggesting a monolithic machine (Ferguson, 1994). Nor am I 
suggesting, as does Baviskar (2004b: citing Li 1999), that development is a contested 
space where power relations are transformed, in part due to resistance by different 
groups struggling for their livelihoods. Rather it is a question of gender being made 
governable where “development mainstream versions of what is gender and what has to 
be done about it has been normalized” (Mukhopadhyay, forthcoming). As 
Subrahmanian (2007: 117) contends 
 
locating ‘gender mainstreaming’ (in its composite sense as a set of strategies) 
within the broader context of development discourses, ideologies and trajectories 
is important. Equally, insisting on more specific and precise definitions of what 
these strategies are can only help to clarify the nature of transformation and 
change that is being pursued. 
 
This thesis concerned understanding the promotion of gender equality in OGB and 
focused on gender mainstreaming. In attempting to understand how policy and practice 
are linked I have analysed the specific historical, organisational and political contexts in 
which these processes take place and concluded that these factors are more influential 
on policy and practice than the relationship between the two.  
 
RESEARCHING DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE IN DEVELOPMENT NGOS 
What are the implications of this study for researching development policy and 
practice?  
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Commonly, as noted in Chapter 2, gender policies concern both an organisation’s 
programme as well as the organisation itself as “mainstreaming” came to be understood 
as both an internal and an external process. With this focus, there is an 
acknowledgement that organisations themselves are gendered (Goetz, 1997a), and that 
this is related to their outcomes, which are also gendered, reflecting an inward-outward 
looking dynamic (Rao and Kelleher, 1997, Macdonald et al., 1997). This research 
suggests that this dynamic is better described as a contestation that is not just concerned 
with delineations between internal and external, but also what these represent and how 
the dynamic is historically manifested. 
 
The defining of gender policy is Janus-faced
198
.  Depicted as two faces looking in 
opposite directions, forwards and backwards, Janus, a Roman god of gates and doors, 
stands at the transition between endings and beginnings, the past and the future.  To 
proceed into the future, one emerges from the past. Similarly gender policy is an attempt 
to establish future gender equality commitments where policies represent new 
beginnings; hope and promise, as described in Chapters 5 and 6. They, however, do not 
emerge from a vacuum but arise from historical organizational specificities that both act 
as the impetus for policy as well as inform the nature of policy.  Like Janus, “cursed and 
blessed [...] with no option other than to look in two directions at once, backwards and 
at the same time forwards, to be always coming yet going” (Arnold, 2003: 233), gender 
policy and practice are historically embedded interpretive processes fraught with Janus-
faced tensions between the past and the future. It is this embedded-ness that needs to be 
uncovered and disinterred when attempting to understand disjunctures in gender policy 
and practice. As argued in Chapter 6, while organizational imperatives to “simplify 
gender” were an attempt to escape the associations of previous efforts and entailed 
privileging the future over the past, historical struggles and their legacies remained. This 
is all the more pertinent, some 20 years after Beijing, when the gender agenda has 
moved beyond entering the mainstreaming and is concerned with what happens to it 
once there.  
 
Similarly, as noted previously, the governmentality of both Aidland and organisations 
plays a role in what happens to gender policy. To appreciate the inward-outward 
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dynamic of gender policy and practice, one needs to consider that aid concerns power, 
as anthropologists of development assert (such as Apthorpe, 1996 and Mosse, 2005). 
But to see such disciplinary power as monolithic (as does Ferguson, 1994) is not to 
recognize the flow of power (Haugaard, 2002) that allows for resistance as well as 
agency, as described in Chapter 8 and 9. This calls for a nuanced understanding of both 
structure and agency and the different ways power operates (Haugaard, 2003). It also 
calls for a more critical (self) reflection in the ways development professionals may, 
unwittingly, contribute to the reproduction of structural inequities.  
 
Methodologically, I framed this research from an organisational ethnographical 
perspective, particularly as method and paradigm (Bate, 1997), in part to be attune to 
the governmentality of Aid and development bureaucracies, as well as to allow for a 
more nuanced appreciation for the interplay between agency and structure (Yanow et 
al., 2011). But this was not unproblematic, particularly for researchers such as myself 
with previous history with the organisation in question. I have already discussed some 
of the limits and ethical challenges of my dual identity – as staff and PhD researcher 
(see Chapter 3) – but what I have not problematized is the assumed access I would have, 
and to some extent did have, due to my identify.  
 
In sum, I was granted permission to conduct my research on Oxfam by the East Asia 
Regional Management Centre, but this did not automatically allow me access to senior 
Oxfam House managers or decision-making bodies. Gaining access to Oxfam House 
was somewhat more complicated and required numerous discussions with the Oxfam 
House gender advisors about the best way forward and various attempts to convince 
Oxford-based managers. In the end, I only had limited access. What I learned about 
being an “insider-outsider” is that approval and access are two different things. 
Approval can be binary – there is approval for research or there isn’t – and this is what I 
tended to focus on. Access, even with approval, is much more of a slippery concept and 
is more of a process and a continuum. Unlike argued by Eberle and Maeder (1997: 63), 
access did not mean “full membership status”. It is the practice of contingent approval 
that needed to be constantly negotiated and, as a result, continuously posed ethical 
challenges that needed regular attention, described in Chapter 3. As Hirsch and Gellner 
(2001: 5) observe, access is not just an issue at the beginning of the research, it is 
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“something that has to be both scrutinized for the way it transforms the research and 
continuously negotiated throughout the time of fieldwork.”    
 
Similarly, my position was much more complicated than the binaries of “outsider” and 
“insider” suggest. These ideas are indeed “hypothetical extremes” that should be seen as 
part of a continuum that allows for both identities to co-exist but in different proportions 
and reference points, depending on the context and how I was perceived. For while 
these terms describe the researcher, they vary depending on different perspectives from 
how others see the researcher, which are contingent, and how the researcher views 
him/herself. In the case of Oxfam House, I was an outsider-insider. For Oxfam 
Cambodia staff, I was an insider-outsider. In negotiating access, one must be cognizant 
of how others emphasise different reference points of these dual identities, which is 
critical to reflexivity and maintaining “strong objectivity” (Harding, 1993: 72).   
 
The need to think in less rigid terms is also applicable to the idea of critical interfaces. 
Other anthropologists (such as Mosse and Lewis, 2006) have criticised the notion for its 
imposition of rigid boundaries. This was evident when studying a global organisation 
such as Oxfam that is trans-local with highly mobile staff. Interfaces I observed did not 
always coincide with geographical boundaries or organisational descriptions of 
“global”, “regional” and “country”. For example, while in a site-specific location, I was 
not limited to research about that site. In Cambodia I was also collecting data about 
Oxfam House and the RMC, as I would meet staff from these sites when they came to 
Cambodia for work; the same was the case in Bangkok, where Cambodian staff 
attended regional meetings. Of course, interfaces are not delineated by geographical or 
physical boundaries. The descriptions I use in this thesis – global, regional and country 
– also describe spheres of influence that overlap and interact. They are how Oxfam staff 
describe their remits, which are relative, dynamic and contingent of a particular time 
and space context. There is also a problem, such as discussed above in defining one’s 
“field” within multi-sited ethnography, of which interfaces to privilege. The challenge 
for researching organisations is to look beyond descriptions organisations themselves 
use but also work with them, for example in my analysis of “the line” (see Chapter 4).  
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As a global organisation, adopting a multi-sited perspective allowed for a release from 
the constraints imposed by more orthodox ethnographic notions of the field but was also 
problematic, at least in my initial conceptualisation. Similar to Hovland’s (2005) 
observation, I overly stressed the multi of multi-sited ethnography, assumed links 
between sites and underprivileged the sitedness or, multiple contexts, of these sites. 
Initially noting (when collecting data) then understanding (through interpretive writing) 
the contexts of gender policy and practice in both Oxfam House and the CBDM project 
allowed for the emergence of one of the main findings - policy does not inform practice, 
other drivers were at play – as well as a focus of critical interfaces beyond 
organizationally defined delineations.  
 
This brings us back to the issue of “scale” but in a different way than addressed by 
Eyben (2005: 2), mentioned previously, and her discussion of “regime” and “reach” in 
her reflections of multi-sited ethnographies. In writing about organisation ethnography 
and issues of scale, the relative inclusiveness or externality of how one defines one’s 
field, Jiménez (2007) provides some guidance by stating that “relations have 
consistently played a [central role] in anthropology” (ibid: xvii, citing Strathern, 1995) 
where they “need to relate to something – to be placed within some sort of scale – if 
they are to map out for us the terrain of moral and political reasons and choices wherein 
they have to make sense” (ibid: xvii). In other words, while the notion of context, as 
defined by Bate (1997), is critical to organisational ethnography, the choice of scale and 
relative inclusiveness is ultimately ad hoc, in the sense that the delineation of the (multi-
sited) field is left to the researcher. In the end, such a choice has to be intelligible to 
both the researcher and reader and sufficiently credible.        
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Oxfam’s Policy on Gender Equality (2003 Final Version) 
1. Oxfam’s mission is to work with others to overcome poverty and suffering. People 
experience poverty when they are denied the right to livelihoods, water, education and 
health, protection and security, a voice in public life, or freedom from discrimination. 
Oxfam’s definition of poverty goes beyond the purely economic to encompass 
capabilities, powerlessness and inequality. Women often have less recourse than men 
to legal recognition and protection, as well as lower access to public knowledge and 
information, and less decision-making power both within and outside the home. 
Women in many parts of the world frequently have little control over fertility, 
sexuality and marital choices. This systematic discrimination reduces women’s public 
participation, often increases their vulnerability to poverty, violence and HIV, and 
results in women representing a disproportionate percentage of the poor population of 
the world. 
2. Gender equality gives women and men the same entitlements to all aspects of human 
development, including economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights; the same 
level of respect; the same opportunities to make choices; and the same level of power 
to shape the outcomes of these choices.  
3. This policy represents our organisational commitment to gender equality. It has been 
written to help staff and volunteers ensure that our work improves the lives of both 
women and men and promotes gender equality. 
  
Principles 
4. Throughout the organisation, we will base our work on a common understanding that 
gender equality is key to overcoming poverty and suffering 
5. We will work with both women and men to address the specific ideas and beliefs that 
create and reinforce gender related poverty 
6. Women and girls will be empowered through all aspects of our programme and ways 
of working, and we will often prioritise work which specifically raises the status of 
women 
7. Our own internal practices, and ways of working, will reflect our commitment to 
gender equality 
  
Strategies for achieving gender equality  
8. A thorough understanding of the different concerns, experiences, capacities and needs 
of women and men, will shape the way we analyse, plan, implement and evaluate all 
our work  
9. We will address the policies, practices, ideas and beliefs that perpetuate gender 
inequality and prevent women and girls (and sometimes men and boys) from enjoying 
a decent livelihood, participation in public life, protection and basic services 
10. We will seek to ensure the full participation and empowerment of women in all areas 
of our work, and will promote women’s rights as human rights, particularly in the 
areas of abuse and violence 
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11. We will work with both men and women, together and separately, to have a more 
lasting impact on beliefs and behaviour. We will ensure that any work we do with men 
and men’s groups supports the promotion of gender equality 
12. Partnerships and alliances will be assessed on the basis of their commitment to gender 
equality 
13. Our campaign, advocacy and media messages, and the images we use to support these, 
will emphasise the importance of gender equality in overcoming poverty and 
suffering. Our communications will also highlight our own commitment to gender 
equality, and the essential role played by women in all aspects of development and 
humanitarian work 
14. Managers will encourage groups and forums across the organisation to share learning 
and best practice on gender equality. Gender training will also be made available to 
staff and volunteers 
15. In all our work we will demonstrate commitment to gender equality through setting 
appropriate team and individual objectives, and through allocating adequate staff and 
resources to enable us to fulfil the gender equality policy 
16. Managers of all divisions will devise and report on measurable objectives and actions 
relating to the gender equality policy; and our management, finance and human 
resource systems will facilitate and contribute to our gender work 
17. Gender awareness and understanding will be used as a criterion for recruitment and 
development of staff and volunteers 
18. Within the organisation we will pursue family friendly work practices that enable both 
men and women to participate fully in work and family life 
19. This gender policy is closely linked to Oxfam’s Equal Opportunities and Diversity 
Policies.  
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Oxfam's Gender and Development Policy (1993 Version) 
 
 GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT - OXFAM'S POLICY FOR ITS PROGRAMME 
 
1. ‘Women are half the world's population, yet they do two thirds of the worlds work, 
earn one-tenth of the world's income, and own less than one-hundredth of the world's 
property’ (UN, 1985) 
  
POVERTY AND GENDER: WHY OXFAM IS CONCERNED 
2. Oxfam's mandate is to combat poverty, distress and suffering, and to educate the 
public about the root causes of these problems. While there are some aspects of 
poverty and exploitation which are shared by women and men, many aspects are 
different. Women are poorer than men and face social and cultural discrimination on 
the grounds of sex. This affects every aspect of their life, including development. 
Oxfam must both analyse and address these differences if it is to be successful in its 
development practice. 
3. Today there is a growing awareness of women's absolute and relative poverty and 
inequality all over the world. In spite of the significant efforts of many national 
governments and at international level, the situation of women has worsened. The 
feminisation of poverty has accelerated in the last decade and further increased 
women's dependence and vulnerability.  
4. The present social and economic crisis has had devastating effects on the Third World 
poor and these have been particularly adverse on women. Cuts in public expenditure, 
coupled with discrimination in employment practices, have led to more female 
unemployment. Falling commodity prices have forced the intensification of cash 
cropping, resulting in more manual work for women without an increase in their pay. 
Structural adjustment policies, particularly cuts in subsidies on drinking water, food, 
health, education and transport, have had a disproportionate effect on women. 
Widespread armed and ethnic conflict have a gender dimension. Women and their 
children form the majority of refugees or displaced populations and the proportion of 
woman-maintained households in turbulent situations has increased. In addition, 
women in conflict situations suffer abuses such as sexual assault and other forms of 
exploitation which are not experienced by men. 
5. The growing environmental destruction has multiple repercussions for women. 
Increasingly they are unable to fulfil their responsibilities for providing fuel, wood and 
water for family needs. Urbanisation has cut women off from traditional support 
systems. Industrialization in factories with poor safety regulations has exposed women 
to hazardous substances, dangerous equipment and dangerous processes. In many 
areas of the world the spread of AIDS is particularly affecting women because of their 
role as mothers and carers and also as sufferers.  
6. Lack of understanding on the part of governments, multilateral agencies and NGOs of 
the different impact of development aid on men and women, has led, in many cases, to 
a further marginalization of women from traditional decision-making structures, 
displaced them from their economic activities and ignored their valuable knowledge 
and contribution to development. Development aid is less effective when women are 
not participating on an equal footing. 
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7. Apart from adverse macro socio-economic conditions, women and girls have to 
contend with aggression and discrimination in their own local contexts due to the 
patriarchal structure of most societies. In many regions of the world they suffer 
violence that breaches their human rights: physical abuse, rape, sexual assault, female 
infanticide, "honour killings", "dowry murder" at the hands of family members and 
other forms of aggression related to cultural customs and practices. To cite a few 
examples, discrimination is expressed in preference for male children, and in double 
standards in nutritional patterns and education.  
8. In the public sphere, religious and cultural intolerance in many societies restricts the 
movement of women and limits their control over their own lives.  
9. Women are not a homogeneous group and their lives vary depending on the place in 
which they live as well as their age, social class, ethnic origin and religion. 
Nevertheless there are some common elements which hold for most women and which 
Oxfam recognises as important to understand and to address in the development 
process: 
10. * In all societies men and women have different responsibilities for the tasks necessary 
for the survival and development of the community. However, within the existing 
division of labour, responsibility for the maintenance of human resources falls largely 
on women's shoulders. Gathering fuel and water, processing food, caring for the 
children, nursing the sick, and managing the household is heavy and time-consuming. 
This is widely seen as a woman's role, and is economically unrecognised.  
11. * Women have less access to power, wealth and resources and are less likely to own 
land or property. In most cases they have inferior status both legally and culturally. 
They have less access to education and training, and to paid employment. They are 
less likely to be represented in decision-making bodies and their voices are less likely 
to be heard. Frequently they have no control over their own bodies and fertility.  
12. * Violence against women constitutes an infringement of basic human rights, 
undermines their self-determination and their ability to participate fully in and to 
benefit from development. 
13. * Faced with many forms of discrimination, many women are challenging the 
patriarchal or male-dominated structures of their societies - either through organised 
groups or networks or through individual actions that defy the system.  
14. * Balancing the unequal power relations between men and women cannot be done in 
isolation. For the development process to be gender-fair, changes will have to take 
place in the economic, political, social and cultural spheres.  
15. Oxfam believes that unless gender-related inequalities are addressed it will not be 
possible to achieve sustainable development and alleviate poverty.  
16. In Oxfam's experience gender-related oppression varies according to context, as do 
women's opportunities for involvement in development. Therefore, Oxfam's responses 
to the above issues will be sensitive to local circumstances and respect the pace, 
capacity and strategies of local women for change. 
 
OXFAM'S WORK ON GENDER AND THE NEED FOR POLICY 
 
17. Oxfam addresses many of these problems by working towards meeting women's 
immediate and long term needs in mixed or women-only projects. Oxfam has taken 
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positive action to counterbalance gender discrimination in development and so ensure 
that its programme reaches women - the poorest and most disadvantaged in most 
communities. 
 
18. The Gender and Development Unit was created in 1985 to develop a gender 
perspective in Oxfam's work. Since then Oxfam has promoted gender training for its 
staff and partners, facilitated exchanges and provided financial support and 
accompaniment to women's groups and networks working for change. Other activities 
have included the appointment of gender experts and consultants for field research, 
evaluation and project development; discussions on gender with partners; and the 
development of criteria for programme evaluations and project appraisal. 
Documentation of Oxfam's experience in gender work through reports, manuals and 
books has contributed to the debate in the North and the South and provided platforms 
for Southern practitioners. Increasingly gender considerations are used in the 
recruitment and selection of staff. Oxfam has taken an active role in advocating 
gender-focused policy changes with bilateral and multilateral agencies and is trying to 
ensure the full integration of gender into all its lobbying and communications work. 
 
19. However, in spite of this awareness and positive action, the lack of a corporate policy 
has made it difficult to close the gap between principles and practice and to ensure an 
integration of gender into the work of different parts of the organisation. 
 
20. A corporate policy is seen as the next essential step in Oxfam's commitment to gender 
- to ensure the issues are fully integrated into its programme and management, and to 
give Oxfam a coherent and consistent framework against which objectives can be 
measured and poor performance rectified.  
 
21. Oxfam's vision and experience of gender has developed as a result of constant 
interaction between staff, project partners and other NGOs in the South and the North.  
It has been inspired by the struggles of Southern women's movements, individual men 
and women and by the real changes taking place in villages and communities where 
Oxfam works.  Because gender relations are dynamic, Oxfam's vision and policy 
cannot be static; adjustments and changes may be required over time. 
 
22. Oxfam also recognises the constraints faced by different divisions in their 
responsibility for implementation. Therefore, the policy promotes a creative look at 
ways of overcoming these constraints. 
 
23. Principles  
"Oxfam believes in the essential dignity of people and their capacity to overcome the 
problems or pressures which can crush or exploit them". Oxfam's principles apply 
across the gender divide - to allow women as well as men their essential dignity, and 
to work with women and men in its emergency and relief programmes in overcoming 
the pressures which exploit them. To achieve this, gender relations need to be 
transformed. 
24. Oxfam's focus is on gender, rather than on women, to ensure that changing women's 
status is the responsibility of both sexes. It acknowledges that development affects 
men and women differently and that it has an impact on relations between men and 
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women. A focus on gender is required to ensure that women's needs (set in the broader 
context of class, ethnicity, race and religion) do not continue to be ignored. 
25. Women are poor because their lack of material wealth is compounded by a lack of 
access to power, skills and resources. Fully integrating gender into Oxfam's 
programme should tackle the causes of women's poverty and promote justice to the 
advantage of women as well as men. Because women are in a subordinate position, 
special efforts and resources are required to promote their full and active participation 
in Oxfam's work and to make them equal partners in the fulfilment of Oxfam's 
mandate. To achieve this Oxfam will try as far as possible to give women the 
opportunity to formulate their own priorities and to work with men in addressing the 
status quo.  
 
26. Objectives  
Oxfam will work towards ensuring that its development and relief programmes will 
make the lives of women better. It is committed to: 
 
27. developing positive action to promote the full participation and empowerment of 
women in existing and future programmes so as to ensure that Oxfam's programme 
benefits men and women equally; 
28. confronting the social and ideological barriers to women's participation and 
encouraging initiatives to improve their status including basic rights; 
29. promoting independent access for women to key resources (eg land, employment), 
services and facilities;  
30. recognising and helping women exercise their rights over their bodies and protection 
from violence; 
31. ensuring all programme work in the UK/Ireland takes gender considerations into 
account and, wherever appropriate, to promoting initiatives with a gender focus. 
 
32. Strategy 
 
33. OVERSEAS PROGRAMME 
Oxfam will achieve its objectives by: 
34. ensuring that all emergency and development responses incorporate a gender 
perspective in assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation;  
35. promoting women's access to basic needs, knowledge, education, new skills, and 
actively encouraging their participation in decision-making; 
36. supporting the development of women's self confidence; strengthening women's 
organisations/groups, promoting dialogue, and networking;  
37. continuing to support and strengthen links between women's groups and organisations 
nationally and internationally to enhance mutual understanding and solidarity for 
action; 
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38. continuing to expand Oxfam's knowledge of and commitment to gender issues, 
through research, documentation, publishing, institutional learning and work on global 
themes;  
39. including a gender perspective in all Oxfam's lobbying and communications work; 
40. strengthening the lobbying of bilateral and multilateral agencies on gender issues; 
promoting advocacy work in coordination with networks and organisations in the 
North and the South including institutional support for international gender-focused 
lobbying networks; 
41. UK AND IRELAND PROGRAMME  
Through the work of the Marketing and the Trading Divisions, Oxfam will: 
42. apply gender considerations and sensitivity to all Oxfam's materials for the UK/I 
public; 
43. where appropriate, communicate the essential role played by women in all aspects of 
development. This means highlighting Oxfam's work on gender, communicating the 
contribution women give to development, and encouraging international links with 
women's groups and organisations; 
44. wherever possible, present positive images from a gender perspective by written, 
verbal and visual means, and try to counterbalance dominant and stereotyped images 
of women provided by the media and other agencies; 
  
 
45. MANAGEMENT  
Through its management and policy implementation, Oxfam will - 
46. raise issues with men and women, sensitising them to gender needs and involving them 
actively in supporting gender equality; 
47. promote the understanding and commitment of Oxfam staff to ensuring policy 
implementation through gender training of all programme staff; 
48. use gender-awareness and understanding as criteria for recruitment and selection of 
overseas and UK/I programme staff; promote women to decision-making positions at all 
levels; and strengthen commitment to Oxfam's Equal Opportunities Policy; 
49. develop guidelines and procedures for implementation and monitoring by managers in 
all relevant divisions with measurable objectives, targets and time tables; 
50. ensure that staff are given the resources for implementing policy; 
51. establish a structure for updating and monitoring the policy within agreed time frames, 
and integrate this structure into the organisational strategic plan;    
52. make information available to Oxfam's trustees and keep them regularly informed about 
the progress of implementation and monitoring of the gender policy; 
53. ensure that staff, partners and volunteers in the UK/I and overseas are aware of the 
existence of the policy by communicating it in accessible ways; 
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54. ensure that managers are responsible and accountable for the implementation of policy; 
55. set a timetable for policy implementation and ensure staff adhere to it. 
  
 AGREED BY OXFAM COUNCIL ON 16TH MAY 1993 
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Oxfam’s Gender Equality Policy Statement (2003 Draft Version) 
 
1. Oxfam GB’s belief  
We believe that all of our work should overcome poverty and suffering, and contribute to 
gender equality. We believe the power imbalance between men and women must be 
addressed in order for equality to be achieved.  
2. Who is this policy for and how should it be used? 
This corporate policy is for all Oxfam staff. It represents our organisational commitment 
to gender equality. If you work for Oxfam you are expected to understand this policy and 
apply it, and to encourage its application in all areas of work, by anyone you manage or 
are managed by.  
 Principles 
3. Throughout the organisation, we will base our work on a common understanding that 
gender equality is central to overcoming poverty and suffering.  
4. We will address gender inequality through: 
 analysing and understanding the different implications for women and men of all our 
development, humanitarian and advocacy work 
 devising strategies and systems to ensure that the different concerns, experiences and 
capacities of women and men fundamentally shape the way we analyse, plan, 
implement and evaluate all our work 
 specific programmes to overcome the many different manifestations of gender based 
discrimination which occur across the lines of gender, race, class, age, colour, 
religion, sexuality, ability and all other aspects of identity 
 ensuring that Oxfam GB’s internal practices are consistent with the above through 
continuously improving systems and ways of working across all departments 
5. Women and girls will be empowered through all aspects of Oxfam’s programme and 
ways of working.  
6. We will work with both women and men, seperately and together, to address poverty 
issues relating to gender inequality, and the ideas and beliefs that create and reinforce it. 
7. We prioritise work which specifically raises the status of women due to the systemic 
gender based oppression women face. 
8. Initiatives with men and men’s groups will be supported when they are collaborative, and 
not competitive, with programmes supporting women’s rights. 
9. In all of our work we will demonstrate commitment to gender equality through the 
allocation of adequate resources, accountability, measurable criteria and targets.  
 
Goals 
10. Humanitarian and development programmes ensure the full participation and 
empowerment of women and promote women’s rights as human rights, particularly in the 
area of protection from and elimination of abuse and violence. 
11. Humanitarian and development programmes change policies, practices, ideas and beliefs 
that perpetuate systemic gender inequality and prevent women and girls (and sometimes 
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men and boys) from enjoying a decent livelihood, public participation, protection and 
basic services. 
12. Humanitarian and development programmes encourage men to take responsibility for 
their violence and to challenge the violence of other men. 
13. Campaign, advocacy and media messages consistently convey that gender equality is 
central to overcoming poverty and suffering. 
14. Management, Finance and Human Resource systems across the organisation contribute to 
and facilitate our work on gender equality goals. 
15. Oxfam Strategies for achieving Gender Equality  
 This gender policy forms the overall framework for Divisional gender action plans, which 
are the responsibility of all divisional Managers. These plans will feed into the Corporate 
Gender Action Plan. 
 
 The Goals outlined in the Policy Statement will be achieved through broad strategies in 
four main areas: 
16. Cross-divisional organisational development 
 Managers will promote the understanding and commitment of all Oxfam staff to gender 
equality objectives, by leading cultural change and though perfomance management and 
capacity building. 
17. Gender training will be made available to all staff. 
 
 18. Gender awareness and understanding will be used as criteria for recruitment and 
development of personnel. 
19. The Gender, Equal Opportunities and Diversity Policies will be linked and Senior 
Management and HR processes and procedures will reinforce these linkages. 
20. Managers will encourage staff groups and forums across the organisation to share 
learning and best practice on gender equality objectives  
21. Oxfam managers will pursue family friendly work practices that encourage both men and 
women to participate fully in work and family life. 
22. Managers of all divisions will regularly report to SMT and CMT on gender 
mainstreaming achievements with measurable objectives, milestones and time-tables. 
23. Resources will be allocated to the achievement of gender mainstreaming and gender 
equality objectives. 
24. The Corporate Action Plan on gender will be regularly monitored, evaluated and updated. 
25. International Division - Humanitarian and Development Programmes  
26. Management, team and individual objectives will include the achievement of gender 
equality outcomes 
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27. Potential and actual partnerships and alliances will be assessed on the basis of the value 
they add to the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights. 
28. Development and Humanitarian preparedness and response teams will research and 
analyse gender relations and build understanding of gender and diversity issues into all 
stages of their work. 
29. Women will be actively involved in all programme planning 
  
30. Campaigns and Policy 
 Policy development, and knowledge of gender issues, will be developed through 
investment in research, documentation, publishing, institutional learning and work on 
global themes. 
31. A well developed, ongoing gender perspective will be integrated by all teams working on 
policy, advocacy and campaigns work. 
32. Specific advocacy on women’s rights will be pursued with external actors including 
bilateral and multilateral agencies, in coordination with global gender and development 
networks and organisations.  
33. Marketing and Trading  
 Marketing materials will routinely communicate the importance of gender equality in 
achieving lasting solutions to poverty, and the essential role played by women in all 
aspects of development and humanitarian responses. 
34. Positive images of gender equitable relationships and equity between men and women’s 
roles will be communicated by written, verbal and visual means, to counterbalance 
dominant and stereotyped images of women and men provided by the media. 
35. The role played by Oxfam GB, in collaboration with others, in overcoming poverty and 
suffering through the promotion of gender equality will be communicated and celebrated. 
36.  ‘Gender equality refers to women and men having the same entitlements to all aspects of 
human development, including economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights; the 
same level of respect for their human dignity, acknowledgment of their equal human 
capacities to make choices; the same opportunities to act on those choices and the same 
level of power to shape the outcomes of their actions’. Adapted from Marsha Freeman, 
Oxfam GB Gender Review September 2001 
 
